



Durham E-Theses

The strategic symbiosis between us Asian policy and Taiwanese nationalism

Lin, Wen-lung Laurence

How to cite:

Lin, Wen-lung Laurence (2006) *The strategic symbiosis between us Asian policy and Taiwanese nationalism*, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2889/>

Use policy

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a [link](#) is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the [full Durham E-Theses policy](#) for further details.

Abstract

THE STRATEGIC SYMBIOSIS BETWEEN US ASIAN POLICY AND TAIWANESE NATIONALISM

by Wen-lung Laurence Lin

This thesis explores the influence of US Asian policy on the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism and the role of Taiwanese nationalism in America's Asian policy. The study consists of five parts. The first part (1895-1950) introduces the source of Taiwanese nationalism and America's strategic scheme on Taiwan before 1945, and explores American options after the germination of Taiwanese nationalism. America's intention to separate Taiwan from the mainland so as to deny the island to Chinese Communists from late 1948 helped preserve inchoate Taiwanese nationalism.

The second part (1950-1970) examines how America simultaneously exploited the Chinese Nationalist regime's anti-communism and facilitated the growth of Taiwanese nationalism in the bipolarized Cold-War era. The Truman administration's separatist intention after the Korean War, US aid and American scholars' Taiwan independence theories had significant implications for the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism.

The third part (1970-1989) examines how America reconciled US-PRC rapprochement with its promotion of Taiwanese nationalism. Taiwan's democratisation evolved in the context of US political, economic and military intervention. During the transition to democratisation, secessionists turned political opposition movement into nation-building revolution.

The fourth part (1989-2000) examines how US conservatives and Taiwanese nationalists jointly promoted Taiwanization. The dynamics of democratisation, native president Lee Teng-hui's domination of political agenda, the ambience of US-Taiwan strategic realignment and the maturity of political nationalism together facilitated Taiwanization.

The fifth part (2000-present) explores how America and Taiwan establish a strategic

symbiosis for US-China strategic competition. The 9/11 Incident has little influence on the course of strategic symbiosis. The consolidation of Taiwan identity obliged the pan-blue camp to identify with Taiwan, promote political nationalism and deviate from their pro-unification ideology. The increased antagonism between Taiwanese nationalism and Chinese nationalism ossifies the symbiotic partnership between US Asian policy and Taiwanese nationalism and hinders China's rise to regional hegemony and global superpower.

THE STRATEGIC SYMBIOSIS BETWEEN US ASIAN POLICY AND TAIWANESE NATIONALISM

**A copyright of this thesis rests
with the author. No quotation
from it should be published
without his prior written consent
and information derived from it
should be acknowledged.**

By

Wen-lung Laurence Lin

A Thesis Presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of East Asian Studies, University of Durham

2006



15 MAR 2006

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	i
THE STRATEGIC SYMBIOSIS BETWEEN US ASIAN POLICY AND TAIWANESE NATIONALISM	iii
Declaration	vi
Acknowledgments	vii
Romanization and Names Convention	viii
Abbreviations	ix
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION	1
Objectives and Rationale	1
Research Methodology and Structure	12
Chapter 2: 1945-1950 ENCOUNTER AND THE GERMINATION OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM	13
Introduction	13
Pre 1945: Planting of the Seed of Taiwanese Nationalism	14
The Evolution of American Hegemony	19
The Germination of Taiwan Secessionism in 1947	25
Initial Intentions of America vis-à-vis Taiwanese Nationalism	33
Inconsistencies in US Policy	36
Summary	49
Chapter 3: 1950-1970 THEORY CONSTRUCTION AND THE GROWTH OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM	51
Introduction	51
The Resumption of Separatism since the Korean War	51
America's Separatist Strategies	56
Theories of Taiwan Independence in the Cold War Era	64
The Taiwan Independence Movement in the Early 1960s	82
Discourses of Taiwanese Nationalism	88
The Taiwan Independence Movement in the Late 1960s	93
Summary	98
Chapter 4: 1970-1989 METAMORPHOSIS AND THE POLLINATION OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM	101
Introduction	101
The Entanglement of Nationalism and Strategic Interests	101
1972 – The First Joint Communiqué	108
1978 – The Second Joint Communiqué	123
1982 – The Third Joint Communiqué	132
Partnership for the Pollination of Secessionism	139
Summary	153
Chapter 5: 1989-2000 STRATEGIC REALIGNMENT AND THE FRUITION OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM	156
Introduction	156
Lee Teng-hui's Initial Rise to Power and the US	157
The First Stage of Lee's Taiwanization and the US	161
The Second Stage of Lee's Taiwanization and the US	169
1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crises	176
Congressmen-Lee Alliance vs. Clinton's "One China"	182

Jigsaw Puzzles in the Taiwan Independence Roadmap	188
Summary	200
Chapter 6: Since 2000 STRATEGIC SYMBIOSIS AND THE DISPERSION OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM	203
Introduction	203
Chen's Initial Policies and the US	204
Strategic Symbiosis on the Basis of Taiwanization	208
The Impact of 9/11	217
The Referendum and the New Constitution.....	229
Implications of the 2004 Presidential Election	238
Summary	252
Chapter 7: CONCLUSION	254
Introduction	254
The Formation & Fortification of Strategic Symbiosis.....	254
A Historical View of the Past, the Present, and the Future	258

Declaration

Hereby I declare that this work is my own, and has not been previously submitted for a degree to this or any other university.

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published in any format, including electronic and the internet, without the author's prior written consent. All information derived from this thesis must be acknowledged appropriately.

Acknowledgments

This thesis could not have been completed without the assistance of certain institutions and individuals, and to them, as well as to other, unmentioned individuals, I express my deep gratitude and thanks. First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Michael Dillon at Durham University for all his assistance and encouragement during my research. I would like to thank the staff of the Department of East Asian Studies for their support. I was fortunate to receive a great deal of assistance from many friends and fellow-PhD candidates. In particular, I have to thank Paul Dimelow at Durham University for his help and advice. I am also grateful to Dr. Jena M. Gaines, an independent scholar in the US, for editing and proofreading my work.

I am grateful for the assistance rendered by the following libraries and their staffs: Durham University Library, the British Library's Document Supply Centre, Harry S. Truman Library, Library of Congress, and Taiwan's Central Library.

This research was made possible by financial sponsorship from the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of China in Taiwan, for which I owe great thanks.

I would like to thank my family for their unlimited patience, encouragement and support.

Romanization and Names Convention

The Chinese Pinyin system, without tone/diacritical marks, has been used as the principal romanization system in this thesis. The use of any romanization system for Chinese is politically loaded; however, given the widespread use of Chinese Pinyin throughout the academic community, and the promotion of globalisation across the Taiwan Strait, use of this system seems appropriate. In addition, the Wade-Giles system will be used for the following:

1. Names such as Chiang Kai-shek, Sun Yat-sen, Taipei and Kuomintang;
2. Names of individuals living outside Mainland China.

Moreover, in the Chinese cultural areas, family name always precedes given name when addressing an individual in Chinese. However, in translation, mainland Chinese and most Taiwanese political figures have their family name precede first name without the punctuation mark “,”. For example, 毛澤東 is translated into Mao Zedong, and Chen Shui-bian is for 陳水扁. Therefore, for the reason of consistency, this practice will be followed throughout the thesis when addressing an individual from the Chinese cultural areas. In addition, whenever possible, Chinese characters will follow individual names for persons and places for clarification.

Abbreviations

3F	Free Formosans' Formosa
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFTA	ASEAN-China Free Trade Area
AH	Academia Historica (Taiwan)
AmCham	American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARATS	Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (China)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN+1	ASEAN and China
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
AWC	US Air War College
CCNAA	Coordinating Committee for North American Affairs (Taiwan)
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CDP	China Democratic Party (Taiwan)
CIA	Central News Agency
CON.RES.	Concurrent Resolution
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies (US)
DoD	Department of Defense (US)
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan)
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration (US)
ECA	European Community
EDAC	Economic Development Advisory Conference (Taiwan)
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
FAPA	Formosan Association for Public Affairs
FAS	Federation of American Scientists
FLR	Formosan League for Re-emancipation
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
FTA	Free Trade Area
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	gross domestic product
GPO	Government Printing Office (US)
H.R. or H.RES.	House of Representatives Resolution
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff (US)
KMT	Kuomintang (Taiwan)
LOC	Library of Congress (US)
MAC	Mainland Affairs Council (Taiwan)

MDT	Mutual Defence Treaty
MFN	Most-Favoured-Nation (status)
MIB	Military Intelligence Bureau (Taiwan)
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taiwan)
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taiwan)
NAC	National Affairs Conference (Taiwan)
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration (US)
NDU	National Defence University (US)
NGOs	non-governmental organizations
NSA	National Security Agency (US)
NSC	National Security Council (US)
NSL	National Security Law (Taiwan)
NUC	National Unification Council (Taiwan)
NYT	New York Times
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Taiwan)
OPROC	Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan)
PFP	People's First Party (Taiwan)
PL	Public Law (US)
PLA	People's Liberation Army
ROC	Republic of China
S. or S.RES.	Senate Resolution
SCMP	South China Morning Post
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TAIP	Taiwan Independence Party (Taiwan)
TAO	Taiwan Affairs Office (China)
TECRO	Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office
TMD	theatre-missile-defence
TRA	Taiwan Relations Act
TSEA	Taiwan Security Enhancement Act
TSU	Taiwan Solidarity Union (Taiwan)
TT	Taipei Times
UDEN	United Daily Evening News
UDN	United Daily News
UFAI	United Formosans in America for Independence
UFI	United Formosans for Independence
UFIE	Union for Formosa's Independence in Europe
UN	United Nations
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USDOS	United States Department of State

USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UYFI	United Young Formosans for Independence
WFTA	World Federation of Taiwanese Association
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WP	Washington Post
WTC	World Taiwanese Congress
WTO	World Trade Organization
WUFI	World United Formosans for Independence
XNA	Xinhua News Agency (China)

Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION

Objectives and Rationale

Although China spares no efforts to advocate “one country, two systems” as a formula for unification across the Strait, the Taiwanese national government is determined to construct a new constitution and become a “normal country.”¹ In mid-March 2005, the National People’s Congress of the PRC passed an anti-secession law that would effectively pre-authorize military action if Taiwan took concrete steps toward formal independence.² The antagonism between Taiwanese and Chinese nationalisms is intensifying. Contemporary Taiwan has become a military and cultural bastion of the US,³ and also the westernmost point on America’s Western Pacific frontier.⁴ Before 1895, the Chinese living in Taiwan shared a history and culture with their mainland counterparts; however, after the Chinese Nationalist government’s misrule and suppression following 1945, they diverged from cognate Chinese nationalism in favour of cultivating a Taiwanese nationalism of their own. Central to this remarkable transformation is the influence of the US on Taiwan since 1945.

All researchers agree that Taiwan would not be what it is today without the influence of the United States. In fact, the American connection is the *sine qua non* of Taiwan’s quasi-independent existence.⁵ However, there are many riddles in terms of the link between American influence and the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism. Before

¹ Former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui called on August 23, 2003 for the rectification of the nation’s name from “ROC” to “Taiwan” so that Taiwan can become a “normal country.” He also advocated major changes to the Constitution to bring it into line with the reality of Taiwan’s situation; see Chang Yun-ping, “Change of Name Must Happen: Lee,” *TT*, Aug 24 2003. President Chen Shui-bian declared on September 28, 2003 to enact a new constitution for Taiwan in 2006; see Chang Yun-ping and Huang Tai-lin, “President Makes DPP Birthday Pledge,” *TT*, Sep 29 2003. It is believed by many secessionists that a new constitution is necessary to build Taiwan into a normal country. In this context, drafting a new constitution inevitably indicates an intention to alter the status quo. See Hsu Yung-ming 徐永明, “Drafting a Constitution Would Alter Status Quo,” *TT*, Oct 3 2003.

² Joseph Kahn, “Beijing Leaders Speak of Force to Keep Taiwan ‘Chinese’,” *NYT*, Mar 8 2005; UDN, “Fan fenlie fa quanwen (The Full Text of the Anti-Secession Law),” Mar 15 2005.

³ John King Fairbank, “Formosa Through China’s Eyes,” *The New Republic*, Vol. 139, No. 15 (1958): 10. Hong Kong scholar Shiu-Lam Paaui terms Fairbank’s argument as “cultural interventionism.” See Paaui Shiu-lam 鮑紹霖, *Taidu’ muhou: Meiguoren de changyi yu zhengce (Behind the Scene of Taiwan Independence: American Propositions and Policies)* (Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju, 1992), 48.

⁴ George H. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1966), 22.

⁵ Thomas W. Robinson, “America in Taiwan’s Post Cold-War Foreign Relations,” *The China Quarterly*, No. 148, Special Issue: Contemporary Taiwan (1996): 1340.



exploring the essence of bilateral interactions, it is necessary to recapitulate the history of US-Taiwan relations.

Taiwan used to be a settlers' society. Austronesian indigenous peoples, who arrived in Taiwan during the Palaeolithic age,⁶ were the original inhabitants of the island.⁷ Following Dutch colonial development of Taiwan, ethnic Han people from Mainland China began substantial migration to the island around 1624. Han migration peaked in the middle of the seventeenth century and the Han became the dominant ethnic group on Taiwan.⁸ As a frontier territory of China, Taiwan was gradually incorporated into China in late seventeenth century and became a Chinese province in 1886. After China was defeated by Japan in the first Sino-Japan War (1894-95), Taiwan was ceded to Japan under the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. The Roosevelt administration decided on the return of Taiwan to the Republic of China (ROC) in the Cairo Declaration of 1943. The Declaration was reaffirmed by the Truman administration at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. Accordingly, Taiwan reverted to China after World War II. After the Chinese Nationalist government (Kuomintang, KMT) killed thousands of Taiwanese in the February 28 Incident in 1947, the US recognized Taiwanese secessionism and has been promoting Taiwanese nationalism ever since.

Next, the KMT's successive failures against the Communists in the Chinese Civil War prompted the US government to implement separatism on Taiwan in late 1948. Nevertheless, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defeated the KMT on the mainland in late 1949, the Truman administration lost interest in defending Taiwan; the US changed its policy toward Taiwan from separatism to "hands off." In response to

⁶ Michael Stainton, "The Politics of Taiwan Aboriginal Origins," in *Taiwan: A New History*, ed. Murray A. Rubinstein (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 28-29.

⁷ Shih Cheng-feng 施正鋒, "Tai-Zhong guanxi yu guojia anquan - Meiguo de yinsu, guojia rentong, yiji minzu rentong (Taiwan-China Relations and National Security - The American Factor, State Identity, and National Identity)" (paper presented at the Liang'an jiaoliu yu guojia anquan guoji yantaohui (International Conference on Cross-Strait Exchanges and National Security), Taipei, Nov-1 2003). Available from <http://mail.tku.edu.tw/cfshih/> [accessed Apr 30 2004].

⁸ Ronald G. Knapp, "The Shaping of Taiwan's Landscapes," in *Taiwan: A New History*, ed. Murray A. Rubinstein (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 9-10. See also Shih Cheng-feng, "Tai-Zhong guanxi yu guojia anquan - Meiguo de yinsu, guojia rentong, yiji minzu rentong (Taiwan-China Relations and National Security - The American Factor, State Identity, and National Identity)".

the Communists' charge that the US was going to occupy Taiwan,⁹ Truman declared on January 5, 1950 that the US had no interest in obtaining special rights or privileges or in establishing military bases on the island.¹⁰ When the Korean War erupted on June 25, 1950, however, Truman abruptly reversed his position on Taiwan. Two days later, he announced that Taiwan's legal status was undetermined. In the next twenty years of Cold War bipolarisation, Washington exploited the KMT's anti-communism and accepted Taiwanese nationalism. America's refusal to recognize the ROC's sovereignty over Taiwan enabled some elements in the US, notably academics and Congress, and sometimes the administration, to promote an indigenous democratic movement in Taiwan. Taiwan independence becomes an option that all administrations have had to consider in order to advance US national interests.

In the late 1960s, the Nixon administration began to seek rapprochement with China for a strategic alliance against the Soviet Union. However, America's "Three Joint Communiqués" with the PRC and the "one China" policy only "acknowledges" that Taiwan is a part of China. The US has never recognized the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan. As the Cold War drew to a close, China's strong economic development and expanding military build-up worried American, Japanese and Taiwanese governments. Taiwan thus became an integral part of American containment policy against China. The pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) unexpectedly won the presidency in 2000. The Taiwanese nationalist DPP government shares with its US counterpart the belief in the threat posed by China. Since 2000, the US and Taiwan have been committed to consolidating a bilateral defence relationship focused on wartime cooperation against China. Taipei also endeavours to extend the US-Japan security alliance and promote regional comprehensive security against Beijing to justify the continued spread of American values and influence in the Asia Pacific region. Contemporary Taiwan has become a *bona fide* westernmost military and cultural bastion of the US on America's Western Pacific frontier. This marks a unique US-Taiwan symbiotic partnership in the international arena. This

⁹ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1970), 350-51.

¹⁰ USDOS, "Memorandum, 5 January 1950," in Papers of Dean Acheson. Confidential, declassified 1976, Harry S. Truman Library, 1. See also June M. Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1987), 137.

partnership is disconcerting to Beijing, as China heads for global and regional hegemony. Chen Shui-bian's re-election in 2004 may consolidate the strategic symbiosis between the US and Taiwan.

In the bipolarised Cold War era (1950-1970), the US maintained an anti-Communist alliance with the KMT government. In US-PRC rapprochement era (1970-1989), the US-Taiwan relationship was characterized by American help for Taiwan's survival under a "one China" structure. In the post-Cold War era, the Taiwanese government has been eager to participate in the American containment policy against China. This transition epitomises the rise of Taiwanese nationalism. The broad outlines of this history are well known; however, several key issues remain unresolved. What is America's ultimate Taiwan policy? Why has the US failed to recognise either the PRC's or the ROC's sovereignty over Taiwan? How do America's "Three Joint Communiqués," "one China" policy and the Taiwan Relations Act fit in this picture? How has the gap between theory and practice of America's "Three Joint Communiqués" and "one China" policy nurtured the US-oriented Taiwanese nationalism? An active and self-assertive Taiwanese nationalism has created both linkages and tensions among regional nations and civilizations. How will current US-Taiwan relations influence the peace and stability of East Asia? These questions can easily lead to more questions on US-PRC-Taiwan trilateral relations.

This thesis seeks to answer these questions. It is necessary to understand the linkage between the US and Taiwanese nationalism, and the role of Taiwanese nationalism in America's Asian policy. There have been many studies of contemporary US-Taiwan relations, but the topic has been far from exhausted. American scholars and politicians typically stress American values of democracy, self-determination and the constitutional democratisation of Taiwan to justify American support of Taiwan, while calling attention to the stubbornness of China's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.¹¹ Americans frequently argue that: "If the cross-Strait rivalry is ever to be resolved, China must

¹¹ The authors of the Heritage Foundation exemplify this approach: John Tkacik, *Whose One China?* [internet] (National Review, 2004 [cited Jun 5 2004]), available from <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/tkacik200406030908.asp>; John J. Tkacik, *The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1717: Time for Washington to Take a Realistic Look at China Policy* (The Heritage Foundation, 2003 [cited Dec 17 2003]), available from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/BG1717.cfm>.

change. Any discussion of reunification without democratic reform in China is premature.”¹² However, they devote little attention to America’s repeated attempts to separate Taiwan from China since the late 1940s and the American policy of containment against China. In contrast, most Chinese arguments concentrate on America’s self-interest in Taiwan,¹³ but overlook the threat that reactionary, irredentist and chauvinistic Chinese nationalism poses to regional peace and stability.¹⁴ This dichotomy represents a traditional split between the American principle of national independence and a Chinese nationalism that emphasises unification.¹⁵ In other words, Taiwan is the battleground of a conflict between American and Chinese national values. Both sides do share one thing: a focus upon the Taiwan problem in the US-PRC relations to the exclusion of Taiwanese nationalism.

Immediately after the inception of the Taiwan independence movement, Taiwanese nationalism has been a subject of scholarly concern. However, the nature of Taiwanese nationalism has been in constant change in the past decades. Works on transitional Taiwanese nationalism provide valuable but fragmented literature of its evolution in duly defined context in a framed period of time. Not until the late 1990s, when Taiwanese nationalism approached its maturation, could scholars make a more comprehensive review about the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism, the aim of which is to unite all residents on the island to construct a Taiwanese nation and establish a modern nation-state of the Republic of Taiwan.¹⁶ Recently there has been more research on Taiwanese nationalism. The research on this subject is characterised by two distinct

¹² USDOS, *Taiwan Relations Act Helps Democracy Thrive, Senator Says* (2004 [cited May 18 2004]), available from <http://lists.state.gov/archives/us-china.html>.

¹³ These arguments are abundant among Chinese official figures and news agency. See Xinhuanet, *Curbing 'Taiwan Independence' Most Urgent Task* [internet] (Xinhuanet, 2004 [cited May 21 2004]), available from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-05/17/content_1472607.htm; Zhongyang dang'anguan 中央檔案館, ed., ^eds., *Zhongguo gongchandang bashinian zhengui dangan (Valuable Documents of Chinese Communists in the Past Eighty Years)*, 2 vols., vol. II (Beijing: Zhongguo dang'an, 2001), 1769-71, 73, 74.

¹⁴ For the criticisms of Chinese nationalism, see Maria Hsia Chang, *Return of the Dragon: China's Wounded Nationalism* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 6, 221.

¹⁵ John King Fairbank, "China: Time For a Policy," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 199, No. 4 (1957): 35. See also Michel Oksenberg, "Taiwan, Tibet and Hongkong in Sino-American Relations," in *Living with China: U.S./China Relations in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Ezra F. Vogel (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 59.

¹⁶ Shih Cheng-feng 施正鋒, *Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism)* (Taipei: Qianwei, 2003), 38-39, 85-86, 117-19, 23, 229. See also Chang Mau-kuei 張茂桂, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," in *Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong (The Relations among Ethnic Groups and National Identity)* (Hong Kong: Yeqiang, 1993), 237.

approaches, the endogenous and the exogenous.

The endogenous approach stresses the intrinsic variables and internal development of Taiwanese nationalism. For early Taiwanese nationalists, the history of Taiwan has been a history of four centuries of struggle against colonial oppression.¹⁷ Yet Maurice Meisner wonders whether the Taiwanese tradition of revolts preceding the Japanese occupation in 1895 had anything to do with modern, western-type nationalism.¹⁸ This tradition of rebellions may have more to do with the struggle against local officials' corruption and exploitation. Indeed, nationalism is an ideology that emerged in Europe at the end of the late eighteenth century and only acquired its present meanings in the course of the nineteenth century.¹⁹

Huang Chun-chieh outlines Taiwanese struggle against Japanese colonial suppression, KMT authoritarian rule and the PRC's policy of intimidation to make the argument that Taiwanese consciousness is the islanders' resistance to foreign rule.²⁰ Chang Mau-kuei argues that Taiwan's domestic problems – including clashes over provincialism, inter-ethnic conflicts and definitions of national identity – reflect the Taiwanese step-up struggles for democracy, self-determination and sovereignty. This process also represents the division of a homogenous Chinese nationalism into a mutually antagonistic Taiwanese nationalism.²¹ Robert Edmondson believed the coercive silencing of Chinese nationalism reinforced Taiwanese collective memory of the February 28

¹⁷ Joshua Liao 廖文奎, *Formosa Speaks* (Hong Kong: Graphic Press, 1950), 3-21. See also Niu Ciong-hau, "The Formation of the Formosan Nation - A Short History of Formosa," *Formosan Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1962): 45-55. Shih Ming 史明, *Taiwan's 400 Year History*, Japanese ed. (Kasugachō: Ootoba Shobō, 1962), 438.

¹⁸ Maurice Meisner, "The Development of Formosan Nationalism," *The China Quarterly*, No. 15 (1963): 92-94. Meisner uses the establishment of "Formosan Democratic Republic," a temporary device for Taiwan's eventual reunification with China, to demonstrate that there did not exist a Formosan sense of nationalism at the moment of Taiwan's cession to Japan.

¹⁹ Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 5.

²⁰ Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑, "Lun 'Taiwan yishi' de fazhan ji qi tezhi (The Development and Characteristics of Taiwanese Consciousness)," in *Zhongguo yishi yu Taiwan yishi: 1999 Aomen xueshu yantaohui*, ed. Xiachao jijinhui (Taipei: Haixia xueshu, 1999), 2, 8-32.

²¹ Chang Mau-kuei 張茂桂, "Taiwan de zhengzhi zhuanxing yu zhengzhi de 'zuqunhua' guocheng (Political Transformation and Ethnization of Politics in Taiwan)" (paper presented at the Jiaoyu yu Zhongguo guojia minzu rentong (Education and Chinese National Identity), Hong Kong, Jun 1 1996). Available from <http://taup.yam.org.tw/PEOPLE/961117-5.htm> [accessed Aug 16 2002]. Provincialism, in the context of Taiwan, refers to "lack of cooperation, division, and even prejudice" between native Taiwanese and mainlanders; see Mau-Kuei Michael Chang 張茂桂, "Provincialism and Nationalism," *Taiwan Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1995): 67, 91 note 1.

Incident and Taiwanese nationalist narratives from the late 1940s.²² After the pro-independence DPP took power in 2000, the official records associated Taiwanese nationalism with democratisation. Chang Yen-hsien, Head of Academia Historica, argues that Taiwan's democratisation results from dissidents' persistent struggle against the authoritarian system of the KMT.²³ Indeed, democratisation played an integral role in the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism; however, the sources of democratisation remain controversial.

There are four theories of democratisation. The first theory holds that democratisation is a consequence of rapid economic growth and social change in a capitalist economy. According to the second theory, it is the result of KMT elites' long-term commitment to the ideal of democracy; third, for counter-elites, it is the result of the compelling power of democratic forces.²⁴ Finally, some argue that since 1977 a series of calculated moves by both the KMT and the opposition, or "a continuous process of bargaining," resulted in democratic breakthrough.²⁵ No scholars have investigated the link between these sources and external forces, such as the influence of the US. In other words, these works concentrate on the domestic conflicts and reconciliation between social structures and political systems on Taiwan. They fail to explain why the nationalism is US-oriented.

The exogenous approach, in contrast, stresses American promotion and Chinese

²² Robert Edmondson, "The February 28 Incident and National Identity," in *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*, ed. Stephane Corcuff (Armonk: M E Sharpe, 2002), 30-31.

²³ Hsueh Yueh-shun, Tseng Pin-tsang, and Hsu Jui-hao 薛月順, 曾品滄, 許瑞浩, ed., eds., *Cong jieyan dao jieyan (The Martial Law Era)*, 8 vols., vol. 1, *Zhanhou Taiwan minzhu yundong shiliao huibian (Documentary Collection on Democratization Movement of Postwar Taiwan)* (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2000), v-x.

²⁴ Chen Ming-tong 陳明通, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)* (Taipei: Xin ziran zhuyi, 2001), 267; Cheng Tun-jen 鄭敦仁, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," *World Politics*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (1989): 471, 90; Chou Yangsun and Andrew J. Nathan, "Democratic Transition in Taiwan," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1987): 283; Peng De-fu 彭德富, "Taiwan difang xuanju yu minzhu zhuanxing zhi yanjiu (A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition)" (PhD thesis, National Taiwan Normal University, 2001), 8, 12, 13; Tien Hung-mao 田宏茂, "Dynamics of Taiwan's Democratic Transition," in *In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949*, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst, 1993), 103.

²⁵ Cheng Tun-jen, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 490; Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 11; Tien Hung-mao, "Dynamics of Taiwan's Democratic Transition," 107-08.

intimidation in the development of Taiwanese nationalism. The official statements of Chinese nationalists, in particular, focus on American proposition for Taiwan independence.²⁶ A typical argument is that American traditional values and strategic interests combined to prompt the US to enforce separatism and interventionism and thus gave rise to Taiwanese nationalism.²⁷ Although this argument is valid, it oversimplifies the linkage between America and Taiwan. It also ignores the awareness of the Taiwanese people of the cultural differences between China and the US and the Taiwanese final selection of American values. This oversimplification and ignorance block the extraction of any constructive lessons from the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism.

In fact, no single approach can satisfactorily explain the development of Taiwanese nationalism, which is the result of both reconciliation among intrinsic variables and interaction with changing external contexts. Wong Ka-ying argues that Taiwanese nationalism results from a desire to “form coherence between a cultural identity and a specific political boundary” with the appreciation that decades-long confrontation and separation across the Strait have forged an identification of a common destiny.²⁸ This argument ignores the influence of the US. Shih Cheng-feng believes that Taiwanese state identity and national identity have a lot to do with the system of the ROC and the war threat from the PRC.²⁹ He believed the deliberate ambiguity of the American “one China policy” since the 1970s has given the proponents of the Taiwan independence movement the leeway to pursue the establishment of an independent Republic of Taiwan;³⁰ in fact, because of the protection of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of the

²⁶ See, for example, Zhongyang dang'anguan, ed., *Zhongguo gongchandang bashinian zhengui dangan* (*Valuable Documents of Chinese Communists in the Past Eighty Years*), 1769-71, 73, 74. See also CNN, Zhu: *China Will Never Allow Taiwan to Declare Independence* (2000 [cited Mar 11 2003]), available from <http://www.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/east/03/15/china.zhu/>.

²⁷ Paa Shiu-lam, *Taidu' muhou* (*Behind the Scene of Taiwan Independence*), 42-45.

²⁸ Timothy Ka-ying Wong, *The Rise and Changing Nature of Taiwanese Nationalism* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 2001), 3, 16.

²⁹ Shih Cheng-feng, “Tai-Zhong guanxi yu guojia anquan - Meiguo de yinsu, guojia rentong, yiji minzu rentong (Taiwan-China Relations and National Security - The American Factor, State Identity, and National Identity)”.

³⁰ Shih Cheng-feng 施正鋒, “American Policy toward Taiwan - A Taiwanese Nationalist Review” (paper presented at the 2nd Annual Symposium on Taiwan's National Security - 20th Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, Taipei, Nov 7 1998). Available from <http://mail.tku.edu.tw/cfshih/Introduction.htm> [accessed Apr 25 2004].

US, Taiwan is able to exist as a quasi-state.³¹ Christopher Hughes argues that the PRC-US rapprochement of the 1970s resulted in Taiwan's intermediate state and the Taiwanese questioning the links between national identity, regime legitimacy and international status; under the umbrella of the Taiwan Relations Act, the international isolation "has provided the context for a deconstruction of Chinese nationalism to take place" and resulted in a "post-nationalist identity in Taiwan."³² Yuan Ho-ling believes that since the 1970s America's "one China" policy has facilitated a division in domestic collective identity on Taiwan and China's policy of intimidation prompted the islanders to strengthen their collective consciousness.³³ James Wang argues that international and domestic pressures since the early 1970s fuelled Taiwanization; America's de-recognition of the ROC and the Taiwanese opposition's challenge to the KMT pushed for democratisation and led to Taiwanization; the Taiwanized ROC finally abandoned the idea of unification with China.³⁴ These works acknowledge the Chinese and American role in the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism. In their study of democratisation, Chu and Lin argue that Taiwan's democratic transition was "triggered by a protracted process of diplomatic derecognition and facilitated by the cumulative social and political mobilization produced by rapid industrialization and strong economic growth."³⁵ However, these arguments refer only in passing to American influence since the 1970s. None of them explores the origin of America's separatist design for Taiwan and American influence on the rise of domestic Taiwanese nationalism.

Although the US is an exogenous variable, it has a deep influence on Taiwan in terms of the evolution of national identity, and on the tension between Chinese and Taiwanese nationalisms. If national identity can be studied in ethnic, cultural and systematic terms, the rise of Taiwanese nationalism is most clearly manifested in terms of culture and system. Cultural identity stresses the shared history and memory, and systematic

³¹ Shih Cheng-feng, *Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism)*, 120 note 40.

³² Christopher Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society* (London: Routledge, 1997), 30, 32, 35, 154, 55.

³³ Yuan Ho-ling 袁鶴齡, "Chutan guojia rentong de waibu yinsu - Meiguo yinsu, Zhongguo yinsu yu Taiwan de guojia rentong (An Introductory Study of the External Factors of National Identity - The American Factor, Chinese Factor and Taiwanese National Identity)," in *Zhongguo yishi yu Taiwan yishi: 1999 Aomen xueshu yantaohui*, ed. Xiachao jijinhui (Taipei: Haixia xueshu, 1999), 506, 11.

³⁴ James Wang 王景宏, "KMT's Localization Claim Is Empty," *TT*, Jan 14 2003.

³⁵ Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan: Social Cleavage, Electoral Competition, and the Emerging Party System," in *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, ed. Tien Hung-mao (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 82.

identity refers to the acceptance of specific political, economic and social systems.³⁶ However, scant research has been dedicated to the relations between the US and Taiwanese nationalism, or to the extent of America's dynamic Asian policies in guiding the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism. Mei-ling T. Wang's *The Dust That Never Settles* explores the interaction between the US and the Taiwan independence movement between 1949 and 1997. The first half of her analysis describes the international events that moulded US policy toward China, which in turn has influenced US policy toward Taiwan. The second half of her work discusses the growing strength of then pro-independence opposition DPP on Taiwan and the success of China's domestic reforms.³⁷ Absent from her analysis is examination of the continuous contribution of the US to the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism.

One more variable complicates scholars' investigation of the relations between the US and Taiwanese nationalism in the 1990s: Lee Teng-hui. As ROC President and KMT Chairman he constantly reaffirmed his faith in unification. He did not reveal himself as a secessionism fundamentalist until his retirement in March 2000. His vacillation between independence and unification in the 1990s obfuscated Taiwanese nationalism. Most scholars attribute the KMT's political indigenisation to Chiang Ching-kuo, successor of Chiang Kai-shek, and the accomplishment of Taiwanization to Lee Teng-hui.³⁸ However, few realize that American scholars had been the ones to coin the term "Taiwanization" in the 1950s as a reference to separating Taiwan from Mainland China. These riddles underscore the need for a more comprehensive, revisionist and updated review on the link between American influence and the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism.

Taiwan's interest in joining the American alliance against China proves that American influence has westernised Taiwan's cultural values and national identity. Shih believes that US-Taiwan relationship is very close to quasi-"security community;"³⁹ within such

³⁶ The three major aspects of national identity include ethnic identity, cultural identity and systematic identity; see Chiang I-hua 江宜樺, *Ziyou zhuyi, minzu zhuyi-yu guojia-rentong (Liberalism, Nationalism and National Identity)* (Taipei: Yangzhi, 1998), 15.

³⁷ Mei-ling T. Wang, *The Dust That Never Settles: The Taiwan Independence Campaign and U.S.-China Relations* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1999), 4-5.

³⁸ See, for example, Wang, "KMT's Localization Claim Is Empty."

³⁹ Shih Cheng-feng, *Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism)*, 157.

a security community, common values are “the wellspring for close security cooperation” and that “security cooperation will deepen those shared values and transnational linkages.” States within a security community will defend their shared values, jointly deal with an external threat and attract new allies that are seeking national security and material progress.⁴⁰ Indeed, the concept of a (quasi-) security community can be used to explain current US-Taiwan relations, where shared democratic values bind Washington and Taipei against the perceived threat from Beijing. However, when the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the most important American law governing the relationship between the US and Taiwan, was enacted in 1979, Taiwan was still administered by the authoritarian KMT regime and there was no mention of democratic values or democracy in the text of the TRA.⁴¹ Instead, the TRA makes Taiwan a protectorate of the US.⁴² That is, the concept of “security community” fails to faithfully reflect the development of bilateral relationship in the past decades. By contrast, the concept of “strategic symbiosis” effectively depicts American efforts to promote Taiwanese nationalism in the past and, in return, the willingness of the nationalist Taiwan government to play the role of a vassal state of the US to serve the interest of American hegemony. Nevertheless, the literature fails to consider the emergent concept of strategic symbiosis in the study of international politics.⁴³

As Taiwanese nationalism grows more active and assertive, Taiwan can no longer be a mere variable subject to US-China relations. Secessionist Taipei is committed to expanding the US-Japan security alliance and promoting regional comprehensive

⁴⁰ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective,” in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4. See also Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, “The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community,” in *The Integration of Political Communities*, ed. Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964).

⁴¹ For the complete text of the TRA, see *Taiwan Relations Act*, 96-8, 96th Congress (Apr 10 1979). Available from http://ait.org.tw/en/about_ait/tra/ [accessed Feb 28 2005].

⁴² Harvey Feldman, “A New Kind of Relationship,” in *A Unique Relationship: The United States and the Republic of China Under the Taiwan Relations Act*, ed. Roman H. Myers (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), 29.

⁴³ The term “strategic symbiosis” has previously appeared in international relations discourse. Thomas Neumann, director of the Jewish Institute for national Security Affairs, for example, uses the term to describe US-Israeli relations (see Mark H. Milstein, *Strategic Ties or Tentacles?* [internet] (Institute for National Security Affairs, 1991 [cited Feb 28 2005]), available from <http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/1091/9110027.htm>.) However, no specific definition is provided and, indeed, no coherent theory has developed around the concept of “strategic symbiosis.” For a detailed definition of “strategic symbiosis” as conceptualised in this thesis, see page 213 of this thesis.

security against Beijing to justify the continued domination and expansion of American values and influence in East Asia. Boasting its democratisation and economic accomplishments, Taiwan has in fact become a major player in the Asia Pacific region. Research on US-Taiwan relations can hardly be complete without an exploration of the development of Taiwanese nationalism. Likewise, research on Taiwanese nationalism cannot be complete without an understanding of the American role in promoting Taiwanese nationalism. If the role of Taiwan in America's Asian policies is to be fully appreciated, these two research approaches must be integrated. Accordingly, this thesis will explore the essence of America's Taiwan policy; the influence of America's Asia policies upon the development of Taiwanese nationalism since World War II; the impact of the US-Taiwan strategic symbiosis upon the peace and stability of Asia Pacific in the twenty-first century; and the implications of US-Taiwan strategic symbiosis on Mainland China.

Research Methodology and Structure

This study uses historical and archival research to explore the dynamics of American strategic schemes on Taiwan in order to highlight the American role in the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism.

This thesis consists of seven chapters. Following an examination of research objectives, the presentation of the rationale, and a discussion of previous research, the thesis will take a chronological approach to explore and analyse the interaction between US Asian policy and Taiwanese nationalism. The periodisation is as follows: 1) 1945-1950: the period between the end of World War II and the outbreak of the Korean War; 2) 1950-1970, the height of the Cold War; 3) 1970-1989, from the beginning of US rapprochement with the PRC to the Tiananmen Incident; 4) 1989-2000, from the collapse of the Communist bloc to the end of Lee Teng-hui's rule in Taiwan; and 5), 2000 to the present. While any imposition of periodisation is, arbitrary, the periods identified above offer a framework for understanding the progression of US-Taiwan relations and the development of Taiwanese nationalism. Each period is characterised by crucial changes in the strategic symbiosis between the US and Taiwan.

Chapter 2: 1945-1950

ENCOUNTER AND

THE GERMINATION OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM

Introduction

The Han had become the dominant race on Taiwan by the mid-seventeenth century. The Ming-dynasty loyalist Cheng Cheng-kung (鄭成功, Koxinga) swept away the Dutch occupiers in 1662 and launched Sinicization efforts on the frontier island.⁴⁴ In 1683, Admiral Shi Lang (施瑯), a defector from the Cheng Cheng-kung camp to the Qing-dynasty, defeated Cheng Ko-shuang (鄭克塽), grandson of Cheng Cheng-kung; Taiwan was then incorporated into China as an island affiliated to Fujian (福建), a southern coastal province of China. In response to the Japanese Empire's intention to occupy Taiwan, China made the island a province of China in 1886.⁴⁵

The major language, Taiwanese, is derived from the dialect spoken in southern Fujian, as are many Taiwanese customs and religious beliefs. The written language is Chinese. Therefore, at least until the beginning of the twentieth century, Taiwanese and Chinese people belonged to the same ethnic group and used the same script. After China's defeat in the first Sino-Japan War (1894-95), Taiwan was ceded to Japan in accordance with the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Chinese nationalism initiated Taiwanese armed resistance against Japanese colonial rule. This nationalism would turn into separatism within two years of Taiwan's reunification with China in 1945.

This chapter describes the initial encounter between Taiwanese secessionism and American government's separatist intention on Taiwan. The first part of this chapter shows how the Chinese nationalism of island Taiwanese crystallized into Taiwanese consciousness, the seed of Taiwanese nationalism. This chapter also examines the nature

⁴⁴ Weng Chia-in 翁佳音, *Taiwanese Armed Resistances under the Early Japanese Rule (1895-1902)* (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1986), 17.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 16-17.

of Taiwan in American foreign policy before 1945. The second part of this chapter explores how the Taiwanese consciousness germinated into secessionism under the rule of the Chinese KMT government, the US' involvement in this process, and the underlying options and constraints of America's Taiwan policy after US recognition of Taiwanese nationalism.

Pre 1945: Planting of the Seed of Taiwanese Nationalism

1895-1915: Taiwanese Armed Resistance and Japanese Despotism

The cession of Taiwan to Japan in 1895 was followed by two decades of anti-Japanese armed resistance. In the first stage (1895-1902), the Taiwanese people's strong Chinese nationalism compelled them to defend their land and protest the cession.⁴⁶ The Taiwan Republic was established on May 25, 1895. Although it lasted for only thirteen days, it reflected widespread popular resistance to the Japanese takeover.⁴⁷ Since early June 1895, the Black Flag force headed by Liu Yung-fu (劉永福) fought valiantly along with local rebels against Japanese military until forced to withdraw from Taiwan in late October 1895.⁴⁸

In 1896, Law No. 63 was enacted, authorizing the Taiwan Governor General the exclusive authority to enforce all regulations on the island for the next three years. This extraordinary power, however, was regularly extended. This law justified the colonial government's long-term discriminative despotism employed to suppress the Taiwanese hostility and resistance.⁴⁹ Furthermore, Taiwanese were excluded from the government and representative bodies, had no voting rights, were vulnerable to police abuse, and had

⁴⁶ Huang Hsiu-cheng 黃秀政, *Taiwanshi yanjiu* (A Study of Taiwan History), 2nd ed. (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1992), 176-78, 207. See also Weng Chia-in, *Taiwanese Armed Resistances* (1895-1902), 1-2, 136-44, 48.

⁴⁷ For the details of the establishment of Formosan Democratic Republic, see Wang Hsiao-po 王曉波, ed., eds., *Yiwei Kang-Ri shiliao huibian* (Documentary Collection of 1895 Resistance against Japan) (Taipei: Haixia xueshu, 1999), 69-74. See also Meisner, "The Development of Formosan Nationalism," 94.

⁴⁸ Huang Hsiu-cheng, *Taiwanshi yanjiu* (A Study of Taiwan History), 176-77.

⁴⁹ Edward I-te Chen 陳以德, "Formosan Political Movements under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914-1937," *Asian Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1972): 482.

no obligation to serve in the military.⁵⁰ In snuffing out local resistance, the Japanese colonial government imposed draconian penalties for even minor crimes. In short, Law No. 63 excluded the Taiwanese from the protection of the Japanese Constitution.⁵¹

The carnage committed by the Japanese military and the corruption and incompetence of its civil officials only made the Taiwanese opposition increasingly militant.⁵² After the Black Flag force withdrew, organized and networked rebellions ensued and persisted until the colonial government forces attacked Lin Shao-mao (林少貓) and eliminated local rebels in southern Taiwan in 1902, concluding the first stage of anti-Japanese armed resistance.⁵³

The second stage of armed resistance, from 1902 to 1915, was characterised by revolutionary nationalism. Inspired by Chinese revolutions and by their own awakening national consciousness, rival elites mobilized mass rebellions against Japanese rule. Among the many uprisings, the "Miao-li (苗栗) Incident" in 1913 and the "Hsi-lai-an (西來庵) Incident" in 1915 were the best examples.⁵⁴

1915-1945: The Modern Taiwanese Nationalist Movement

The Taiwan Government-General shifted to a patronage or assimilationist policy from 1915 to early 1920s.⁵⁵ The purpose of Japanese assimilation policy was to promote racial harmony in the interest of Japanese expansionism in Asia. Governor General Akashi Motijirō (明石元二郎) vigorously pursued an assimilation policy in order to tighten Japan's political and ideological control over Taiwan. His policy had little to do with Taiwanese aspirations for political equality and shared responsibility.⁵⁶

⁵⁰ Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin, "Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity," *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 165 (2001): 106.

⁵¹ Weng Chia-in, *Taiwanese Armed Resistances (1895-1902)*, 48.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 136.

⁵³ Huang Hsiu-cheng, *Taiwanshi yanjiu (A Study of Taiwan History)*, 177. See also Meisner, "The Development of Formosan Nationalism," 94.

⁵⁴ Huang Hsiu-cheng, *Taiwanshi yanjiu (A Study of Taiwan History)*, 177-78. See also Weng Chia-in, *Taiwanese Armed Resistances (1895-1902)*, 145-46.

⁵⁵ Huang Hsiu-cheng, *Taiwanshi yanjiu (A Study of Taiwan History)*, 207. See also Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Attitudes toward Colonialism," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 102-04.

⁵⁶ Peattie, "Japanese Attitudes toward Colonialism," 103-04.

Accordingly, Taiwanese elites began to join resistance or anti-government movements. This was the birth of the modern nationalist movement in Taiwan.⁵⁷

After the First World War, inspired by President Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of political self-determination for minorities, young Taiwanese fervently anticipated the end of colonial rule.⁵⁸ Taiwanese students in Tokyo established a variety of organizations to promote racial enlightenment, racial self-determination, and assertion of civil rights.⁵⁹ Among these, the most prominent was Tokyo Taiwan Seinenkai (東京台灣青年會, The Society of Taiwan Youth in Tokyo). With the financial support of members of the Taiwanese gentry such as Lin Hsien-tang (林獻堂) and Tsai Hui-ru (蔡惠如) and the support of prominent Japanese intellectuals such as Yoshino Sakuzō and Izumi Tetsu, Tokyo Taiwan Seinenkai was in the vanguard of the racial enlightenment and emancipation movements in Taiwan.⁶⁰ In July 1920, Tokyo Taiwan Seinenkai published the *Taiwan seinen* (*Taiwan Youth*, 1920-1922), the first journal dedicated to awakening the national consciousness, and to fighting for the speech and press freedom.⁶¹ Later on, it became a *bona fide* journal for the Taiwanese nationalist movement. On the one hand, it castigated the administration of Taiwan Governor General and called for self-government; on the other hand, it introduced its readers to the culture and society of the motherland, and joined forces with several racial movement organizations.⁶²

Law No. 63 became the first target in a volley of political movements launched by the anti-government elite. In November 1920, when the law was again due to be extended, Tokyo Taiwan Seinenkai recruited more than two hundred Taiwanese students to join the Movement for the Repeal of Law No. 63 and demand self-government.⁶³ Finally, in March 1921, Law No. 63 was replaced by Law No. 3, "Law regarding the Ordinances to be enforced in Taiwan," which stipulated that the laws of the Japanese homeland were, in

⁵⁷ Huang Hsiu-cheng, *Taiwanshi yanjiu* (*A Study of Taiwan History*), 207.

⁵⁸ Liao, *Formosa Speaks*, 13.

⁵⁹ Lan Po-chou 藍博洲, *Riju shiqi Taiwan xuesheng yundong* (*Taiwanese Student Movement during Japanese Occupation Period*) (Taipei: Shibao wenhua, 1993), 86-87.

⁶⁰ Huang Hsiu-cheng, *Taiwanshi yanjiu* (*A Study of Taiwan History*), 209.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 212.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 227.

⁶³ Lan Po-chou, *Riju shiqi Taiwan xuesheng yundong* (*Taiwanese Student Movement during Japanese Occupation Period*), 93.

principle, to be enforced in Taiwan.⁶⁴ This assimilationist law was the culmination of “homeland extensionism.” Although this symbolized the shift of Japanese colonial policy from discriminative despotism to assimilation, the Taiwanese elites were no longer satisfied and had decided in late 1920 to drop the Movement for the Nullification of Law No. 63. This decision rendered moot the homeland extensionism adopted by Den Kenjirō (田健治郎), the first civilian Taiwan Governor General (serving from 1919-1923). Instead, the elites made an argument on behalf of Taiwanese particularism. Each year, from 1921 to 1927, Tokyo Taiwan Seinenkai launched its Campaign for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament.⁶⁵ Another important anti-government society, the Taiwan Cultural Association (*Taiwan bunka kyōkai*), was formed in 1921; it cooperated with Tokyo Taiwan Seinenkai until 1934.⁶⁶ This petition movement explicitly emphasized the particularism of Taiwanese society. Implicitly, it made a social and an ethnic distinction between Taiwanese and Japanese.⁶⁷ In effect, it “demanded Japanese recognition of a distinct Taiwanese identity within the Japanese empire.”⁶⁸ The Taiwanese finally forced the colonial government to agree to hold partial and limited elections in April 1935. Taiwanese could now elect half the members of the city, street, and village councils, who would then elect half the members of the provincial councils.⁶⁹

Inchoate Taiwanese Consciousness

Japan’s invasion of China in July 1937 interrupted the development of political resistance in Taiwan. The goal of self-determination could not be realized under wartime conditions. Yet, from the nationalist perspective, a Taiwanese consciousness was born. National consciousness, the key prerequisite of nationalism, is mainly ethnocentric; that is, it is defined by “favourable feelings and actions regarding one’s own nation and unfavourable feelings and actions concerning other nations.”⁷⁰

⁶⁴ Chu and Lin, “Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan,” 107.

⁶⁵ Lan Po-chou, *Riju shiqi Taiwan xuesheng yundong* (*Taiwanese Student Movement during Japanese Occupation Period*), 93-94.

⁶⁶ Wu Mi-cha and Chang Yen-hsien 吳密察, 張炎憲, *Jianli Taiwan de guomin guojia* (*Establish a Civic Nation for Taiwan*) (Taipei: Qianwei, 1993), 45-46.

⁶⁷ Chu and Lin, “Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan,” 108.

⁶⁸ Leo T. S. Ching, *Becoming 'Japanese': Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 103.

⁶⁹ Chu and Lin, “Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan,” 109.

⁷⁰ James G. Kellas, *Nationalist Politics in Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 14.

National consciousness recognizes "the specificity of one's own nation and its difference from other nations," and is constituted by a person's perception of his own nationality.⁷¹ Clearly, national consciousness does not have to imply a desire for statehood; it is a perceptive reaction of a group of people to external threat or oppression. Although there was a mosaic of ethnic groupings on the island,⁷² including aboriginal tribes, Hakkas (Ke-chia jen, 客家人) and Hokkiens (Min-nan jen, 閩南人), Japanese colonial despotism prompted an oppressed consciousness that united people of various ethnic and linguistic groups living in the same area.⁷³ This "cohesion and distinctiveness" of the oppressed group of people gave rise to national consciousness.⁷⁴ Clearly, when Taiwan was under Japanese rule, the racial and social contradictions nurtured a consciousness of local islanders; this consciousness may be termed "Taiwanese consciousness."⁷⁵ Promoted by the counter-elite, or "intellectual awakeners,"⁷⁶ the notion of guaranteeing civil rights for Taiwanese and the pursuit of a distinctive Taiwan identity had been widely disseminated. Nourished by modern ideologies such as democracy and self-determination, this consciousness intensified and evolved into a nascent, nebulous, inchoate Taiwanese consciousness, which was identity-minded, equality-minded, and

⁷¹ Otto Bauer, *The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 119, 21, 23.

⁷² Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 23.

⁷³ Paavo Vayrynen, "Nation State: Some Basic Concepts and Definitions," in *The Future of the Nation State in Europe*, ed. Jyrki Iivonen (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1993), 14.

⁷⁴ Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (Cambridge: M.I.T., 1966), 173-74.

⁷⁵ Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 239, 66-67; Chen Lung-chu and Harold D. Lasswell, *Formosa, China, and the United Nations: Formosa in the World Community* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 165; Meisner, "The Development of Formosan Nationalism," 95; Shih Cheng-feng, *Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism)*, 79, 213; Wu Mi-cha and Chang Yen-hsien, *Jianli Taiwan de guomin guojia (Establish a Civic Nation for Taiwan)*, 43, 46; Yuan Ho-ling, "Chutan guojia rentong de waibu yinsu - Meiguo yinsu, Zhongguo yinsu yu Taiwan de guojia rentong (An Introductory Study of the External Factors of National Identity - The American Factor, Chinese Factor and Taiwanese National Identity)," 15. Christopher Hughes questions whether the binding force of the Taiwanese resentment against the Japanese colonial government can be called "national" consciousness; according to Hughes, a "national" consciousness is one in which group identification is the premise for a claim to statehood; he argues that it was unlikely for the islanders to have formed a homogeneous Taiwanese identity before 1945; see Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 22-23. This argument is ambiguous with regard to the substance of national consciousness. A claim to statehood presupposes a national consciousness; while a national-conscious must consolidate into nationalism first before uttering a claim to statehood. If national consciousness is a premise of nationalism, the islanders as a group of oppressed people had demonstrated an emergent national consciousness before 1945.

⁷⁶ Walter A. Kemp, *Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: A Basic Contradiction?* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 13.

self-determination-minded.⁷⁷

There are two incompatible characteristics of Taiwanese consciousness in its initial stage. One is that the root of Taiwanese consciousness is Han national consciousness.⁷⁸ The Taiwanese were eager to reunite with the Chinese after 1895. Therefore, it was a form of Chinese irredentism, and nothing more than a pre-national Taiwanese identity.⁷⁹ Secondly, during the fifty years of colonial rule, the Japanese government integrated Japanese and Taiwanese systems and institutions.⁸⁰ Japan raised Taiwan's standard of living, education and industrialization well above mainland China's levels.⁸¹ The modern administrative techniques used by the Japanese colonial government imposed on Taiwan an infrastructure for a new "imagined community," or a new independent nation.⁸²

The Evolution of American Hegemony⁸³

The US Values and National Interests: "Self-Determination" and Hegemony

⁷⁷ Hans Rogger argues that national consciousness is manifested by a striving for a common identity, character, and culture by the articulate members of a given community; see Hans Rogger, *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 3.

⁷⁸ Kuo Chao-lieh 郭昭烈, "Taiwan yishi de lishi guiji (The Historical Track of Taiwanese Consciousness)," in *Zhongguo yishi yu Taiwan yishi: 1999 Aomen xueshu yantaohui*, ed. Xiachao jijinhui (Taipei: Haixia xueshu, 1999), 44.

⁷⁹ Ibid; Shih Cheng-feng 施正鋒, "Taiwan yishi de tansuo (An Exploration of Taiwanese Consciousness)," in *Zhongguo yishi yu Taiwan yishi: 1999 Aomen xueshu yantaohui*, ed. Xiachao jijinhui (Taipei: Haixia xueshu, 1999), 62-63. See also Shih Cheng-feng, *Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism)*, 90-91.

⁸⁰ Edward I-te Chen 陳以德, "The Attempt to Integrate," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 272.

⁸¹ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 40, 98-99; Peng Ming-min 彭明敏, *A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), 12-13; Shih Ming 史明, *Taiwanren sibai nian shi (Taiwan's 400 Years History)*, Japanese ed. (Tōkyō: Yinyu shufang, 1962), 439, 43-45. See also Edmondson, "The February 28 Incident and National Identity," 26; J. Bruce Jacobs, "Taiwanese and the Chinese Nationalists, 1937-1945: The Origins of Taiwan's 'Half-Mountain People' (Banshan Ren)," *Modern China*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1990): 84; Meisner, "The Development of Formosan Nationalism," 95-96; Steven Phillips, "Between Assimilation and Independence," in *Taiwan: A New History*, ed. Murray A. Rubinstein (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 280.

⁸² Chang Mau-kuei, "Political Transformation and Ethnization of Politics in Taiwan," in *Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)*, 266. For the concept of "imagined communities," see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), 15-16.

⁸³ "Hegemony comes from the Greek word for political leadership," see Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 66 note 2.

The origins of the American hegemony can be traced to the values of self-determination on which the US was founded in 1776 in revolt against the European monarchy. After the fall of the Spanish empire as a result of the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the US extended recognition to many new Latin American republics in 1822 in response to their quest for independence from the Spanish empire. When France and Spain attempted to re-establish their colonies in the New World, President Monroe warned the European powers in 1823 that any interference in American affairs would be considered by the US “as dangerous to our peace and safety.”⁸⁴ This was the “Monroe Doctrine.” Thus, recognising the new republics in the New World accelerated the disintegration of the old empires, and ensured the rise of the US. Within the space of a century, the US used subtle “acquisition” measures – including the Monroe Doctrine, diplomacy, the Spanish-American War and economic penetration – to expand its territory. As Lens stated, “the decimation of the Spanish empire resulted in the enlargement of the American empire ... from less than 900,000 square miles in 1790 to more than 10 million square miles – including spheres of influence – today.”⁸⁵

The US abandoned its values of self-determination while it expanded. Instead, such ideas as “white man’s burden,” “[duty of the] superior [race] of civilizing the inferior races,” aggressive altruism, self-protection and “divine commission” were used as pretexts to amass domestic support for Western, self-interest imperialism.⁸⁶ In 1890, Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan used “moral obligations” in his work, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, to justify American imperial expansionism.⁸⁷ He advocated the government to take the Caribbean Islands, Hawaii, and the Philippine Islands for bases to protect its commerce and for free access of fleets to consolidate

⁸⁴ USDOS, *The Monroe Doctrine (1823)* [internet] ([cited Aug 9 2002]), available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/50.htm>.

⁸⁵ Sidney Lens, *The Forging of the American Empire: A History of American Imperialism from the Revolution to Vietnam* (London: Pluto, 2003), 88.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 165-66; Parker Thomas Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1973), 73-74. “White man’s burden” was originally a British concept; the phrase comes from Rudyard Kipling. “[Duty of the] superior [race] of civilizing the inferior races” was a French idea of *mission civilisatrice*. Although the US was motivated by all of these things, these terms were more blatantly stated by European imperialists.

⁸⁷ Lens, *The Forging of the American Empire: A History of American Imperialism from the Revolution to Vietnam*, 13.

American national interests.⁸⁸ In 1898, the US defeated Spain, seized the Philippine Islands and developed its ambition to become a world power. In response to the Philippine Insurrection of 1899 and 1902, America used force to quell the indigenous population's desire for self-determination. When the war ended in July 1902, 20,000 Filipino soldiers and 200,000 Filipino civilians were killed.⁸⁹ Evidently, old imperial expansionism could not accept self-determination by other peoples.

American Hegemonic "Open Door" Policy in China

The 1898 Spanish-American War also facilitated American intervention in China. In the late nineteenth century, European imperial powers scrambled for spheres of influence, claimed extraterritorial rights in China and even partitioned Chinese territory. Taiwan had already been ceded to Japan. Like the European powers, America also required new markets to absorb its surplus products and goods. To protect the prospect of American business and investment, the McKinley administration declared the "Open Door" policy in 1899 to prevent the further partition of China and assure America's access to markets in China. Hence, this Open Door policy embodied American hegemonism, which since 1898 was market-centred rather than colonial.⁹⁰

The Fusion of Self-Determination and Hegemony

America's extension of self-determination to many new Latin American republics in 1822 served to disintegrate the dominance on the American continent of the Spanish empire. The US further used the "Monroe doctrine" to deny the resurgence of European imperialism and expand American hegemony. After succeeding Great Britain as a sea power and occupying the Philippine Islands, the US responded to the Filipino request for "self-determination" with a brutal massacre between 1899 and 1902. However, during World War I the US faced the likely victory of Germany and the ensuing dominance of German imperialism in Europe; this could have put an end to American hegemonic ambitions. Woodrow Wilson skilfully innovated American hegemony by incorporating the values of self-determination, which provided "a moral

⁸⁸ *The World of 1898: The Spanish-American War*, [internet] (Library of Congress, [cited Sep 10 2004]), available from <http://www.loc.gov/r/r/hispanic/1898/chronology.html>.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, ([cited]).

⁹⁰ Neil Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 116.

rationale” for “a liberal war against German imperialism” and enabled him to launch a “moral crusade for ‘a new world order.’”⁹¹ Woodrow Wilson wove together American “global ambition and moral renditions” to support an “unprecedented international adventurism in Europe and the Pacific.”⁹² The marriage of self-interest hegemonism and liberal “self-determination” led the US to proclaim itself a nation innocent of imperial pretensions, and enabled the preservation and advancement of global openness to sustain American pre-eminence and guide American foreign policy.⁹³

After World War II, most of the European empires disintegrated. The doctrine of national self-determination became the mainstream of international political thought and initiated the era of decolonisation. The global openness policy – free access of the US fleets to every part of the oceans in the world and the backbone of the American hegemony – finally evolved into an ambition of global domination.⁹⁴

Chinese Claims, American Schemes and the Disposition of Taiwan

Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) did not publicly call for the return of Taiwan before the outbreak of the Sino-Japan War in 1937. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1942, advocating national self-determination was useful in mobilizing minority ethnic groups against Japan. In January 1934, Mao Zedong (毛澤東) promised his comrades from Taiwan, Korea and Vietnam that the Chinese Communist Party would allow minorities to establish independent states.⁹⁵ Chiang declared in 1938 that although Taiwan had been Chinese territory, the purpose of the Resistance War against Japanese Aggression from 1937 was to “restore the independence and freedom of the brethren in ... Taiwan.”⁹⁶ Likewise, when interviewed by Edgar Snow, an American journalist,

⁹¹ Ibid., 115, 17.

⁹² Ibid., 115-17.

⁹³ Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 79, 114; Kiki Caruson, "Book Review: American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2003): 687.

⁹⁴ Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, 88; Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization*, 52, 115.

⁹⁵ Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 14.

⁹⁶ Academia Historica 國史館, ed., ^eds., *A Chronology of Relevant Events of Taiwan Sovereignty and One China Discourse* (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2002), 4; Marc J. Cohen and Emma Teng, ed., ^eds., *Let Taiwan Be Taiwan: Documents on the International Status of Taiwan* (Washington: Center for Taiwan International Relations, 1990), 42, 45-46; Frank S. T. Hsiao and Lawrence R. Sullivan, "The Chinese

in 1938, Mao expressed his willingness to treat Taiwan as he had Korea and to help Taiwan to achieve independence.⁹⁷ Not until 1942 did the Chinese government begin to argue formally and publicly for the recovery of Taiwan. The earliest known official claim that Taiwan must be returned to China was made on October 6, 1942 when Chiang met Wendell Wilkie, an envoy of the US President.⁹⁸ Chiang further asserted in *China's Destiny* that Taiwan was "a fortress essential for the nation's defence and security."⁹⁹

Because of Taiwan's unique geo-strategic value, American strategists proposed in 1942 to internationalise Taiwan so as to establish a US-UN defence belt across the Pacific. This belt would begin at Hawaii in the east and terminate at Taiwan in the west as "the logical anchor of the line and the mighty western terminus for the air armadas of the United Nations." The Pentagon also suggested the creation of a postwar policing base in southern Taiwan.¹⁰⁰ However, in 1942 and 1943 the Council on Foreign Relations found that the disposition of Taiwan presented a dilemma:

On the one hand, Taiwan was such a key spot for sea control in the western Pacific that it should not be confidently delegated to a weak and disoriented China. On the other hand, denial [of] Taiwan to China would damage that country's relations with the Western Allies, and "suspicion of all Occidental schemes and motives [in China] may be so great [as] to frustrate, or at least, seriously limit, postwar Chinese collaboration in security matters with the other United Nations."¹⁰¹

Evidently, American original interest in Taiwan was based upon hegemonism. In May 1943, the Territorial Subcommittee proposed four alternative solutions: the continuance of Japanese sovereignty, independence of Taiwan, the internationalisation of Taiwan, and the restoration of Chinese sovereignty in Taiwan. The subcommittee investigated each alternative and finally concluded that the last was the most logical one. Even though there were many proponents of Taiwan's self-determination in Congress, Chiang's

Communist Party and the Status of Taiwan, 1928-1943," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (1979): 463. [accessed Aug 27 2004].

⁹⁷ Academia Historica, ed., ^eds., *A Chronology of Relevant Events of Taiwan Sovereignty and One China Discourse*, 4; Cohen and Teng, ed., ^eds., *Let Taiwan Be Taiwan*, 55-57; Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, 1st revised ed. (London: Lowe & Brydone, 1968), 110.

⁹⁸ Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, ed., ^eds., *History of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945)*, 2 ed. (Taipei: Chung Wu, 1972), 44. See also Hsiao and Sullivan, "The Chinese Communist Party and the Status of Taiwan, 1928-1943," 464; Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 6.

⁹⁹ Chiang Kai-shek and Philip J. Jaffe, *China's Destiny & Chinese Economic Theory* (New York: Roy, 1947), 36. Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 6.

¹⁰⁰ Xiaoyuan Liu, *A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and Their Policies for the Postwar Disposition of the Japanese Empire, 1941-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 64-66, 71.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 72.

reactionary nationalism and the historical and ethnic relationship between Taiwan and China, led the US to rule out self-government of Taiwan.¹⁰² Between 1942 and 1943, Roosevelt indicated that he favoured “both returning Taiwan to China and having American bases on the island.”¹⁰³ By the end of 1943, the US had made no formal public commitments concerning Formosa. The US Navy proposed to place Taiwan under an American naval administration before Japan’s surrender.¹⁰⁴ However, considering the internal and external situation before the Cairo Conference on December 1, 1943, the Roosevelt administration decided upon the return of Taiwan to China.

Accordingly, the Cairo Declaration stipulated the return of Taiwan to China: “All territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.”¹⁰⁵ At about the same time, the Chinese Communist Party changed its position of helping Taiwan achieve independence to identifying Taiwan as part of the Chinese nation.¹⁰⁶ In 1945, President Harry Truman told General George Marshall who was about to embark on the Marshall Mission to China that a “strong, united, and democratic China is in the most vital interest of the United States and all the United Nations.”¹⁰⁷ Therefore, the Potsdam Proclamation signed by China, the US and Great Britain on July 26, 1945 (and subsequently by the Soviet Union) reiterated: “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out.”¹⁰⁸ On September 2, 1945, Japanese Surrender Documents reaffirmed the Potsdam Proclamation.¹⁰⁹ Thus, Taiwan reverted to China after World War II. However, to George Kerr, Vice Consul of American Consulate at Taipei, the Cairo Declaration was a fatal blunder, “some of the damage to American interests will never be repaired.”¹¹⁰

¹⁰² Ibid., 76.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 74.

¹⁰⁴ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 329.

¹⁰⁵ USDOS, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49* (Washington DC: GPO, 1950), 20. See also Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, ed., ^eds., *History of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945)*, 49.

¹⁰⁶ Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 13.

¹⁰⁷ USDOS, *The China White Paper, August 1949*, reissued ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), 133.

¹⁰⁸ *HyperWar: A Hypertext History of the Second World War*, (HyperWar Foundation, 1943 [cited Feb 12 2003]), available from <http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Dip/index.html#peaceourtime>.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., (cited).

¹¹⁰ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 23-27.

The Germination of Taiwan Secessionism in 1947

Toward the end of the WWII, when Germany surrendered, the US and the USSR had unfolded their struggle in East Europe in order to expand their respective spheres of influence, which marked the prelude to the Cold War. In August 1945, although Japan was on the way to defeat in the Pacific War and despite the availability of other means of ending the war, the US dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Gar Alperovitz argues in his classic *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* that these new instruments of war were deliberately used by the US as the first blow in the emerging Cold War confrontation with the USSR.¹¹¹ This argument illustrated the struggle between the two world powers as World War II drew to its close. Therefore, at the moment of the Emperor Hirohito's radio announcement of Japan's willingness to "bear the unbearable," Taiwan was to be engulfed in Nationalist-Communist civil war, behind which the US and the USSR struggled to dominate China.

Taiwan under Chinese Nationalist Rule since the 1945 Takeover

Despite the so-called cooperation between the Communists and the Nationalists against Japanese aggression, the Communists dealt with the Nationalists perfunctorily but conducted clandestine campaigns to expand its territory. Military conflicts persisted throughout the years.¹¹² When Japan surrendered in August 1945, Communists and Nationalists immediately clashed again over who had the right to accept Japanese capitulation and to scramble for control of the northeast part of China. Hostilities soon spread to the mainland.¹¹³

The Chinese Nationalist government was preoccupied with the civil war and ignored Taiwanese political and economic demands. The KMT takeover started in September 1945 when Chiang appointed General Chen Yi (陳儀) Governor General of Taiwan. He arrived in Taiwan on October 23, 1945. Chen Yi dismissed almost half of the governmental staff. More than 37,000 Taiwanese public servants lost their jobs and

¹¹¹ Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), 58-60.

¹¹² Li Ping-nan 李炳南, *Zhengzhi xieshang huiyi yu Guo-Gong tanpan (The Political Consultation Conferences and the KMT-CCP Negotiation)* (Taipei: Yongye, 1993), 9-11.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 65-67.

almost all department heads were mainlanders.¹¹⁴ This crushed native aspirations for political autonomy. Understaffing of governmental positions also caused inefficiency.¹¹⁵ Corruption and nepotism were rampant.¹¹⁶ The poor discipline of the military posed another serious problem.¹¹⁷ The officials and soldiers from the mainland openly despised the Taiwanese as a vanquished people.¹¹⁸ Worst of all, Chen Yi used capital from mainland syndicates and the bureaucracy to exploit Taiwan's economy and industries, creating a drastic commodity shortage, inflation and unemployment by early 1946.¹¹⁹

By January 1946, the American Army's Formosa Advisory Group had already predicted serious uprising against Chen Yi.¹²⁰ The Taiwanese were so embittered that hostility against mainland Chinese replaced their high hopes for the new KMT government. Taiwanese consciousness – characterized by the hostility between mainlanders and Taiwanese, invaders and natives, and conquerors and vanquished – prevailed.¹²¹ An ethnic division between Taiwanese and mainlanders was born.¹²² Because Japanese colonial rule brought some modernisation for the islanders, many Taiwanese believed they were superior to the Nationalists from the mainland; they despised and resented Nationalist Chinese.¹²³ On January 10, 1947, Taiwanese were infuriated by Chen Yi's

¹¹⁴ Before the takeover in 1945, the total governmental staff amounted to 84559; Taiwanese accounted for 46955, or 56%. In 1946, the total number was 44551; only 9951, or 22% were Taiwanese. Yet, there were still 6266 Japanese, or 14% of the total staff number. Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 66. *Tragic Beginning* remains the most comprehensive academic account of the February 28 Incident.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 65.

¹¹⁶ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 105-13, 15; Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 73-75; Liao, *Formosa Speaks*, 23-25.

¹¹⁷ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 97-105.

¹¹⁸ Niu Ciong-hau, "The Formation of the Formosan Nation," 53.

¹¹⁹ Hou Kun-hung and Hsu Chin-fa 侯坤宏, 許進發, ed., ^eds., *Ererba shijian dang'an huabian (Archives Materials on the 228 Incident)*, 10 vols., vol. 1 (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2002), 67. See also George Kerr, "Formosa's Return to China," *Far Easter Survey*, Vol. 16, No. 18 (1947): 206; Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 124-36; Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 80.

¹²⁰ Kerr, "Formosa's Return to China," 207.

¹²¹ Huang Chun-chieh, "Lun 'Taiwan yishi' de fazhan ji qi tezhi (The Development and Characteristics of Taiwanese Consciousness)," 22.

¹²² Some argue that an ethnic division is Hans versus aborigines, and thus refer to native Taiwanese versus mainlanders as sub-ethnic division. For instance, see Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 81, 82; Françoise Mengin, "State and Identity," in *Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China*, ed. Steve Tsang and Tien Hung-mao (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 116.

¹²³ Niu Ciong-hau, "The Formation of the Formosan Nation," 53.

announcement that he would postpone the introduction of China's new constitution on Taiwan because he believed that the Taiwanese were politically lagging behind the mainland and required at least two more years of Nationalist tutelage before they would be mature enough to enjoy the rights of full citizenship.¹²⁴

The February 28 Incident

On February 27, 1947, investigators of the Taipei City Monopoly Bureau, accompanied by uniformed policemen arrested a forty-year-old Taiwanese widow for peddling illegal tobacco in Taipei, confiscating her cash and untaxed cigarettes and then beating her. Outraged onlookers surrounded the investigators and one investigator, attempting to escape, accidentally shot a bystander.¹²⁵ Around noon the following day, to vent their anger, a Taiwanese mob attacked a branch office of the Tobacco Monopoly Bureau in the name of demanding redress and assaulted five or six officials, killing two of them. The rest were spared after surrendering their money and belongings.¹²⁶ In the afternoon, a mob occupied the Taiwan radio station and took over the airwaves to urge other Taiwanese to march on the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office to protest the government. Two people were killed and others injured by the guards as the crowd gathered and petitioned in front of Chen Yi's Executive Office.¹²⁷ As the news and violence spread, greater numbers of Taiwanese gathered in places throughout the island, attacking and killing mainlander Chinese, and even seizing military ordnance to arm themselves.¹²⁸

The Taipei Settlement Committee, established on March 1 and composed of Taiwanese aiming to reform the government and settling the incident, failed to stop the violence from escalating into island-wide clashes.¹²⁹ Although Hsieh Hsueh-hung (謝雪紅), a leading Communist in Taiwan, had played a role in instigating the March 2 riots in

¹²⁴ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 240.

¹²⁵ Hou Kun-hung and Hsu Chin-fa, ed., eds., *Ereba shijian dang'an huibian* (Archives Materials on the 228 Incident), 162-63, 66-67; Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 103.

¹²⁶ Hou Kun-hung and Hsu Chin-fa, ed., eds., *Ereba shijian dang'an huibian* (Archives Materials on the 228 Incident), 164, 68; Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 105-06.

¹²⁷ Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 106.

¹²⁸ Hou Kun-hung and Hsu Chin-fa, ed., eds., *Ereba shijian dang'an huibian* (Archives Materials on the 228 Incident), 71-73, 161-68, 71, 92; Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 102-07.

¹²⁹ Hou Kun-hung and Hsu Chin-fa, ed., eds., *Ereba shijian dang'an huibian* (Archives Materials on the 228 Incident), 74; Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 120-21.

Taichung (台中),¹³⁰ the Taiwan Communist Party actually had little official involvement in starting the uprising.¹³¹ On March 4, the Settlement Committee established seventeen subdivisions, or local Settlement Committees, throughout the island. Some controversy stemmed from some local Settlement Committees' attempts to take over the ordnance of local police departments, military police units or even troops.¹³²

In the week following February 28, eyewitness reports were sent to the American Consulate at Taipei and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).¹³³ On March 5, a Taiwanese delegation petitioned the American Consul to forward an enclosed letter and a "Manifesto" that restated the request for reform to Ambassador Dr. Leighton Stuart for transmission to the Chinese Nationalist government.¹³⁴ On March 7, inquiries about the American attitude to this uprising and the international legal status of Taiwan were put to George Kerr, Vice Consul and Foreign Service Staff Office at Taipei (from April 1946 to March 1947).¹³⁵ During World War II, he had been a staff officer in charge of "Island X" (Taiwan's code name) in the Navy's "Operations Causeway," Admiral Nimitz' plan to capture Taiwan from Japan.¹³⁶ At this juncture, Kerr argued that the US should consolidate its interests in the region by supporting self-determination of Taiwan. He saw a parallel between the islanders and the American colonists in 1776 and wrote secret reports naming the leading Taiwanese who had sought the help of the American Consulate before and during the February 28 Incident.¹³⁷

On March 7, the Taipei Settlement Committee proposed the "32 Demands" to the

¹³⁰ Hou Kun-hung and Hsu Chin-fa, ed., eds., *Ererba shijian dang'an huibian* (Archives Materials on the 228 Incident), 358-60; Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 124-27.

¹³¹ Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 136-40. See also Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 279.

¹³² Hou Kun-hung 侯坤宏, ed., eds., *Guoshiguan cang ererba dang'an shiliao* (Archives Materials on the February Twenty-Eighth Incident as Deposited in the Academia Historica), 3 vols., vol. 1 (Taipei: Academia Historica, 1997), 12-13. See also Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 115. See also John Leighton Stuart, *Memorandum on the Situation in Taiwan* [internet] (1947 [cited Sep 15 2003]), available from http://www.taiwandocuments.org/228_01.htm.

¹³³ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 275-76.

¹³⁴ Yet Vice Consul George Kerr was unable to discover any record of the Manifesto later. Ibid., 284-85.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 280, 323.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 28-30. "Operation Causeway" was aborted because of General MacArthur's insistence of return to the Philippines first. See Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 31-32.

¹³⁷ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 280, 323.

Governor General's Executive Office and the central government. These demands called for self-government.¹³⁸ However, some items demanded that all military forces on Taiwan temporarily disarm, the Garrison Command Headquarters be abolished, and Taiwanese take charge of the judicial organizations.¹³⁹ These demands were construed by Taiwan authorities and central government as intention to mount an armed rebellion.¹⁴⁰ On March 8, Chang Mu-tao (張慕陶), Commander of the Fourth Regiment of military police, advised the Taipei Settlement Committee not to offend the central government by acceding to these demands.¹⁴¹ The Taipei Settlement Committee took his advice and rescinded many of the demands.¹⁴²

However, in the middle of the afternoon of March 8, the streets of Taipei were cleared by random machine gun fire. After dark, Nationalist reinforcements consisting of 2,000 police and about 8,000 lightly armed troops with American jeeps landed in Keelung (基隆) and rushed to Taipei. An estimated 3,000 men simultaneously landed at Takao (Kaohsiung, 高雄).¹⁴³ At the same time, radical dissidents were beyond the control of the Taipei Settlement Committee.

After 10:00 that evening, armed Taiwanese insurgents in Taipei attacked the Executive Office, the Garrison Command Headquarters, the Taipei City police, military police, some officials' residences, and attempted to rob the Taiwan bank and some major corporations.¹⁴⁴ The situation was so dangerous that the Nationalist military source in Taipei warned the central government that the mob had established a command, that the Taiwan situation had deteriorated and that troops had to be immediately airlifted to

¹³⁸ Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 120, 97-200. See also Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 285-87, 475-79.

¹³⁹ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 287; Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 120-21.

¹⁴⁰ Hou Kun-hung and Hsu Chin-fa, eds., *Ereba shijian dang'an huibian* (*Archives Materials on the 228 Incident*), 74-75. See also Stuart, *Memorandum on the Situation in Taiwan* ([cited]).

¹⁴¹ Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 120-21. See also Stuart, *Memorandum on the Situation in Taiwan* ([cited]).

¹⁴² Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 121, 45-46.

¹⁴³ Troops were reported continuing to arrive on March 17. Stuart, *Memorandum on the Situation in Taiwan* ([cited]). See also Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 121.

¹⁴⁴ Hou Kun-hung and Hsu Chin-fa, eds., *Ereba shijian dang'an huibian* (*Archives Materials on the 228 Incident*), 87-88; Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 87, 146.

Taiwan.¹⁴⁵ The KMT reinforcements annihilated the rebels and restored order within a few days. Several thousand armed rebels escaped to the mountainous hinterland.¹⁴⁶ Yet, the undisciplined KMT troops engaged in much wanton killing and looting.¹⁴⁷ Many Taiwanese secessionists, including Liao Wen-i (廖文毅, Thomas Liao), escaped to Hong Kong. On March 17, General Pai Chung-hsi (白崇禧), Minister of National Defence, reached Taipei to settle and investigate the crisis. On March 24, he submitted a long report to Chiang outlining the causes of the incident.¹⁴⁸

The KMT authorities then launched a household enumeration to facilitate the hunting of radicals who had participated in the insurgency; Taiwan was caught in a time of terror and many innocent Taiwanese were arrested or summarily killed.¹⁴⁹ An estimated 10,000 people were killed during and immediately after the February 28 Incident.¹⁵⁰ The February 28 Incident distinguished Taiwanese history from Chinese history.¹⁵¹

Taiwanese Consciousness and George Kerr after the February 28 Incident

The February 28 Incident and the ensuing reign of terror germinated the seed of Taiwanese nationalism. Many people with strong Taiwanese consciousness saw the February 28 Incident as an attempt "to replace misrule with home rule,"¹⁵² and as a demand for political self-determination.¹⁵³ Seeking international intervention and stressing cultural differences across the Straits were immediately available measures.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁵ Hou Kun-hung and Hsu Chin-fa, ed., ^eds., *Ererba shijian dang'an huibian* (Archives Materials on the 228 Incident), 191-93.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., ed., ^eds., 88.

¹⁴⁷ Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 161. See also Stuart, *Memorandum on the Situation in Taiwan* ([cited]).

¹⁴⁸ Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 153. See also Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 315. Here Kerr called General Pai's report "whitewashing."

¹⁴⁹ Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 151-58. See also Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 343.

¹⁵⁰ Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 159. Kerr also believed the around 5000-10000 people were killed. See Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 310. See also Phillips, "Between Assimilation and Independence," 295-96. However, H. Y. Chu, research fellow of Institute of Modern History of Academia Sinica, assessed the total number of killed and missing is between 800 and 900. See UDN, "228 shijian siwang shizong babai duo ren (Over 800 People Were Killed or Missing in 228 Incident)," Feb 3 2004.

¹⁵¹ Edmondson, "The February 28 Incident and National Identity," 25.

¹⁵² Liao, *Formosa Speaks*, 51.

¹⁵³ Liao Kianliong, "Why Formosa Wants Independence," *Formosan Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1962): 6.

¹⁵⁴ Hsu Tsung-mao 徐宗懋, *Taiwanren lun* (An Analysis of the Taiwanese) (Taipei: Shibao wenhua, 1993), 89.

Some survivors were so embittered and desperate that they colluded with Americans to promoted secessionism.

George Kerr was the most important American involved in this process.¹⁵⁵ As Vice Consul and Foreign Service Staff Officer at Taipei, Kerr was irritated with a Consul who “had consistently played down the gravity of events preceding the fatal clash” and with diplomats’ divergent attitudes toward the February 28 Incident in American Embassy at Nanjing.¹⁵⁶ After March 17, he spent a week working on a memorandum of the February 28 Incident for Dr. Leighton Stuart, US Ambassador to China. Kerr wrote to Dr. Stuart that “all Formosan leaders who sought intervention by the United States or United Nations were very keenly aware of Formosan’s unsettled legal status, and would continue to raise the issue at every opportunity.”¹⁵⁷ Kerr argued in his original memorandum to Dr. Stuart, that: “No area in China is so enthusiastically pro-Americans [*sic*] as this island, which completes the chain we influence, control, or occupy strategically from the Hokkaido through the Philippines.”¹⁵⁸ He listed seven different forms or degrees of intervention suggested “by thoughtful Formosans.”¹⁵⁹ Kerr explained:

The most extreme proposal called for the creation of a United Nations trusteeship or protectorate. This should be set up for a stated period of time, and subject to review at a reasonable interval before the proposed terminal date, or until a local plebiscite would afford the Formosans themselves an opportunity to determine their permanent status.¹⁶⁰

On April 18, Dr. Stuart sent to Chiang a *Memorandum on the Situation in Taiwan*, which was essentially Kerr’s account of the February 28 Incident.¹⁶¹ The memorandum showed that Kerr did not comprehend the difficulties that resulting from the civil war and the resignation of Premier T.V. Soong (Sung Tsu-wen, 宋子文).¹⁶² Kerr omitted ten of the 32 demands that dealt with military and political matters, thus rendering his

¹⁵⁵ Kerr was active in communicating with secessionists in Taiwan. For instance, see Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 326.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 321.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 324.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 325.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ Stuart, *Memorandum on the Situation in Taiwan* ([cited]. More expanded details are exposed in Kerr’s *Formosa Betrayed* published in 1965.

¹⁶² Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 142.

presentation “very misleading.”¹⁶³ Kerr played down the Taiwanese request to disarm the troops and its rebellious elements that left the KMT little choice but to resort to military force. Furthermore, he ignored the casualties inflicted upon the KMT troops by local rebels,¹⁶⁴ and the disturbances caused by local radicals attempting to take over military ordnance.¹⁶⁵ He similarly ignored the insurgents’ attacks and killings of mainlanders. In particular, he failed to mention the attacks by insurgents on the night of March 8. Instead, he stressed the reformism of the Taiwanese. However, his account shaped the American understanding of the February 28 Incident.¹⁶⁶

The KMT government appointed Wei Tao-ming (魏道明), former Chinese Ambassador to the US, to replace Chen Yi on May 15, 1947. He made an honest effort to rectify the errors of Chen Yi’s incompetence and inefficiency.¹⁶⁷ However, he still had to face such realistic structural issues as economic control and reliance on an autonomous budget. Hence, the state-entrepreneurship system established by Chen Yi was relaxed but not discarded. Meanwhile, the worsening civil war had aggravated central requisitioning of local resources.¹⁶⁸ Accordingly, Wei was not able to effectively solve the economic problems. The terror continued and undisciplined troops remained a problem.¹⁶⁹

On May 26, 1947, following his return to Washington, Kerr was keen to sell his account of the February 28 Incident, interventionism and his conclusion that “a friendly, non-Communist and *non-Nationalist* Formosan population would serve our interests best” to Department of State officials, including Secretary of State General Marshall, Senator Joseph Ball, UN Ambassador Warren Austin, the Navy, the War Department and

¹⁶³ Ibid., 197. The “32 Demands” presented in Dr. Stuart’s memorandum to Chiang Kai-shek in 1947 are identical to those presented in Kerr’s *Formosa Betrayed* published in 1965.

¹⁶⁴ Hou Kun-hung, ed., ^eds., *Guoshiguan cang ererba dang’an shiliao* (Archives Materials on the February Twenty-Eighth Incident as Deposited in the Academia Historica), 13-14.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., ed., ^eds., 17.

¹⁶⁶ Later, many American scholars based their descriptions of the incident on Dr. Leighton Stuart’s memorandum to Chiang or on Kerr’s work, *Formosa Betrayed*.

¹⁶⁷ Joseph William Ballantine, *Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1952), 64-65. Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 166-67.

¹⁶⁸ Wu Jo-yu 吳若予, *Zhanhou Taiwan gongying shiye zhi zhengjing fenxi* (The Political-Economic Analysis of the State-Run Business in Postwar Taiwan) (Taipei: Yeqiang, 1992), 49-50.

¹⁶⁹ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 343.

the Pentagon.¹⁷⁰

Initial Intentions of America vis-à-vis Taiwanese Nationalism

The Wedemeyer Report and American Support

In July 1947, Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer was sent to China by Secretary of State Marshall to reassess the US' China policy. Before concluding his fact-finding mission, he flew to Taiwan. In August, Thomas Liao, who had escaped to Hong Kong and had remained in contact with Kerr,¹⁷¹ sent General Wedemeyer a petition requesting American assistance.¹⁷² Based on Kerr's research and his account of February 28,¹⁷³ Wedemeyer echoed Kerr's most extreme views by asserting in his report to Secretary of State Marshall that "Formosans would be receptive toward United States guardianship and United Nations trusteeship."¹⁷⁴ Within seven months of the report, a series of suspicious events took place.

The US government announced its plan to help the KMT government develop a military training program on the island. Kerr believed that this was the Pentagon's effort to prevent Taiwan from being "written off."¹⁷⁵ A Hong Kong news story alleged on October 3, 1947 that a Taiwanese leader had a two-hour conversation at the American Consulate with the Director of the USIS, who commented upon Formosa's unsettled legal status and pledged American help for the trusteeship issue.¹⁷⁶ According to Kerr, this story "had alarmed Nanjing and Taipei, for it was too close to the truth."¹⁷⁷

On December 15, the New Zealander Allen Shackelton, the Industrial Rehabilitation Officer of the UNRRA, denounced Wei Tao-ming's "reform government" and provoked a furious reaction in Taiwan.¹⁷⁸ Wei responded with an announcement in Nanjing on

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 326-29. Emphasis of *non-Nationalist* is Kerr's.

¹⁷¹ George Kerr's *Formosa Betrayed* provides many accounts of his association with the Liao brothers.

¹⁷² Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 454-55.

¹⁷³ Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 218 note 21.

¹⁷⁴ USDOS, *The China White Paper*, August 1949, 309.

¹⁷⁵ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 343.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 346-47.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 351.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 348.

December 20 stating that “all outside criticism of the policies and conduct of the Nationalists on Formosa was promoted by the intrigues of communists and ‘ambitious elements of a certain nation’ who wanted to sever Formosa from China.”¹⁷⁹

During the Chinese Lunar New Year in early and mid-January 1948, the American Consulate used eight non-American Catholic priests to “pour propaganda into Formosa which pictured the United States as the world’s foremost champion of liberty and of minority rights.”¹⁸⁰ They spent the long New Year holiday in villages far from Taipei, carried with them an American film series made available by the Consulate, showed the films seven times and each showing drew large crowds.¹⁸¹ According to the priests:

Anywhere the Formosan people is very enthusiastic about anything coming from the U.S., and not only that but also some people many times ask me when will the U.S.A. take control of this Island. They say that [they] hope the day of being free of the “Pigs” (as they call them) of the Mainland ... Many people want to learn English ...¹⁸²

This deliberate and delicate exercise of clerical political influence, not long before the first anniversary of the February 28 Incident, inflamed secessionist sentiment and alienated the Taiwanese from Wei Tao-ming’s government. The message delivered by these US Consulate-directed Fathers was warmly received by Taiwanese secessionists.¹⁸³ From February 20, 1948, Governor Wei combed the island for dissidents. Although the atmosphere on the island was tense, the anniversary came and went uneventfully. Many dissidents wrote to foreign friends in the American Consulate and in the media to vent their rage and reiterate their appeal for separation from China.¹⁸⁴

The promotion of self-determination became a subject of media interest. On February

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ The American Consul made comprehensive use of information gathered by missionaries because they travelled around and saw signs of popular feeling. Kenneth C. Krentz, American Consul General at Taipei, used missionaries to gather information about Taiwanese general feeling of the KMT authorities on Taiwan in early 1949. See *Foreign Relations of the United States 1949*, vol. 9 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1974), 280. *Foreign Relations of the United States 1949*, vol. 9 is hereafter cited as *FRUS 1949* (v.9).

¹⁸² Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 349.

¹⁸³ This is best illustrated by a secessionist’s conversation with John J. Macdonald, US Consul General at Taipei. When Acheson’s defeatism loomed around September 1949, Mr. C. F. Chien, Chairman of the Taiwan Tea Association, questioned Macdonald in September 1949 how the US could have the audacity to face the world, posing as a nation professing democratic principles, believing in self-determination of peoples and the rights of small nations, and yet allow Taiwan to fall into the hands of the Communists. See *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 387-88.

¹⁸⁴ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 349-50.

27, 1948, Dr. Sun Fu (孫復), President of the Legislative Yuan and Premier of the KMT government, issued an address in Taipei and denounced inaccurate reporting of conditions in Formosa by foreign newsmen who raised the question of Formosa's future status.¹⁸⁵ At a press conference in Shanghai on March 1, Dr. Sun chastised a press officer in the US Consulate in Taiwan for spreading a rumour that Formosa wished to be separated from China, and questioned whether the US government "should allow such a man undermining the U.S.-China friendship to remain in its government until the present moment ..."¹⁸⁶ This amounted to a showdown, in which the US was urged to express its positions on Taiwan and against Communism.

Chiang Kai-Shek and US Partisanship on China

The civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists and the struggle for China between the US and the USSR eclipsed this historic encounter. At this juncture, the US had yet to define a single China policy. Secretary of State George Marshall distrusted Chiang and favoured a policy of quiet disengagement from China. In fact, Marshall believed that the US "should not commit its military and economic resources to the saving of Chiang, because no matter how much you poured in, under his leadership you couldn't win."¹⁸⁷ Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, believed there was no solution to the Chinese problem "unless we could have assassinated Chiang and gotten a good leader" to replace him.¹⁸⁸ The Republicans, however, with their belief in the greatness of Chiang, their conviction that the Chinese Communists were puppets of the Russians, and their reluctance to abandon a traditional ally, called for increased aid to the KMT against the Chinese Communists. Republicans used their majority in Congress to influence foreign policy, even threatening to torpedo the Marshall Plan in order to generate support for Chiang's KMT government. In April 1948, the China Aid Act was passed with Republican support.¹⁸⁹ With strong Republican Congressional support and the strategic need for the KMT cooperation, the US government would not set itself at odds with the KMT government on the Taiwan

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 351.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 352.

¹⁸⁷ "Thursday, December 16, 1954," Papers of Harry S. Truman, Post-Presidential Files, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, 13.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 12.

¹⁸⁹ USDOS, *The China White Paper, August 1949*, Introduction, p3.

issue. The Nationalist-Communist civil war took clear priority over Taiwan in the US master plan to position China in the democratic camp.

The Overseas Taiwan Independence Movement

In mid-summer 1948, the Liao brothers, Liao Wen-kuei (廖文奎, Joshua Liao) and Thomas Liao, together with Hsieh Hsueh-hung founded the Formosan League for Re-emancipation (FLR). It was the first organization demanded extreme interventionism, US guardianship and UN trusteeship for ultimate self-determination of Taiwan. The FLR is considered the flagship of the Taiwan independence movement. On August 23, 1948, the exiled FLR members issued in Tokyo a manifesto demanding independence and a plebiscite. The manifesto declared the invalidity of the Cairo decision by invoking the Atlantic Charter that provided for racial self-determination and free choice of government.¹⁹⁰ To provide a theoretical basis and doctrinal grounds for self-determination, the FLR manifesto demanded that Taiwan be treated in the same way as independent Korea and declared that Formosans were not “pure” Chinese but a mixed race with no natural political bond with any nearby country.¹⁹¹

Inconsistencies in US Policy

Separatism and Extreme Interventionism

From late 1948, the Nationalists suffered successive defeats at the hands of the Communists. Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett requested an appraisal of Taiwan’s strategic importance. On November 24, 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) warned that control of Taiwan by Chinese Communists could threaten maritime communication between Japan and the Malaysia and cause very serious damage to American national interests. Yet the JCS suggested that it would be in the interests of American national security if diplomatic and economic measures could be deployed to thwart Communist domination of Formosa.¹⁹² On December 20, the JCS still suggested

¹⁹⁰ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 456; Liao, *Formosa Speaks*, 21; Fred W. Riggs, *Formosa under Chinese Nationalist Rule* (New York: Macmillan, 1952), 56-57, note 56.

¹⁹¹ Liao, *Formosa Speaks*, 51. See also Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 456-57.

¹⁹² *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 263.

refraining from making a military commitment to Taiwan.¹⁹³ However, Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett reported to President Truman on January 14, 1949 that Taiwan was planned as a last Nationalist bastion.¹⁹⁴ He predicted that it might be necessary “for the US to take military action if Formosa is to be denied to the communists.” He believed that should the Chinese Communist invade Taiwan or should the Taiwanese revolt against the Chinese, UN intervention could be justified based on the *de facto* right of Taiwan to arrange a plebiscite.¹⁹⁵ He suggested that the US base its military intervention on the principle of self-determination instead of upon obvious strategic interests to gain international support. In the event that the Nationalists proved unable of denying the island to the Communists, the US should cultivate a Formosan autonomy movement.¹⁹⁶

A National Security Council (NSC) draft report on January 19, 1949 asserted that the legal status of Taiwan and the Pescadores was that they were a part of Japan awaiting final disposition by a peace treaty; that the US had recognized Chinese *de facto* control over the islands since V-J Day; that the Taiwanese welcomed independence under the protection of the US or UN, and that the US should maintain discreet contact with potential indigenous leaders and “be prepared to make use of a Formosan autonomous movement” should it be in the American national interests to do so.¹⁹⁷ Its conclusions recommended that the US issue the following warnings to the governing KMT authority on Taiwan:

- (1) The US does not want to see chaos spread from the of mainland to Taiwan;
- (2) If KMT misrule continues, world opinion might swing in favour of Formosan autonomy;
- (3) The US requests that the KMT look after Taiwanese welfare and economic needs

¹⁹³ Ibid., 286.

¹⁹⁴ Before his retirement, Chiang Kai-shek had adopted a series of measures to transform Taiwan into a base for reunification. He had already transferred the gold and silver bullion and foreign exchange of the government from Nanjing to Taiwan. He had requested the US to ship all the remaining military supplies under the US\$125-million special grant to Taiwan after December 1948. He had tightened his political control over Taiwan by appointing Chen Cheng as new Governor to replace Wei Tao-ming on January 5, 1949. Chiang Kai-shek renounced his retirement on January 21, 1949. See Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941-1950*, 2 vols., vol. II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 497.

¹⁹⁵ *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 266.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 267.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 271-72, 74. See also Jon W. Huebner, "The Abortive Liberation of Taiwan," *The China Quarterly*, No. 110 (1987): 262.

- and encourage active Taiwanese political participation;
- (4) The US is concerned about the influx of refugees from the mainland, which aggravates the burden on Taiwan's economy, and is disturbed at the increment of KMT troops, which is not an effective barrier to Communist penetration;
 - (5) The KMT authorities should draw lessons from past failures on the mainland and on the island to deal with the situation in Taiwan.¹⁹⁸

On January 26, Formosan League for Re-emancipation (FLR) leader Joshua Liao informed US Consul General at Shanghai, John M. Cabot, that a Taiwanese revolt against the KMT authorities on Taiwan could start upon the fall of Nanjing to the Communists and requested that US assist the Taiwanese rebels or at least remain neutral toward the revolt.¹⁹⁹ The Liao brothers had been maintaining contacts with US Consulates since the establishment of the FLR in mid-1948.

On February 3, the NSC sent to Truman a top-secret report, NSC 37/2, an abstract of the NSC draft report of January 19. There were three main points. First, the US should maintain contact with potential native Taiwanese leaders to exploit a Formosan autonomous movement should it serve US national interest. Second, it outlined the conclusions of American warnings to the KMT authority on Taiwan. Third, the US "should conduct a vigorous program of economic support for the economy of Formosa, designed to assist the Formosans in developing and maintaining a viable, self-supporting economy."²⁰⁰ A successful Formosan autonomous movement conceivably presupposes a viable Formosa economy, one for which American economic aid was designed. The link between economic aid and separatist intention filtered all the way down; as Secretary of State Dean Acheson and other key officials later insisted, economic aid was intended to deny Taiwan to the Communists; "ECA (Economic Cooperation Administration) program only means [to] aid autonomous Formosa."²⁰¹ With Truman's approval and with the direction of coordinated implementation on February 4, NSC 37/2

¹⁹⁸ *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 274-75.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 276.

²⁰⁰ Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 46-47; NSC, "NSC 37/2: A Report to the President by the National Security Council on the Current Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa," Feb 3 1949, in Papers of Harry S. Truman. Top secret, declassified 1975, Harry S. Truman Library, 1-2. *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 281-82.

²⁰¹ *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 285, 89, 91, 93, 95-96, 305.

became the guiding policy toward Taiwan in early 1949.²⁰² On the same day, the American Consulate reported to State Department that the Formosan League for Re-emancipation had small influence and that other secessionist groups were not unified. “[I] Suspect all of them hope to force outside action by exaggeration.”²⁰³ At this point, secessionism apparently lacked popular support in Taiwan.

Dean Acheson was appointed Secretary of State after George C. Marshall resigned on January 21, 1949. Acheson played an important role in the Truman administration’s China and Taiwan policies. On February 14, Acheson instructed Livingston Merchant, then Counsellor of US Embassy in Nanjing, to go to Taiwan to pave the way for the Formosan autonomy movement. Merchant’s responsibilities included establishing a personal relationship with Taiwanese independence groups,²⁰⁴ and seeking to enable General Sun Li-jen (孫立人) to replace Governor Chen Cheng (陳誠) so as to facilitate separation.²⁰⁵ For the US, Sun was “an American trained officer of integrity, competence and liberal philosophy.”²⁰⁶ The US government was eager to replace Chen Cheng, a henchman of Chiang, with Sun as governor of Taiwan when Chiang’s future was still unknown after his retirement.²⁰⁷ American diplomatic officials in Taipei maintained very close contacts with Sun. America’s earliest exploratory thoughts were to manoeuvre for the replacement of Chen Cheng by Wei Tao-ming or Sun Li-jen so that the Taiwan regime would agree to declare Formosan autonomy or to be taken under the wing of the UN upon Chiang Kai-shek’s fall.²⁰⁸

On February 18, Acheson directed the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) to provide economic assistance to Taiwan by developing and maintaining a viable, self-supporting economy.²⁰⁹ Later, Merchant urged that US economic aid be directed at improving the welfare of native Taiwanese, by providing fertilizer under the ECA

²⁰² Ibid., 282; Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 47.

²⁰³ *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 280.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 293, 303. See also Richard D. McKinzie, *Oral History Interview with Livingston Merchant* [internet] (Harry S. Truman Library, 1975 [cited Sep 20 2003]), available from <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/merchant.htm>. Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 47-48.

²⁰⁵ *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 303.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 338.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 297-300, 12, 28, 38. On Sun’s disgust of local and mainland developments, see *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 331, 35.

²⁰⁸ See *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 263.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 289.

program and implementing revival projects under the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction.²¹⁰

On March 2, Acheson realized that apparent American efforts to separate Taiwan from the mainland would create an irredentist movement and anti-US sentiment. A vigorous program and the ambitious mission of American economic aid “would make US position more noticeable but general US position [on] Formosa as seen [from] outside should not be particularly affected by [the] size [of] mission.”²¹¹ Although the American government avoided making any promises to offer military assistance to the KMT government, the US planned to extend its aid program to maintain the viability of the Formosan economy.²¹²

On March 3, Acheson informed the NSC that the US was attempting to cultivate separatism in Taiwan but had to avoid raising American-created irredentism that the Communists could use for their own purposes: “if our present policy is to have any hope of success in Formosa, we must carefully conceal our wish to separate the island from mainland control.”²¹³ He realized that diplomatic and economic measures alone would not guarantee a denial of Taiwan to the Communists, even the use of US military power, short of complete blockade and occupation, would be ineffective.²¹⁴ He said, after exhausting all political and economic measures, if the US would resort to military intervention, America would do so in concert with like-minded powers and with the use of UN mechanisms. The proclaimed intention would be to satisfy legitimate Taiwanese demands for self-determination, either under a UN trusteeship or through independence.²¹⁵ Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, executive secretary of the NSC, noted that the president approved of this policy.²¹⁶ The State Department acknowledged on March 23 that it was interested in the activities of the Formosan League for Re-emancipation and had instructed the appropriate consular offices to keep

²¹⁰ Ibid., 314, 36, 38, 40.

²¹¹ Ibid., 293-94.

²¹² Ibid., 294. See also Annie H. Chou, ed., eds., *Documentary Collection on US Aid to ROC*, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Taipei: Academia Historica, 1995), introduction 1-2.

²¹³ *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 295-96. See also Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 47.

²¹⁴ *FRUS 1949* (v.9).

²¹⁵ Ibid., 296.

²¹⁶ Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 49.

in touch.²¹⁷ However, Merchant reported to Acheson that Taiwanese independence groups were disunited, politically illiterate, disorganized and unreliable. Merchant believed that the US could not advise or encourage an American-backed Governor to declare separation unless he possessed sufficient force to defend it.²¹⁸

The China White Paper and the Rush for Extreme Interventionism

Following the Democratic victory in the Senate and House elections in 1948, the KMT's debacle in late 1948, Chiang Kai-shek's announcement of retirement on January 21, 1949, and the ensuing disintegration of the Nationalist leadership, the Truman administration decided in March 1949 to draft the China White Paper. The White Paper was intended to "show that we had done as much as we could, that our course had [been] basically correct, and that the impending fall of China to the Communists was in no way attributable to American policy."²¹⁹ This decision marked the conclusion of US support to the Nationalists on the mainland and the acceptance of the imminent Communist victory. If the United States wanted to deny Taiwan to the Communists, more vigorous interventionism would be required.

Merchant affirmed to Acheson on April 12 that the control of Taiwan by Chen Cheng and Chiang who were preoccupied with their self-interest in defending the island from the Communist invasion would now serve the immediate interests of America.²²⁰ Acheson agreed and instructed Merchant to inform T. V. Soong, an important KMT government official and brother-in-law of Chiang, that the US would give "primary consideration" to the Nationalist economic and self-strengthening projects,²²¹ and to disabuse him of the linkage between US economic aid and US imperialistic designs on Taiwan.²²² The superficiality of American support for the KMT regime worried the secessionists. On May 2, P. Huang, a member of the Formosan League for Re-emancipation, visited the US Embassy and urged the US to make its separatist intentions toward Taiwan clear and, in particular, to support Formosan independence to save the island from communism.²²³

²¹⁷ *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 301.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 303.

²¹⁹ USDOS, *The China White Paper, August 1949*, Introduction, p5.

²²⁰ *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 314.

²²¹ Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 52.

²²² *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 315.

²²³ *Ibid.*, 323.

The American approach was both sophisticated and opportunistic. On May 5, Merchant recommended to Acheson the use of some economic programs on Taiwan to support military establishment and raise the average standard of living. In return, the US should request Taiwan's permission for the long-term leasing of US Navy and US Air Forces bases and the placement of Sun Li-jen in command of all forces and services.²²⁴ On May 24, Merchant concluded that efforts to replace Governor Chen Cheng with liberal General Sun had proven unsuccessful and that the Formosan population was deeply resentful of its Chinese rulers. However, the Formosans did not have the revolutionary organization, leadership or the arms to mount a successful uprising. Taiwanese independence groups were too weak. He urged a reconsideration of American policy.²²⁵ Among the three lines of actions he enumerated, he suggested "a policy of calculated inaction colored with opportunism" which took advantage of the Nationalist self-interest in resistance and continued to direct American economic aid to native Taiwanese.²²⁶ He realized that although economic aid and secret diplomatic efforts might contribute to the ultimate raising of the Formosa issue in the UN as a result of an appeal by the native population and by mainland elements on the island, economic and diplomatic measures alone could not guarantee that Taiwan would not fall to the Communists.²²⁷

In the arena of international politics, the US Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Walton Butterworth, consulted UN officials about the Taiwan issue on June 8. The following day the US proposed a statement to be delivered to the UN General Assembly to revoke the Cairo Declaration, denounce the Nationalist misrule which had forfeited its right to sovereignty over the island, and call for a plebiscite or some alternative UN trusteeship pending Taiwan's qualification for independence. He believed the right of self-determination would render the US position morally unassailable.²²⁸

On Taiwan, the US also required a stabilizing Chinese force apart from American troops and unsophisticated secessionist groups. Donald Edgar, US Consul at Taipei, reported

²²⁴ Ibid., 326-27.

²²⁵ Ibid., 338-39.

²²⁶ Ibid., 340-41.

²²⁷ Ibid., 341.

²²⁸ Ibid., 346, 49, 50.

to the State Department on June 12 that General Sun Li-jen "brightened considerably" after Edgar showed him a letter from Butterworth to Merchant. Sun believed that if Governor Chen received replacement orders from ROC Acting President Li Tsung-jen (李宗仁), Chen would withdraw and Chiang Kai-shek could not obstruct the replacement; Sun believed that a change of governor or regime would serve national interests and save Taiwan for China.²²⁹

A draft memorandum prepared by the Policy Planning Staff on June 23 considered all possible measures. It indicated that any US plan for the removal of the KMT authorities on Taiwan might encounter the military resistance of 300,000 KMT troops on the island. Although the document claimed it did not attempt to provide solution to this military obstacle, it suggested that an inquiry be instituted to see whether the US National Military Establishment was able and willing to "subdue and eject ... the Nationalist troops now on the island" and to "exert effective authority there for an interim period."²³⁰ It proposed to call the powers that had defeated Japan to petition the UN for a plebiscite regarding the ultimate disposition of Taiwan based on self-determination within one year.²³¹ It recommended that Chiang be informed that if he wished to remain on Taiwan, he would be accorded the status of a political refugee.²³²

On July 6, Director of the Policy Planning Staff George F. Kennan reasserted that the only reasonable chance of denying Taiwan and Pescadores to the Communists lay in the removal of the present KMT administrators from the islands and in the establishment of

²²⁹ Ibid., 352. On February 11, 1950, General MacArthur had a meeting with General Sun in Japan. After Chiang reinstalled himself as President of the ROC in Taiwan in March 1950, Sun was promoted as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. A CIA document dated March 20, 1950 indicated that Sun was going to launch a coup against Chiang. In early June 1950, Sun sent a messenger to deliver a secret note to Dean Rusk, then US Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs. Sun told Rusk that he was going to mount a coup to oust Chiang; he asked for the support or at least the acquiescence from the US. To prevent any possible leaks of secret, Rusk destroyed the note but reported Sun's coup bid to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who then reported to Truman. Before Truman made a decision, the Korean War erupted on June 25; Rusk therefore requested Sun to abort the coup to maintain the stability of Taiwan. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, *Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 209. See also Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 145; Tu Nien-chung 杜念中, "Sun Liren queshi paifale yitong xiangyao zhengbian de midian: Meiquo qian guowuqing Lusike toulou Sun'an mixin (Former US Secretary of State Dean Rusk: Sun Li-jen Did Send a Secret Message about an Attempt for Coup)," *Xinxinwen* 新新聞, No. 183 (1990), 24-26.

²³⁰ *FRUS* 1949 (v.9), 359-60.

²³¹ Ibid., 361.

²³² Ibid., 363.

a provisional international or US regime that would invoke the principle of self-determination and hold a plebiscite to determine the ultimate disposition of the islands. He believed that "Formosan separatism is the only concept which has sufficient grass-roots appeal to resist Communism" and urged action to change the National Military Establishment's view of Taiwan's strategic importance.²³³

On August 4, America revealed its deepest fear: the turnover of Taiwan to the Communists resulting from widespread mutinies by disaffected KMT troops. The State Department requested the JCS to consider two situations incurred by US military occupation: (1) occupation in the face of initial opposition from Nationalist forces on the island or an attack by Communist forces, and (2) occupation by agreement with the existing authorities on Taiwan with implicit responsibility for internal security and external defence.²³⁴

Publication of the "China White Paper" on August 5 precipitated the fiasco of the Nationalists on the one hand; on the other hand, it dismissed Soviet and Chinese Communists' accusations against American imperialistic designs on Taiwan and to reach an accommodation with the Communist government in China once it was officially established.²³⁵ Yet the Democratic victory in the 1948 Congressional elections and the publication of the "China White Paper" intensified partisanship on China issue. Many conservative Republican senators, including Styles Bridges, William Knowland, Pat McCarran, and Kenneth Wherry, denounced the China White Paper as "a wishful, do-nothing policy that has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of Soviet conquest."²³⁶

The State Department received on August 22 the JCS' reply to the planned military occupation of Taiwan. The JCS did not regard Taiwan's strategic importance as vital to the US under peacetime conditions. Citing the disparity between US military strength, budgetary limitations and global commitments, the JCS reaffirmed that Taiwan's importance did not justify overt military action. The JCS recommended against

²³³ Ibid., 356-57.

²³⁴ Ibid., 370-71. See also Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 89.

²³⁵ Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 85-86.

²³⁶ Tsou, *America's Failure in China*, 509.

occupation. Yet the JCS promised to advise on overt military action in case of war from the standpoint of national security.²³⁷

The Emergence of Acheson's Defeatism on Taiwan

In September the continuing deterioration of the mainland situation and the influx of refugees into Taiwan led many prominent secessionists to appeal to Macdonald, Consul General at Taipei, and Rankin, Consul General at Hong Kong, for support of Taiwan independence.²³⁸ Moreover, the British Foreign Office gave the US State Department officials a written statement on September 9 regarding its position on Taiwan. The statement stressed that the legal status of Taiwan could not be altered without the consensus of the Four Powers (the US, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China); that submitting Taiwan case to the UN was both unlikely and harmful; and that Taiwan would eventually fall into Communist hands.²³⁹

Considering the JCS' view of Taiwan's strategic importance, the allies' refusal to support interventionism, and Acheson's assertion that American influence in China "remains one of [the] most valuable assets in that country,"²⁴⁰ the State Department decided on October 6 not to take "any action contrary to the wishes of the present or future Chinese authorities in Formosa."²⁴¹ The State Department was resigned to accept the KMT control of Taiwan and refrain from extreme interventionism. However, the US was determined to make it clear to Chiang that he was responsible for the defence of Taiwan, that the US would not commit its armed forces to defend Taiwan, and that American support and attitude toward Taiwan depended upon KMT efforts to establish an efficient administration that would see to the political and economic well-being of Taiwan.²⁴²

On October 28, Acheson instructed John J. Macdonald, the Consul General at Taipei, to convey American views on Taiwan forcefully to Chiang.²⁴³ Macdonald did so on

²³⁷ *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 377-78. See also Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 90-91.

²³⁸ *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 383-84, 86-87, 91, 92. For statistics concerning this influx, see Phillips, "Between Assimilation and Independence," 299.

²³⁹ *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 389-90.

²⁴⁰ Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 5.

²⁴¹ *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 396.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 394-97. See also Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 91-92.

²⁴³ *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 402.

November 3. Chiang believed that the US had extended moral support to the KMT and was willing to again deal directly with him.²⁴⁴ In reply, Chiang shared the view that “improvement of the political and economic well-being of the Taiwanese people will fundamentally strengthen the security of Taiwan.”²⁴⁵

Abandonment of the most extreme interventionism caused a backlash in the conservative camp. Senator H. Alexander Smith sent a letter to Secretary Acheson on November 4 to urge military occupation on the position that Taiwan was still technically a part of Japan and that it might be made a trusteeship area. He also stated that, pending a peace treaty with Japan, America should take the view that the US could establish a sort of protectorate over Taiwan.²⁴⁶ Smith’s calls were to no avail. On December 1, Merchant, now Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, filed a memorandum on the expected loss of Taiwan, in which he suggested announcements designed to reassure the American people as to the preparedness and competence of US government, to minimize the psychological repercussions, and to repair or neutralize the resultant shift in the strategic balance of American defences.²⁴⁷

After the Nationalist government’s formal declaration of the retreat of the ROC to Taiwan on December 9, on December 19 Acheson instructed Donald D. Edgar, Consul at Taipei, to make an estimate of domestic support for the KMT, the Communists, Taiwanese independence leaders, the prospects of a coup, KMT defections to the Communists, prospects of economic stability, and official and public receptivity of US military occupation and UN trusteeship.²⁴⁸ In response, Edgar concluded on December 23 that the KMT had no popular support, and that independence leaders were unorganised and unreliable. A coup could not succeed without outside support. If US aid did not arrive soon, the number of defections from the KMT would increase. Taiwan’s economy was basically sound but the KMT military drain had to be scaled down. The KMT troops would oppose US military occupation without negotiation but welcome military control through advisors. Over one million Chinese civilians on

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 412.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 415.

²⁴⁶ Tsou, *America's Failure in China*, 528. See also Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 350.

²⁴⁷ *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 431-32.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 446-47. See also Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 131-32.

Taiwan looked hopefully ahead to a temporary US takeover and most Taiwanese welcomed UN trusteeship.²⁴⁹

While awaiting Edgar's reply, President Truman had already issued a statement to the press on December 22. He said: "Formosa is a part of Nationalist China and we still recognize the Nationalist Government as the government of China."²⁵⁰ In late December, the US moved its embassy from Nanjing to Taipei. It was evident that at this time, the JCS was revising its opinion on the strategic importance of Taiwan. On December 23, the JCS recommended stepped-up economic and diplomatic aid and military advisers and the gift of military equipment and supplies to the KMT government on Taiwan as a part of the overall program to resist the spread of Communist domination in East Asia.²⁵¹ Meanwhile, the American Consulate reported to the State Department in late December 1949 "Only Liao brothers can be called independence leaders and their reliable following in Taiwan most uncertain. ... Other Taiwan 'big names' ... equally without solid backing."²⁵²

Senator Smith again urged on December 27 that the administration open a dialogue immediately with Mr. Wu Kuo-chen (K.C. Wu, 吳國楨), the new Governor of Taiwan, to arrange an American occupation of Taiwan. On December 30, Senator William Knowland called for the dispatch of a military mission to Taiwan. On the same day, Senator Robert Taft strongly suggested that Taiwan be kept out of the Communist hands even if it were necessary to send the US Navy there.²⁵³ Yet, on December 29, despite an assertion from General Bradley, Chairman of the JCS, that Taiwan's strategic importance justified military assistance, Acheson maintained a defeatist attitude, believing that "there is no Chinese basis of resistance to Communism," that the corrupt Nationalist China was doomed to losing Taiwan to the Communists and that the loss of Taiwan would not breach American defense.²⁵⁴ Accordingly, he reaffirmed the existing policy – the US would continue to use its best diplomatic and economic efforts to keep

²⁴⁹ *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 451-55. See also Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 134-35.

²⁵⁰ *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 456.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 460-61.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 451-52.

²⁵³ Tsou, *America's Failure in China*, 529-30.

²⁵⁴ *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 464-66.

the island out of Communist hands but would not use force.²⁵⁵

The Hidden Reversal Mechanism in Truman's Abandonment Policy

Citing the proposals of some Congress members, the Communists charged that the US was going to occupy Taiwan; in response, Truman issued a statement on January 5, 1950 to end further speculation.²⁵⁶ A key sentence of Truman's "abandonment" policy toward Taiwan initially read, "The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time *or to detach Formosa from China*."²⁵⁷ Chairman of JCS General Bradley suggested deleting the phrase "or to detach Formosa from China" because "the situation might arise where [the Communists] will march South, in which case we may want to detach Formosa from China." Truman agreed. So did Acheson, although he said he would have preferred to leave the phrase in the statement. Thus Truman's announcement read "The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time."²⁵⁸ On the same day, Acheson told Senators Knowland and Smith: "if one wanted to be legalistic it could be argued that in sheer legality Formosa would not be a part and parcel of China until a stipulation to that effect had been made in the Japanese Peace Treaty."²⁵⁹

This announcement seemed to announce the abandonment of Taiwan. Secretary of State Acheson reinforced this perspective when he excluded Taiwan from the "defence perimeter" in his speech to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950.²⁶⁰ Most people believed that the eruption of the Korean War reversed the abandonment policy and saved Taiwan.²⁶¹ As Edwin W. Martin, Consul at Taipei recalled to US in January

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 468. See also Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 349. However, Grasso stressed that the US believed the Nationalists' resources sufficient to accomplish self-defence and an expanded American role there might be costly to the achievement of American objectives on the mainland. See Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 136.

²⁵⁶ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 350-51.

²⁵⁷ USDOS, "Memorandum, 5 January 1950," 1. See also Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 137. Emphasis is my own.

²⁵⁸ USDOS, "Memorandum, 5 January 1950," 1. See also Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 137.

²⁵⁹ USDOS, "Memorandum of Conversation on Formosa Problem, 5 January 1950," in Papers of Dean Acheson. Confidential, declassified 1976, Harry S. Truman Library, 2.

²⁶⁰ Schoenbaum, *Waging Peace and War*, 207-08; Tsou, *America's Failure in China*, 536-37.

²⁶¹ See, for example, Shih Cheng-feng, "A Taiwanese Nationalist Review"; Peter Chen-main Wang, "A Bastion Created, a Regime Reformed, an Economy Reengineered, 1949-1970," in *Taiwan: A New History*, ed. Murray A. Rubinstein (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 321.

1950, stated:

Our policy was hands off, let the dust settle, we're not going to defend Formosa. We had no military aid program then of any kind there. We had long ago recognized that Formosa was part of China and that was it. Now, if China had taken Formosa at that time rather than gone into Korea – of course they eventually might have gone into Korea and we might have gotten involved then, but by that time they would have already had Formosa, at least that wouldn't be an issue today.²⁶²

Summary

Japan's fifty-year period of colonial rule planted the seed of Taiwanese nationalism, a prototypical Taiwanese consciousness. The Taiwanese consciousness was defined by the Chinese diaspora's passion for irredentism. However, Japan's modern administrative techniques had given Taiwan an infrastructure for a new "imagined community." America's involvement in Asian affairs evolved from an old-style imperialism, through market-centred hegemonism, and finally to modern hegemonism that incorporates self-determination, enabling the US to claim innocence of imperial pretensions, vitiate old imperialism, and achieve and sustain global domination. Since the early 1940s, this modern hegemonism has persisted through American involvement in Taiwanese affairs.

After the Taiwanese reunited with the Chinese in 1945, the KMT's incompetence ruined Taiwanese passion for irredentism but fermented an embittered Taiwanese consciousness. The February 28 Incident and the ensuing reign of terror then converted the embittered Taiwanese consciousness into secessionism. After the Incident, some American strategists began fomenting separatism in the name of self-determination. George Kerr, American Vice Consul at Taipei, capitalized upon the compatibility between Taiwanese secessionism and American strategic scheme to call for extreme interventionism.

The KMT debacle on the mainland and the projected Communist challenge to American hegemony prompted the US government to encourage separatism on Taiwan. Politically, the US attempted to revoke the Cairo Declaration and manoeuvre a plebiscite or UN trusteeship based on the unsettled legal status of Taiwan and the principle of

²⁶² Richard D. McKinzie, *Oral History Interview with Edwin W. Martin* (Harry S. Truman Library, 1975 [cited Oct 7 2002]), available from <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/martinew.htm#note>.

self-determination. America's vigorous economic aid to Taiwan was intended to maintain a viable, self-supporting economy; the link between economic aid and separatist intention did build up as key US officials repeatedly stressed that economic measure in the form of aid was an integrated tool to deny Taiwan to the Communists. In addition, the US considered manoeuvring General Sun Li-jen into new leader of Taiwan authorities independent from mainland control, plotting a coup against Chiang, eliminating the Nationalist troops and authorities from Taiwan, and launching a military occupation by American troops to achieve its separatism on Taiwan and safeguard the integrity of the openness policy.

However, the cause of independence did not initially receive strong popular support from the Taiwanese. Despite the secret and subtle promotion of separatism, the US diplomats' first-hand reports in 1949 insisted that the Taiwanese secessionist groups were too fragmented, inexperienced, and unreliable, and that despite their minimal influence they tended to exaggerate the support behind them by saying what the US wanted to hear. Still, the Truman administration was eager to inflame separatism. The American Consulate finally admitted in late December 1949 that the Liao brothers were truly independence leaders but that they had no assured following in Taiwan. This underlines the American use of Taiwan independence to serve its hegemonism. However moral the universalism of self-determination is, the literature does not absolve the US of hegemonic pretensions.

Realistically, the weakness of Taiwanese independence groups, the influx of mainland refugees into Taiwan, the disparities between US military strength and global obligations, the lack of allies' support of interventionism, and Acheson's attempt to seek a rapprochement with Communist China after the establishment of the PRC combined to lead the Truman administration to defeatism. Consequently, although the US government fully recognized the genesis of Taiwanese secessionism and was interested in collaborating with secessionist activities, America could not enforce separatism on Taiwan. However, the paradox was that the hidden reversing mechanism embedded in Truman's abandonment policy would only function with the eruption of the Korean War in 1950, when the strategic position of Taiwan assumed new importance.

Chapter 3: 1950-1970

THEORY CONSTRUCTION AND THE GROWTH OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM

Introduction

After the Chinese Communists claimed the mainland in 1949, the expansion of the Communist bloc worried the US. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the Truman administration had to resort to military intervention in the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait to consolidate its defence belt in the Western Pacific. For the US, exploiting the anti-Communist attitude of the Chiang Kai-shek regime became an immediate option. This did not mean, however, the US would commit to reviving the failed KMT regime that had just lost Mainland China to the Communists. Promoting Taiwanese nationalism was another viable, long-term option. Parallel use of these two options best served American interests. That is, despite America's official position of supporting the KMT regime, there was an underlying promotion of Taiwanese independence.

This chapter shows how the US pursued these two options by focusing on four questions: What was the essence of Truman's interventionism after the Korean War? How did the US government use Taiwanese nationalism to undermine the KMT regime and contribute to the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism? How did these two options allow American politicians and scholars who supported separatism on Taiwan, and Taiwanese secessionists to shape their respective visions of Taiwan independence? How did the Taiwan independence movement benefit from American patronage in this era of bipolarisation?

The Resumption of Separatism since the Korean War

Truman's Ambiguous Options over the Future of Taiwan

Truman's "hands-off" policy toward Taiwan faced many challenges from early 1950. On the front of US-PRC relations, America's attempts to secure its national interests on the mainland by recognizing the Communist regime had proven impractical. Mao Zedong's course of "leaning-to-one-side," most evident in his "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" speech on June 30, 1949, dismissed American efforts for improving relationship with Chinese Communist regime.²⁶³ From November 1948 to December 1949, Chinese Communist authorities arrested and detained American consulate staff in Shenyang (瀋陽). The failure of American diplomatic efforts to resolve this issue made it impossible for the Truman administration to recognize the newly established PRC. The detained American diplomats suffered mistreatment and were tried in November 1949 for allegedly beating Chinese employees. On January 13, 1950, Communist authorities confiscated part of the American consular compound in Beijing, a move Ambassador O. Edmund Clubb assessed as one designed to hasten recognition. In response, the State Department withdrew its personnel from China.²⁶⁴ On February 14, 1950, the Sino-Soviet Thirty-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid was signed after Mao's two-month visit to Moscow. The Soviet Union thus increased its influence over China. America closed its consulates in China in April.²⁶⁵ American hopes of securing the national interests in the mainland and influence on Communist China had been frustrated.

On the front of strategic balance, Stalin was impressed with Acheson's "defence perimeter" speech that implied that America was retreating from East Asia. Stalin thus supported Kim Il Sung's plans to invade South Korea and Mao Zedong was preoccupied with plans to invade Taiwan.²⁶⁶ Truman learned from the CIA that North Korean Communists were actively preparing to attack the south with the assistance of the USSR

²⁶³ Mao Zedong 毛澤東, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, 3rd ed., vol. 4 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1969), 415-17.

²⁶⁴ Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 8-9.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

²⁶⁶ Zhihua Shen, "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Stalin's Strategic Goals in the Far East," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2000): 45-54. See also Huebner, "The Abortive Liberation of Taiwan," 265-68; Paa Shiu-lam, *Taidu' muhou (Behind the Scene of Taiwan Independence)*, 27; Allen Suess Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), 21-22.

and the PRC.²⁶⁷ Truman calculated the possible loss of the entire Korean peninsula and Taiwan as a serious threat to the bases included in the so-called security perimeter in Japan, Okinawa, Philippines, and Aleutians.²⁶⁸

When the Korean War erupted on June 25, 1950, the immediate military threat outweighed American political consideration that had led to the “hands-off” policy on Taiwan.²⁶⁹ Taiwan immediately became “an important anchor in a US defensive chain” stretching from the Aleutians to Australia.²⁷⁰ The hidden reversal mechanism that had been embedded in Truman’s “abandonment” policy was activated. Truman found it expedient to use the war to escape the yoke of the Cairo Declaration and resume the separatist intention without any UN resolution. Therefore, in addition to immediately committing American soldiers and war material to South Korea as a member of the UN, Truman made an emphatic statement regarding Taiwan on behalf of America alone on June 27. He arbitrarily asserted that the legal status of Taiwan was undetermined.²⁷¹ Truman also dispatched the Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Strait, making Taiwan a protectorate of the US.²⁷² All of these measures marked a resumption of separatist intention on the island.

Although the very next day PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (周恩來) accused America of imperialism and declared Beijing’s determination to liberate Taiwan, the US stuck to its new position.²⁷³ On July 10, Truman and Acheson denounced the Kremlin’s request to link the restoration of the *status quo ante* on the Korean peninsula to the change of America’s latest position on Taiwan for a peaceful settlement.²⁷⁴ Believing that the pronouncement on June 27 may have inspired the Chinese Communists to speed up the invasion timetable, Truman dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Strait to reinforce its

²⁶⁷ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs (Years of Trial and Hope: 1946-1953)*, 2 vols., vol. 2 (New York: Doubleday, 1955-56), 349.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 355.

²⁶⁹ Ballantine, *Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign Policy*, 130.

²⁷⁰ Gary Klintworth, “China and Taiwan - From Flashpoint to Redefining One China,” (Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2000), 19.

²⁷¹ Harry S. Truman, *Letter to Ambassador Warren Austin Restating the US Position on Formosa* (Harry S. Truman Library, 1950 [cited Oct 8 2002]); 357, available from <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/nsc.htm#collect>.

²⁷² Oksenberg, “Living with China,” 64.

²⁷³ Zhongyang dang'anguan, ed., ^eds., *Zhongguo gongchandang bashinian zhengui dangan (Valuable Documents of Chinese Communists in the Past Eighty Years)*, 897.

²⁷⁴ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 418-19.

position in the Far East.²⁷⁵ With respect to the most controversial issue of the legal status of Taiwan, Truman explained the American position in his letter of August 27, 1950 to Ambassador Warren R. Austin, US Representative in the UN. Truman stated:

The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now.²⁷⁶

Truman thus brought his position on the legal status of Taiwan in line with the draft report of the NSC on January 19, 1949, which asserted that the Taiwanese would welcome independence under the protection of the US or UN and recommended that the US “be prepared to make use of a Formosan autonomous movement.”²⁷⁷ Surely Truman was being prudent in keeping his options over the future of Taiwan open by maintaining legal ambiguity, given the poor state of the KMT regime and the threat from the CCP. This ambiguous position would allow Washington to deny any claim to the island by the CCP.

The Emergence of Taiwanese Primordialism

Although Truman’s assertion about the unsettled status of Taiwan never mentioned such terms as the Cairo Declaration or self-determination, it nullified the Cairo decision and granted the request of the Formosan League for Re-Emancipation (FLR) on August 23 1948 that the Cairo Declaration be invalidated in accordance with Atlantic Charter’s national self-determination.²⁷⁸ Truman’s explanation of Taiwan’s legal status in his August 27 letter added momentum to the exiled Taiwanese secessionist camp. Taiwanese secessionists in Japan founded the Formosan Democratic Independence Party in 1950. Although Thomas Liao was imprisoned on charges of illegal entry in MacArthur’s Japan for openly attacking Chiang Kai-shek and was waiting for deportation, his associates elected him Chairman in absentia.²⁷⁹ In September 1950 Joshua Liao submitted his memorandum, *Formosa Speaks*, to the UN, in support of the

²⁷⁵ NSC, “Prospects for an Early Successful Chinese Communist Attack on Taiwan,” Jul 26 1950, in Papers of Harry S. Truman. Secret, declassified 1993, Harry S. Truman Library, 16.

²⁷⁶ Truman, *Letter to Ambassador Warren Austin Restating the US Position on Formosa* ([cited]).

²⁷⁷ See page 37 of this thesis.

²⁷⁸ See page 36 of this thesis.

²⁷⁹ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 464.

petition for Taiwan independence. He stated:

With [Formosan] group-consciousness growing into Formosan Nationalism, ... the Formosan patriots now want complete independence through a plebiscite under neutral supervision in accordance with the principle and practice of self-determination and democracy ...²⁸⁰

He enumerated six failings of the Cairo Declaration to justify the unsettled political status of Taiwan as the legal basis for Taiwan independence.²⁸¹ To strengthen the theoretical and doctrinal basis for "self-determination," he argued:

[T]hough Chinese blood dominates, constant absorption of Dutch, Spanish, and Manchu elements in the remote past and of Japanese immigrants in the recent time through intermarriage is indisputable. Thus, in both race-psychology and physical appearance the native Formosans have become as different from the Chinese as – if not more than – the Americans are from the English and the Brazilians from the Portuguese.²⁸²

...

In industry and population, cultural advancement and social organization Formosa is comparable with the majority of the independent nations in the present world and therefore deserves to become independent.²⁸³

The FLR manifesto of August 1948 argued that the Taiwanese were a mixed race.²⁸⁴ Joshua Liao's *Formosa Speaks* asserted the biological heterogeneity between Chinese and Taiwanese and the cultural superiority of the Taiwanese over the Chinese to frame a cultural argument as the basis of a Taiwanese nation-state. The narrative is typical of primordialism, or ethno-nationalism, which argues that the collective identity of an ethnic group is founded on physical cultural or biological determinants,²⁸⁵ such as common consanguinity, ethnicity, language or religion.²⁸⁶ Evidently, America's ambiguity over the policy of Taiwan after the outbreak of the Korean War directly contributed to this Taiwanese primordialism.

²⁸⁰ Liao, *Formosa Speaks*, 54.

²⁸¹ The six faults of the Declaration were: (1) The Cairo decision to hand Formosa to China was internationally dictatorial and is therefore not to be recognized. (2) The Cairo decision to return Formosa to China was technically erroneous. (3) The Cairo decision was unjust in selling the Formosans' hereditary rights and interests. (4) The Cairo decision is no longer applicable. (5) The Cairo decision is not final. (6) The Cairo decision is no longer valid. See Ibid., 54-57, 58.

²⁸² Ibid., 51.

²⁸³ Ibid., 59.

²⁸⁴ See page 36.

²⁸⁵ Shih Cheng-feng, "Taiwan yishi de tansuo (An Exploration of Taiwanese Consciousness)," 60-61, 66.

²⁸⁶ Shih Cheng-feng, *Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism)*, 52, 90, 153. See also Wu Mi-cha and Chang Yen-hsien, *Jianli Taiwan de guomin guojia (Establish a Civic Nation for Taiwan)*, 141.

America's Separatist Strategies

"Two Chinas" and "One China, One Taiwan"

After the eruption of the Korean War, the US resumed its aid to the Nationalists on Taiwan and thus strengthened the KMT regime. On May 18, 1951, Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, reaffirmed in a speech to the China Institute that the US recognized the KMT as the government of China.²⁸⁷ There was no official repudiation of Rusk's statement from the Truman administration.²⁸⁸ Grasso believed that recognizing the KMT as the ROC was the foundation of Truman's "Two Chinas" policy.²⁸⁹ However, behind this "Two Chinas" solution was a widely held view that the KMT, as a corrupt and unpopular dictatorship, would collapse upon the death of Chiang or the withdrawal of American support.²⁹⁰ There was also an assumption that in the course of time, after power passed to a younger generation of leaders, an independent Formosa might be accepted.²⁹¹ Fred W. Riggs argued that many Taiwanese "no doubt felt the greatest amount of sympathy for those of their leaders" who advocated independence and that power transition on the island would blur and ultimately eliminate the distinction between mainland Nationalists and Taiwanese.²⁹² Therefore, "Two Chinas" could finally lead to Taiwan independence.

Meanwhile, Truman's insistence upon the undetermined legal status of Taiwan had become a guiding principle of America's China policy. In the US-Japan San Francisco Peace Treaty, sponsored by the US government on September 8, 1951, America not only deliberately excluded the Communist Chinese and the Nationalist Chinese representatives from meetings to discuss the Treaty, but also circumvented the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty.²⁹³ Under Article 2 of the Peace Treaty, "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores."²⁹⁴ The Treaty of Peace between the

²⁸⁷ Ballantine, *Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign Policy*, 131; Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 13; Riggs, *Formosa under Chinese Nationalist Rule*, 9.

²⁸⁸ Ballantine, *Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign Policy*, 132.

²⁸⁹ Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy*, 13.

²⁹⁰ Michael Lindsay, "Formosa's Future," *The New Republic*, Vol. 139, No. 14 (1958): 8.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*: 9.

²⁹² Riggs, *Formosa under Chinese Nationalist Rule*, 56-58. See also Paaui Shiu-lam, *Taidu' muhou (Behind the Scene of Taiwan Independence)*, 56.

²⁹³ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 540-41.

²⁹⁴ *US-Japan San Francisco Peace Treaty*, (1951 [cited Oct 11 2002]), available from <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm>.

Republic of China and Japan was signed on April 28, 1952. Article 2 stipulated: "It is recognised that under Article 2 of the [US-Japan San Francisco Peace Treaty] ... Japan has renounced all right, title, and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (澎湖, the Pescadores) as well as the Spratley Islands and the Paracel Islands."²⁹⁵ Again the sovereignty issue was conspicuously absent. Arguing the superiority of treaties over declarations and proclamations, Taiwanese secessionists always based their argument for independence on Truman's statements about the undetermined legal status of Taiwan and his position on the KMT's control of Taiwan.²⁹⁶ Thus Truman's own words were a major factor in the birth of "One China, One Taiwan" policy.

"Two Chinas" and "One China, One Taiwan" is a reflection of merely two different, non-exclusive approaches to separatism.

The Authoritarian Regime of Chiang Kai-shek

Before the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the ROC's First National Assembly had appended to the constitution several clauses, collectively called the "Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion" (動員戡亂時期臨時條款) on April 18, 1948.²⁹⁷ These provisions overrode the constitution itself with mandatory unification of China. After retreating to Taiwan, citing these temporary provisions, the KMT regime set aside the basic principles of constitutional democracy in pursuit of unification with the mainland. Chiang Kai-shek resumed the Presidency of the ROC on Taiwan in March 1950. The outbreak of the Korean War two months later and the signing of the US-ROC Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in February 1951 immediately benefited the creation and extension of Chiang's Leninist-style authoritarian

²⁹⁵ *Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan*, (1952 [cited Oct 11 2002]), available from <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/taipei01.htm>.

²⁹⁶ In addition to Joshua Liao's points in his *Formosa Speaks*, see also Ko Kiansin 高見信, "The Legal Status of Formosa from the Viewpoint of International Law," *Formosa Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1962). *Formosan Quarterly* was one of the earliest secessionist journals that maintained this argument. Chen Lung-chu and Lasswell, *Formosa, China, and the United Nations*, 83-85, 93. Shih Cheng-feng, "Tai-Zhong guanxi yu guojia anquan - Meiguo de yinsu, guojia rentong, yiji minzu rentong (Taiwan-China Relations and National Security - The American Factor, State Identity, and National Identity)". In November 2004, the DPP government's Ministry of Education released a proposed Taiwan-centric curriculum for high schools to indicate that the ROC is not the legal government of Taiwan. See page 247 of this thesis.

²⁹⁷ Chiu Hungdah 丘宏達, "Constitutional Development in the ROC in Taiwan," in *In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949*, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst, 1993), 23.

regime.²⁹⁸

Politically, the KMT established a two-tier system. The upper tier consisted of Martial law.²⁹⁹ To cope with "the subversive danger" of Communism and comply with the Temporary Provisions, the KMT had imposed Martial law on May 20, 1949.³⁰⁰ Martial law suspended the planned national elections to the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, gave all members of these two political bodies unlimited terms of office, established a ruling stratum that was isolated from the population, and deprived the Taiwanese of the right to campaign and vote in national elections.³⁰¹ Because martial law was based on the Temporary Provisions, they arguably legalized the KMT dictatorship by linking it with the unification of China over the coming decades.³⁰² The lower tier was comprised of the Local Autonomy Law and allowed local elections after 1950.³⁰³ The KMT intended to use local elections to impress the US and infiltrate Taiwanese society.³⁰⁴ Although local elections establish a façade of democracy, the KMT formed networks of patron-client relations, implemented a *de facto* vote distribution scheme among its candidates, and took advantage of irregularities in balloting and vote counting to manipulate local elections.³⁰⁵ The patron-client system

²⁹⁸ Hu Fu 胡佛, "The Electoral Mechanism and Political Change in Taiwan," in *In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949*, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst, 1993), 137; Steve Tsang 曾銳生, "Transforming a Party State into a Democracy," in *Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China*, ed. Steve Tsang and Tien Hung-mao (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 2-6. For the definition of "authoritarian regime," see Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 83; Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology*, ed. Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen (Helsinki: Distributor: The Academic Bookstore, 1964), 297.

²⁹⁹ Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 7.

³⁰⁰ Chiu Hungdah, "Constitutional Development in the ROC in Taiwan," 23-25. The ROC Legislative Yuan further enhanced Chiang Kai-shek's power in December 1949 after it issued an administrative order declaring Taiwan as a combat zone; see Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 26.

³⁰¹ Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 243. For the number of members of elected central government organs (including the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan) in 1947 and 1948, see F. Gilbert Chan, *China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question* (Hong Kong: Asian Research Service, 1984), 20, 46 note 56; Chen Lung-chu and Lasswell, *Formosa, China, and the United Nations*, 133; Chou Yangsun and Andrew J. Nathan, "Democratic Transition in Taiwan," 279; Douglas Heusted Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 90-91.

³⁰² Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 10.

³⁰³ Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 7.

³⁰⁴ Huang Teh-fu 黃德福, "Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang," in *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, ed. Tien Hung-mao (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 106-07.

³⁰⁵ Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 7. See also Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 95; Tien Hung-mao 田宏茂, "Elections and Taiwan's Democratic

was based on the exchange of economic interests and political support between the KMT and native local factions. As the patron, the KMT divided, ruled and rewarded native heavyweight followers, or its clients, with economic favouritism and political ascendancy; in return, the native local factions supported the KMT regime. The patron-client system was originally designed to make political inroads into the Taiwanese community.³⁰⁶ So-called local self-government under martial law actually reinforced KMT authoritarian rule by enhancing the KMT's legitimacy and suppressing opposition forces.³⁰⁷ The KMT also used the Taiwan Garrison Command to maintain an extensive intelligence network to monitor suspicious activities by Communist agents or by Taiwanese dissidents.³⁰⁸ In a sense non-supportive of the KMT, the political structure and security system were designed for the minority mainlanders to rule over the Taiwanese majority.³⁰⁹ Furthermore, between 1949 and 1953, a series of land reforms created a large owner-cultivator class to win Taiwanese gratitude and rally support for the Chinese Nationalists.³¹⁰ In the eyes of the landlord class that constituted "the social elite in every community" and that was "known to have been active in the 1947 revolt," however, the land reforms removed them from their accustomed position as political

Development," in *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, ed. Tien Hung-mao (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 8.

³⁰⁶ Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 7-9, 107-10, 87, 236-37; Hu Fu, "The Electoral Mechanism and Political Change in Taiwan," 138-39; Huang Teh-fu, "Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang," 107-08; Robert R. Kaufman, "Corporatism, Clientelism, and Partisan Conflict: A Study of Seven Latin American Countries," in *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, ed. James M. Malloy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 113; Shiao Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," in *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, ed. Tien Hung-mao (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 213, 15-17; Wu Mi-cha and Chang Yen-hsien, *Jianli Taiwan de guomin guojia (Establish a Civic Nation for Taiwan)*, 126. Robert A. Scalapino argues that the KMT's networks of patron-client relations was an embryonic form of Taiwanization; see Robert A. Scalapino, "Foreword," in *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, ed. Tien Hung-mao (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), x. Initially, the ruling Chiangs were the paramount patrons. In contrast, native Lee Teng-hui became the paramount patron of the patron-client system in the 1990s; see page 171 of this thesis.

³⁰⁷ Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 67, 69-70. See also Hu Fu, "The Electoral Mechanism and Political Change in Taiwan," 139; Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 97; Shiao Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 216; Tien Hung-mao, "Elections and Taiwan's Democratic Development," 5, 8-9.

³⁰⁸ Ralph N. Clough, *Island China*, ed. Twentieth Century Fund Study (London: Harvard University Press, 1978), 37, 42.

³⁰⁹ Neil Herman Jacoby, *U.S. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign Aid, Self-Help, and Development* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 112. See also Chen Lung-chu and Lasswell, *Formosa, China, and the United Nations*, 135-36.

³¹⁰ Before the agrarian reform, 40% of more than half a million farmer families were wholly tenants. Land rents amounted normally to somewhere between 55% and 60% of the crop. The peasant population suffered from disease and undernourishment, which nurtured social unrest and discontent. See Ballantine, *Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign Policy*, 138.

leader.³¹¹ The landowner class that had been expropriated by the KMT land reform was often compensated with state-owned-enterprise stock.³¹²

Militarily, because the Chiang Kai-shek regime cited "return to the mainland" as its highest national policy, its exorbitant military budget made native Taiwanese bemoan their sacrifice for an impossible mission.³¹³ Economically, because the KMT confiscated all Japanese-owned property in 1945, a large part of Taiwan's industry came under government control and passed into mainlander hands. After the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1948, mainlanders took industrial and administrative positions *en masse*. The KMT regime imposed a party-state capitalist monopoly upon the economic system.³¹⁴ In addition to the daunting task of recovering the mainland, the KMT seemed more interested in protecting mainlanders' interests, squeezing limited resources to support an immense mainlander-dominated military, in addition to an administrative and teaching personnel corps that amounted to one quarter of the population.³¹⁵ Native Taiwanese therefore took charge of the private sector.³¹⁶ Psychologically, the KMT made any reference to the February 28 Incident taboo, but this policy only encouraged Taiwanese pride in the incident as the latest native rebellion against mainlander suppression.³¹⁷ Culturally, the KMT imposed a Chinese national identity by instituting

³¹¹ Peng Ming-min in his *Taiwan ziji yundong xuanyan* (A Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation) accused the purpose of the land reform is to weaken or even eliminate the potential leadership class' opposition to the Nationalists. See also Hill Gates, "Ethnicity and Social Class," in *The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society*, ed. Emily Martin Ahern and Hill Gates (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), 269; Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 28; Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 70, 256. Wu Mi-cha and Chang Yen-hsien, *Jianli Taiwan de guomin guojia* (Establish a Civic Nation for Taiwan), 47.

³¹² John Kaplan, *The Court-Martial of the Kaohsiung Defendants* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1981), 5; Mengin, "State and Identity," 119.

³¹³ Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 76, 85-86. According to Peng Ming-min, Chiang Kai-shek's own statistics in 1964 showed that military expenditure accounted for more than 80% of the budget. See Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, 128.

³¹⁴ Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian* (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan), 112-13; Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 98, 105, 20-21, 24-27; Meisner, "The Development of Formosan Nationalism," 100; Riggs, *Formosa under Chinese Nationalist Rule*, 89; Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 218; Wu Neng-yuan, "Taiwan jingji fazhan de ruogan wenti (Some Issues about the Development of Taiwan Economy)," in *Taiwan: Economy, Society and History*, ed. E.K.Y. Chen, Jack F. Williams, and Joseph Wong (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1991), 44-45.

³¹⁵ Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 240, 46, 49-50; Chen Lung-chu and Lasswell, *Formosa, China, and the United Nations*, 166-67.

³¹⁶ Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 249; Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 78; Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 218.

³¹⁷ Chang Mau-kuei, "Political Transformation and Ethnization of Politics in Taiwan".

Mandarin Chinese (*guoyu*, 國語) education, a manifestation of cultural hegemony,³¹⁸ and enshrining Sunist thought or the *Three Principles of the People* as official ideology³¹⁹ to justify authoritarian KMT rule.³²⁰

For Taiwanese nationalists and their sympathizers, the KMT instilled in the Taiwanese a sense of inferiority to the mainlanders. Virtually all native Taiwanese were marginalized by definition;³²¹ the Taiwanese believed that they were politically dominated, economically exploited and socially discriminated against by the KMT regime.³²² However, it is an exaggeration to argue that because of the structural inequities, "the Formosans overwhelmingly favour the establishment of an independent republic."³²³ As explored in Chapter 2, the cause of independence had never received strong backing from the Taiwanese community.³²⁴ Although the KMT regime was very repressive, most of its victims were mainlanders who were suspected of anti-Chiang Kai-shek or pro-Communist activities. The second group was a small circle of native secessionists. British diplomats in Taipei repeatedly reported in the 1950s that the majority of residents had little to do with the security apparatus and were hardly affected by the Chiang regime.³²⁵ In any case, the Korean War tightened Chiang's authoritarian control in the 1950s and 1960s and generated resentment of the regime's structural inequities,

³¹⁸ Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 255; Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 114-17; Shih Cheng-feng, "Taiwan yishi de tansuo (An Exploration of Taiwanese Consciousness)," 67; Wu Mi-cha and Chang Yen-hsien, *Jianli Taiwan de guomin guojia (Establish a Civic Nation for Taiwan)*, 162-68.

³¹⁹ Tsang, "Transforming a Party State into a Democracy," 4.

³²⁰ Wu Nai-teh 吳乃德, "Ethnic Consciousness, Political Support, and National Identity: A Preliminary Analysis of the Political Ideologies among Ethnic Groups in Taiwan," *Taiwan Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1995): 50.

³²¹ Shu Wei-der, "Who Joined the Clandestine Political Organization?" in *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*, ed. Stephane Corcuff (Armonk: M E Sharpe, 2002), 64.

³²² Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 240-41; Meisner, "The Development of Formosan Nationalism," 101-02.

³²³ Meisner, "The Development of Formosan Nationalism," 102.

³²⁴ See page 50 of this thesis. Even after democratic transition began in 1986, the results of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan elections strongly showed that the majority of Taiwan's population identified with the ROC. After democratisation was accomplished in 1996, the majority of population still identified with the ROC in 2000 and 2004 legislators and presidential elections. For further details, see Chapter 5 and 6.

³²⁵ Tsang, "Transforming a Party State into a Democracy," 9.

reinforcing the ethnic and class divisions that had emerged when Chen Yi took over the governorship of Taiwan in 1945.³²⁶

American Aid and the Emergence of Taiwanese Structuralism³²⁷

Before the Korean War, American economic aid had been used to promote Formosan autonomy and to deny Taiwan to the Communists. Although American recognition of the ROC strengthened the KMT regime, the US had used economic assistance (1950-1965) first to make the Taiwanese economically powerful, and then to make them politically powerful. As Jacoby put it:

It was wise for the United States to focus upon rapid material progress, based on a vigorous private sector. In this way, American aid helped to disperse economic power and to create new power sectors in society. Indirectly, pressures were built up for political and social changes that are likely to occur in due time.³²⁸

Here, the private sector refers to the overwhelmingly native-owned small and medium businesses. The KMT feared the implications of economic power passing into the hands of the Taiwanese.³²⁹ However, the defection of the Nationalist Navy's only cruiser to the Communists in early 1949 had made Washington worry about a likely political conspiracy and deals between the Communists and the higher echelons of the KMT.³³⁰ The US strongly pressured the KMT to cultivate private businesses, making it an important condition for the use of American aid.³³¹ Chiang initially opposed investing in the private sector at the expense of the military; yet he did not want to be restrained by US aid and accepted the suggestion of economic policy-makers that Taiwan

³²⁶ Gates, "Ethnicity and Social Class," 266, 68; Huang Chun-chieh, "Lun 'Taiwan yishi' de fazhan ji qi tezhi (The Development and Characteristics of Taiwanese Consciousness)," 16-17.

³²⁷ For the definition of structuralism, see page 89 of this thesis.

³²⁸ Jacoby, *U.S. Aid to Taiwan*, 148, 70-71; Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 84, 278 note 71.

³²⁹ Wu Neng-yuan, "Taiwan jingji fazhan de ruogan wenti (Some Issues about the Development of Taiwan Economy)," 45.

³³⁰ *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 296.

³³¹ Li Chia-chuan, "Taiwan jingji de fazhan, lianxiang he sikao (The Association and Reflection on the Development of Taiwan Economy)," in *Taiwan: Economy, Society and History*, ed. E.K.Y. Chen, Jack F. Williams, and Joseph Wong (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1991), 7; Liu Chin-ching, "Taiwan jingji suxing zhi tantao (A Study of the Revival of Taiwan Economy)," in *Taiwan: Economy, Society and History*, ed. E.K.Y. Chen, Jack F. Williams, and Joseph Wong (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1991), 21; Wu Neng-yuan, "Taiwan jingji fazhan de ruogan wenti (Some Issues about the Development of Taiwan Economy)," 45-46.

should use the aid to create economic self-sufficiency.³³² To encourage economic development in the 1950s and 1960s, the economic policy-makers of the ROC expanded private industry through the early privatisation of state-owned enterprises; the transfer was accomplished by turning stock in the companies to landlords as part of their compensation for lands that had been surrendered to tenants under the land reform program.³³³ With the deliberate channelling of American aid into the private sector, native landlords became entrepreneurs; their private small and medium factories increased the levels of export trade and accounted for more than two-thirds of industrial production since the 1960s.³³⁴ Li Kuo-ting (李國鼎), one of the most influential economic policy makers from the late 1950s to late 1980s, asserted that the US was the single most important factor in the fast growth of Taiwan's export trade.³³⁵ Accordingly, economic power passed into the hands of the Taiwanese.

The continuing local elections compelled local factions to expand and upgrade their political and economic networks.³³⁶ Many of the local factional leaders grew interested in advancing their political territory from local level to central level, or were willing to struggle against the structural inequalities imposed by the KMT regime. In any case, the rising economic power as a result of the channelling of American aid emboldened the native local factions to become openly critical of the structural inequities. In 1966, more than half of the seventy-four members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly presented a petition urging the resignation of all members elected in 1947 to the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and Control Yuan to pave the way for new elections in accordance with a constitutional amendment that had just been approved.³³⁷ This

³³² Kang Lu-dao 康綠島, *Li Guodǐng kǒushu lishi: Huashuo Taiwan jingyan* (Oral History by Li Kuo-ting: An Account on Taiwan Experience) (Taipei: Zhuoyue wenhua, 1993), 115, 43.

³³³ Clough, *Island China*, 77-78.

³³⁴ Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 84. Clough, *Island China*, 77-78; Allan B. Cole, "Political Roles of Taiwanese Enterprisers," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 7, No. 9 (1967): 645. According to Cheng Tun-jen's calculation, between 196 and 1980, Taiwan's gross national product increased at an annual rate of 9%, exports expanded at around 20% a year, the industrial share of production increased from 25 to 45%, see Cheng Tun-jen, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 481. See also Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 248-49.

³³⁵ Kang Lu-dao, *Li Guodǐng kǒushu lishi: Huashuo Taiwan jingyan* (Oral History by Li Kuo-ting: An Account on Taiwan Experience), 113-22.

³³⁶ Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 217-18.

³³⁷ Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 92. Factional candidates consistently occupied more than 55% of the seats in the Provincial Assembly from 1954 to 1989; see Huang Teh-fu, "Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang," 130, 31.

episode was a preliminary example of the intended purpose of American aid. The episode also reflected the rise of structuralism on the island.³³⁸ Consequently, American aid was conducive to the emergence of Taiwanese structuralism. Moreover, the US government was eager to investigate the KMT regime's fear of the rising economic power of Taiwanese, and the relationship between Taiwanese and the KMT; this investigation led to protests from the KMT regime.³³⁹ It is understandable that the Chiangs drew a clear line between local factional leaders and businessmen, not permitting businessmen to play an active role in the political arena. Under the Chiangs' regime, the business community was little more than the primary economic coalition partner of the authoritarian state.³⁴⁰

In the following decades, increasing numbers of native Taiwanese businessmen joined the struggle against the structural inequities imposed by the KMT. Although the US ceased its economic aid to Taiwan in 1965, American aid had multi-dimensional, far-reaching socio-economic implications in the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism. As Chapter 4 will show, rapid economic growth beginning in the late 1950s and the ensuing socio-economic changes had created a sizable new middle class and a literate urban working class by the 1970s.³⁴¹ This new middle class, in conjunction with a higher literacy rate, intensified mass communication, greater per capita income and an emerging urban sector, was instrumental in natives' struggle against the ruling elites from the mainland and in the transformation of the KMT authoritarian party-state system.

Theories of Taiwan Independence in the Cold War Era

The KMT's Immobilism

As Chiang stepped up his authoritarian rule in Taiwan, liberal mainlanders, Lei Chen (雷

³³⁸ Shih Cheng-feng, "Taiwan yishi de tansuo (An Exploration of Taiwanese Consciousness)," 60-61.

³³⁹ Cole, "Political Roles of Taiwanese Enterprisers," 645.

³⁴⁰ Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 218, 19.

³⁴¹ Alexander Ya-li Lu 呂亞力, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party," in *Political Change in Taiwan*, ed. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 122.

震)'s *Free China Fortnightly* group in particular, expressed their opposition.³⁴² However, the international situation continued to bipolarise after John Foster Dulles assumed the post of Secretary of State (1953-1959) and proposed the "domino theory" which ossified bi-polar confrontation and justified deeper American involvement in East Asia.³⁴³ The domino theory along with the increase in authoritarianism in turn gave rise to an immobilism, a new conservatism and resistance to reform, in the KMT. In February 1954, the former Governor Wu Kuo-chen issued an article sharply criticising Chiang's dictatorship and modelling the KMT on Soviet's political control on the Soviet Union.³⁴⁴ To call American attention to conditions in Taiwan, Wu published "Your Money is Building a Police State in Taiwan" in the June 29 issue of *Look Magazine*.³⁴⁵ However, these accusations against Chiang were overshadowed by McCarthyism.³⁴⁶ Until the end of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (September 1954-early 1955), Dulles still openly lauded Chiang.³⁴⁷ When Dulles visited Taiwan in early September 1954, Chiang told Dulles that he did not want to drag the US into a war with the Chinese Communists, that he intended to recover the mainland with his own forces without American military assistance, and that he would attack only when he was certain of success. Knowing that the KMT had no chance of repulsing an all-out attack by the Chinese Communists without American help, Dulles refused to believe that Chiang was preparing to recover the mainland by force.³⁴⁸ Dulles even asserted that Chiang knew it was impossible to recover the mainland or return to the mainland.³⁴⁹ As the First

³⁴² Chen Shih-hung et al. 陳世宏, 張世瑛, 許瑞浩, 薛月順, ed., ^eds., *Documentary Collection on the Lei Chen Case: Selective Archives of the Defense Ministry*, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2002), 10-11. See also Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 114-15.

³⁴³ Rick Laverre, *Extended Deterrence and US Policy in the Taiwan Straits* [internet] (University of Michigan, 1999 [cited May 24 2003]), available from <http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rlavere/taiwan.html>.

³⁴⁴ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 421-24. For the extracts of Dr. K. C. Wu's views, see Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 480-83. On the rise and fall of Wu and his struggle with Chiang Ching-kuo, see Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 140-43.

³⁴⁵ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 423-24.

³⁴⁶ Lung-chu Chen argued that "McCarthyism was fed by information much of which came from the China interests close to Chiang." See Chen Lung-chu and Lasswell, *Formosa, China, and the United Nations*, 203.

³⁴⁷ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 424, 26.

³⁴⁸ Steve Tsang 曾銳生, "Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang's Policy to Reconquer the Chinese Mainland, 1949-1958," in *In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949*, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst, 1993), 53.

³⁴⁹ Chen Shih-hung and Chang Chien-lung 陳世宏, 張建隆, ed., ^eds., *Cong dangwai zhuxuantuan dao dangwai zongbu (Organization of Opposition Movement)*, 8 vols., vol. 3, *Zhanhou Taiwan minzhu yundong shiliao huibian (Documentary Collection on Democratization Movement of Postwar Taiwan)*

Taiwan Strait Crisis unfolded, to secure a mutual defence pact with the US, Chiang pledged that the KMT government would neither invade nor attack the mainland without first consulting America.³⁵⁰ When the US and Taiwan signed the Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) on December 2, 1954, Chiang reached a secret understanding with the US that he would not use force without American consent. At the same time he remained free to continue his rhetoric of military recovery of the mainland.³⁵¹ In retrospect, not preparing to recover mainland by force and realizing the impossibility of recovering or returning to the mainland are separate interpretations based on separate positions. Opponents of the Chiang regime were correct to argue in 1978 that the Chiang regime had continued to use the Temporary Provisions, martial law and "recovery of the mainland" as excuses to deny democratic reform and suppress dissidents.³⁵² Chiang's authoritarianism became even more pronounced after the dismissal of liberal General Sun Li-jen on May 25, 1955.³⁵³

Continued Practices of American Separatism

Despite its support of the KMT regime on Taiwan, in practice the US government persistently stressed "the unsettled status of Taiwan." ROC Foreign Minister George Yeh Kung-chao (葉公超) admitted that "the delicate international situation makes it that [Taiwan and Pescadores] do not belong to us."³⁵⁴ When the MDT was signed, on the issue of sovereignty, both parties exchanged notes reiterating the ROC's effective control of Taiwan and the Pescadores.³⁵⁵ Dulles reaffirmed to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that the MDT carefully avoided any reference to Taiwan's sovereignty.³⁵⁶ The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations emphasised that "nothing in the treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or sovereignty

(Taipei: Academia Historica, 2000), 302-03. This news was blockaded by the KMT but disclosed by a Japanese newspaper in June 1978.

³⁵⁰ Tsang, "Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang's Policy to Reconquer the Chinese Mainland, 1949-1958," 53-54.

³⁵¹ Ibid., 54.

³⁵² Chen Shih-hung and Chang Chien-lung, ed., eds., *Cong dangwai zhuxuantuan dao dangwai zongbu* (*Organization of Opposition Movement*), 302-03. This news was blockaded by the KMT.

³⁵³ On the details of Sun's struggle with Chiang Kai-shek, see Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian* (*Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan*), 143-46; Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 424-25.

³⁵⁴ John J. Czyzak, "Legal Status of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores Islands (Penghu)," Feb 3 1961, USDOS. Confidential, 9.

³⁵⁵ Ibid., " 10.

³⁵⁶ Ibid."

of the territories to which it applies," though it accepted the KMT government as the lawful authority on Formosa.³⁵⁷ On January 24, 1955, in the course of the hearings on the Formosa Resolution as a response to the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, Dulles again indicated that "sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores was not considered to have been transferred to the Republic of China in the Japanese Peace Treaty and that the question of sovereignty over these islands was not yet finally determined."³⁵⁸

The MDT formalized the American protectorate over Taiwan, yet it never explicitly guaranteed the offshore islands such as Quemoy (金門), Matsu (馬祖) or the Tachens (大陳) against the Communist attack.³⁵⁹ The Senate attached several understandings that "military operations by either party from the territories held by the ROC shall not be taken except by joint agreement"; that the application of the MDT to "other territories" "shall be construed as requiring the advice and consent of the Senate of the US" to make sure that Chiang could not drag the US into war with Communist China.³⁶⁰ To dispel the Senate Committee's fear that the passage of the Formosa Resolution would automatically draw the US into a war with Communist China, Dulles testified in a secret hearing that Chiang knew that it was impossible for the KMT to return to or recover the mainland.³⁶¹

From mid-February 1955, President Eisenhower repeatedly attempted to cajole or pressure Chiang into withdrawing KMT troops from Quemoy and Matsu in order to eliminate the risk of war with Communist China.³⁶² However, the KMT's retreat from the offshore islands would weaken or even sever China's offshore link with Taiwan, construct a neutral zone across the Strait, consolidate a framework for the territory

³⁵⁷ Ibid., " 11..

³⁵⁸ Ibid. " For the details of the Formosan Resolution, see Roderick MacFarquhar, *Sino-American Relations, 1949-71* (New Abbot: David & Charles, 1972), 112-13.

³⁵⁹ Thomas E. Stolper, *China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1985), 53.

³⁶⁰ C. Lin, "The Unleashing and Relashing of Chiang Kai-shek," *The Independent Formosa*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1970): 6.

³⁶¹ The contents of Dulles' testimony at a secret hearing on January 24, 1955 were not made known until the Senate Foreign Relations Committee published the hearing record on June 4, 1978; a Japanese newspaper disclosed the story the next day. See Chen Shih-hung and Chang Chien-lung, ed., eds., *Cong dangwai zhuxuantuan dao dangwai zongbu (Organization of Opposition Movement)*, 303.

³⁶² Wang Hsiao-po 王曉波, *Liang'an guanxi lunji (A Collection of Arguments on Cross-Strait Relations)* (Taipei: Haixia, 1997), 2-3. See also Stolper, *China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands*, 51, 102-03. MacFarquhar, *Sino-American Relations, 1949-71*, 156.

governed by either side and justify international status for both sides.³⁶³ As a tough Chinese nationalist, Chiang resolutely declined Eisenhower's proposal in late April 1955.³⁶⁴

Realizing the impossibility of taking over Taiwan because of American commitment to defending the Nationalists, PRC Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai for the first time proposed a negotiation with the US to lessen the conflict on Taiwan at the Bandung Conference in April 1955. Between May and July, Zhou repeatedly expressed the desire to "seek the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means."³⁶⁵ In August 1955, the US and the Chinese Communists started a series of ambassadorial talks, first at Geneva and later at Warsaw.³⁶⁶ The sovereignty of Taiwan became a central issue in bilateral relations. Meanwhile, the members of the Western alliance diverged over the recognition of Communist China.³⁶⁷ The US considered adopting the "Two Chinas" policy which "redefines, at least implicitly, the Republic of China's sovereignty as being limited to Formosa and the Pescadores ... and which insists on a UN Assembly seat for the Republic of China as part of any UN admission for Communist China."³⁶⁸ Yet neither the Nationalists nor the Communists were comfortable with the undetermined legal status of Taiwan. Each claimed to represent China, had sovereignty over Taiwan, and vowed to accomplish unification by the use of force.³⁶⁹ The KMT claim that the ROC on Taiwan represented China drew an increasing amount of criticism in the international community.

American Scholars' Input on Taiwan Issue

Cultural Assimilation as a Matter of Time

³⁶³ Tsang, "Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang's Policy to Reconquer the Chinese Mainland, 1949-1958," 57-58. See also Hsieh Hua-yuan 薛化元, *The 823 Artillery War and Its Historical Significance* [internet] (2001 [cited Sep 25 2003]), available from <http://www.twhistory.org.tw/20010820.htm>.

³⁶⁴ Stolper, *China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands*, 103-04. See also Wang Hsiao-po, *Liang'an guanxi lunji* (A Collection of Arguments on Cross-Strait Relations), 2.

³⁶⁵ Chan, *China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question*, 15.

³⁶⁶ From August 1955 to February 1970, the PRC and the US conducted 136 sessions of talks at ambassadorial level on the key issue of easing, removing Taiwan Strait tensions.

³⁶⁷ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 465.

³⁶⁸ "Chiang's Future," *The New Republic*, Vol. 139, No. 14 (1958): 4.

³⁶⁹ Gao Lang 高朗, *Zhonghua Minguo waijiao guanxi zhi yanbian, 1950-1972* (The Evolution of Republic of China's Diplomatic Relations, 1950-1972) (Taipei: Wunan tushu, 1993), 31-33. See also Chen Lung-chu and Lasswell, *Formosa, China, and the United Nations*, 87, 137.

After the Korean crisis, Taiwan became a major element in international politics and a topic of great scholarly interest. In May 1952, Dr. Fred W. Riggs introduced the argument that power transition would blur and ultimately eliminate the distinction between mainland Nationalists and Taiwanese.³⁷⁰ The power transition argument suggests the cultural assimilation of Taiwanese and mainlanders in the course of time.

Independent Taiwan: An Experiment in American Values

The American government's endorsement of Taiwanese secessionism might have been overwhelmingly self-interested; a more positive policy toward China came from the academic field. By the mid-1950s, Chinese Communist rule had greatly enhanced the military power and economic productivity of China.³⁷¹ Harvard professor Edwin O. Reischauer suggested that the US government drive a wedge between China and Russia, for the sake of maintaining a balance of power, and persuade the Chinese to abandon totalitarianism, for a US-envisaged democratic world order.³⁷² He urged the use of economic and political tools to develop Taiwan into a successful democracy in order to demonstrate that democracy is "a better system than communism for all Chinese."³⁷³ For this goal, the KMT would have to engage in political growth and "integrate the native population with the ruling regime until the Formosans themselves have their rightfully preponderant place in the government."³⁷⁴ Apparently, he believed a democratic Taiwan would serve the interests of both America and China. Still, he supported Taiwan independence, "for it is larger and stronger than many nations at present in the UN."³⁷⁵

Cultural Conflict between American and Chinese

During World War II, prominent sinologist John King Fairbank served as Special

³⁷⁰ Riggs, *Formosa under Chinese Nationalist Rule*, 56-58. See also Paaui Shiu-lam, *Taidu' muhou* (*Behind the Scene of Taiwan Independence*), 56.

³⁷¹ Edwin Oldfather Reischauer, *Wanted: An Asian Policy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), 237. Often regarded as a Japan expert; Reischauer specialized in the history of China, Japan and Korea. He and John King Fairbank are co-authors of *East Asia: The Great Tradition*, and *East Asia: The Modern Transformation*. See Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Asia, the Pacific, and the United States: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate with Former Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer*, 90th Congress, Jan 31 1967, 2.

³⁷² Reischauer, *Wanted: An Asian Policy*, 233.

³⁷³ *Ibid.*, 242.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 245.

Assistant to the American Ambassador in Chongqing (重慶) and later as Director of the USIS in China. After the war, he returned to the history faculty at Harvard University. Most people in the political and academic communities noticed his support of the Nixon administration's rapprochement with China in the 1970s but ignored his support of Taiwan independence from the 1950s. In fact, Fairbank had been a champion of the Taiwan independence movement in the US.³⁷⁶ His most remarkable contribution rests on associating American values with the cause of Taiwan independence. Since the beginning of 1957, he had warned that the Communists could exploit modern nationalism, which "stems from the ingrained tradition of Chinese superiority," to focus upon "foreign imperialism" and the US.³⁷⁷ He saw the Taiwan problem as a deep-seated cultural conflict of two antithetical political traditions: American values of self-determination and freedom of access among peoples, and the Chinese political tradition of unified empire and a political universe under a centralized Chinese despotism in the Chinese cultural area.³⁷⁸ He pointed out that the struggle between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong was typical of reactionary Chinese culture: rivals scrambling for the throne of the Son of Heaven.³⁷⁹ He warned that Taiwan, if it fell into Communist hands, could upset the world balance of power and force the US to fight against or acquiesce to Communist hegemony.³⁸⁰ He urged Americans to veto Chiang's ambition to recover the mainland and instead to "engineer an independent Republic of Taiwan."³⁸¹ Many Americans would not be prepared to accept an overwhelmingly selfish balance of power strategy, but would prefer that American power be used for both self-interest and seemingly moral, altruistic purposes.³⁸²

³⁷⁶ For Fairbank's arguments of supporting Taiwan independence, see John King Fairbank, *China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A.* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), 75; Fairbank, "China: Time For a Policy," 39; John King Fairbank, "Legacies of Past Associations," in *The Foundations of U.S. China Policy*, ed. Urban G. Whitaker (Berkeley: Pacifica Foundation, 1959), 75. See also Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 192; Paaui Shiu-lam, *Taidu' muhou (Behind the Scene of Taiwan Independence)*, 47-49.

³⁷⁷ Fairbank, "China: Time For a Policy," 37.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.: 35-36, 38. Fairbank, "Formosa Through China's Eyes," 9. See also Paul M. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 185.

³⁷⁹ Fairbank, "China: Time For a Policy," 38; Fairbank, "Formosa Through China's Eyes," 9.

³⁸⁰ Fairbank, "China: Time For a Policy," 37-38.

³⁸¹ Ibid.: 39.

³⁸² This is a revision of the criticism of British imperialism. See Richard Koebner and Helmut Dan Schmidt, *Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political Word, 1840-1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 219.

Alternative Self-Determination through Democratisation

Starting on August 23, 1958 Communist China ferociously shelled Quemoy and Matsu for forty-four days, creating the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. With the American Seventh Fleet and advanced weapons, the KMT successfully defended these two islands. The KMT's success presented a stark contrast to the Taiwan independence movement in Japan. Australian scholar Michael Lindsay commented in early October that "Excluding Japan, Formosa may quite well be the best administered country in Asia" and "an independent Formosa has become less and not more acceptable."³⁸³ One week later, Fairbank, in response, used this crisis to attest to the traditional political antithesis between America and China and warned the US not to allow Chiang to manipulate fears of Communism.³⁸⁴ Fairbank devised an innovative interpretation of "self-determination" in the context of the Chiang regime's tight control of Taiwan. "As [Taiwan's] genuine electoral process continues to develop in scope and efficacy, ... it can validly claim to be a channel of popular self-determination, without recourse to a plebiscite."³⁸⁵ Furthermore, he stated that "a plebiscite on Formosa is not easily conceivable. Self-determination through letting an electoral process function is probably the most we can hope for, but in time it may be enough to represent genuine democracy."³⁸⁶ On the premise that most Taiwanese were sympathetic to the cause of independence, because democratisation meant the redistribution of political power between the minority mainlanders and the majority Taiwanese, democratisation would undermine the legitimacy of the KMT and ultimately invalidate its support for unification. Consequently, democratisation became an alternative vehicle of "self-determination." Self-determination through democratisation was realistic in the minds of decision-makers in Washington. In October 1958, as the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis drew to a close, Dulles persuaded Chiang to issue a joint communiqué that amounted to recovering the mainland through politics and diplomacy, not force.³⁸⁷ That is, Chiang had to develop Taiwan as a model Chinese society and initiate democratisation if he hoped to put Communism on the defensive.

³⁸³ Lindsay, "Formosa's Future," 9.

³⁸⁴ Fairbank, "Formosa Through China's Eyes," 9-10.

³⁸⁵ Fairbank, "China: Time For a Policy," 39.

³⁸⁶ Fairbank, "Formosa Through China's Eyes," 10.

³⁸⁷ MacFarquhar, *Sino-American Relations, 1949-71*, 157; Tsang, "Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang's Policy to Reconquer the Chinese Mainland, 1949-1958," 48, 55.

Cultural Differences across the Strait

In addition, Fairbank supported the use of American aid to raise the standard of living in Taiwan and to establish political freedom well ahead of the mainland in order to bring *de facto* independence to the island.³⁸⁸ He believed that many Taiwanese cherished the memory of the higher civilization developed under Japanese colonial rule.³⁸⁹ The differences in civilization across the Strait would help distinguish the identity of Taiwan from Chinese nationalism.

Taiwanese Nationalism versus Chinese Nationalism

Fairbank repeatedly hinted at the use of Taiwanese nationalism against Chinese nationalism: "the real argument for an independent Formosa, is in the broadest sense cultural. ... Formosa is now a cultural bastion as much as it is a military one."³⁹⁰ He contended that "we can't do anything else than support an independent Taiwan – we've got to do that."³⁹¹ "[We are given an opportunity] to build up an independent Taiwan, to make it a non-Communist place which can go ahead with progress in welfare and in education in all sorts of cultural studies which are Chinese and yet not Communist."³⁹²

American Scholars' Links with Taiwanese Secessionists

On September 1, 1955, Thomas Liao's Taiwan Democratic Independence Party formed a Commission of Exiled Representatives for each of the twenty-four principal cities and districts of Formosa to constitute "Provisional National Congress of the Republic of Formosa."³⁹³ On February 28, 1956, Liao's "Congress" inaugurated a "Provisional Government." Thomas Liao was named First President.³⁹⁴ Although Liao was accepted in the US and Canada as the spokesman for the Taiwan independence

³⁸⁸ Fairbank, "China: Time For a Policy," 39.

³⁸⁹ Fairbank, *China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A.*, 70.

³⁹⁰ Fairbank, "Formosa Through China's Eyes," 10. In 1976, Fairbank reaffirmed his theory as "cultural intervention." He stated: "Taiwan today is the latest manifestation of American 'intervention' in Chinese life, yet this is also a manifestation of the spread of 'Western civilization.' The essence of modern East Asian history is that Western civilization has intervened in Chinese life and thereby produced a great cultural-historical fault line conducive to political earthquakes." See John King Fairbank, "Taiwan: Our Hardy Perennial Problem," in *China Perceived: Images and Policies in Chinese-American Relations*, ed. John King Fairbank (London: Andre Deutsch, 1976), 131. Hong Kong scholar Shiu-lam Paaui terms Fairbank's argument as "cultural interventionism." See Paaui Shiu-lam, *Taidu' muhou (Behind the Scene of Taiwan Independence)*, 48.

³⁹¹ Fairbank, "Legacies of Past Associations," 75.

³⁹² Ibid., 76.

³⁹³ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 465.

³⁹⁴ Ibid.

movement and all Taiwanese, his "Provisional Government" camp was plagued by constant internal dissension.³⁹⁵ Meanwhile, the rising economy enabled more Taiwanese to educate their children in the US, where they were exposed to American democratic ideas and practices. As a result, America became a meeting place for Taiwanese students and a cradle for young reformists, oppositionists or secessionists, depending on their attitude to the KMT. Many secessionists credit their American mentors on university campus with converting them to secessionism. In 1956, Chen I-te (陳以德, Edward Chen) encouraged by his mentor John King Fairbank,³⁹⁶ grouped several like-minded associates including Lin Jung-hsun (林榮勳) and Lu Chu-i (盧主義) to set up the first Taiwan independence movement organization in North America – Free Formosans' Formosa (3F).³⁹⁷ In 1959, the Philadelphia-based Free Formosans' Formosa was reorganized as the United Formosans for Independence (UFI).³⁹⁸ George Kerr drew an elaborate comparison between Taiwan independence and American independence.³⁹⁹ As to be seen below, this UFI later became the main body of the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI), the largest international Taiwanese independence organization.

The Conlon Report

The need to improve US-Communist China relations in the late 1950s eroded the strategic basis for American support of the KMT. To assess the practicability of America's Asian policy, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations published the Conlon Report on November 1, 1959.⁴⁰⁰ Professor Robert A. Scalapino of University of California- Berkeley wrote the section on northeast Asia, which included Taiwan. The part on Taiwan began with a discussion of the historical and cultural differences between Taiwanese and mainland Chinese and stressing the ways in which American aid was helping to strengthen Taiwan's economy.⁴⁰¹ The report then commented on the

³⁹⁵ Ibid., 465-67. See also Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 148-49.

³⁹⁶ Paau Shiu-lam, *Taidu' muhou (Behind the Scene of Taiwan Independence)*, 33.

³⁹⁷ Chen Ming-cheng and Shih Cheng-feng 陳銘城, 施正鋒, ed., eds., *A History of World United Formosans for Independence* (Taipei: Qianwei, 2000), 34-35.

³⁹⁸ Ibid., ed., eds.

³⁹⁹ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 451.

⁴⁰⁰ Robert A. Scalapino, "United States Foreign Policy - Asia (North East Asia - Communist China and Taiwan)," (Washington DC: Conlon Associates, 1959). See also Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 431-33.

⁴⁰¹ Scalapino, "United States Foreign Policy - Asia (North East Asia - Communist China and Taiwan)," 139-40.

respective situations of Chiang Kai-shek's KMT regime and of the Taiwanese. The report rejected the practicability of Chiang's reunification program;⁴⁰² denied the KMT's claim to be the government of China;⁴⁰³ and urged the US government to disengage from its commitments to the offshore islands.⁴⁰⁴ The report went on to defend the Formosans' ideal of independence;⁴⁰⁵ proposed a Republic of Taiwan under an American guarantee of its defence;⁴⁰⁶ and proposed a plebiscite allowing the Taiwanese to vote on separation from the mainland.⁴⁰⁷ The report specifically pointed out the KMT regime's vulnerability: "The increasing democratisation could occur ... [and could] produce new political crises. Some of these will almost certainly reflect the unresolved differences between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders."⁴⁰⁸

Most noticeably, the report explored cultural assimilation in detail:

... assimilation is beginning, a process whereby the dominant Taiwanese population is starting to absorb the refugee minority through intermarriage and a variety of other ways.

... Under present trends, ... gradualism will prevail, with increased pressures for local autonomy and expanded social and political rights. One prediction is fairly safe: either Taiwan will be joined with mainland China or the process of Taiwanization will continue. In the concrete terms of the present, if Taiwan does not go to the Communists, it will go increasingly to the Taiwanese.⁴⁰⁹

The Senate's Conlon Report made several salient points. It reflected the political reasoning behind discrediting Chiang and promoting Taiwanese nationalism. It equated cultural assimilation with Taiwanization. It distinguished democratisation from Taiwanization, wherein the former would produce political crisis and the latter political reconciliation. Indeed, more than twenty years later, Taiwan's democratisation was compounded by the politicisation of ethnic cleavages and the emergence of the national identity crisis; both of which were manifestations of political crisis.⁴¹⁰ More than thirty

⁴⁰² Ibid., 143.

⁴⁰³ Ibid., 147.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., 154.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., 143.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid., 153. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 433.

⁴⁰⁷ Scalapino, "United States Foreign Policy - Asia (North East Asia - Communist China and Taiwan)," 155.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., 142.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., 143. On the very same page, Scalapino also mentioned "acculturation," a merging of cultures as a result of prolonged contact between the mainlanders and the Taiwanese. Still, acculturation eventually leads to assimilation; see Shih Cheng-feng, *Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism)*, 14-16.

⁴¹⁰ Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 81. For further discussion of the political crisis, see page 148 of this thesis.

years later, Taiwanization proved an egoistic political scheme centring upon Taiwan.⁴¹¹ In this context, Taiwanization can be defined as follows: A process of achieving political domination of island Taiwan by ethnic Taiwanese, while including members of the mainlander elites in the political process.⁴¹² Despite the differences between democratisation and Taiwanization, calls for democratisation or "increased pressures for local autonomy and expanded social and political rights" would invigorate Taiwanization.⁴¹³ Finally, radical or ultimate Taiwanization would culminate in secessionism, splitting Taiwan from the mainland.⁴¹⁴

Lei Chen's Case

In July 1958, a group of Taiwanese activists and mainlanders critical of Chiang's dictatorship applied to the KMT government for the establishment of "The Society for the Study of Local Autonomy in the Republic of China."⁴¹⁵ To avoid the trouble that would arise from any linkage between democracy and national identity in the "White Terror" era, the group limited its objectives to demands to put an end to corrupt electoral politics.⁴¹⁶ The KMT rejected the application in December 1958, fearing that the Society might evolve into a Formosan political party that would later oppose the KMT.⁴¹⁷ As Hill Gates pointed out, "attempts by the Taiwanese to gain an equal share

⁴¹¹ Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 244. See Chapter 5 for analysis of Lee Teng-hui's Taiwanization.

⁴¹² Most scholars refer to Chiang Ching-kuo's political engineering from the early 1970s on as indigenisation, which is often mixed with Taiwanization. There are some basic differences between indigenisation and Taiwanization. The former is for the KMT regime to strengthen its ruling legitimacy, while the latter is for ethnic Taiwanese to achieve political domination of the island. For further discussion about the differences between indigenisation and Taiwanization, see page 160 of this thesis. Peter Yu argues that Taiwanization means "the political process by which political figures, especially native Taiwanese, try to preserve Taiwan's political independence from any mainland Chinese rule in the future." See Peter Kien-hong Yu, "The Politics of Taiwanisation (II): The Road to a New Identity," in *Taiwanisation: Its Origin and Politics*, ed. National University of Singapore (Singapore: World Scientific, 2001), 30.

⁴¹³ Peter Yu argues that Taiwanization is one of the major derivatives of democratisation; see *Ibid.*, 29.

⁴¹⁴ Scalapino, "United States Foreign Policy - Asia (North East Asia - Communist China and Taiwan)," 143. See also Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 244. Scalapino's observation of the political development of Taiwan centres around the idea of Taiwanization. Scalapino argues that the KMT's networks of patron-client relations was an embryonic form of Taiwanization; the elevation of the local patron-client factional politics to the national level in the following decades has been a prominent trend in connection with the Taiwanization process. Scalapino, "Foreword," x, xii.

⁴¹⁵ Kou Patkau, "The Movement to Establish a New Opposition Party in Formosa," *Formosan Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1962): 11.

⁴¹⁶ Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 33.

⁴¹⁷ Kou Patkau, "The Movement to Establish a New Opposition Party in Formosa," 11.

of political power at the national level can be seen as subversive of the whole system.”⁴¹⁸ The constraints associated with the population structure and the supreme goal of “return to the mainland” made the KMT reactionary and resistant to reformism.

The *Free China Fortnightly* led by Lei Chen had been criticizing the dictatorship of the Chiang Kai-shek regime since 1951. His journal urged the KMT to abandon “recovering the mainland,” called for “a democratic Formosa” to preserve the ROC, and proposed to establish a pro-democracy opposition party.⁴¹⁹ Since 1957, his group had argued that popular will outweighed the hollow “*fatong*” (法統, constitutional legitimacy) that the KMT used as a pretext to reject the demands for comprehensive re-election of the three national elective bodies.⁴²⁰ In particular, Lei “advocated genuine cooperation between the continental refugees and the Formosan people.”⁴²¹ This was unacceptable to the KMT because since 1949 the *demos* was limited to the island, expansion of democracy in Taiwan would invalidate the idea of constitutional legitimacy.⁴²² On November 16, 1959, *Free China* published an article attacking Chiang Kai-shek’s desire to revise the constitution in order to extend the presidential term indefinitely for himself.⁴²³ Lei’s criticism of Chiang Kai-shek and his interest in collaborating with the democratic opposition in Taiwan drew the attention of American officials and scholars. The Asia Foundation subsidised his *Free China Fortnightly*.⁴²⁴ On May 18, 1960,

⁴¹⁸ Gates, “Ethnicity and Social Class,” 267.

⁴¹⁹ Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung 周琇環, 陳世宏, ed., ^eds., *Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties)*, 8 vols., vol. 2, *Zhanhou Taiwan minzhu yundong shiliao huibian (Documentary Collection on Democratization Movement of Postwar Taiwan)* (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2000), 4-7. See also Chen Shih-hung et al., ed., ^eds., *Documentary Collection on the Lei Chen Case: Selective Archives of the Defense Ministry*, 10-11. Kou Patkau, “The Movement to Establish a New Opposition Party in Formosa,” 12.

⁴²⁰ Cheng Yu-feng and Li Fu-chung 程玉鳳, 李福鐘, ed., ^eds., *Guohui gaizao (Congressional Reformation, 1948-1972)*, 8 vols., vol. 4, *Zhanhou Taiwan minzhu yundong shiliao huibian (Documentary Collection on Democratization Movement of Postwar Taiwan)* (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2001), 154, 62, 65-67; Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed., ^eds., *Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties)*, 53.

⁴²¹ Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, 100.

⁴²² Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 38.

⁴²³ Chen Shih-hung et al., ed., ^eds., *Documentary Collection on the Lei Chen Case: Selective Archives of the Defense Ministry*, 11. See also Chan Ta-cheng, *Yi Lei Chen de minzhu fangong (Recalling Lei Chen's Appeals of Anti-Communism and Democracy)* [internet] (Taiwan Tati Cultural And Educational Foundation, 1988 [cited Aug 11 2003]), available from <http://taiwantt.org.tw/cdrom/20020831/content/1980/19880425-100.htm>; Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed., ^eds., *Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties)*, 7.

⁴²⁴ The Asia Foundation suspended its subsidy to Lei’s *Free China Fortnightly* in June 1960 after ROC ambassador George Yeh registered the Nationalist concern to the US. See Chen Shih-hung et al.,

mainlander liberals centring on *Free China* brought some Taiwanese activists together to establish a new opposition party – the China Democratic Party (CDP).⁴²⁵ Lei's group sought to enlist Fairbank's support in securing the American Embassy's protection for the opposition party. Fairbank declined and warned Lei of the doomed prospect of the CDP.⁴²⁶ Lei was arrested on September 4. On the same day, Dr. Hu Shih (胡適), a respected mainlander liberal and President of Academia Sinica, sent a telegram from the US to Vice President Chen Cheng, castigating the KMT's ban on the formation of an opposition party.⁴²⁷ Many major foreign news agencies in Taipei gave unflattering reports of the "explosive incident."⁴²⁸ On September 7, the Associated Press reported Dr. Hu's defence of Lei Chen and asserted that American officials completely concurred with Hu's point of view.⁴²⁹ Lei was court martialed on "sedition" charges on October 3. Upon Chiang's demand, Lei was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment on October 8.⁴³⁰ The CDP immediately collapsed.

Lei's case was a classic example of the Chiang regime's use of an extensive security network and trumped-up sedition charges to purge dissidents to consolidate the KMT's authoritarian rule under the pretext of national security.⁴³¹ Ironically, the KMT's immobilism denied itself the opportunity for self-revival. The opposition camp's use of reformism was to take its toll on the KMT regime in the 1970s.

The Taiwan Independence Roadmap

ed., ^eds., *Documentary Collection on the Lei Chen Case: Selective Archives of the Defense Ministry*, 213, 26, 27.

⁴²⁵ Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed., ^eds., *Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties)*, 61-65. Chen Shih-hung et al., ed., ^eds., *Documentary Collection on the Lei Chen Case: Selective Archives of the Defense Ministry*, 11-12. Kou Patkau, "The Movement to Establish a New Opposition Party in Formosa," 12.

⁴²⁶ According to JKF, Lei Chen's "group sought my 'advice,' i.e., foreign support." See John King Fairbank, *Chinabound: A Fifty-Year Memoir* (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), 384. See also Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, 230.

⁴²⁷ Chen Shih-hung et al., ed., ^eds., *Documentary Collection on the Lei Chen Case: Selective Archives of the Defense Ministry*, 4 note 1.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*, ed., ^eds., 202, 03, 05, 09, 10, 23, 26.

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*, ed., ^eds., 205.

⁴³⁰ The declassified document provided by the ROC Defence Ministry in 2001 indicated Chiang Kai-shek himself instructed Lei should serve at least ten-year prison sentence. See *Ibid.*, ed., ^eds., 19, 277, 331-32.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, ed., ^eds., 21.

In a lecture at Connecticut University on November 21, 1960, John King Fairbank used Lei's case to reaffirm the cultural conflict between US and China and illustrate the obsolete, residual and typical features of the Confucian rulers and the KMT dictatorship.⁴³² To deal with the cultural conflict, he argued:

- The epochal Sino-America antagonism further highlighted Taiwan's strategic importance.⁴³³ In particular, "based on rough balance of power: we would support islands and peninsulas in the Western Pacific ... against the growing power of mainland China."⁴³⁴
- Taiwan can be a window for America to contact and study Chinese so that consequently America will not "be less able to deal with them."⁴³⁵
- In American long-term political strategy, the US wants to help Taiwan grow and develop, "not necessarily as a military threat, but as a pilot-model competitor."⁴³⁶
- As long as the American Seventh Fleet was able to patrol the Taiwan Straits and use a Taiwan base, US should abstain from invoking the misleading "Two Chinas" concept. "The fact of Taiwan's independence is our object, not the name."⁴³⁷
- The two million mainlanders will finally be integrated with the Taiwanese, many of whom cherish the memory of the higher civilization developed under fifty years of Japanese colonial rule.⁴³⁸
- The dream of "Taiwan for the Taiwanese" in one sense is being realized by time. ... The mainlander-Taiwanese antagonism might die away, and the American good will toward smaller states struggling for "independence" might have full opportunity, ...⁴³⁹

The last two points reinforced the argument of cultural assimilation by suggesting that the mainlanders on Taiwan would ultimately join the Taiwanese to become a culturally distinct race from the Chinese. Professor A. Doak Barnett of Columbia University also promoted a version of constructuralist cultural assimilation in 1960:⁴⁴⁰

... it is both possible and desirable for the Taiwanese to participate in their government and to identify their loyalties with it and for the mainlanders to become increasingly "Taiwanized" by identifying their interests and sentiments more and more with Taiwan rather than their former mainland homes ...⁴⁴¹

⁴³² Fairbank, *China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A.*, 60-61.

⁴³³ *Ibid.*, 54, 65.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, 54.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, 56.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*, 63.

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*, 70.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁴⁴⁰ For the definition of constructuralism, see page 90 of this thesis.

⁴⁴¹ A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy* (New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper, 1960), 422.

The argument enhanced the link between democratisation, integration, and Taiwanization. In 1960, Chester Bowles, twice US Ambassador to India, also wrote in *Foreign Affairs* that native Taiwanese would determine their own fate in the long run. He urged neutralization of the offshore islands, the development of a Sino-Formosan state and America's assumption of Taiwan's protectorate.⁴⁴²

These American scholars' arguments reaffirmed the concepts of cultural conflict between the US and China, cultural differences across the Taiwan Strait, and cultural assimilation on Taiwan which equated to a culture-based "Taiwan Independence Roadmap."⁴⁴³ This pattern of American political thought on Taiwan by the end of 1960 made the following argument. In the realities of segregation of the Taiwan Strait by American military intervention, American values of self-determination justified a balance of power on Taiwan in the name of cultural conflict, as Fairbank had been arguing since 1957. American aid produced substantial improvements in Taiwan economy and intensified the already significant cultural differences between the Taiwanese and the Chinese. American aid also generated more pressure for local autonomy and promoted the social and political rights that were conducive to democratisation. Increasing democratisation would expand cultural differences across the Strait and promote cultural assimilation or Taiwanization on the island. Put simply, American values of self-determination justified cultural conflict and American separatist intention on Taiwan; American aid and American values helped expand cultural differences across the Taiwan Strait; American aid and values also promoted cultural assimilation or Taiwanization, which would break Taiwan away from China.⁴⁴⁴ Consequently, Sino-US cultural conflict, cross-Strait cultural differences and intra-island cultural assimilation or Taiwanization would perpetuate an independent Taiwan. There is an assumption that once Taiwanization or cultural assimilation were accomplished, the US could exploit Taiwanese nationalism in an epochal Sino-US struggle. However, Fairbank exhorted the US government to safeguard Taiwan's *de facto* independence, not

⁴⁴² Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 181-82.

⁴⁴³ In late 2002, a peace plan for the Middle East was jointly offered by the US, EU, Russia and the UN. After several revisions, it became a "Middle East Peace Roadmap." By analogy, the American scholars' separatist arguments on Taiwan are considered in this thesis to comprise a "Taiwan Independence Roadmap."

⁴⁴⁴ Scalapino, "United States Foreign Policy - Asia (North East Asia - Communist China and Taiwan)," 143.

de jure independence, to avoid a direct confrontation with formidable Chinese nationalism.⁴⁴⁵

The values of “self-determination” pervade this “Roadmap.” In a broad sense, as Fairbank argued, democratisation is an alternative vehicle for “self-determination.” Because democratisation lends dynamism to Taiwanization, which would, as Scalapino and Barnett argued, break the island away from China, Taiwanization is also a vehicle for “self-determination.” Avoiding direct confrontation with China, the “Taiwan Independence Roadmap” would lead to Taiwan’s self-determination short of *de jure* or full independence and serve the interests of American security.

The Feasibility of the Roadmap

The “Taiwan Independence Roadmap” is comparable to a US-defined balance of power system. Based on the US government’s separatist intention on the island, as Fairbank stated in 1957 that “Taiwan’s independence has been the chief fruit of our China policy for seven years past and there is nothing on the horizon, except disaster, to alter it,”⁴⁴⁶ American scholars defined the dimensions of cultural conflict, cultural differences and cultural assimilation. The starting point of the balance of power system is Taiwan’s original status as China’s frontier island. These scholars intended to pull Taiwan away from this original point to serve US hegemony without triggering a war with China. Their contribution lies not on influencing the immediate policy of the government. The concrete policy is subject to realistic restrictions, such as the American need for the Chiang Kai-shek regime in the bi-polarized era, and the American need for Communist China in the era of US-China rapprochement.⁴⁴⁷ Instead, their contribution lies in inspiring the long-term, metaphysical ethos of America. Although scholars might not necessarily have been political decision-makers, many of them were affiliated with academic or think tanks, held official positions in the State Department, assumed diplomatic positions, and testified in Congressional hearings.⁴⁴⁸ Because very few

⁴⁴⁵ Fairbank, *China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A.*, 63.

⁴⁴⁶ Fairbank, “China: Time For a Policy,” 39.

⁴⁴⁷ On the latter restriction, see Chapter 4.

⁴⁴⁸ Two prominent examples are A. Doak Barnett, who became a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program and was a dedicated supporter of the National Committee on US-China Relations from its founding in 1966; and Edwin O. Reischauer, who served with the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department (1945-1946), was director of the Harvard-Yenching Institute (1956-1961), assumed

students studied the Far East before the early 1940s, only a handful of experts emerged from this generation.⁴⁴⁹ Therefore, people such as A. Doak Barnett, John King Fairbank and Robert Scalapino who “straddled the cold and post-cold war worlds, come to mind” as the academic figures who “significantly shaped American’s interaction with Beijing.”⁴⁵⁰ Their ideas of Taiwan had essentially been presented in the US foreign policy making in the following decades. Rather than serving as independent policy analysts providing informed analysis for government policies, these scholars acted more like mentors who sought to convince senior policy-makers of their opinions or whose students functioned as policy-makers at the highest level of government. According to native secessionist scholar Chen Lung-chu, “Despite [American] official support of the Nationalist regime and the influence of the ‘China lobby,’ there are channels and predispositions open to the champions of Formosa.”⁴⁵¹ These champions of Formosa strengthened the undercurrent of America’s separatist intentions in Taiwan.

The Roadmap did not encounter resistance from the regime of Chiang Kai-shek. In the 1950s, Dulles had already convinced Chiang that force would not be the principal means of liberating the mainland;⁴⁵² Chiang had privately admitted that it would be impossible to return to the mainland, but that developing Taiwan as a model Chinese society would help his political offensive against Beijing.⁴⁵³ The rise of structuralism among the Taiwanese in the 1960s and, the KMT’s indigenisation in the 1970s and political liberalization in the 1980s were closely related to the infusion of American aid (1950-1965) and American values,⁴⁵⁴ which did expand cross-Strait differences, facilitate intra-island assimilation, and prove that self-determination through democratisation and Taiwanization was practical and feasible.

US Ambassador to Japan (1961-1966), and returned to Harvard in 1966. See *Asia, the Pacific, and the United States*, 2. Another prominent example is John King Fairbank.

⁴⁴⁹ When Edwin O. Reischauer studied in Harvard from 1931 to 1933, there were only five or six students seriously studying the Far East. Even in the early 1940s, studying Asia was still “sort of a way-out thing to do.” See *Ibid.*, 3. Reischauer clearly expressed this lack of expertise first in 1955, see Reischauer, *Wanted: An Asian Policy*, preface vii-ix.

⁴⁵⁰ David M. Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 347.

⁴⁵¹ Chen Lung-chu and Lasswell, *Formosa, China, and the United Nations*, 200.

⁴⁵² MacFarquhar, *Sino-American Relations, 1949-71*, 157; Tsang, “Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang’s Policy to Reconquer the Chinese Mainland, 1949-1958,” 48; Tsang, “Transforming a Party State into a Democracy,” 116-17.

⁴⁵³ Cheng Tun-jen, “Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan,” 480; Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 27; Tsang, “Transforming a Party State into a Democracy,” 117.

⁴⁵⁴ See Chapter 4.

In terms of Sino-US relations, “the hostility felt for each other’s political system helped to sustain the Sino-American confrontation throughout the 1950s and 1960s;”⁴⁵⁵ there was a “pervasive, often intense enmity toward China felt throughout the executive branch in the late 1960s” and most agencies were charged with hostile missions toward China.⁴⁵⁶ This political mentality sustained the scheme of “One China, One Taiwan” and “Two Chinas.” Next, despite the ostensible rapprochement with Beijing, the Three Joint Communiqués between the US and China were consistent with the three dimensions of the Roadmap. As Sino-US confrontation loomed, their arguments reveal well thought-out policy references. After the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, “the political differences assumed centre-stage in the debate over American China policy;”⁴⁵⁷ the US Congressional and official use of “human rights,” “democracy” and “the future of Taiwan” strongly connote Sino-US “cultural conflict” and cross-Strait “cultural difference.”⁴⁵⁸ The realization of democratisation and Taiwanization in the 1990s became the incarnation of self-determination. In other words, the general trend of Taiwan Strait affairs followed the arguments of the “Roadmap.” According to Heritage Foundation research fellow John Tkacik, the *status quo* of Taiwan Strait in 2004 means “no unification, no independence and no war.”⁴⁵⁹ This illustrates the ambiguity of US policy and shows that this policy is not aiming at achieving independence. However, the *status quo* of Taiwan Strait reveals the crystallization of perpetuating a *de facto* independent Taiwan. This is the latest footnote in America’s long-term Taiwan policy vis-à-vis the insight of the “Roadmap.”

The Taiwan Independence Movement in the Early 1960s

The Predicament of the KMT versus the Fruit of American Aid

During the 1960 presidential campaign, Senator John F. Kennedy openly declared the

⁴⁵⁵ David Shambaugh, “Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations,” in *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, ed. Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 208.

⁴⁵⁶ Michel Oksenberg, “A Decade of Sino-American Relations,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (1982): 176.

⁴⁵⁷ Shambaugh, “Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations,” 208.

⁴⁵⁸ See page 152 of this thesis.

⁴⁵⁹ CNA, “US Support Weakening, Confab Told,” *TT*, Oct 10 2004, 4.

disengagement of American commitment to the islets of Quemoy and Matsu, and suggested these two islets be given up before they entangle US in the Chinese Civil War.⁴⁶⁰ This injured Chiang's nationalistic feeling but cheered many native Taiwanese scholars. Taiwanese secessionists had strong misgivings about Chiang's use of Quemoy and Matsu to maintain the fiction of a "national emergency" and prolong the "state of war" to justify his dictatorship and thereby suppress Taiwanese participation in constitutional democracy.⁴⁶¹

In February 1961, after Kennedy's inauguration as President, State Department legal adviser John Czyzak reaffirmed the denial of ROC's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.⁴⁶² Kennedy himself favoured "Two Chinas," but worried about the huge domestic uproar that would accompany Communist China's admission to the UN.⁴⁶³ After Chiang made a public promise to use the permanent membership in the Security Council to veto Outer Mongolia's admission to the UN on the grounds that the ROC represented Outer Mongolia and China, Washington pressured Taipei to prevent the veto, a demand to which Chiang finally agreed.⁴⁶⁴ In the meantime, international questioning of ROC's representation of China mounted. The US persuaded several allies to co-sponsor a resolution classifying any change in Chinese representation as an "important question" which by definition would require a two-thirds vote under the UN Charter. In the early 1960s, this device helped the ROC to keep its seat on the UN Security Council.⁴⁶⁵

As international reservations over the ROC's claim to represent China mounted, so did the KMT's sense of domestic insecurity and political paranoia at home. After the arrest of Lei Chen, Su Tung-chi (蘇東啓), a native councillor from Yunlin (雲林) county,

⁴⁶⁰ Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 175. Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, 110.

⁴⁶¹ "Abandon Quemoy and Matsu, America," *Formosan Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1962): 32-33; Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, 110, 25-26. Lung-chu Chen called the shelling of Quemoy on odd days after the crisis "ceremonial," see Chen Lung-chu and Lasswell, *Formosa, China, and the United Nations*, 86.

⁴⁶² Czyzak, "Legal Status of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores Islands (Penghu)," 12.

⁴⁶³ MacFarquhar, *Sino-American Relations, 1949-71*, 183-84. See also Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 30. Arthur M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 423-24.

⁴⁶⁴ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 424. See also Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 175; Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, 111.

⁴⁶⁵ Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 236.

persuaded his colleagues in the assembly to pass a resolution asking Chiang Kai-shek to pardon Lei. He was arrested on September 19, 1961 and later indicted by a military court upon flimsy charges of planning to overthrow the KMT.⁴⁶⁶ Perhaps in an attempt to tighten his control, Chiang declared in his 1962 New Year's Day message to the Chinese that the KMT forces had made adequate preparations to recover the mainland.⁴⁶⁷ In retaliation, the Communists shelled Quemoy on June 17 and tensions escalated.⁴⁶⁸ The Kennedy administration informed Beijing through Ambassadorial talks at Warsaw on June 23 that Washington would not support a KMT bid for recovery.⁴⁶⁹ At a press conference days later, Kennedy openly reassured the defence character of American commitment to Taiwan.⁴⁷⁰ This was tantamount to a formal veto of Chiang Kai-shek's ambition to return to the mainland.

The KMT positions were compounded when Yin Hai-kuang (殷海光), a popular professor at Taiwan National University, and Li Ao (李敖), an aggressive anti-KMT historian, sparked a heated debate on Chinese and Western cultures in the journal *Wenxing zazhi* (文星雜誌, *Literary Star*) in 1962.⁴⁷¹ Because Fairbank had been a vocal critic of Chinese traditional culture, domestic intellectuals who questioned China's traditional social values, advocated modernization on the Western model or had strong academic affiliations and friends in the US, such as Hu Shih, Yin Hai-kuang and their associates, became targets of attack by the KMT. Their critics were interpreted as issuing symbolic challenges to the Chiang Kai-shek regime.⁴⁷² The debate soon

⁴⁶⁶ Up to March 1962, according to *Formosan Quarterly*, more than 400 Formosans were arrested relating to Su's case. He was sentenced to death on May 18, 1962. See "Councillor Su Tung-chi Sentenced to Death," *Formosan Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1962): 17-18; Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 448; Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 116. Su was released in 1976 after serving fifteen years in prison. See Chen Shih-hung and Chang Chien-lung, eds., *Cong dangwai zhuxuantuan dao dangwai zongbu* (*Organization of Opposition Movement*), 16.

⁴⁶⁷ Chan, *China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question*, 16.

⁴⁶⁸ Harold C. Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics* (Macmillan: Macmillan, 1966), 271-72. See also Chan, *China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question*, 16.

⁴⁶⁹ Harold C. Hinton, *China's Turbulent Quest: An Analysis of China's Foreign Relations since 1949* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 114. See also Chan, *China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question*, 16.

⁴⁷⁰ Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics*, 272.

⁴⁷¹ Chan, *China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question*, 22.

⁴⁷² Both Hu and Yin were renowned scholars and critics of Chinese traditional values and maintained close association with John King Fairbank. See *Ibid.* See also Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 449. Chiang Kai-shek regime even saw liberalism championed by these intellectuals "as a Trojan horse employed by the Chinese Communists for the destruction of traditional culture." See Mab Huang, *Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976), 3.

degenerated into personal invective and lawsuits. Although the journal had not entered the political arena with a program of political reform, many famous professors and intellectuals were harassed, kept under surveillance, and persecuted. The journal was suppressed by the KMT in 1965.⁴⁷³ This illustrated not only the plight of liberal intellectuals under the Chiang Kai-shek regime, but also the political hysteria and predicament of the KMT regime in the 1960s.

In contrast, American aid, started in 1948, was bearing fruit. The aid had been disrupted by the Communist victory over the KMT and resumed in the second half of 1950 after the start of the Korean War.⁴⁷⁴ The US aid program, terminated in June 1965, had eased Taiwan's initial inflation, compensated for the island's international revenue deficit, and bolstered Taiwan's economic development.⁴⁷⁵ In addition, American aid had introduced American values and culture, and oriented Taiwan's economic and trade structure toward the American market.⁴⁷⁶ This consolidated the ROC's reliance on America for international political legitimacy, economic and trade development and military support. The Taiwanese appreciated American goodwill. These developments, along with the KMT regime's efforts in fomenting animosity against the PRC, facilitated a US-oriented Taiwanese nationalism. American aid had far more significant implications. The resumption of aid in 1950 was designed to promote local autonomy and social and political rights for the Taiwanese. Since the 1960s, the growing economic power of the island enabled the Taiwanese to struggle against the social inequalities imposed by the Chiang Kai-shek regime. In 1966, the native members of the Provincial Assembly circulated a petition urging resignation of members elected in 1947 to the three national elective bodies to pave the way for new elections in

⁴⁷³ Huang, *Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973*, 1, 2, 107 note 1.

⁴⁷⁴ Chou, ed., ^eds., *Documentary Collection on US Aid to ROC*, introduction 1-2. Although the American government avoided making any conclusive promises in providing military assistance to the KMT government in 1948, the US devised further plans to extend aid program to maintain the viability of Formosan economy; see page 40 of this thesis.

⁴⁷⁵ Gao Lang, *Zhonghua Minguo waijiao guanxi zhi yanbian, 1950-1972 (The Evolution of Republic of China's Diplomatic Relations, 1950-1972)*, 245-51. From 1952 until 1968, the US gave Taiwan around \$1.5 billion of economic aid, which did not include military assistance over the same period; see Ramon H. Myers, "Introduction: A Unique Relationship," in *A Unique Relationship: The United States and the Republic of China Under the Taiwan Relations Act*, ed. Roman H. Myers (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), 2.

⁴⁷⁶ Gao Lang, *Zhonghua Minguo waijiao guanxi zhi yanbian, 1950-1972 (The Evolution of Republic of China's Diplomatic Relations, 1950-1972)*, 245-51.

accordance with a constitutional amendment just approved.⁴⁷⁷

The gerontocracy and natural attrition of the membership of the three national elective bodies was becoming a serious problem. Considering its international and domestic challenges, the KMT regime realized that grass-root support was its only hope for survival. The ROC's National Assembly amended the Constitution in 1966 to authorize Chiang Kai-shek to hold a supplementary election. In December 1969, fifteen, eleven and two new members were elected to the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan respectively.⁴⁷⁸ All of these new members were native Taiwanese. American aid, local autonomy and natural attrition of the national elective bodies together conferred upon the Taiwanese the strength to request that the KMT regime open itself to an America-conceived "Taiwanization." However, given the size of the three organs and the extent of KMT authoritarianism, the supplementary election was a token gesture.⁴⁷⁹ Furthermore, more native Taiwanese students pursued advanced studies overseas, where they were exposed to Western, especially American, values and were able to express their structuralistic Taiwanese nationalism more freely.

The Overseas Taiwan Independence Movement in the Early 1960s

Although many Americans and Japanese might have been sympathetic to the Taiwan independence movement, there was not much firm support in the early 1960s. The Communist China-Soviet bloc still posed a serious threat and bipolar confrontation forced the US to support the KMT. Attitudes toward the Taiwan independence movement in America and Japan diverged before 1970.⁴⁸⁰ However, American diplomats in Taiwan were more sympathetic.⁴⁸¹ The "Formosa desk" and other diplomats in the US Embassy at Taipei kept a close eye on local affairs and exploited the gap between mainlanders and Taiwanese.⁴⁸² The general international situations thus were fertile ground for the overseas Taiwan independence movement. The following events are a chronology of the rise of overseas Taiwan independence movement in the early 1960s.

⁴⁷⁷ See page 63 of this thesis.

⁴⁷⁸ Clough, *Island China*, 35-36.

⁴⁷⁹ Huang, *Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973*, 5.

⁴⁸⁰ For an analysis of American and Japanese views of Formosan nationalism before 1970, see Chapters 8 and 9 of Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid., 180.

⁴⁸² Ibid., 180-81.

- 1960 February 28, Taiwanese student Wang Yu-te (Ong Joktik, 王育德) organized the "Taiwan Chinglian Hue" (Young Formosan Association, or Formosan Youth Association) in Tokyo and published the Japanese-language journal *Taiwan Chinglian* (*The Young Formosan*, or *Formosan Youth*, 台灣青年) to advocate independence.⁴⁸³
- 1960 March, UFI addressed an "Appeal for Justice" to the American people. Exiled Taiwanese leaders warned that unqualified support for Chiang since 1945 had damaged American prestige, called for recognition of the true American interests and Washington support of Taiwan independence, demanded an immediate UN Trusteeship over Taiwan, and asserted that a plebiscite would demonstrate an overwhelming sentiment in favour of independence.⁴⁸⁴
- 1961 February 28, Edward Chen, Chairman of UFI, held a press conference in New York and made public for the first time the Taiwan independence movement in North-America.⁴⁸⁵
- 1961, Taiwanese students at Kansas University organized the first Formosan Club in America.⁴⁸⁶
- 1961, Senator William Fulbright helped Thomas Liao win a diplomatic victory by inviting Liao to deliver a speech on the UN. However, because of the KMT's interference, Liao was not able to enter the US.⁴⁸⁷
- 1961 August 4, the UFI launched the first demonstration of the Taiwan independence movement to protest the visit of the ROC Vice-President Chen Cheng to the UN. Although only seven or eight native Taiwanese (including children) attended the demonstration, it drew the attention of American media.⁴⁸⁸
- 1962, the Taiwan Chinglian Hue in Japan published the *Toklip Taiwan* in Romanised Fukien dialect to conduct propaganda for the Taiwan independence movement in Taiwan.⁴⁸⁹
- 1962 June, Shih Ming (史明) published his famous book, *Taiwan's 400 Years History*, in Tokyo.
- 1962 July, the "Formosan Association" began publishing *The Formosan Quarterly*, an English counterpart of the monthly *Taiwan Chinglian*. Chairman Wang Yu-te strongly urged that the US "not be blind to what it is supporting in Formosa."⁴⁹⁰
- 1963 June, Taiwanese students in Canada established the Formosan Association of Canada.⁴⁹¹

⁴⁸³ Ong Joktik 王育德, "In The Beginning," *Formosan Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1962): 3. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 468.

⁴⁸⁴ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 472.

⁴⁸⁵ Chen Ming-cheng and Shih Cheng-feng, ed., ^eds., *A History of World United Formosans for Independence*, 35.

⁴⁸⁶ Lin Ming-hsien 林茗顯, *Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji* (*A Chronology of Relevant Events of World United Formosans for Independence*) [internet] (WUFI, Jun 11 2003 [cited Jan 11 2005]), available from <http://www.wufi.org.tw/>.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid., ([cited). See also Chen Lung-chu and Lasswell, *Formosa, China, and the United Nations*, 136-37.

⁴⁸⁸ Lin Ming-hsien, *Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji* (*A Chronology of Relevant Events of World United Formosans for Independence*) ([cited).

⁴⁸⁹ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 468. See also Lin Ming-hsien, *Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji* (*A Chronology of Relevant Events of World United Formosans for Independence*) ([cited).-

⁴⁹⁰ Ong Joktik, "In The Beginning," 3.

⁴⁹¹ Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 169. See also Chen Ming-cheng and Shih Cheng-feng, ed., ^eds., *A History of World United Formosans for Independence*, 40.

- 1964 spring, League for Self-Determination of Formosans was established in Canada.⁴⁹²
- 1964 February 29, UFI launched a demonstration commemorating the February 28 Incident in front of the ROC embassy. About seventy or eighty Taiwanese students took part in the event and again attracted the American media attention. The rise in attendance showed that UFI was gaining support among the Taiwanese community in the US.⁴⁹³

As the Taiwan independence movement became more visible in America, more scholars and diplomats expressed their support for Taiwan independence. George F. Kennan, former Director of the Policy Planning Staff and US Ambassador to Russia and Yugoslavia and an eminent scholar, told Douglas Mendel in January 1964 that the US should solve this problem with a UN plebiscite.⁴⁹⁴

Discourses of Taiwanese Nationalism

Primordialism or Ethno-Nationalism

Joshua and Thomas Liao's Formosan League for Re-Emancipation was regarded as the beginning of the Taiwan independence movement. America's resumption of separatist intentions after the outbreak of the Korean War prompted Joshua Liao to articulate Formosan nationalism in his *Formosa Speaks*, a document that bore the hallmark of primordialism, or ethno-nationalism. Yet the Liaos' argument that Taiwanese were not pure Chinese but a mixed race, and using this argument as a theoretical basis for racial self-determination was not popular among the Taiwanese.⁴⁹⁵ This is because among the Han-dominated Taiwanese there exists a strong sense of racialism, which believes the purity of ethnic-Han blood represents the superiority of Chinese culture.⁴⁹⁶ Despite Thomas Liao's credibility in the US and Canada, he did not receive much support from the US or Japan because of the bi-polar Cold War confrontation.⁴⁹⁷ His dogmatism and the factionalism among independence organizations in Tokyo rendered his Provisional

⁴⁹² Chen Ming-cheng and Shih Cheng-feng, ed., eds., *A History of World United Formosans for Independence*, 40.

⁴⁹³ Lin Ming-hsien, *Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji* (*A Chronology of Relevant Events of World United Formosans for Independence*) ([cited]).

⁴⁹⁴ Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 181. Since 1949, Kennen, then Director of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department, had strongly promoted separatism. See *FRUS 1949* (v.9), 356-57.

⁴⁹⁵ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 456-57.

⁴⁹⁶ Shih Cheng-feng, "Taiwan yishi de tansuo (An Exploration of Taiwanese Consciousness)," 67. See also Shih Cheng-feng, *Taiwan minzu zhuyi* (*Taiwanese Nationalism*), 214.

⁴⁹⁷ Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 148, 50, 52.

Government ineffectual.⁴⁹⁸ Such structural, subjective and objective factors undermined the promotion of ethno-nationalism. Thomas Liao finally surrendered to the KMT and returned to Taiwan on May 14, 1965.

Structuralism

The subsequent overseas secessionists tended to dwell upon the structural inequities imposed by the KMT. After ROC Vice-President Chen Cheng was confronted by demonstrators for Taiwan independence in August 1961, Peng Ming-min (彭明敏) described the character of the independence movement in the US to KMT security officials:

Their advocacy of independence ... was ... a general reaction to the basic policies of government in Formosa. They objected to the *structure* of government in Formosa. They were not content to take part only in a provincial organization while being excluded from an effective place in the national administration that absorbed provincial taxes and made decisions binding on the provincial administration.⁴⁹⁹

Peng's description indicated that overseas Taiwan independence discourse at this time was characterized by structuralism. Structuralism, also known as instrumentalism, argues that the generation of collective national identity derives from structural inequities, in which government policy institutionalises dominance of one group over another, as evidenced by the unfair allocation of political power and material wealth, discrepancies in social status, and the enforced proscription of the oppressed group's cultural norms. Structuralist theory further argues that the resultant sense of disfranchisement compels opposition elites to exploit blood or cultural characteristics as a means by which to campaign for national liberation against alien dominators.⁵⁰⁰

Constructuralism or Political Nationalism

Political nationalism seemed a natural corollary to the dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek. Lei Chen and his group had already proposed cooperation with the Taiwanese and the establishment of an opposition party to promote a democratic Formosa. Yet

⁴⁹⁸ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 465-67. See also Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 148-49.

⁴⁹⁹ Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, 116. Available online at: <http://www.hi-on.org.tw/ATASTE.htm>.

⁵⁰⁰ Shih Cheng-feng, *Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism)*, 93-94, 180, 88; Shih Cheng-feng, "Taiwan yishi de tansuo (An Exploration of Taiwanese Consciousness)," 60.

secessionist Taiwanese did not appreciate his desire to preserve the ROC. Some thoughtful independence theorists sought to tackle persistent Han racialism to highlight the subjectivity of Taiwanese. Shih Ming (史明) and Peng Ming-min were two of the most important pioneers in these efforts.

Shih Ming's Constructuralism

Shih Ming was a militant Taiwanese Communist. He became a fugitive in 1950 after the KMT discovered that he was organizing a paramilitary force against the KMT. He fled to Japan, where he became a close friend of Wang Yu-te, founder of the Formosan Association. To transcend Han racialism, he published his Japanese-language *Taiwan's 400 Years History* in Tokyo in June 1962. This is the first postwar history of Taiwan written by a Taiwanese after WWII. Shih argued that for the past four hundred years, particularly in the previous century, the separate geographical and historical paths conspired to transform the Han Taiwanese into a more heterogeneous race.⁵⁰¹ He sought to enshrine Taiwan's unique history and culture to transcend the ethnic and blood connections with Mainland China in order to establish an independent Taiwanese nation.⁵⁰² This argument is constructuralism, which argues that a nation is an imagined community that can be constructed upon its collective history or memory, common experience in the present, and, more importantly, upon a shared wish for the future. In other words, a nation is constructed upon a subjective collective identity, and national identity can be an acquired matter of choice. Accordingly, national identity is highly fluid; a national movement looks to the future, aspiring to unite all residents, beyond the limits of consanguinity, language, culture and religion, in the construction of a new nation and establishment of a new country, of which the new titles can be determined through open debate.⁵⁰³

In July 1962, an article entitled "Why Formosa Wants Independence" appeared in the *Formosan Quarterly*, the English-language organ of the Formosan Association. The

⁵⁰¹ Shih Ming, *Taiwan's 400 Years History*, 439-41.

⁵⁰² Ibid., 453, 640-41. See also Shih Cheng-feng 施正鋒, "Wo dui Shi Ming de renshi (My Understanding of Shih Ming)," in *Huangye gudeng - Shi Ming (A Lone Lamp in the Wilds - Shih Ming)*, ed. Yeh Po-wen (Taipei: Shih Ming jiaoyu jijinhui, 2001), 66-67.

⁵⁰³ Shih Cheng-feng, *Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism)*, 52, 95-96. See also Shih Cheng-feng, "Taiwan yishi de tansuo (An Exploration of Taiwanese Consciousness)," 60.

article related Shih Ming's arguments and expounded the western concept of a nation:

A nation consists of a part of people. Among the people of a nation, there are common feelings which ... can be created by various causes. ... The most important cause is the possession of an historically defined territory where people share the same political tradition, a common memory of their history and a common pride and humiliation, joy and regret for past events. Or a nation can be expressed as a community of men which has been historically constructed.

There is no doubt ... that we Formosans consist of a nation. ... Formosa followed a different path from that of mainland China, and has made different advances in historical stage.⁵⁰⁴

Shih is well respected as a pioneer in interpreting the history of Taiwanese independence in the light of historical and cultural differences. However, he made scant reference to how to deal with mainlander Chinese on Taiwan. His militancy destroyed his association with Wang Yu-te and the Formosan Association; moreover, it left little room for cooperation with the US. In 1967, he founded the radical Independent Taiwan Association. Because of the KMT crackdown of overseas secessionist publications and factional politics among secessionist camps in Japan and America, Shih Ming's constructuralism failed to gain substantial support at home or abroad.⁵⁰⁵

Peng Ming-min's Constructuralism

Peng Ming-min was a native Taiwanese authority in international law, and a faculty member at National Taiwan University. When asked about Taiwan's legal position by students, he explained that the foundations of a modern nation-state "are not formed on the basis of biological origin, culture, religion, or language, but rather on a sense of common destiny and a belief in shared interests" that "rise out of a common history."⁵⁰⁶ This argument is typical of constructuralism or political nationalism.

From 1955 to the early 1960s, Peng discerned that American policy was moving toward recognition of the Communists. He also witnessed the KMT's immobilism, pondered the reality of the two million mainlanders' perpetual residence on Taiwan, and was exploited

⁵⁰⁴ Liau Kianliong, "Why Formosa Wants Independence," 7.

⁵⁰⁵ For the role of factionalism among Taiwan independence movement organizations in US, see Wang, *The Dust That Never Settles*, 190-91. For the role played by factionalism in Japan, see Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 152-53.

⁵⁰⁶ Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, 93. This political philosophy is enlightened by Ernest Renan's essay, *Qu'est qu'une nation?* ("What is a Nation?"); see Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, 26. Wu Mi-cha and Chang Yen-hsien, *Jianli Taiwan de guomin guojia* (*Establish a Civic Nation for Taiwan*), 153.

by the KMT who sent him to the UN and Washington.⁵⁰⁷ He attended two conferences hosted by Dr. Henry Kissinger in 1956 and 1960 respectively, where the "Formosan question was a frequent topic."⁵⁰⁸ During the 1960 conference, he argued publicly for the first time that the legal status of Formosa had not yet been settled by formal action, and suggested that the Formosan people have a say in their future.⁵⁰⁹ In 1961, he was a legal adviser to the KMT delegation at the UN, and was privy to the Kennedy administration's thwarting of the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Outer Mongolia's admission to the UN.⁵¹⁰ In the second half of 1962, he called for "attention to the diverse peoples who had been cut off from their own past by colonial rule, and were now seeking to control their own destinies."⁵¹¹ The US government took Peng's words very seriously; American diplomats in Taipei frequently consulted him on matters relating to international politics.⁵¹²

In 1964, Peng issued a manifesto *Taiwan ziji yundong xuanyan* (台灣自救運動宣言, A Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation,)⁵¹³ in which he declared Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship as the common enemy of the mainlander refugees and Taiwanese, appealed for joint support of self-determination and urged all people on Taiwan to unite on behalf of a new, independent and democratic Taiwan.⁵¹⁴ This was the most radical brand of political nationalism to date. He and two of his students, Hsieh Tsung-min (謝聰敏) and Wei Ting-chao (魏廷朝), were arrested on September 20, 1964 when preparing to

⁵⁰⁷ Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, 97-98, 108.

⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 96, 99.

⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 99-100.

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 111.

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.*, 122-23.

⁵¹² The American Embassy held a thick folder about Peng; even Ambassador Admiral William J. Kirk was keen to invite Peng to his office for a long talk. Yet Kirk's invitation was not realized after Kirk returned to Washington for surgery in January 1963. See *Ibid.*, 123.

⁵¹³ *Ibid.*, 129. There are two translations for Peng's manifesto "台灣自救運動宣言." The first one of April 1966 from the Japan-based United Young Formosans for Independence (UYFI) was entitled *The Independence Declaration of Formosa*. See Peng Ming-min, Hsieh Chung-min, and Wei Ting-chao 彭明敏, 謝聰敏, 魏廷朝, "The Independence Declaration of Formosa," *Independent Formosa*, Vol. V, No. 1-2 (1966): 2-9. The second was completed in May 1966 by US-based United Formosans for Independence (UFI) and entitled *A Declaration of Formosans*. See Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 249-60.

⁵¹⁴ Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, 129.

issue ten thousand copies of the manifesto.⁵¹⁵

The Taiwan Independence Movement in the Late 1960s

The Implications of the Peng Ming-min Case

Peng was charged with “an attempt to overthrow the government by illegal means” and sentenced to eight years in prison in early 1965.⁵¹⁶ However, under pressure from international news media, human rights organizations and Washington, the KMT regime yielded, commuting Peng’s sentence on November 3, 1965 but keeping him under house arrest.⁵¹⁷ International support, particularly from the US, galvanized the secessionist camp. Taiwan’s independence movement entered an era of unprecedented activity between the middle of 1965 and 1970.⁵¹⁸ The significance of these events is described below.

The Association between US Separatists and Taiwanese Secessionists

After Peng was arrested, Fairbank published an editorial against the arrest in the *New York Times*. He and Dr. Scalapino, author of the Conlon Report, organized a lobbying campaign to compel Washington to make a formal protest of the arrest.⁵¹⁹ As Peng’s case attracted publicity, more high-level American diplomats openly spoke out in favour of Taiwan independence. In October 1964, George F. Kennan’s article, “Japanese security and American policy” published in *Foreign Affairs*, demanded a solution of the Taiwan issue in accordance with the sentiments of the inhabitants.⁵²⁰ In 1965, Averill Harriman, a former Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East and later a roving

⁵¹⁵ Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 185. See also Tai Kuo-hui, Wang Tso-jung, and Hsia Chen 戴國輝, 王作榮, 夏珍, *Aizeng Li Denghui (Love and Hatred of Lee Teng-hui)* (Taipei: Tianxia yuanjian, 2001), 163-64.

⁵¹⁶ Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, 167, 74.

⁵¹⁷ William Burr, *Nixon’s Trip to China* [internet] (GWU, 2003 [cited Dec 11 2003]), available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106/index.htm>; Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 468-69; Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, 150-51, 79-83. According to Peng, in addition to JFK’s letter published in the *New York Times*, Dr. Kissinger of Harvard and the Dean of the Law School at McGill University joined efforts for rescuing Peng.

⁵¹⁸ For a brief description of these events, see Lin Ming-hsien, *Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji (A Chronology of Relevant Events of World United Formosans for Independence)* ([cited]).

⁵¹⁹ Fairbank’s concern with the fate of intellectuals in Taiwan led him to contact American officials concerning expatriate Chinese scholars in need of immigration or financial help. See Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, 236-37. Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, 150.

⁵²⁰ Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 181.

Ambassador for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, told a Taiwanese student after a public lecture at Madison, Wisconsin, that "The United States is going to support the inhabitants of Formosa in their struggle for independence. Even if they choose to join Communist China, we will support them in accordance with the principle of self-determination."⁵²¹

After Peng was released, Fairbank published an article, entitled "Taiwan: Myth, Dream, and Nightmare" in the February 5, 1966 issue of *The New Republic*. He supported Taiwan independence on the basis of American principles of self-determination, Taiwan's economic-technological superiority, and the bloody suppression of the KMT in 1947.⁵²² He reaffirmed the ongoing cultural assimilation through integration between Taiwanese and mainlanders;⁵²³ and referred to the cultural conflict between American values and China's ancient ethnocentrism, which survived in the Communists and Nationalists alike.⁵²⁴ To defend Taiwan as an American cultural bastion, he reiterated:

The American interest is to preserve the substance of Taiwan's independence without demanding that our cherished English-language formula of "self-determination" be accepted in Chinese terminology. Let us continue to leave the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Straits and the Taiwan-China relationship ambiguous and not demand neat definitions.⁵²⁵

On January 31, 1967, Edwin O. Reischauer, Harvard Professor and former US Ambassador to Japan (1961-1966), testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that "There is ... a completely viable unit on Taiwan with a population of between 12 and 13 million ... We have the actuality of an independent political and social organ living there."⁵²⁶

The Integration of Taiwan Independence Organizations

Efforts to free Peng, Thomas Liao's surrender to the KMT and his renunciation of secessionism in May 1965 combined to convince independence organizations in various regions to accelerate their reorganization and integration. With the increasing number

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² Fairbank, *China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A.*, 75. The book was published in 1967 but the article was published in *The New Republic* and dated February 5, 1966.

⁵²³ Ibid., 76.

⁵²⁴ Ibid.

⁵²⁵ Ibid., 78.

⁵²⁶ *Asia, the Pacific, and the United States*, 25-26. See also Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 182.

of Taiwanese students studying in the US, and the divisions within the independence camp based in Tokyo, the US gradually replaced Japan as the bastion for the Taiwan independence movement.⁵²⁷ Immediately after Peng's arrest, the League for Self-Determination of Formosans in Canada renamed itself the Committee for Human Rights in Formosa. On September 23, 1965, the Formosan Association in Japan was reorganized as the United Young Formosans for Independence (UYFI). In June 1966, the UFI in America became the United Formosans in America for Independence (UFAD).⁵²⁸ In spring 1967, the Union for Formosa's Independence in Europe (UFIE) was founded. Finally, to achieve unity, the four major organizations in US (UFAD), Japan (UYFI), Canada and Europe (UFIE) agreed on September 20, 1969 to organize the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI), the largest Taiwan independence movement organization in the world, with its general headquarters in the US and branches in Canada, Japan and Europe.⁵²⁹

The Advance of Taiwanese Nationalism Discourse

In April 1966, Peng's *Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation* was first published in English by *Independent Formosa*, an organ of UYFI in Japan.⁵³⁰ In May 1966, the UFI had it re-translated and circulated in the US. Again, when there was a heated debate on seating Communist China in the twenty-first annual meeting of the UN Assembly, Peng's manifesto appeared in the *New York Times* on November 20, 1966 to promote international support.⁵³¹

To promote the Taiwan independence movement more effectively, the integration of organization and propaganda was necessary. Since May 25, 1968, the three major independence camps in America, Japan and Europe jointly published the monthly Chinese-language journal *Taiwan Chinglian* (*The Young Formosan*, or *Formosan Youth*,

⁵²⁷ Lung-chu Chen believed that the success or failure of the Taiwan independence movement in the US would be decisive for the future; see Chen Lung-chu and Lasswell, *Formosa, China, and the United Nations*, 195.

⁵²⁸ Ibid., 196.

⁵²⁹ "The Declaration on the Establishment of the World United Formosans for Independence," *Independent Formosa*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1970): 3, 13.

⁵³⁰ Peng Ming-min, Hsieh Chung-min, and Wei Ting-chao, "The Independence Declaration of Formosa," 2-9.

⁵³¹ Lin Ming-hsien, *Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji* (*A Chronology of Relevant Events of World United Formosans for Independence*) ([cited]).

台灣青年)⁵³² and published “Taiwanren de zhuzhang” (台灣人的主張, Taiwanese Propositions) in each issue.⁵³³ These Propositions encapsulated and itemized the arguments of Peng’s *Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation*. Notably, the Propositions extended the definition of Taiwanese to anyone who identified Taiwan as their motherland and were committed themselves to its freedom, welfare and prosperity.⁵³⁴ This redefinition inspired a confident, flexible and pluralistic Taiwan identity. By the middle of 1968, the primary objective of overseas political nationalism or constructivism had been accomplished and welcomed by overseas secessionist groups.⁵³⁵ The realisation of overseas political nationalism is important because, as will be seen in the next chapter, the influx of overseas political nationalism into Taiwan in the 1980s fractured the national identity and helped the dissemination of secessionism at home.

Human Rights as an Emergent Issue

In the second half of 1960s, the KMT’s heavy-handed policy of arresting and harassing overseas pro-independence Taiwanese students caused considerable human rights pressure from American academia and officialdom. The arrest of native student Huang Chi-ming (黃啓明) on September 2, 1966 and the Nationalists’ yielding to pressure and granting Huang a three-year suspended sentence in July 1967 is the finest example of the growing importance of human rights.⁵³⁶ A spate of arrests of pro-independence students reinforced the perception of the KMT as a Leninist-type party.

The KMT Fall and the Rise of Secessionism

Toward the end of the 1960s, the Vietnam War and the split between the PRC and the USSR prompted the US to make gradual and subtle overtures to China. When Italy

⁵³² The Romanization of the journal’s title was deliberately rendered according to Taiwanese pronunciation for political reasons.

⁵³³ Chen Ming-cheng and Shih Cheng-feng, ed., ^eds., *A History of World United Formosans for Independence*, 11. See also *Taidu lianmeng Riben benbu yuanqi (The Story of WUFI in Japan)*, [internet] (WUFI, Jun 11 2003 [cited Jan 11 2005]), available from <http://www.wufi.org.tw/>.

⁵³⁴ Lin Ming-hsien, *Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji (A Chronology of Relevant Events of World United Formosans for Independence)* ([cited).

⁵³⁵ Secessionist scholar Lung-chu Chen argued in 1967 that the native Taiwanese and mainland Chinese should live, work and communicate in a shared destiny, see Chen Lung-chu and Lasswell, *Formosa, China, and the United Nations*, 198.

⁵³⁶ Melvin Gurtov, “Recent Developments on Formosa,” *The China Quarterly*, No. 31 (1967): 88.

proposed the creation of a UN study committee to investigate ways of breaking the Chinese representation deadlock in 1966, America, along with Canada, Japan and other nations, agreed.⁵³⁷ When Italy repeated its proposal to solve the Chinese representation deadlock in 1968, the US backed it again.⁵³⁸

Although the UN General Assembly never had a chance to vote on a “Two Chinas” or “one China, one Formosa” formula because of opposition by both Chinas and by their respective partisans in the UN,⁵³⁹ the pervasive, intense anti-China climate in the US contributed to the rise of overseas secessionists.⁵⁴⁰ In 1967, Taiwanese secessionist scholar Chen Lung-chu and pro-separatism American scholar Harold Lasswell stated in their work *Formosa, China, and the United Nations*, “To seat Communist China in place of the Nationalist delegation in both the General Assembly and the Security Council without guaranteeing a just status for Formosa would amount to a license for Peking’s armed conquest of Formosa.”⁵⁴¹ The most appropriate solution, they argued, would be to apply the principle of self-determination and to hold a UN-supervised plebiscite.⁵⁴² They optimistically predicted that a UN resolution authorizing a plebiscite might provoke the KMT regime into withdrawing from the UN and might even culminate in the disintegration of the KMT regime and the establishment of a new Republic of Formosa.⁵⁴³ Notably, in the preface of the book, the authors noted that they had received much help from both the scholarly and government communities. The substantial contribution from members of these communities is acknowledged by the authors, who termed their work a result of collaborative “decision seminar.”⁵⁴⁴ Moreover, the book asserted the visible, gradual process of “Taiwanization” among the

⁵³⁷ Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 237. See also Wang Cheng-hua 王正華, ed., ^eds., *Zhonghua minguo yu Lianheguo shiliao huibian - Zhongguo daibiaoquan (Documentary Collection on R.O.C. and United Nations - Chinese Representation)* (Taipei: Academic Historica, 2001), 305, 15.

⁵³⁸ Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 237.

⁵³⁹ Ibid., 236.

⁵⁴⁰ Oksenberg, “A Decade of Sino-American Relations,” 176; Shambaugh, “Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations,” 208.

⁵⁴¹ Chen Lung-chu and Lasswell, *Formosa, China, and the United Nations*, 138.

⁵⁴² Ibid., 139.

⁵⁴³ Ibid., 152-53. Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 235-36.

⁵⁴⁴ Chen Lung-chu and Lasswell, *Formosa, China, and the United Nations*, vi. Probably because of sensitivity, the authors did not name the officials contributing to their work. The authors did acknowledge gratitude to many famous scholars, including A. Doak Barnett, John King Fairbank, and Neil H. Jacoby.

general mainlanders on the island.⁵⁴⁵ Considering the “channels and predispositions open to the champions of Formosa,”⁵⁴⁶ and the prevalent undercurrent of separatism, this means that by the end of the decade, “Taiwanization” had become a proven and expanding consensus among American scholars, government officials and diplomats with an interest in Taiwan affairs.

However, American withdrawal of its support of the KMT made the position of the regime untenable. The rising publicity of the Taiwan independence movement and the swelling number of participants in demonstrations gave rise to mass movement in overseas secessionist camp. The establishment of the WUFI on January 1, 1970 symbolized the culmination of the more than twenty years of partnership between the US and Taiwanese nationalists. WUFI believed that “the 1970s will be a turning point in the history of Taiwan and will be the decade during which to establish an independent State of Taiwan.”⁵⁴⁷ Echoing Fairbank’s rejection of “the misleading ‘Two Chinas’ concept,” WUFI rejected “the ambiguous policy of ‘Two Chinas’.”⁵⁴⁸ This confidence was shared by O. V. Armstrong, a Taiwan expert at the US Embassy in Taipei. After serving five years as Taiwan specialist, Armstrong sent a telegram to the State Department in 1970, asserting that by the mid-1980s the KMT government “must somehow be encouraged to transfer more real power to the Taiwanese and acquiesce in the eventual Taiwanization of the Republic of China.”⁵⁴⁹

Summary

Truman’s interventionist measures during and after the Korean War marked the resumption of separatism on Taiwan. Both the “Two China” and “One China, One Taiwan” policies served the goal of Taiwan independence. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Cold-War bipolarisation apparently facilitated Chiang Kai-shek’s authoritarian control of Taiwan. However, the US government used American aid – already used to promote Formosan autonomy and to deny Taiwan to the Communists before the Korean

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid., 167.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid., 200.

⁵⁴⁷ “The Declaration on the Establishment of the World United Formosans for Independence,” 13.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid. See also Fairbank, *China: The People’s Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A.*, 63.

⁵⁴⁹ Wang, “KMT’s Localization Claim Is Empty.”

War – to promote the social and political rights for the Taiwanese and to undermine the KMT.

Truman's interventionism contributed to the emergence of Taiwanese ethno-nationalism. The administration of Chiang Kai-shek cemented an ethnic-provincial consciousness that was characterized by social inequalities and gave rise to Taiwanese structuralism. American aid reinforced Taiwanese structuralism against the KMT regime. Although the US suspended its aid to Taiwan in 1965, American aid had multi-dimensional, far-reaching socio-economic implications in the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism. The rapid economic growth from the late 1950s and the resultant socio-economic changes contributed significantly to the native political struggle against the mainland ruling elites and the transformation of the KMT authoritarian party-state system in the following decades. American aid also nurtured a US-oriented Taiwanese nationalism.

In the context of Truman's separatist intention and Chiang Kai-shek's authoritarian control of Taiwan, American scholars with separatist sympathies and Taiwanese secessionist scholars respectively accomplished their theories for Taiwan independence. By the end of 1960, American scholars had shaped a roughly discernable "Taiwan Independence Roadmap" based on Sino-US cultural conflict, cross-Strait cultural differences and intra-island cultural assimilation. The values of "self-determination" pervade the Roadmap. Both democratisation and Taiwanization are alternative vehicles for "self-determination." Cultural assimilation or Taiwanization would ultimately break Taiwan away from the mainland. The "Roadmap" would lead to Taiwan's self-determination but not to full independence. The developments of US-PRC-Taiwan relations in the following decades follow this roadmap.

American scholars appeared to have reached a consensus with their Taiwanese counterparts. On the part of Taiwan, western-style political nationalism seemed an inevitable of the KMT's authoritarianism and the constant threat from the Communists. Democratisation had become the shared goal of liberal mainlanders and Taiwanese nationalists since the late 1950s. Peng Ming-min's manifesto was a typical discourse of political nationalism. Peng's case had far-reaching implications for the integration of overseas secessionist organizations and independence narratives. The accomplishment

of the discourse of overseas political nationalism, exemplified by the redefinition of Taiwanese identity, was important. From the late 1970s on, there were strong internal dynamics for political change on the island. The influx of overseas political nationalism into Taiwan in the early 1980s contributed to the division of national identity at home, which facilitated the dissemination of secessionism in the late 1980s.

Since the late 1960s, the ROC's representation of China faced increasing challenges in the international community. In contrast, America's separatist intention on Taiwan, American aid and scholars' theories of independence resulted in a booming of the Taiwan independence movement. In terms of Taiwan policy, "Taiwanization" had become a proven and expanding consensus across the communities in the US. Consequently, overseas independence groups had every reason to be confident that an independent state of Taiwan was going to be established in the 1970s.

Chapter 4: 1970-1989

METAMORPHOSIS AND

THE POLLINATION OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM

Introduction

In the late 1960s, America began to reverse both its antagonism against Communist China and its support of the ROC. The shared perception of the Soviet threat prompted Nixon and Mao Zedong to set aside their differences and realign US-PRC relations on a new trajectory for security cooperation.⁵⁵⁰ From early 1969, the Nixon administration made cautious overtures to China.⁵⁵¹ Washington began to paint a bright picture of Beijing as a strategic ally against the Kremlin and play down the differences between American and Chinese foreign policies. Accordingly, such issues as Sino-US cultural conflict and cross-Strait cultural differences were shelved. This, however, does not mean that American promotion of intra-island cultural assimilation or Taiwanization stalled.

This chapter explores how the US reconciled the strategic need of US-PRC rapprochement with its promotion of Taiwanese nationalism by addressing several related questions. How did the US placate China with the Three Joint Communiqués? How did the Three Joint Communiqués fit into the Taiwan Independence Roadmap? How did the Three Joint Communiqués affect the KMT regime and Taiwanese nationalism? What forces initiated the democratic transition in Taiwan? How did Chinese nationalists and Taiwanese nationalists interact in terms of national identity in the era of US-PRC rapprochement?

The Entanglement of Nationalism and Strategic Interests

⁵⁵⁰ Myers, "Introduction: A Unique Relationship," 13; Oksenberg, "A Decade of Sino-American Relations," 177.

⁵⁵¹ Oksenberg, "A Decade of Sino-American Relations," 176.



Overseas Secessionists and American Supporters: Self-Determination

With the joint efforts of American anti-Chiang Kai-shek left-wing groups, and Japanese and Taiwanese friends, Peng Ming-min fled from Taiwan to Sweden on January 3, 1970.⁵⁵² At the invitation of Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), then Deputy Premier and Chiang Kai-shek's heir apparent, paid a ten-day visit to the US from April 18, 1970. The WUFI staged demonstrations to protest Chiang's visit. WUFI President Tsai Tung-jung (蔡同榮, Trong R. Chai) urged Nixon to endorse self-determination and an internationally supervised plebiscite for Taiwan.⁵⁵³ On April 24, 1970, Huang Wen-hsiung (黃文雄) and Cheng Tzu-tsai (鄭自才), members of the WUFI, attempted to assassinate Chiang Ching-kuo at the Plaza Hotel in New York.⁵⁵⁴ This marked the beginning of secessionist Taiwanese terrorism.⁵⁵⁵ On May 25, Dr. Douglas H. Mendel, author of the recently published *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, testified at the New York bail hearing for the two Taiwanese would-be assassins. Peng's escape from Taiwan, Mendel's work, and the assassination attempt publicized Formosan nationalism.⁵⁵⁶ On July 29, US Representative Donald M. Fraser presented a paper to the US Congress, "Political Repression in 'Free China'" and urged that US policy move away from support of Chiang Kai-shek and toward governance of Taiwan by Taiwanese in accordance with the principle of self-determination.⁵⁵⁷

Peng was later offered a research post at the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan. His visa application was approved by Secretary of State Kissinger and the State Department.⁵⁵⁸ On September 19, the US consular officers in Stockholm warned

⁵⁵² White House, "Memorandum of Conversation, 24 February 1972, 5:15 p.m. - 8:05 p.m.," 1972, in Nixon's Next Trip to China. Top secret, declassified 2003, George Washington University, 14. Available from <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106/NZ-3.pdf> [accessed Dec 15 2003]. Peng has never revealed the identities of Americans that helped him escape from Taiwan.

⁵⁵³ Chai Trong R. 蔡同榮, "Telegram to President Nixon," *The Independent Formosa*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1970): 9.

⁵⁵⁴ "Chiang and Ching and April 24, 1970," *The Independent Formosa*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1970): 2; Chen Ming-cheng and Shih Cheng-feng, eds., *A History of World United Formosans for Independence*, 55-57.

⁵⁵⁵ For more cases of terrorist links, see James Tyson, "Christians and the Taiwanese Independence Movement: A Commentary," *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 14, No. Fall (1987): 165.

⁵⁵⁶ Douglas Heusted Mendel, "The Role of Violence in Liberation Movements: A Reader's Opinion," *The Independent Formosa*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1970): 12.

⁵⁵⁷ "Congressman Fraser Urges Self-Determination for the People of Formosa," *The Independent Formosa*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1970): 7.

⁵⁵⁸ Burr, *Nixon's Trip to China* ([cited]). See also Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, 95-97.

Peng not to deviate from his original purpose of conducting research.⁵⁵⁹ However, after his arrival in America in late September as a political refugee, he was given few restrictions in “commenting on current world affairs.”⁵⁶⁰ Peng became President of the WUFI in January 1972. In the same year, George Kerr helped him publish his memoirs, *A Taste of Freedom*.⁵⁶¹ Harvard professor Edwin O. Reischauer wrote a brief review of his memoirs in which he supported the establishment of an independent state of Taiwan.⁵⁶² Senator Edward Kennedy also offered Peng his moral support.⁵⁶³

Two Meetings between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai in 1971

In 1970, O. V. Armstrong asserted to the State Department that by the mid-1980s the KMT must somehow be encouraged to transfer more real power to the Taiwanese and acquiesce in the Taiwanization of the ROC.⁵⁶⁴ Before reorienting American China policy for security cooperation against the Kremlin, Nixon and Kissinger had the national security establishment assess the potential costs and benefits of rapprochement with the PRC. On April 19, 1971 Kissinger instructed the national security bureaucracy to explore the impact upon US relations with the ROC.⁵⁶⁵ The NSC Interdepartmental Group later replied: “time is not necessarily in Peking’s favor on the issue of Taiwan’s eventual status. The drift of events, notably Taiwan’s progressively greater viability, increases the possibility of a one China/one Taiwan solution.”⁵⁶⁶ Self-determination through democratisation and Taiwanization, the theme of the “Taiwan Independence Roadmap,” was a viable course of action. In June 1971, the CIA proposed a Taiwanese-dominated electoral government through Taiwanization of the Taiwan

⁵⁵⁹ Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, 232.

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 235.

⁵⁶¹ *Ibid.*, xii.

⁵⁶² Paa Shiu-lam, *Taidu' muhou (Behind the Scene of Taiwan Independence)*, 34. See also Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou 賴澤涵, 馬若孟, 魏萼, *Beijuxing de kaiduan: Taiwan ererba shibian (A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947)*, trans. Luo Jia Luo (Taipei: Shibao wenhua, 1993), 308.

⁵⁶³ Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *Beijuxing de kaiduan*, 308.

⁵⁶⁴ See page 98 of this thesis.

⁵⁶⁵ Henry A. Kissinger, *National Security Study Memorandum 124: Next Steps towards the People's Republic of China (Apr 19, 1971)* [internet] (George Washington University, 1999 [cited Apr 16 2002]); 1, available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB19/02-01.htm>.

⁵⁶⁶ USDOS, “Memorandum for the Chairman, NSC Senior Review Group, NSSM 124: Next Steps Toward the People's Republic of China (PRC),” Apr 17 1971, in *China and the United States: From Hostility to Engagement, 1960-1998*. Top secret, declassified 1974, George Washington University, 4. Available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB19/03-01.htm> [accessed Sep 27 2002].

regime.⁵⁶⁷ Consequently, American confidence in “One China, One Taiwan” and Taiwanization facilitated US-PRC rapprochement.

The Nixon administration made only limited concessions on the issue of Taiwan. On July 1, 1971, Nixon instructed Dr. Kissinger “not to indicate a willingness to abandon much of our support for Taiwan until it was necessary to do so;” Nixon also emphasized that “the overall statement with respect [to] Taiwan should be somewhat more enigmatic.”⁵⁶⁸ When Kissinger secretly met Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in Beijing on July 9, 1971, Zhou questioned him about State Department spokesman Charles Bray’s reiteration of the “undetermined legal status of Taiwan” as the position of the US government. Kissinger simply replied: “He hasn’t repeated it!”⁵⁶⁹ As to the political future of Taiwan, Kissinger told Zhou that “we are not advocating a ‘Two Chinas’ solution or a ‘One China, One Taiwan’ solution.”⁵⁷⁰ Immediately after Kissinger returned to America in mid-July, Nixon delivered his shocking announcement of his decision to recognize the PRC. Later, Secretary of State Rogers recommended that the ROC relinquish the Security Council seat but reserve its UN membership for dual representation;⁵⁷¹ on August 2 he openly stated that the US would call for seating the PRC but oppose any move to expel the ROC.⁵⁷² Apparently, this was Nixon’s “Two China” solution for preserving “Taiwan’s right to exist as an independent nation.”⁵⁷³ On September 16, Nixon declared at a press conference that the ROC’s Security Council seat should be ceded to the PRC. The ROC resolutely rejected this proposal⁵⁷⁴ and the PRC just as vigorously opposed “Two Chinas” or dual representation.⁵⁷⁵ A few days later, exile Peng Ming-min spearheaded a Taiwanese independence demonstration in

⁵⁶⁷ Wang Hsiao-po, *Liang'an guanxi lunji (A Collection of Arguments on Cross-Strait Relations)*, 41.

⁵⁶⁸ White House, “Memorandum for the President’s Files: Meeting Between President, Dr. Kissinger, and General Haig, Thursday, July 1, Oval Office,” Jul 1 1971. Top secret, declassified 2001, George Washington University, 1-3. Available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-33.pdf> [accessed Jun 3 2002].

⁵⁶⁹ Winston Lord, “Memorandum for Henry Kissinger: Memcon of your Conversations with Chou En-lai on July 9 1971,” Jul 29 1971, USDOS. Top secret, declassified 2001, George Washington University, 9. Available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/> [accessed May 27 2002].

⁵⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁵⁷¹ Wang Cheng-hua, ed., ^eds., *Zhonghua minguo yu Lianheguo shiliao huibian - Zhongguo daibiaquan (Documentary Collection on R.O.C. and United Nations - Chinese Representation)*, 534.

⁵⁷² *Ibid.*, ed., ^eds., 555.

⁵⁷³ Richard M. Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (London: Book Club Associates, 1978), 556-57, 70.

⁵⁷⁴ Wang Cheng-hua, ed., ^eds., *Zhonghua minguo yu Lianheguo shiliao huibian - Zhongguo daibiaquan (Documentary Collection on R.O.C. and United Nations - Chinese Representation)*, 579-80.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, ed., ^eds., 596-602.

front of the UN.⁵⁷⁶ When the General Assembly discussed the issue of Chinese representation in mid-October, the WUFI launched demonstrations for independence around the world.⁵⁷⁷

During his second visit to Beijing, on October 21, Kissinger returned to his rejection of "Two Chinas" or "One China, One Taiwan," and the creation of an Independent Taiwan Movement.⁵⁷⁸ In reply to Zhou's suspicion of the linkage among numerous Taiwan independence demonstrations, the CIA and the Pentagon, he repeatedly promised "If you have any information of any American engaging in those activities and you give me his name, I can promise you in the name of the President he will be removed."⁵⁷⁹ In response to the Taiwan problem, he said that the US would support any peaceful resolution. "We recognize that the People's Republic considers the subject of Taiwan an internal issue, and we will not challenge that."⁵⁸⁰ He parried Zhou's question on the "undetermined legal status of Taiwan" by saying "That's not been said by any American spokesman since June."⁵⁸¹ Zhou repeatedly expressed his grave concern that the Taiwan independence movement would rise up in accordance with the theory that the status remains undetermined. Kissinger replied:

We do not challenge the fact that all Chinese maintain that there's only one China and that Taiwan is part of that China. And therefore we do not maintain that the status in that respect is undetermined. ... I can also assure the Prime Minister that the phrase "undetermined" will not be repeated.⁵⁸²

Kissinger had notably mentioned "a framework of one China" for the first time:

Our attempt will be to bring about a solution within a framework of one China and by peaceful means. ... I can confirm our position to bring about peaceful solution within a framework of one China. To "bring about" may be too active; "to encourage" is more correct. It's for the Chinese themselves to settle. It's not something we should actively push. We should try within a framework of one China.⁵⁸³

⁵⁷⁶ Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, 258.

⁵⁷⁷ Lin Ming-hsien, *Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji* (*A Chronology of Relevant Events of World United Formosans for Independence*) ([cited]).

⁵⁷⁸ White House, "Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou: President's Visit, Taiwan and Japan," Oct 21 1971. Top secret, declassified 2001, George Washington University, 13. Available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc11.pdf> [accessed Nov 15 2002].

⁵⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, " 14-5.

⁵⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, " 20.

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid.*, " 22.

⁵⁸² *Ibid.*, " 25-7.

⁵⁸³ *Ibid.*, " 27.

While Kissinger was still in China, the UN Assembly voted on in favour of Resolution 2758 to admit the PRC into, and expel the ROC from, the UN, thus thwarting Nixon's "Two China" solution.⁵⁸⁴ In 1971, fifteen nations established diplomatic relations with the PRC and eleven severed relations with the ROC.⁵⁸⁵ Doubts about the legitimacy of the KMT regime were raised at home.

The KMT: Under the Pressure of Taiwanization

Repeated diplomatic setbacks prompted many young intellectuals to enter the political arena; the *Daxue zazhi* (大學雜誌, *The Intellectual*) journal took a leading role in fomenting moves for political reforms.⁵⁸⁶ The *Daxue zazhi* intellectuals had become politicised since late 1970 by the controversy over America's unilateral decision to transfer the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai (釣魚台) Islands (Japanese, Senkaku islands) to Japan without consulting the PRC or the ROC, both of which claimed sovereignty over the islands.⁵⁸⁷ The intellectuals, who were really disillusioned Chinese nationalists, decried the KMT's defence posture toward the US and Japan as "a sign of weakness and betrayal of national interest."⁵⁸⁸ In July 1971, they insisted that only a thorough reform could save the nation.⁵⁸⁹ In October, fifteen prominent liberal, reformist intellectuals, mainlanders and native Taiwanese alike, proposed a reform program. They insisted that Taiwan should indefinitely remain a *de facto* autonomous political entity and achieve an open and democratic society as an alternative to the Communist system in China.⁵⁹⁰ This appeal was especially true when public awareness of the chaos resulting from the 1966 Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution grew.⁵⁹¹

Chang Chun-hung (張俊宏), a native Taiwanese, editor of *Daxue zazhi*, and a staff member of the Secretary General of KMT, condemned the representatives in the three

⁵⁸⁴ Wang Cheng-hua, ed., ^eds., *Zhonghua minguo yu Lianheguo shiliao huibian - Zhongguo daibiaowan* (Documentary Collection on R.O.C. and United Nations - Chinese Representation), 698-99.

⁵⁸⁵ Gao Lang, *Zhonghua Minguo waijiao guanxi zhi yanbian, 1950-1972* (The Evolution of Republic of China's Diplomatic Relations, 1950-1972), 37.

⁵⁸⁶ Huang, *Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973*, 107 note 1.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid., 5-9. See also Chan, *China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question*, 24.

⁵⁸⁸ Huang, *Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973*, 7. See also Chan, *China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question*, 24.

⁵⁸⁹ Chan, *China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question*, 12.

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid., 23.

⁵⁹¹ Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning*, 184.

national elective bodies as an aging privileged group and urged regular elections.⁵⁹² Chen Shao-ting (陳少廷), a native Taiwanese and President of *Daxue zazhi*, was the first to demand a “comprehensive re-election” of all members of the three national elective bodies.⁵⁹³ After the expulsion of the ROC from the UN, on October 27 the KMT pledged to strengthen the people’s national representative organs “in accordance with the principle of a democratic constitutional system.”⁵⁹⁴

Taiwanese Nationalists at Home: Call for Self-Determination

Since Kao Chun-ming (高俊明, C. M. Kao) was elected Secretary General of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church in 1970, he had aggressively led the Presbyterian Church to join the political struggle against the KMT.⁵⁹⁵ After Kissinger’s visits to Beijing and the ROC’s expulsion from the UN, the Presbyterian Church issued a “Statement on Our National Fate,” on December 29. The Statement requested that the global society respect the principle of self-determination and urged the KMT regime to “grasp the opportunities available to raise our demand for justice and freedom, and for internal renewal” by holding elections within the Taiwan area “of all representatives to the highest government bodies to succeed the present representatives who were elected twenty-five years ago on the mainland.”⁵⁹⁶ It threw down the gauntlet to the aging national elective bodies that symbolised Chinese rule. In the same year, to support the position of Taiwan Presbyterian Church, Huang Chung-hui (黃彰輝), together with other Taiwanese Christians, founded “The Formosan Christians for Self-Determination” (台灣基督徒自決運動) in New York.⁵⁹⁷

On the eve of the First Joint Communiqué, Taiwanese nationalists at home and abroad

⁵⁹² Chan, *China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question*, 27-28.

⁵⁹³ Huang, *Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973*, 30.

⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 31-32.

⁵⁹⁵ Tyson, “Christians and the Taiwanese Independence Movement,” 163-67. See also *Taiwan jiaohui gongbao zhoubao* (Taiwan Church News), [internet] (New Taiwan Foundation, 2001 [cited Oct 7 2003]), available from <http://formosa.yam.org.tw/magazine1.asp?ID=750921341>. The Presbyterian Church has played an important role in bridging the domestic and international movements over the decades; however, it did not draw so much publicity until the early 1970s.

⁵⁹⁶ Liu Hua-yi and Kao Chun-ming 劉華義, 高俊明, *Statement on Our National Fate by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan* [internet] (Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, 1971 [cited Sep 27 2003]), available from http://www.pct.org.tw/english/statements_1.htm.

⁵⁹⁷ “Notes: In Memoriam Reverend Dr. Shoki Coe,” *Taiwan Communique*, No. 37 (1988): 21.

alike articulated their desire for self-determination; Beijing seemed satisfied with Kissinger's promises, and the KMT already felt the pressure for Taiwanization.

1972 – The First Joint Communiqué

Nixon Administration: "One-China" vs. Taiwan's Undetermined Status

Between October 1971 and February 1972, the US repeatedly used the "carrot and stick" measures to discourage Taipei from derailing the US-PRC rapprochement.⁵⁹⁸ During his February 1972, Nixon informed Zhou of the five principles of his China policy:

Principle one. There is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China. There will be no more statements made ... that the status of Taiwan is undetermined. Second, we have not and will not support any the Taiwan independence movement. Third, we will ... discourage Japan from moving into Taiwan as our presence becomes less ... we do not want Japan moving in on Taiwan and will discourage Japan from doing so. The fourth point is that we will support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue ... Finally, we seek the normalization of relations with the People's Republic.⁵⁹⁹

Nixon and Kissinger assured Zhou that they would not support the Taiwan independence movement; however, Kissinger noted that they could not "suppress the movement on Taiwan if it develops without our support."⁶⁰⁰ Nixon also persuaded Zhou to accept the reality of US military presence in Japan because "our interest in peace in the Pacific was to restrain Japan."⁶⁰¹ The Carter administration later called these principles "Nixon's Five Points."⁶⁰² Nixon's first point was paraphrased as "Status is determined – One China, Taiwan is part of China" in Harding's *A Fragile Relationship: The United States*

⁵⁹⁸ Robert A. Madsen, "Chinese Chess: US China policy and Taiwan, 1969-1979" (PhD thesis, Oxford, 1999), 88-90.

⁵⁹⁹ White House, "Memorandum of Conversation, 22 February 1972, 2:10 p.m. - 6:00 p.m." Top secret, declassified 1999, 2003, George Washington University, 5. Available from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/DOC_readers/kissinger/nixzhou/12-01.htm [accessed Mar 27 2002, Dec 18 2003]. This document was first declassified on January 21, 1999 with the third principle partly sanitized. The document was completely declassified on May 30, 2003 and published for the first time by the National Security Archive on the web on December 11, 2003 after Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian defied US President Bush's warning on Taiwan's referendum legislation.

⁶⁰⁰ White House, "Memorandum of Conversation, 24 February 1972, 5:15 p.m. - 8:05 p.m.," 14. This top-secret position, the US would not support but could not suppress TIM; was not made known until the National Security Archive posted the newly declassified documents on December 11, 2003.

⁶⁰¹ Ibid., 11.

⁶⁰² Shirley A. Kan, "CRS Report for Congress: RL30341: China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy - Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei," (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 2001), 11.

and China since 1972.⁶⁰³ Yet the historical Shanghai Communiqué issued on February 28 deliberately circumvented the oral, non-binding principle of the determined status of Taiwan. According to the Communiqué:

The US government acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.⁶⁰⁴

The so called “one China Policy” – all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is only but China and Taiwan is a part of China – has been embedded in the “Three Joint Communiqués” and replaced the “undetermined status of Taiwan” since 1972. However, the deliberate selection of “acknowledges” instead of “recognizes” reflected the hollowness of Nixon’s words – not to mention the undetermined status of Taiwan.⁶⁰⁵ Harvey Feldman, a career diplomat who assumed the position of Director of the Office of ROC Affairs in September 1977 and created the AIT when the Second Joint Communiqué was signed, explained the word “acknowledges” as polite, diplomatic speech for “we understand that this is the position you take.”⁶⁰⁶ Consequently, the deliberately ambiguous “acknowledges” preserves the essence of the “undetermined status of Taiwan.” Some Taiwanese secessionist scholars have read between the lines and have argued that the wording had never settled the legal status for Taiwan.⁶⁰⁷ Secessionist Shih Cheng-feng believes that America’s “one China policy” is very different from China’s “one China principle” and that the US stance of “not support Taiwan independence” is just a perfunctory position to pacify China.⁶⁰⁸ In addition, the condition of “peaceful settlement” to the Taiwan issue legitimises US military

⁶⁰³ Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992), 43-44.

⁶⁰⁴ USDOS, “Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (Shanghai Communiqué of 1972),” (Shanghai: 1972). See also Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, 576.

⁶⁰⁵ In the Chinese text, the word for “acknowledge” is “cheng ren” (承認, recognize), a change from “ren shi” (認識, acknowledge), used in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. Kan, “RL30341,” note 29.

⁶⁰⁶ Harvey Feldman, “The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1429: A Primer on U.S. Policy Toward the ‘One-China’ Issue: Questions and Answers,” (Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2001).

⁶⁰⁷ Lee Hung-hsi 李鴻禧, “Dangqian tongdu lunzhan de xianfaxie di xili (A Constitutionalist Analysis of the Contemporary Dispute between Unification and Independence),” in *Guojia rentong xueshu yantaohui lunwenji (Collection of Articles from the Conference on National Identity)* (Taipei: Caituan faren xiandai xueshu yanjiu jijinhui, 1993), 4.

⁶⁰⁸ Shih Cheng-feng, “Tai-Zhong guanxi yu guojia anquan - Meiguo de yinsu, guojia rentong, yiji minzu rentong (Taiwan-China Relations and National Security - The American Factor, State Identity, and National Identity).”

intervention in the case of a PRC strike across the Taiwan Strait.

Furthermore, John H. Holdridge, a former student of John King Fairbank and Edwin Reischauer,⁶⁰⁹ then a senior staff member for East Asia and the Pacific at the NSC under Kissinger, wrote that “it was helpful that both the CCP and the Kuomintang regarded Taiwan as part of China, for by accepting this point and affirming our interest in the settlement of the sovereignty question ‘by the Chinese themselves’ we would affront neither side.”⁶¹⁰ Holdridge recounted that the wording of “all Chinese” was originally formulated as “all people,” but the State Department objected to the use of “people” because some inhabitants on Taiwan regarded themselves as “Taiwanese” and would not agree that Taiwan was a part of China.⁶¹¹ In short, behind each façade of “one China” policy, there is always a back door that allows “One China, One Taiwan.”

As far as Taiwan was concerned, the Communiqué was a further setback for the ROC. In 1972 alone, fourteen nations severed diplomatic relations with the ROC and seventeen, including Japan, established relations with the PRC.⁶¹² Moreover, since February 1972, American official documents had not used the title of “the Republic of China” but adopted “Taiwan” when referring to the government and people on the island.⁶¹³ Furthermore, for the remainder of 1972 and 1973, the Nixon administration gradually restricted Taipei’s access to senior US officials; the ROC had only rare opportunities to engage in diplomatic discussions with officials in the highest levels of the US government.⁶¹⁴

US Congress: Mixed Support for the PRC and Taiwan

Some Congress members had strong personal and political interests in the sudden thaw in Sino-US relations. As Peng Ming-min stated in 1972, “To our misfortune, the term ‘self-determination’ seems to have become an unsavoury phrase in the American

⁶⁰⁹ John H. Holdridge, *Crossing the Divide: An Insider's Account of Normalization of U.S.-China Relations* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), xii.

⁶¹⁰ Ibid., 89. Also refer to Kan, “RL30341,” 11-12., note 22.

⁶¹¹ Holdridge, *Crossing the Divide*, 93. Also refer to Kan, “RL30341,” 11-12., note 22.

⁶¹² Gao Lang, *Zhonghua Minguo waijiao guanxi zhi yanbian, 1950-1972 (The Evolution of Republic of China's Diplomatic Relations, 1950-1972)*, 37.

⁶¹³ Madsen, “Chinese Chess”, 104.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid., 104-05.

vocabulary.”⁶¹⁵ On February 21, 1973, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced a resolution strongly urging the US to establish full diplomatic relations with the PRC and to make it clear that the US was prepared to, alongside the American unilateral guarantee of the security of Taiwan, “reaffirm the commitment contained in the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and the Potsdam Proclamation of 1945 that Taiwan shall be restored to China;” and “reaffirm the interest of the United States in a peaceful reunification of Taiwan with mainland China.”⁶¹⁶ However, as Feldman argues, even after the issuance of the Shanghai Communiqué in 1978, had the ROC abandoned the claim as the legal government of all China and sought American recognition as a separate state, “there would have been intense political pressure in the United States to grant such recognition, despite the consequences for relations with the PRC.”⁶¹⁷ Many American conservatives hoped that Taipei would solve its internal political dilemma over constitutional legitimacy and become a separate state.

Chiang Ching-kuo’s “Indigenisation” and American Involvement

Chiang Kai-shek started grooming Chiang Ching-kuo as his heir apparent immediately after the KMT retreated to Taiwan; Chiang Ching-kuo had been in charge of Taiwan before becoming Premier in May 1972.⁶¹⁸ American rapprochement with the PRC took its toll on the KMT. In response to the internal and external questions on the legitimacy of KMT rule, international isolation and to domestic calls for reform, the KMT decided to strengthen its legitimacy at home by promoting “indigenisation,”⁶¹⁹ resolved to survive international isolation by mounting “flexible diplomacy,” and to weather the economic impact by adopting developmentalism to expand Taiwan’s exports.⁶²⁰

⁶¹⁵ Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, 257-58.

⁶¹⁶ S.RES.68, 93th Congress.

⁶¹⁷ Feldman, “A New Kind of Relationship,” 29-30.

⁶¹⁸ Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 119-32.

⁶¹⁹ Peng De-fu, “A Study on Taiwan’s Local Election and Democratic Transition”, 56. Chang Mau-kuei, “Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism),” 243; Bruce J. Dickson, “The Kuomintang before Democratization: Organizational Change and the Role of Elections,” in *Taiwan’s Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, ed. Tien Hung-mao (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 53-56; Wu Mi-cha and Chang Yen-hsien, *Jianli Taiwan de guomin guojia (Establish a Civic Nation for Taiwan)*, 131-33.

⁶²⁰ Wu Jo-yu, *Zhanhou Taiwan gongying shiye zhi zhengjing fenxi (The Political-Economic Analysis of the State-Run Business in Postwar Taiwan)*, 151-54. See also Li-Min Hsueh, Chen-Kuo Hsu, and Dwight H. Perkins, *Industrialization and the State: The Changing Role of Government in Taiwan’s Economy, 1945-1998* (London: Harvard University Press, 2000), 36-37.

From the perspective of indigenisation, Chiang Ching-kuo promoted Taiwanese for important posts in the party and the government to win native approval of his regime on the one hand; on the other hand, the government continued to hold national supplementary elections to rally support for the KMT-dominated parliament.⁶²¹ Six out of the sixteen cabinet members (including Lee Teng-hui, 李登輝), the Taipei Mayor and Provincial Governor were Taiwanese.⁶²² America closely watched the Taiwanization of the ROC government. The State Department's intelligence note on June 21, 1972 commented that "the new appointments pointed to eventual advancement of Taiwanese to positions of real power."⁶²³ In the 1972-1973 national supplementary elections, fifty-three, fifty-one and fifteen new native members were elected to the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan respectively.⁶²⁴ Although these elections "had been designed more to co-opt the opposition than to expand participation,"⁶²⁵ with each election, these national bodies became increasingly representative of Taiwanese.⁶²⁶ He also decreed the release of many political prisoners.⁶²⁷ In addition, he endeavoured to reduce the differences between the native Taiwanese and the ethnic groups from the mainland.⁶²⁸

An invisible crack existed between Chiang Ching-kuo's indigenisation and Washington's anticipation of Taiwanization. Chiang's indigenisation aimed to strengthen domestic legitimacy, while the US expected Taiwanization to lead to separatist self-determination; Chiang cautiously drew a line in between.⁶²⁹ The difference was most evident in American government's interest in orienting dissidents for Taiwanization beyond the

⁶²¹ Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 56. See also Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, eds., *Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties)*, 120.

⁶²² Li Hsiao-feng 李筱峰, 424 *ciJiang an de lishi yiyi (The Historical Significance of the Assassination Attempt against Chiang on April 24)* [internet] (Li, Hsiao-feng, 2000 [cited Oct 2 2003]), available from <http://www.jimlee.idv.tw/>.

⁶²³ Wang, "KMT's Localization Claim Is Empty."

⁶²⁴ Chan, *China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question*, 35-36; Clough, *Island China*, 26.

⁶²⁵ Cheng Tun-jen, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 485.

⁶²⁶ Chan, *China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question*, 35-36; Clough, *Island China*, 26.

⁶²⁷ Huang, *Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973*, 81-101. See also Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992: Uncertain Friendships* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), 150.

⁶²⁸ A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, *The Republic of China and U.S. Policy: A Study in Human Rights* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1983), 69.

⁶²⁹ There is a distinct difference between Chiang Ching-kuo's indigenisation and Lee Teng-hui's Taiwanization; see page 160 of this thesis.

indigenisation of the KMT. For instance, heeding the call for regular elections, the State Department invited Chang Chun-hung to visit the US.⁶³⁰ The purpose of such invitation might have been designed to boost his popularity in the 1972 year-end elections. This kind of invitation later became an established but subtle means of making contact with Taiwanese dissidents.⁶³¹ The US Embassy's report to the State Department on March 6, 1973 reinforced American confidence in Taiwanization. The report said: "both government and citizens [of the ROC] rejected reunion with the PRC and there is near universal agreement on the desirability of continued separation or independence from mainland control."⁶³² Meanwhile, Chiang Ching-kuo's indigenisation was not limited to the promotion of natives to the decision-making bodies; by 1975, the KMT had significantly increased the native Taiwanese presence in its membership, and at the district and county levels.⁶³³

From the perspective of flexible diplomacy, the KMT regime promoted civilian and commercial exchanges with other countries, substituting economic ties for diplomatic recognition, and trade and cultural offices for consulates and embassies.⁶³⁴ The ROC established a Congressional Affairs Section in the Washington embassy in 1972 and invited Congress members to visit Taiwan during the 1970s; Taipei thus overcame its diplomatic dilemma and considerably enhanced its influence in Congress.⁶³⁵ Public awareness of the disastrous Cultural Revolution provided the ROC with a pulpit from which to promote its image of freedom and traditional values. Taipei made excellent use of American public relations firms and, following their guidance, increased the number of advertisements and propaganda articles published in newspapers and magazines to sway public opinion.⁶³⁶ Meanwhile, Taipei gradually de-emphasized the purely ideological anti-Communist argument and in favour of invoking Washington's

⁶³⁰ Huang, *Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973*, ix, 77.

⁶³¹ See page 129 for another example.

⁶³² Wang, "KMT's Localization Claim Is Empty."

⁶³³ Dickson, "The Kuomintang before Democratization: Organizational Change and the Role of Elections," 54-56; Jürgen Domes, "The Kuomintang and the Opposition," in *In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949*, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst, 1993), 118; Huang Teh-fu, "Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang," 115.

⁶³⁴ Gao Lang, *Zhonghua Minguo waijiao guanxi zhi yanbian, 1950-1972 (The Evolution of Republic of China's Diplomatic Relations, 1950-1972)*, 39. See also Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 49. Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 226-29.

⁶³⁵ The KMT leadership endorsed the proposal of establishing the Congressional Affairs Section in 1971; see Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 146-48.

⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*, 149. See also Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 153-55.

moral obligation to protect Taiwan, credibility of its global commitments, and American geopolitical interests.⁶³⁷ Despite the tacit prohibition in US diplomatic circles against treating the ROC as a sovereign entity, in August 1974 the State Department generously announced that it would allow the ROC to open five consulates in US territory over Beijing's protests.⁶³⁸ Hence, flexible diplomacy eroded the one-China policy and endowed Taiwan with greater independence in international community.⁶³⁹

From the perspective of Taiwan's economic development, US involvement was most evident. In the face of the exodus of foreign investment as a result of Washington's contact with Beijing since 1970, the US helped bolster international confidence in Taiwan's economic future by encouraging an influx of foreign capital and expanding American economic ties with Taiwan.⁶⁴⁰ This helped Chiang launch the "Ten Major Development Projects" which were synonymous with economic modernization or industrialization. Chiang's developmentalism permeated the fabric of society, raised the standard of living, strengthened the legitimacy of KMT, and contributed to the proliferation of bilateral commercial interests.⁶⁴¹ Between 1971 and 1980, the annual GDP rose by approximately 10%.⁶⁴² Growing economic prosperity fuelled flexible diplomacy.⁶⁴³ Taiwan's trading power and modernization won the sympathy and support of many American industries, companies, political and social leaders and citizens.⁶⁴⁴ There were, however, accusations that members of Congress had been bribed in exchange for their support.⁶⁴⁵

Therefore, US-PRC rapprochement institutionalised Chiang Ching-kuo's indigenisation, which considerably enhanced US-Taiwan unofficial and economic ties and transformed bilateral strategic cooperation in the era of bipolar confrontation. The growing US Congressional concern over the future of Taiwan was evidence of this change. Before

⁶³⁷ Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 150-51.

⁶³⁸ This raised the number of such offices from 9 to 14. Ibid., 127, 231.

⁶³⁹ Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 50.

⁶⁴⁰ Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 113-14, 28-29. See also Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 143-44.

⁶⁴¹ Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 114, 28-29.

⁶⁴² Wu Jo-yu, *Zhanhou Taiwan gongying shiye zhi zhengjing fenxi (The Political-Economic Analysis of the State-Run Business in Postwar Taiwan)*, 160. See also Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 225.

⁶⁴³ Wu Jo-yu, *Zhanhou Taiwan gongying shiye zhi zhengjing fenxi (The Political-Economic Analysis of the State-Run Business in Postwar Taiwan)*, 159-60.

⁶⁴⁴ Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 230-33.

⁶⁴⁵ Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 281 note 106.

the signature of the Second Joint Communiqué, Congress passed numerous resolutions requiring that the US do nothing to compromise the freedom of the ROC and maintain close relations with the ROC. The proposed legislation created an environment and affected policy, even if they were never enacted.⁶⁴⁶ Beyond these tangible fronts, America advanced its values and lifestyle on the island and consolidated US-oriented Taiwanese nationalism that had taken root since the input of American aid.⁶⁴⁷

Overseas Taiwanese Nationalism: "Community of Shared Destiny"

US-PRC rapprochement galvanized the Taiwan independence movement in the US. While Nixon and Kissinger sought to improve US-PRC relations, Peng Ming-min, facing the reality of mainlanders' indefinite residence on the island, endeavoured to deal with the division between the Taiwanese and mainland ethnic groups and the tenacious Han racialism shared by both groups, so as to create a consolidated, new and independent nation. He advanced his constructivist discourse by promoting the concept of a "community of shared destiny" to enlighten Chinese and Taiwanese about the formation of modern nation-states. In his memoir, published in 1972, he stated:

... it is difficult for the Chinese to understand that modern nation-states are not formed on the basis of biological origin, culture, religion, or language, but rather on a sense of common destiny and a belief in shared interests. There are subjective feelings which rise out of a common history, and are not necessarily related to these objective criteria of biological origin, culture, religion, and language.⁶⁴⁸

The first Communiqué dealt a blow to the independence movement; the secessionist camp lost some of its leaders and a part of its membership.⁶⁴⁹ Peng's "community of shared destiny" served as a rallying point for overseas secessionists.

Domestic Taiwanese Nationalism: The Rise of *Dangwai*

Developmentalism: Advancement of Taiwanese Wealth and Opposition

From the late 1970s, leading dissidents at home managed to unite into a loose non-KMT

⁶⁴⁶ For example, see Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams*, 333.

⁶⁴⁷ Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 156-57.

⁶⁴⁸ Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, 244. See also Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 97-98.

⁶⁴⁹ Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 111.

coalition – the so-called *Dangwai* (黨外, outside the party).⁶⁵⁰ The source of *Dangwai* can be traced to Chiang Ching-kuo's developmentalism of the early 1970s. The tapping of American aid had created a sizable new middle class and a literate urban working class by the 1970s.⁶⁵¹ Chiang's economic modernization helped many government-operated corporations to flourish.⁶⁵² The landowner class that had been displaced by KMT land reform and compensated with state-owned-enterprise stock in the early 1950s prospered accordingly. Industrialization also benefited the owners of well-situated land.⁶⁵³ In addition, owners of private enterprises, who were predominantly native Taiwanese and major recipients of US aid, expanded their business domain.⁶⁵⁴ As a result, Chiang's developmentalism, through urbanization, rural industrialization, land speculation and the expansion of large public construction projects, advanced the control of most of the island's wealth by native businessmen and local factions.⁶⁵⁵ This had serious implications for the KMT's patron-client system. Tien Hung-mao (田宏茂) argues:

Many groups and their leaders derive income and resources from the private sector of the economy, thus diluting the leverage stemming from the authorities' patronage. In other words, growth of the private sector plus general economic prosperity have created economic sources of power independent of government control. Between 1952 and 1988, the ratio of privately owned enterprises in Taiwan's economy surged from 43.4 percent to 82 percent. As economic groups become less vulnerable to the party-state's political manipulation, they progressively gain autonomy from political intervention from the party-state.

... Even groups traditionally under the party-state's strict corporatist control, ... are subject to internal divisions that allow the political opposition to organize countergroups for protest purposes.

... In addition, economic prosperity and expansion of the private sector have created abundant private wealth and autonomous sources of income that can be channelled into political activities.⁶⁵⁶

Consequently, US-PRC rapprochement fortuitously contributed to the rapid accumulation of Taiwanese wealth, which was translated into greater activism among the

⁶⁵⁰ Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed., eds., *Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties)*, 121. Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party," 124.

⁶⁵¹ See page 64 of this thesis.

⁶⁵² For example, China Steel Corporation, China Shipbuilding Corporation and Chinese Petroleum Corporation expanded their business rapidly with huge official investment.

⁶⁵³ Kaplan, *The Court-Martial of the Kaohsiung Defendants*, 5.

⁶⁵⁴ Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 218-19.

⁶⁵⁵ Kaplan, *The Court-Martial of the Kaohsiung Defendants*, 5; Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 218-19; Tyson, "Christians and the Taiwanese Independence Movement," 164-65.

⁶⁵⁶ Tien Hung-mao 田宏茂, "Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State: Taiwan's Development Experience," in *Political Change in Taiwan*, ed. Cheng Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 37-38.

opposition. The rapid development of industrialization and urbanization broadened the middle class and gave rise to new political opposition.⁶⁵⁷ Many members of the new opposition movement were socially connected to native small and medium businesses, which "offered political funds and a fall-back career to leaders of the political opposition."⁶⁵⁸ These businesses were the main beneficiaries of American aid, which was intended to help "disperse economic power and to create new power sectors in society" and promote native Taiwanese input in the political field. The rise of Taiwanese opposition is one of the most prominent socio-economic legacies of American aid.

"Dangwai": Reformism out of the Indigenisation / Taiwanization Fissure

As mentioned earlier, Chiang Ching-kuo was careful to draw a line between indigenisation and Taiwanization. In addition, the KMT was paralysed by the fear of American liberalism's connection with Communist infiltration.⁶⁵⁹ These fears hampered the KMT from adopting *bona fide* reforms. As the contributors to the reformist *Daxue zazhi* decreased in late 1972, new blood from the intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie joined native dissidents, who then seized the initiative for democratic reformism.⁶⁶⁰ They soon rose from the fault line between indigenisation and Taiwanization. The opposition movement demanded the abandonment of the concept of constitutional legitimacy, that all representatives stand for re-election, that martial law be lifted and that the provisions of the Constitution be implemented.⁶⁶¹ Dissident Kang Ning-hsiang (康寧祥) vehemently attacked the authoritarian KMT regime. Before an American audience, he proclaimed that "the political and social status of Taiwanese was

⁶⁵⁷ Cheng Tun-jen, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 474; Hu Fu, "The Electoral Mechanism and Political Change in Taiwan," 148; Huang Teh-fu, "Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang," 108, 11; Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party," 122-23; Tien Hung-mao, "Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State," 35-38.

⁶⁵⁸ Cheng Tun-jen, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 474, 81, 83-84. A typical example was the native landlord Yu family in Kaohsiung. See Chapter 5 of Chen Shih-hung and Chang Chien-lung, ed., ^eds., *Cong dangwai zhuxuantuan dao dangwai zongbu* (Organization of Opposition Movement).

⁶⁵⁹ Huang, *Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973*, 74-77, 79-80. See also Chan, *China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question*, 25-26.

⁶⁶⁰ Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed., ^eds., *Zudang yundong* (Organizing the Opposition Parties), 120-21; Hermann Halbeisen, "In Search of a New Political Order? Political Reform in Taiwan," in *In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949*, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst, 1993), 80.

⁶⁶¹ Halbeisen, "In Search of a New Political Order? Political Reform in Taiwan," 80.

worse than that of Negroes in the United States.”⁶⁶² Again, these arguments were typical structuralism. Kang was elected to the Legislative Yuan in late 1972. Some reformist mainlanders, such as legislator Fei Hsi-ping (費希平), joined the native opposition camp.

In late 1973, dissidents, including Kang Ning-hsiang and Chang Chun-hung, founded the United Independence Front.⁶⁶³ After a visit to the US at the invitation of the State Department, in response to KMT accusations about his sympathy for the Taiwan independence movement, Chang issued a campaign pamphlet in which he argued that if the Taiwan independence movement was interpreted as a movement for sovereignty and autonomy from Chinese Communist rule, he could see nothing wrong with it; if it was referred to as a Western civil rights movement, he was certainly in favour of it.⁶⁶⁴ In August 1975, Kang, Chang and Huang Hsin-chieh (黃信介) established the first dissident journal, *Taiwan Zhenglun* (台灣政論, *Taiwan Political Review*), to promote the opposition movement. When the December elections approached, the journal enjoyed a large readership and enthusiastic support from dissident candidates; this alerted the KMT regime to the journal's influence.⁶⁶⁵ The journal's demand for the lift of martial law was more than the KMT could tolerate. The journal was banned for “sedition” after just five issues.⁶⁶⁶

The local elections since 1950 engendered a participatory political culture for the Taiwanese;⁶⁶⁷ the infusion of American dollars had improved their economical and political status; and the change of political climate since the early 1970s pushed the opposition into the vanguard of reformism. This opposition, which had originated as a reform movement at the beginning of the decade, had, by the late 1970s, coalesced into the *Dangwai* coalition which was able to take collective action to highlight the structural

⁶⁶² William Glenn, “Beating the System,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 79, No. 1 (1973): 13. See also Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 150.

⁶⁶³ Huang, *Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973*, 77-78.

⁶⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 78.

⁶⁶⁵ Lu, “Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party,” 124.

Chang Chien-lung 張建隆, *Taiwan zhenglun (Taiwan Political Review)* [internet] (New Taiwan Foundation, 2001 [cited Oct 12 2003]), available from <http://formosa.yam.org.tw/magazine1.asp?ID=750801047>.

⁶⁶⁶ Chan, *China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question*, 26.

⁶⁶⁷ Tien Hung-mao, “Elections and Taiwan's Democratic Development,” 4.

inequality between “hereditary” politics at the central level and democratic politics at the local level.” The coalition scored a significant electoral victory in 1977.⁶⁶⁸ This was also a long-awaited goal of the US.

Dangwai: Beneficiary of Carter's Human Rights Diplomacy

Calls for independence came from the far end of the *Dangwai* spectrum. In June 1977 a leaked NSC study known as PRM-24 revealed that the Carter administration was eager to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC.⁶⁶⁹ John King Fairbank withdrew his support for Taiwan independence and in late summer 1977 urged Taipei to accept Beijing's demand to drop the 1954 Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) because “Taiwan's security would be better assured if Washington and Peking achieved a workable normalization.”⁶⁷⁰ A sense of crisis permeated the secessionist groups and pushed them into action. At this juncture, Carter's human rights diplomacy was an inspiration to the opposition movement in Taiwan.⁶⁷¹

On August 16, six days before Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's visit to China,⁶⁷² the Taiwan Presbyterian Church issued *A Declaration on Human Rights* to advocate independence. It urged Carter to “uphold the principle of human rights,” claiming that “the future of Taiwan shall be determined by the 17 million people,” and demanding that the KMT “face reality and to take effective measures whereby Taiwan may become a new and independent country.”⁶⁷³ This statement revealed the connections between “human rights,” “the future of Taiwan,” “self-determination” and “independence,” which carried different political weight but pointed in the same direction. Under the KMT, radical appeal for independence might be out of the platform of the opposition; but the widespread appeals for democracy and human rights justified the opposition movement's

⁶⁶⁸ Cheng Tun-jen, “Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan,” 484-85.

⁶⁶⁹ Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 129. Oksenberg, “A Decade of Sino-American Relations,” 181-82. See also NSC, *Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 24 (Apr 5, 1977)* [internet] (Jimmy Carter Library, [cited Apr 23 2002]), available from http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/prmemorandums/pres_memorandums.phtml.

⁶⁷⁰ Fairbank, *Chinabound*, 440.

⁶⁷¹ Chen Shih-hung and Chang Chien-lung, ed., eds., *Cong dangwai zhuxuantuan dao dangwai zongbu (Organization of Opposition Movement)*, 145.

⁶⁷² Madsen, “Chinese Chess”, 163.

⁶⁷³ Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 151. Chao H. E., Weng Hsiu-kung, and Kao Chun-ming 趙信悃, 翁修恭, 高俊明, *A Declaration on Human Rights by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan* [internet] (Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, 1977 [cited Sep 30 2003]), available from http://www.pct.org.tw/english/statesments_4.htm.

struggle against the KMT. The five local elections scheduled on November 19, 1977, prompted *Dangwai* to coordinate island-wide campaign activities. US Ambassador Leonard Unger had warned Taipei of Carter's extraordinary interest in human rights. This interest was evidenced by the inauguration of the annual human rights report and the creation of the Bureau of Human Rights in Humanitarian Affairs pinpointing abuses in Taiwan. As a result, in the 1977 election campaign, the *Dangwai* platform focused on two themes: liberal democracy and self-determination.⁶⁷⁴ Carter's human rights diplomacy effectively deterred the KMT from a policy of political suppression and benefited opposition movement in Taiwan.⁶⁷⁵

Defections of the KMT's Native Clients

After the KMT retreated to Taiwan, the KMT's patron-client system allowed native factions to hold onto local economic privileges, control local power apparatus and nurture more local followers; however, it alienated the general public, who criticized the KMT for conniving with the corrupt local politicians.⁶⁷⁶ The KMT had devised a faction replacement policy in an attempt to sap local factions; the KMT nominated younger, native KMT staff to replace local leaders.⁶⁷⁷ Encouraged by the success of the policy in 1968 and 1972 elections, the KMT decided to neutralize the local factions in 1977.⁶⁷⁸ However, Taiwan's flourishing economy had clearly increased the economic strength⁶⁷⁹ and the political autonomy⁶⁸⁰ of local factions. The KMT's faction replacement policy outraged local factional leaders, who then mobilized their followers to vote for *Dangwai* dissident candidates.⁶⁸¹ As a result, the KMT lost four county magistracies and twenty-one seats in the Provincial Assembly; non-KMT politicians claimed 29.6% and 33.3% of the county magistrate and Provincial Assembly votes

⁶⁷⁴ Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party," 134.

⁶⁷⁵ Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 151.

⁶⁷⁶ Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 180-81.

⁶⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 181-82, 84.

⁶⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 184-85.

⁶⁷⁹ Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 218.

⁶⁸⁰ Huang Teh-fu, "Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang," 108; Tien Hung-mao,

"Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State," 37-38.

⁶⁸¹ Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 185, 268-69.

respectively.⁶⁸² The 1977 local contests proved a watershed in Taiwan politics; *Dangwai* evolved into an inchoate opposition party.⁶⁸³ In a sense, the relaxation of the KMT's patron-client ruling alliance with native local factions in 1977 was a turning point for the democratisation of Taiwan.⁶⁸⁴ Indeed, the convergence between dissident politicians and rebellious factional leaders indicated that local factions were no longer monopolized by the KMT; to maximize their interests, local factions could easily defect to the opposition, thereby making an unintentional contribution to democratisation of Taiwan.⁶⁸⁵

Legacies of the 1977 Elections

The *Chungli* (中壢) Incident was an important by-product of the 1977 victory. On the evening of November 19, acting upon allegations of ballot rigging by the KMT, supporters of dissident Hsu Hsin-liang (許信良) attacked a local police station. The mass violence enabled Hsu to win the post of Taoyuan (桃園) county magistrate. The *Chungli* Incident thus symbolized a victory of mass movement. The sweet victory of 1977 local elections was tainted by bitter provincial politics because of the minority status of *Dangwai* in the Provincial Assembly; this often caused the frustrated opposition leaders to resort to mass action.⁶⁸⁶ It was in this context that the incident foreshadowed the split of the *Dangwai* camp over the line of mass movement.⁶⁸⁷

The 1977 victory inspired dissidents to seek a bigger success in the 1978 year-end national supplementary election. On June 5, 1978, a Japanese newspaper published the account of Dulles' testimony to Congress about his 1954 conversation with Chiang

⁶⁸² Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 71, 74. See also Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian* (*Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan*), 185, 268-69.

⁶⁸³ Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 71.

⁶⁸⁴ Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian* (*Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan*), 269-70. Professor Robert A. Scalapino, one of the main contributors to the formulation of the Taiwan Independence Roadmap, has another argument: he believes that the KMT's networks of patron-client relations was an embryonic form of Taiwanization. He also argues that the elevation of the local patron-client factional politics to the national level in the following decades has been a prominent trend in connection with the Taiwanization process. Scalapino, "Foreword," x, xii.

⁶⁸⁵ Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian* (*Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan*), 245, 70.

⁶⁸⁶ Cheng Tun-jen, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 486.

⁶⁸⁷ Shelley Rigger, *From Opposition to Power: Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party* (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 2001), 19. See also Chen Shih-hung and Chang Chien-lung, ed., eds., *Cong dangwai zhuxuantuan dao dangwai zongbu* (*Organization of Opposition Movement*), 15, 22.

Kai-shek in which he indicated that Chiang Kai-shek was aware of the impossibility of his recovering the mainland.⁶⁸⁸ The news reinforced dissidents' belief that the KMT had resorted to martial law as a pretext to justify its suppression of opposition.⁶⁸⁹ Carter's human rights diplomacy at this juncture inspired more challenge to the KMT regime. Shih Ming-teh (施明德) was an activist in the independence movement. He served fifteen years in prison (1962-1977) on the charge of sedition because of his involvement in the case of Su Tung-chi. After his release, he helped Su's wife win a seat in the Provincial Assembly by emphasizing the contradiction between human rights and KMT political persecution.⁶⁹⁰ In June 1978, Shih upset the KMT by publishing a book proposing the addition of a fourth national elective body for the people on Taiwan.⁶⁹¹ To protect Shih from imminent arrest, US human rights activist Linda Gail Arrigo married Shih on June 15, 1978. Because Arrigo called the US Embassy and Amnesty International whenever her Taiwanese friends faced arrest, this marriage reinforced the Taiwanese opposition movement's connection with Amnesty International and the US Embassy in Taipei.⁶⁹² "Human rights" carried the least political weight in the opposition appeals; it was, however, the key to undermining the authoritarian KMT system.

In the autumn of 1978, not long before the signature of the second Communiqué, Harvey Feldman, Director of the Office of ROC Affairs at the State Department, visited the Taiwan Presbyterian Church in support of the Taiwanese opposition movement.⁶⁹³ Taking advantage of Carter's human rights diplomacy and aspiring for victory in the December 23 supplementary elections for the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, Huang Hsin-chieh telegrammed Carter on behalf of the *Dangwai* campaign coalition on December 9 to draw his attention to the opposition movement on Taiwan.⁶⁹⁴

⁶⁸⁸ See page 65 of this thesis.

⁶⁸⁹ Chen Shih-hung and Chang Chien-lung, ed., ^eds., *Cong dangwai zhuxuantuan dao dangwai zongbu* (*Organization of Opposition Movement*), 298, 302.

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid., ed., ^eds., 8. For the case of Su, see page 83 of this thesis.

⁶⁹¹ Ibid., ed., ^eds., 16-17.

⁶⁹² Ibid., ed., ^eds., 14-22.

⁶⁹³ *Taiwan jiaohui gongbao zhoukan* (*Taiwan Church News*), ([cited]).

⁶⁹⁴ Chen Shih-hung and Chang Chien-lung, ed., ^eds., *Cong dangwai zhuxuantuan dao dangwai zongbu* (*Organization of Opposition Movement*), 146.

1978 – The Second Joint Communiqué

The Carter Administration: Safeguarding an Independent Taiwan

During the campaign, Carter had referred to Taiwan as the ROC and stated that he “would never let our friendship [with Beijing] stand in the way of preservation of the independence and freedom of the people on Taiwan.”⁶⁹⁵ After the election, he commented that Sino-US interdependence would be a better bulwark for Taiwan than the MDT.⁶⁹⁶ His National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, thought that Washington should move swiftly to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing and tilt the global balance of power towards the US.⁶⁹⁷ While Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was in the Middle East and the Congress in recess, Brzezinski dominated the last-minute negotiations with Beijing.⁶⁹⁸ On December 15, 1978, the Second US-China Joint Communiqué (Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations) was released. The Carter administration announced that it would establish full diplomatic relations with the PRC on January 1, 1979 and that the US would sever formal relations with Taiwan, terminate its MDT with Taiwan, and withdraw all US forces from the island; these measures met the “three conditions for normalization” demanded by Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) in November 1974.⁶⁹⁹

This did not mean that Carter was indifferent to the future of Taiwan, however. Carter had decided as early as June 1977 that normalization must meet three premises: continued US arms sales to Taiwan, continued unofficial relations between the US and

⁶⁹⁵ Madsen, “Chinese Chess”, 165. See also NYT, “Foreign Policy Questions,” Oct 17 1976, 28.

⁶⁹⁶ Madsen, “Chinese Chess”, 188.

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid., 159, 67.

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid., 188, 206.

⁶⁹⁹ Chiu Hungdah 丘宏達, “The Taiwan Relations Act and Sino-American Relations” (Occasional papers/reprints series in contemporary Asian studies, University of Maryland School of Law, 1990), 6-7. Feldman, “A New Kind of Relationship,” 26. On September 19, 1978, during his meeting with Chai Zemin (柴澤民), head of China's Liaison Office in Washington, President Carter conditioned the “normalization” of relations with China on the continuation of sales of selected military equipment and services to Taiwan, a peaceful solution to the Taiwan problem, and termination of the Mutual Defence Treaty with one year's notice. See USDOS, “News Release: Diplomatic Relations with the People's Republic of China and Future Relations with Taiwan,” December 2 1978, 2. However, Nixon already promised to withdraw all of American forces on Taiwan during his 1972 trip. See White House, “Memorandum of Conversation, 24 February 1972, 5:15 p.m. - 8:05 p.m.,” 11.

Taiwan, and peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.⁷⁰⁰ On December 30, 1978, Carter issued a memorandum to all government departments and agencies instructing that all existing treaties and agreements between the US and the ROC “shall continue in force” and “whenever any law, regulation, or order of the United States refers to a foreign country, nation, state, government, or similar entity, departments and agencies shall construe those terms and apply those laws, regulations, or orders to include Taiwan.”⁷⁰¹ A critic remarked, “This memorandum in fact wiped out most of the legal effect of US de-recognition of the ROC.”⁷⁰² In fact, this memorandum gave Taiwan a *de facto* status of a state.⁷⁰³

In February 1979, Senator Jacob K. Javits noted that the word “acknowledge” had been changed into “recognize” in the Chinese version ⁷⁰⁴ of the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. During the process of enacting the Taiwan Relations Act, he said that “it is very important that we not subscribe to [the Chinese position on one China] either way.” In response, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher asserted, “We regard the English text as being the binding text. We regard the word ‘acknowledge’ as being the word that is determinative for the U.S.”⁷⁰⁵

Congress: The Taiwan Relations Act

The Carter administration’s secret negotiation with Beijing on the establishment of diplomatic relations enraged the KMT,⁷⁰⁶ the American people and Capitol Hill.⁷⁰⁷ Beijing’s hawkish attitude toward Taiwan also fuelled the backlash in the Congress. In response to Carter’s statement on peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, Beijing immediately announced that “As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and reunifying the country, it is entirely China’s internal affair.”

⁷⁰⁰ Oksenberg, “A Decade of Sino-American Relations,” 182. See also Richard Bush, “Helping the ROC to Defend Itself,” in *A Unique Relationship: The United States and the Republic of China Under the Taiwan Relations Act*, ed. Roman H. Myers (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), 81.

⁷⁰¹ Chiu Hungdah, “The Taiwan Relations Act and Sino-American Relations”, 12.

⁷⁰² Ibid.

⁷⁰³ For the definition of a *de facto* state, see Scott Pegg, “De Facto States in the International System,” (working paper: University of British Columbia, 1998), 1.

⁷⁰⁴ For the Chinese text, see footnote 605 of this thesis.

⁷⁰⁵ Kan, “RL30341,” note 29.

⁷⁰⁶ Madsen, “Chinese Chess”, 197-98.

⁷⁰⁷ Bush, “Helping the ROC to Defend Itself,” 79; Feldman, “A New Kind of Relationship,” 29; Madsen, “Chinese Chess”, 187, 238; Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 131-32.

Stressing that it is legitimate for a country to use force to settle its internal affairs, Beijing's statement amounted to a rejection of Carter's request.⁷⁰⁸ Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping further made it clear at a Beijing press conference on January 5, 1979 that Beijing could not renounce the use of force for unification and reaffirmed that the future of Taiwan "is entirely an internal Chinese affair."⁷⁰⁹ The irredentist and militant Chinese nationalism solidified the American commitment to the security of Taiwan.

After a frenetic and complex struggle, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was signed into law (Public Law 96-8, or PL96-8) by Carter on April 10, 1979 and was retroactive to January 1, 1979. The biggest controversy over the TRA was that it codified Taipei's legal rights and responsibilities under US law.⁷¹⁰ On the issue of security, the PRC's invasion of Vietnam in February resulted in Section 2(b) of the 1979 TRA which required the US to provide defence material and services to Taiwan, and to consider with "grave concern" any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan's future.⁷¹¹ The wording "grave concern" was deliberately chosen so as not to specify the conditions under which the US military would defend Taiwan or to commit the United States to a particular response to any actions taken by Taiwan to change its declared political status. This was later termed the "ambiguity strategy." However, Harvey Feldman argues that the TRA replaced the MDT to empower the US as Taiwan's ambiguous protectorate with a unilateral American guarantee of Taiwan's security.⁷¹²

Section 15(2) defines "Taiwan" as "the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores, the people on those islands, corporations and other entities and associations created or organized under the laws applied on those islands, and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor governing authorities."⁷¹³ Section 4(b)(1) stipulates: "Whenever the laws

⁷⁰⁸ Chiu Hungdah, "The Taiwan Relations Act and Sino-American Relations", 10. For the original text of Beijing's statement, see "Statement of the Chinese Government," *Beijing Review*, Vol. 21, No. 51 (1978): 8-9.

⁷⁰⁹ Chiu Hungdah, "The Taiwan Relations Act and Sino-American Relations", 10.

⁷¹⁰ Madsen, "Chinese Chess", ii.

⁷¹¹ *Taiwan Relations Act*; Bush, "Helping the ROC to Defend Itself," 83; Kan, "RL30341.,"; Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 134-35.

⁷¹² Feldman, "A New Kind of Relationship," 29.

⁷¹³ *Taiwan Relations Act*.

of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan.”⁷¹⁴ The TRA also legalized the new US relationship with Taiwan. Under the bill, the US sells Taiwan arms, lends it money, recognizes its passports and grants its diplomats immunity.⁷¹⁵ In effect, the TRA mandated the US to continue to treat Taiwan as an independent country, reaffirming its status as a *de facto* state. In addition, the TRA promotes Taiwan’s flexible diplomacy. Section 4(c) states “Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any financial institution or any other international organization.”⁷¹⁶ Feldman argues that the legislative history of the TRA makes it plain that Congress intended the US to support Taiwan’s membership in international organizations.”⁷¹⁷

Last but not the least, the Carter administration’s interest in identifying human rights abuses by the KMT was inserted in the TRA Section 2(c) “lest the disruption of official contact suggest a diminution of interest.”⁷¹⁸

Chiang: Control at Home and the Five Principles in US-Taiwan Relations

In urgent response to de-recognition, Chiang Ching-kuo suspended the December 23, 1978 supplementary elections and all campaign activities for the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan. To weather the impact of de-recognition, Chiang advanced the “five principles” during the Christopher negotiations: recognition of the “reality” that the ROC is the effective government of Taiwan; “continuity” in the bilateral treaties and agreements; American guarantee of Taiwan’s “security,” a legal foundation for bilateral ties; and “inter-governmental” exchange and communication.⁷¹⁹ Therefore, the Carter

⁷¹⁴ Ibid.

⁷¹⁵ Ibid.

⁷¹⁶ Ibid.

⁷¹⁷ Feldman, “The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1429,” 2.

⁷¹⁸ Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 151. Section 2(c) stipulates: The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States. See *Taiwan Relations Act*.

⁷¹⁹ Chen Shih-hung and Chang Chien-lung, ed., eds., *Cong dangwai zhuxuantuan dao dangwai zongbu* (*Organization of Opposition Movement*), 266-69. See also David Chou, “The Republic of China and the Taiwan Relations Act,” in *A Unique Relationship: The United States and the Republic of China Under the Taiwan Relations Act*, ed. Roman H. Myers (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), 141-42; Madsen, “Chinese Chess”, 242. Academia Historica 國史館, ed., eds., *Yige Zhongguo lunshu shiliao huibian*

administration's secret negotiations which led to the establishment of relations with Beijing, Beijing's irredentist nationalism, and the KMT's response to de-recognition prompted the US Congress to enact the TRA, a US law that helps Taiwan's breaking away from China and institutionalises the Taiwanization of the ROC.

Taiwanese Nationalism and the Kaohsiung Incident

Carter's announcement not only interrupted the national supplementary elections, but also stimulated mass movement of the opposition. In December, Deng Xiaoping had for the first time proposed the so-called "one country, two systems" for peaceful unification with Taiwan. Shih Ming-teh was concerned by America's abandonment of Taiwan and Chinese Communist attempt to liberate Taiwan; in an unpublished statement he had expounded the principle of "popular sovereignty" and used it to reject the CCP's attempt for unification in accordance with the principle of human rights.⁷²⁰ The *Dangwai* camp convened a national affairs conference and issued a statement on December 25. The statement echoed the Presbyterian Church's appeal of the previous August that "the future of Taiwan shall be determined by the 17 million people."⁷²¹ The PRC issued a *Message to Compatriots in Taiwan* (告台灣同胞書) on January 1, 1979, suspended the bombardment of Quemoy and proposed "three links" (mail, air and shipping services, and trade) and "four exchanges" (relatives and tourists, academic groups, cultural groups, and sports representatives) with Taiwan to relay Deng's overtures for peace.⁷²²

The *Dangwai* camp was upset with the suspension of the supplementary elections. In the climate of mass movement and human rights, Yu Teng-fa (余登發), an influential landlord and magistrate of Kaohsiung county, planned to unite island-wide dissidents and

(*Documentary Collection on One China Discourse*), 2 vols., vol. 1 (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2000), 338-39.

⁷²⁰ Chen Shih-hung and Chang Chien-lung, ed., ^eds., *Cong dangwai zhuxuantuan dao dangwai zongbu* (*Organization of Opposition Movement*), 274-75. "Popular sovereignty" argues that the ultimate power or sovereignty of a state belongs to the governed people; see Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 2; Kemp, *Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: A Basic Contradiction?* 10; James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 27; Shih Cheng-feng, *Taiwan minzu zhuyi* (*Taiwanese Nationalism*), 43.

⁷²¹ Chen Shih-hung and Chang Chien-lung, ed., ^eds., *Cong dangwai zhuxuantuan dao dangwai zongbu* (*Organization of Opposition Movement*), 276-79.

⁷²² Liu Jintian 劉金田, *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan ciyu huishi* (*A Phrase Book of Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*) (Beijing: Jiefangjun, 1994), 205.

factions to push for resumption of the elections. The KMT responded by arresting Yu on January 21 and implicating him in seditious activity; this triggered a series of violent confrontations between dissidents and the KMT.⁷²³ The disruption of dissidents' political participation thus aggravated the split of the opposition camp over the line of mass movement.⁷²⁴ In June 1979, Kang Ning-hsiang founded the journal *Bashi niandai* (八十年代, *The Eighties Monthly*), which took the moderate line of parliamentary electioneering within the KMT system. Yet Kang's compromise with the KMT on suspending campaign activities alienated the other main dissidents and left Huang Hsin-chieh to inherit leadership of the mainstream opposition.⁷²⁵ On August 24, 1979, Huang founded the journal *Meilidao* (美麗島, *Formosa Magazine*), which took the radical line of mass movement outside KMT system.⁷²⁶ *Formosa* soon became an influential platform for political dissents. Its circulation of 100,000 and networked organizations and activities throughout Taiwan alarmed the KMT.⁷²⁷ During the *Formosa* faction's rise to popularity in 1979, the number of violent clashes between *Dangwai* radicals and the KMT regime soared.

In June 1979, Chen Chu (陳菊), a human rights and *Formosa* activist, visited the US to establish ties with overseas associates. Despite Kang Ning-hsiang's lecture in New York in June urging better relations with the KMT, overseas secessionists saw eye to eye with the *Formosa* faction and spent the summer sponsoring a series of demonstrations, including hunger strike in front of the Coordinating Committee for North American Affairs (CCNAA, ROC's representative office in the US after de-recognition). There was an explosion in front of the CCNAA.⁷²⁸ Terrorist attacks on ROC officials and

⁷²³ For the details, see Chapter 5 of Chen Shih-hung and Chang Chien-lung, ed., eds., *Cong dangwai zhuxuantuan dao dangwai zongbu* (*Organization of Opposition Movement*).

⁷²⁴ Wang, *The Dust That Never Settles*, 216. Li Hsiao-feng 李筱峰, *Jin bainian Taiwan minzhu yundong gaiyao* (*A Summary of the Democratic Movement in Taiwan in the Recent One Hundred Years*) [internet] (Li, Xiaofeng, 2001 [cited Oct 6 2003]), available from http://www.jimlee.idv.tw/art_01_17.htm.

⁷²⁵ Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition"; Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 20.

⁷²⁶ Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 72; Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 19-20. Wang, *The Dust That Never Settles*, 216. Cheng Tun-jen, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 486.

⁷²⁷ Kaplan, *The Court-Martial of the Kaohsiung Defendants*, 14.

⁷²⁸ Lin Ming-hsien, *Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji* (*A Chronology of Relevant Events of World United Formosans for Independence*) ([cited]). See also Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 22.

offices surged at home and abroad.⁷²⁹

The US continued to intensify Taiwanization. On September 15, the State Department invited Lin I-hsiung (林義雄), a *Formosa* activist and a Provincial Assembly councillor, to visit the US.⁷³⁰ On November 4, Chen Chu hosted a seminar in Kaohsiung to brief two hundred *Formosa* supporters of the political activities of overseas secessionists. A clash occurred the next day.⁷³¹ To publicise the struggle for human rights and democracy, Shih Ming-teh, general manager of the journal *Formosa*, spearheaded a mass demonstration in Kaohsiung on December 10, 1979 to commemorate International Human Rights Day. The rally ended in a riot when demonstrators and policemen clashed. Taiwan's police started massive searches and arrests from December 13.⁷³²

Partnership between the US Congress and Taiwanese Nationalists

President of the journal *Formosa* Hsu hsin-liang sought political asylum in the US, where he was travelling when the violence occurred.⁷³³ Hsu united ten overseas secessionist groups and announced the establishment of the "United Front for the Nation-Building of Taiwan" in New York on December 15 in protest of the arrests.⁷³⁴ Chen Tang-shan (陳唐山, Mark Chen), head of the secessionist World Federation of Taiwanese Associations (WFTA), urged US Congress to put pressure upon the KMT to release the arrested dissidents. Congressional leaders expressed concern about the rights of the accused to the KMT leadership.⁷³⁵ Soon most of the arrested were released. Finally, eight *Formosa* leaders were indicted for sedition by a military court. Kang

⁷²⁹ From 1978 to 1981, there were at least twenty-one attacks of this kind. See Tyson, "Christians and the Taiwanese Independence Movement," 165.

⁷³⁰ Lin Ming-hsien, *Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji* (A Chronology of Relevant Events of World United Formosans for Independence) ([cited]).

⁷³¹ Huang Tzu-yang 黃子揚, *Gaoxiong shijian jishi* (A Faithful Account of the Kaohsiung Incident) [internet] (WUFI, 1979 [cited Oct 6 2003]), available from <http://www.wufi.org.tw/>.

⁷³² Kaplan, *The Court-Martial of the Kaohsiung Defendants*, 17-18. Wang, *The Dust That Never Settles*, 217. Tyson, "Christians and the Taiwanese Independence Movement," 166. See also Huang Tzu-yang, *Gaoxiong shijian jishi* (A Faithful Account of the Kaohsiung Incident) ([cited]).

⁷³³ Chan, *China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question*, 28; Lillian Craig Harris, "Towards Taiwan's Independence," *Pacific Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1988): 31. See also Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 20.

⁷³⁴ Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed., eds., *Zudang yundong* (Organizing the Opposition Parties), 219-21.

⁷³⁵ Wang, *The Dust That Never Settles*, 218.

Ning-hsiang organized a team of defence attorneys.⁷³⁶ During the pre-trial hearing, defendant Lin I-hsiung's mother and his six-year-old twin daughters were stabbed to death in their home in Kaohsiung on February 28, 1980 after she had tried to contact Amnesty International.⁷³⁷

In mid-March, Senator Edward M. Kennedy said that the crackdown could jeopardize the remaining unofficial US ties to Taiwan and called for a speedy end to the thirty-one years of martial law. Ramsey Clark, former US Attorney General, said a "brutal use of martial law is being directed at moderate political opposition."⁷³⁸ After Kennedy's request for a fair trial, the military court was opened to foreign media and human rights groups, and newspapers published the transcripts.⁷³⁹ The court martial revolved around the dissidents' argument for Taiwan independence.⁷⁴⁰ Shih Ming-teh testified that Taiwan was already a sovereign country and its current name was the ROC; he argued for "evolutionary independence" for Taiwan.⁷⁴¹

On March 20, 1980, Representative James A. Leach introduced a bill urging Taiwan authorities to relax restrictions on freedom of expression, continue democratic development, and show a spirit of reconciliation on the Kaohsiung Incident.⁷⁴² On April 18, the eight main defendants were sentenced to terms ranging from twelve years to life imprisonment.⁷⁴³ Kao Chun-ming, Secretary General of the Taiwan Presbyterian

⁷³⁶ Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 21.

⁷³⁷ Kaplan, *The Court-Martial of the Kaohsiung Defendants*, 25. See also Chan, *China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question*, 28; Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 152. Chai Trong R. 蔡同榮, "The Future of Taiwan," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 26, No. 12 (1986): 1311. Robert Edmondson labelled the murder an intelligible act of the KMT. See Edmondson, "The February 28 Incident and National Identity," 33. This case has to date not been solved.

⁷³⁸ James P. Sterba, "8 Taiwan Dissidents Go On Trial Today," *NYT*, Mar 18 1980.

⁷³⁹ *The Re-Formation of a Unified Actor: Taiwanese Quest for National Unity and Identity*, [internet] (Sep 6 2002 2002 [cited Jun 15 2004]), available from <http://www6.plala.or.jp/masak12/polsci/ir/#Anchor-27-45980>.

⁷⁴⁰ Kaplan, *The Court-Martial of the Kaohsiung Defendants*, 28, 31. Wang, *The Dust That Never Settles*, 218. See also Li Hsiao-feng, *Jin bainian Taiwan minzhu yundong gaiyao* (A Summary of the Democratic Movement in Taiwan in the Recent One Hundred Years) ([cited]).

⁷⁴¹ Lo Hsiao-ho and Ho Chen-chung 羅曉荷, 何振忠, "Daxuan qian fu Mei, Shi Mingde xuanze taoli (Shih Ming-teh's Choice to Flee to the US before the Presidential Election)," *UDN*, Oct 19 2003. See also Wang, *The Dust That Never Settles*, 216.

⁷⁴² *A Resolution Expressing Concern over the Kaohsiung Incident in Taiwan*, 96th Congress, H.RES.616.

⁷⁴³ Chai Trong R., "The Future of Taiwan," 1311.

Church, was arrested on April 24 for having provided sanctuary to Shih Ming-teh.⁷⁴⁴ Activists of the Formosan Association for Human Rights appealed to the US Senate for help. In May, 1,200 Taiwanese Christians in Los Angeles and Chicago held a five-week hunger strike to demand Kao's release.⁷⁴⁵ In support of Taiwanese dissidents, Leach introduced another resolution to reaffirm support for human rights in Taiwan.⁷⁴⁶ Consequently, the Kaohsiung Incident facilitated a partnership among members of US Congress, overseas secessionists and domestic dissidents in the name of human rights. Because the ROC simply could not survive without US support, the KMT regime had to pay heed to the US opinion. In the following years, Congress used "human rights" and "democracy" to build up domestic and international pressure on the KMT for Taiwanization. This helped the dissidents remain politically resilient. After the Kaohsiung Incident, the opposition movement was dominated by the moderate wing; the KMT re-instituted supplementary elections to normalize the political process.⁷⁴⁷ *Dangwai* candidates, including many relatives and attorneys of these defendants, campaigned in the elections, which were held on December 6, 1980. These candidates claimed 25% and 15% of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan votes, respectively.⁷⁴⁸

In June 1981, native Taiwanese Professor Chen Wen-cheng (陳文程) at Carnegie-Mellon University was found dead on the campus of National Taiwan University after the Taiwan Garrison Command detained and interrogated him about his political activities in the US. The death sparked Congressional investigations into KMT spy networks on American campuses.⁷⁴⁹ House Representative Stephen Solarz sponsored an amendment, H.AMDT.434, to prohibit military aid or sales to countries with a pattern of intimidating or harassing individuals in the US.⁷⁵⁰ Chen Tang-shan wrote an open letter to Chiang Ching-kuo on March 22, 1982, pointing out that the protection of human rights had

⁷⁴⁴ Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 152. See also Tyson, "Christians and the Taiwanese Independence Movement," 167.

⁷⁴⁵ Lin Ming-hsien, *Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji* (A Chronology of Relevant Events of World United Formosans for Independence) ([cited].

⁷⁴⁶ H.RES.708.

⁷⁴⁷ Cheng Tun-jen, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 487.

⁷⁴⁸ Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 72, 75. Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed., eds., *Zudang yundong* (Organizing the Opposition Parties), 229.

⁷⁴⁹ Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 152.

⁷⁵⁰ H.AMDT.434, 97th Congress. See also Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 152-53. David E. Kaplan, *Fires of the Dragon* (New York: Atheneum, 1992).

become a prerequisite for US arms sale to Taiwan.⁷⁵¹ This amendment intensified the domestic and American pressure for opening the KMT to Taiwanization.

More family members and attorneys of *Formosa* defendants won seats in 1981 local elections. Many opposition journals, many of which were founded by dissident politicians, also appeared after the 1980 and 1981 elections.⁷⁵² The KMT situation was compounded when the Reagan administration, as a strategic measure, bowed to Beijing's pressure. As the Reagan administration adjusted its China policy, in early 1982 the secessionist WUFI planned to set up a broadcast station to publicise Taiwan's independence movement. After this program failed, the WUFI founded the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), a Taiwanese lobbying organization based in Washington DC.⁷⁵³ The FAPA later played a prominent role in enlisting Congressional allies in attacking the human rights violations of the KMT regime and in advocating self-determination for Taiwan.⁷⁵⁴ Senators Kennedy and Pell and Representatives Solarz and Leach jointly issued an open letter urging the KMT to end martial law on May 20, 1982; thirty-one Representatives also added their signature.⁷⁵⁵

1982 – The Third Joint Communiqué

The Reagan Administration: The TRA over the August 17 Communiqué

Beijing had always strongly opposed US arms sales to Taiwan. The normalization of Sino-US relations was due to the Chinese tacit agreement "to defer the issue by proceeding to normalize relation even though they knew the Americans intended to

⁷⁵¹ Hsueh Yueh-shun, Tseng Pin-tsang, and Hsu Jui-hao, ed., ^eds., *Cong jieyan dao jieyan (The Martial Law Era)*, 287-88.

⁷⁵² Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed., ^eds., *Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties)*, 309, 18. Li Hsiao-feng, *Jin bainian Taiwan minzhu yundong gaiyao (A Summary of the Democratic Movement in Taiwan in the Recent One Hundred Years)* ([cited]).

⁷⁵³ Lin Ming-hsien, *Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji (A Chronology of Relevant Events of World United Formosans for Independence)* ([cited]).

⁷⁵⁴ Feldman, "A New Kind of Relationship," 40; Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams*, 104; Rober Sutter, "The TRA and the United States' China Policy," in *A Unique Relationship: The United States and the Republic of China Under the Taiwan Relations Act*, ed. Roman H. Myers (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), 75.

⁷⁵⁵ Hsueh Yueh-shun, Tseng Pin-tsang, and Hsu Jui-hao, ed., ^eds., *Cong jieyan dao jieyan (The Martial Law Era)*, 288-97.

continue such arms sales.”⁷⁵⁶ Finally, in January 1982, Beijing declared, “The whole question of United States arms sales to Taiwan is a major issue affecting China’s sovereignty, which must be settled through discussions between the United States and Chinese governments.”⁷⁵⁷ After months of negotiations, the US and China reached a compromise and issued the 1982 August 17 Communiqué. However, on July 14, 1982, one month before the third Communiqué, Reagan made “six assurances” to Taiwan.⁷⁵⁸ At the end of July, John H. Holdridge, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, sent a report to Congress listing the “six assurances” that the US position made regarding the sovereignty of Taiwan. He wrote that “while we would continue to regard Taiwan as part of China, the question of unification would be left to the Chinese themselves, with our only stipulation being that unification be by peaceful means.” According to Holdridge, the last point of the “six assurances” stated, “the United States would not formally recognize China’s sovereignty over Taiwan.”⁷⁵⁹ Before signing the Communiqué, Reagan stated:

Arms sales will continue in accordance with the act and with the full expectation that the approach of the Chinese Government to the resolution of the Taiwan issue will continue to be peaceful. We attach great significance to the Chinese statement in the Communiqué regarding China’s “fundamental” policy, and it is clear from our statements that our future actions will be conducted with this peaceful policy fully in mind. ... We have an abiding interest and concern that any resolution be peaceful. I shall never waver from this fundamental position.⁷⁶⁰

On August 17, 1982, the third Joint Communiqué – the “August 17 Communiqué” – was promulgated. The US stated that it did not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan; that its arms sales to Taiwan would not exceed, either in qualitative or in

⁷⁵⁶ A. Doak Barnett, *U.S. Arms Sales: The China-Taiwan Tangle* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1982), 21. Deng Xiaoping played a key role in the normalization process and was regarded as the key figure responsible for the decision to defer the issue of US arms sales to Taiwan. See Barnett, *U.S. Arms Sales: The China-Taiwan Tangle*, 23.

⁷⁵⁷ Barnett, *U.S. Arms Sales: The China-Taiwan Tangle*, 30.

⁷⁵⁸ The six assurances state that the US has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan; has not agreed to hold consultations with the PRC prior to agreeing on arms sales to Taiwan; will not act as a mediator between Taiwan and the PRC; has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act; has not altered its position on the question of sovereignty over Taiwan; will not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC. See *Key Documents and National Policy Statements*, [internet] (CSIS, [cited Jan 23 2003]); 16, available from http://www.csis.org/isp/taiwan/US/us_keydocs.pdf.

⁷⁵⁹ Holdridge, *Crossing the Divide*, 232. See also Kan, “RL30341,” 20., note 41. There were slight differences between Reagan’s version and Holdridge’s account. – Points 5 and 6 of Reagan’s “six assurances” were combined as point 5 in Holdridge’s account. The wording of Point 6 in Holdridge’s account is not found in Reagan’s version.

⁷⁶⁰ OPROC, *Vice President Lu Receives Rep. Ben Gilman, Honorary Chairman of the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives* [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 5 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4>.

quantitative terms, the level of those supplied since the establishment of diplomatic relations; and that it intended gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, to a final resolution.⁷⁶¹ This immediately raised questions about the integrity of the TRA. The State Department argued that "final resolution" was not synonymous with 'ultimate termination'; therefore the Communiqué did "not provide for termination of arms sales."⁷⁶² Davis R. Robinson, State Department legal advisor, told the Congress on September 27:

[The Communiqué] is not an international agreement and thus imposes no obligations on either party under international law. Its status under domestic law is that of a statement by the President of a policy which he intends to pursue. ... The Taiwan Relations Act is and will remain the law of the land unless amended by Congress. Nothing in the joint Communiqué obligates the President to act in a manner contrary to the Act or, conversely, disables him from fulfilling his responsibilities under it.⁷⁶³

Thus the Reagan administration tended to insist on the legal precedence of the TRA over the August 17 Communiqué. After a few meetings over the conflict on arms sales issue, the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Power, chaired by conservative Republican Senator John East decided that the Communiqué and the TRA were not fundamentally contradictory.⁷⁶⁴ To mitigate the adverse implication of the Communiqué, the US agreed in the mid-1980s to transfer military technology to help Taiwan manufacture weaponry and thereby strengthen its defence capabilities.⁷⁶⁵

In addition, the August 17 Communiqué repeated the US position of peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. Harvey Feldman asserted that US insistence on peaceful resolution through the Three Joint Communiqués entrusted the ultimate status of Taiwan to islanders themselves.⁷⁶⁶ Consequently, the Three Joint Communiqués were consistent with Truman's "undetermined status of Taiwan" and espoused ultimate "self-determination" from the very beginning. Indeed, as A. Doak Barnett, one of the

⁷⁶¹ USDOS, "Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China (August 17 Communiqué of 1982)," (Beijing: 1982).

⁷⁶² Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 140.

⁷⁶³ Martin L. Lasater, *The Changing of the Guard: President Clinton and the Security of Taiwan* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 140.

⁷⁶⁴ Bush, "Helping the ROC to Defend Itself," 90.

⁷⁶⁵ Chiu Hungdah, "The Taiwan Relations Act and Sino-American Relations", 29. Bush, "Helping the ROC to Defend Itself," 101-03.

⁷⁶⁶ Harvey Feldman, "In Clinton's China Shuffle, Taiwan Loses," *WP*, Jul 19 1998.

contributors to the idea of Taiwanization,⁷⁶⁷ noted in a policy review article published by the Brookings Institute, America helped the KMT “successfully [operate] a *de facto* separate regime” and that “the prospects for reunification of China appeared to decline steadily.”⁷⁶⁸

Congress: Human Rights, Democracy and Economy for Taiwanization

After the resignation of Secretary of State Alexander Haig, perhaps the highest official urging closer relations with China in July 1982, the new Secretary of State George Shultz and the new Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs Paul Wolfowitz decided to downgrade China’s strategic importance to the US.⁷⁶⁹ Furthermore, the US proved persistently unwilling to accede to Beijing’s pressure. In this political environment, the secessionist FAPA strived to advance Congressional concerns over Taiwan. Some Congress members that were sympathetic to Taiwan independence held hearings and introduced resolutions to express their concerns over Taiwan’s human rights and democracy and the future of the island republic. On September 16, 1982, Solarz sponsored a resolution calling upon the KMT authorities to end martial law and replace it with a democratic system.⁷⁷⁰ On February 28, 1983, Pell initiated S.RES.74, demanding that the future of Taiwan be settled in a manner that was both acceptable to the people of Taiwan and consistent with the TRA.⁷⁷¹ On March 1, Leach brought the appeal to the floor of the House.⁷⁷² On May 19, 1983, Pell introduced a concurrent resolution urging the KMT to end martial law in order to establish a more democratic society.⁷⁷³ On May 25, Solarz and thirty colleagues cosponsored a similar resolution.⁷⁷⁴ The House invited Huang Chang-hui, founder of “The Formosan Christians for Self-Determination” and a member of board of directors of the FAPA, to testify in a

⁷⁶⁷ See page 78 of this thesis.

⁷⁶⁸ Barnett, *U.S. Arms Sales: The China-Taiwan Tangle*.

⁷⁶⁹ Sutter, “The TRA and the United States’ China Policy,” 69-71.

⁷⁷⁰ *A Resolution Expressing the Sense of the House concerning Martial Law on Taiwan*, 97th Congress, H.RES.591.

⁷⁷¹ *A Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate concerning the Future of the People on Taiwan*, 98th Congress, S.RES.74. See also Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 183.

⁷⁷² *A Resolution Expressing the Sense of the House of Representatives concerning the Future of the People of Taiwan*, 98th Congress, H.RES.112.

⁷⁷³ *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate concerning Martial Law on Taiwan*, 98th Congress, S.CON.RES.38.

⁷⁷⁴ *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the House of Representatives concerning Martial Law on Taiwan*, 98th Congress, H.CON.RES.129.

Taiwan hearing on human rights.⁷⁷⁵ Moreover, the economic viability of Taiwan continued to be a subject of concern. In April and May 1983, two resolutions were introduced in the House and the Senate to demand that Taiwan retain full membership in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and not be expelled as a precondition for the admission of the PRC.⁷⁷⁶ Despite Beijing's protests, the Reagan administration threatened to reduce the US' contribution should the ADB expel Taiwan.⁷⁷⁷

Taiwanese Nationalism: The Publicization of Political Nationalism

Although the KMT regime repeatedly rejected Beijing's peace overture, Taipei leaders gradually eased their ban on contacts with the mainland. Accordingly, there were some nonofficial contacts in third countries and a rapid growth of indirect trade exchanges.⁷⁷⁸ Taiwanese nationalists were always worried that the KMT might sell out the interests of Taiwan. As cross-Straits nonofficial contacts and indirect trade increased, so did the misgivings of the Taiwanese nationalists. In an internal assembly on September 28 1982, the opposition adopted "self-determination" as its common platform, arguing that the future of Taiwan should be decided by its 18 million people.⁷⁷⁹ Under the KMT, only a small part of the members of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan were receptive to so-called supplementary elections. Parliamentary electioneering could neither change the political structure of the parliament nor secure more political resources for *Dangwai* camp; instead it would facilitate factionalism and paralyse both the line of parliamentary electioneering and the line of mass movement. The younger generation of the opposition camp began to criticize Kang Ning-hsiang's line of parliamentary electioneering. They stressed the need for the construction of a "people's party" with the salient ideology of "self-determination." Consequently, "self-determination" became an important weapon of the opposition against the

⁷⁷⁵ "Notes: In Memoriam Reverend Dr. Shoki Coe," 22. The hearing was held on May 31, 1984.

⁷⁷⁶ *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress That the Support Provided by the United States to the Asian Development Bank Will Be Terminated If the Republic of China Is Denied Full Membership in the Asian Development Bank*, 98th Congress, H.CON.RES.120. *A Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate That Taiwan Should Retain Full Membership in the Asian Development Bank*, 98th Congress, S.RES.137. See also Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 168, 284 note 36.

⁷⁷⁷ Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 168.

⁷⁷⁸ The indirect trade was largely through Hong Kong; and, by 1982, the annual trade amounted to several hundred million dollars annually. See Barnett, *U.S. Arms Sales: The China-Taiwan Tangle*, 25.

⁷⁷⁹ Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed., ^eds., *Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties)*, 269, 77, 78.

traditional KMT suppression of dissidence.⁷⁸⁰ At this juncture, the strong pressure in support of human rights and democracy and the concern about the future of Taiwan from the US Congress aided themes of liberal democracy and self-determination of the opposition. As mentioned above, pro-Taiwanese Congress members such as Pell, Leach and Solarz introduced resolutions or held hearings on the future of Taiwan, the TRA, martial law, human rights and democracy in 1983 and 1984.

The renewed dynamics for “self-determination” in the US Congress and Taiwan emboldened overseas secessionist groups. In June 1983, the WUFI formally proposed draft guidelines for revolutionary nation-building and used the redefined Taiwanese as a rallying cry to promote an alternative national identity and “self-determination” in an ethnically divided Taiwan.⁷⁸¹ The publicization of political nationalism had new and compelling significance after the signing of the Three Joint Communiqués, which over the past decade had repeatedly prompted the ethnically divided community to face common crises, reconcile internal differences and reflect upon their shared future. Meanwhile, on June 26, Deng Xiaoping proposed six points to elaborate his “one country, two systems” for peaceful reunification; the KMT rejected them with “Three Noes,” namely “no contact, no negotiation and no compromise.”⁷⁸² The KMT’s rebuff served as a vantage point for political nationalism and set the stage for the debate on national identity.

In August 1983, at the height of Congressional concern over human rights, martial law, democracy and the future of Taiwan, Representative Solarz paid a visit to Taiwan. The *Dangwai* camp held a grand reception for him. During the run-up to the year-end Legislative Yuan elections, *Dangwai* activists for the first time proposed “Democracy,

⁷⁸⁰ Ibid., ed., ^eds., 334-37. Chiu I-jen (邱義仁) is the champion for “self-determination.” He was keen on criticizing Kang’s parliamentary electioneering. See Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed., ^eds., *Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties)*, 380-83.

⁷⁸¹ Liu Ching-pai 劉清白, *Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng Meiguo benbu yu Taiwan jianguo yundong zhong banyan juese (The Role of WUFI Headquarters-USA in Taiwan's Nation-Building Movement)* [internet] (WUFI, Jun 11 2003 [cited Oct 14 2003]), available from <http://wufi.org/WUFIhistory/history.html>.

⁷⁸² Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 161. For the details of Deng’s “one country, two systems,” see Zhongyang dang’anguan, ed., ^eds., *Zhongguo gongchandang bashinian zhengui dangan (Valuable Documents of Chinese Communists in the Past Eighty Years)*, 1593-94, 604-606.

Self-determination, Save Taiwan" as their slogan.⁷⁸³ Senator Pell convinced the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to pass S.RES.74 in November 1983 to endorse the dissidents' appeal for self-determination.⁷⁸⁴ Because of KMT hostility to the idea of self-determination, the moderate Kang Ning-hsiang clique compromised and dropped it. However, the aggressive *Formosa* clique insisted on the demand for "self-determination" and scored relatively better than other dissident candidates in the December 1983 election.⁷⁸⁵ Elections since then provoked the people to greater political consciousness, which was reflected in the increased concern for democratisation and Taiwanization and a conflict of identity.⁷⁸⁶

In July 1984, more House colleagues joined Solarz in calling for the KMT to end martial law and to protect the human rights of Taiwanese so as to achieve full democracy.⁷⁸⁷ The Congress advanced the human rights issue after amending the International Financing Institutions Act to monitor violations of human rights and tasked the Secretary of the Treasury to make a quarterly report on of US opposition to multilateral assistance to a country based on the country's human rights record.⁷⁸⁸

In 1984, a more audacious dissident organ, the *New Tide Magazine* (新潮流), emerged in Taiwan. It was marked by "the highest intellectual level, the strictest discipline, the strongest commitment to struggle and the hardest ideology." It put special emphasis on mass protest and a pro-independence position; it opposed parliamentary participation as the primary goal.⁷⁸⁹

⁷⁸³ Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed., ^eds., *Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties)*, 378-79. See also Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 23.

⁷⁸⁴ S.RES.74. See also Lin Cheng-yi 林正義, "The U.S. Factor in Taiwan's Political Development," in *R.O.C.-U.S.A. Relations, 1979-1989*, ed. Jaw-ling Joanne Chang (Taipei: Institute of American Culture, Academia Sinica, 1991), 138.

⁷⁸⁵ Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 23.

⁷⁸⁶ Hu Fu, "The Electoral Mechanism and Political Change in Taiwan," 141-42.

⁷⁸⁷ *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress concerning the Need to Achieve Full Democracy on Taiwan*, 98th Congress, H.CON.RES.344.

⁷⁸⁸ *A Bill Making Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1984*, 98th Congress, H.R.3959.

⁷⁸⁹ Cheng Tun-jen and Hsu Yung-ming, "Issue Structure, the DPP's Factionalism, and Party Realignment," in *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, ed. Tien Hung-mao (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 145; Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party," 126-28, 40; Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 24. For the articles of this faction, see Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed., ^eds., *Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties)*, 405-16.

Chiang Ching-kuo: Deepening Indigenisation

Facing relentless challenges, Chiang Ching-kuo stuck to indigenisation to preserve the ruling status of the KMT. After his deputy, the native Hsieh Tung-min (謝東閔), retired in 1984, Chiang promoted Lee Teng-hui as Vice President. Moreover, by the mid-1980s, the socio-economic changes unleashed by rapid economic growth, including expansion of the middle class, blurred ethnic lines between mainlanders and Taiwanese, swelling native membership in the KMT, the ascent of Taiwanese in KMT power hierarchy, the development of a collective consciousness favouring the conception of civil society, and the rise of a kind of participatory political culture, were pushing the KMT for democratisation.⁷⁹⁰ Even under such pressure, Chiang intended to use indigenisation to extend the party-state system. The relaxation of the patron-client system after the 1977 elections exposed a serious weakness of the KMT: the corruption and defection of local factions. Chiang Ching-kuo continued to suppress local factions.⁷⁹¹ Kuan Chung (關中) introduced the US primary election in 1984 in an effort to neutralize local factions and advance KMT competitiveness in the emergent democratic market.⁷⁹²

Partnership for the Pollination of Secessionism

The following events made Chiang Ching-kuo realize that indigenisation alone would be insufficient: more had to be done to strengthen KMT legitimacy.

Chiang Ching-kuo's Democratisation: The Prelude to Taiwanization

Scandals

⁷⁹⁰ Cheng Tun-jen, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 495; Chou Yangsun and Andrew J. Nathan, "Democratic Transition in Taiwan," 280; Thomas B. Gold, "Taiwan's Quest for Identity in the Shadow of China," in *In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949*, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst, 1993), 177-78; Hu Fu, "The Electoral Mechanism and Political Change in Taiwan," 148; Tien Hung-mao, "Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State," 35-38; Tsang, "Transforming a Party State into a Democracy," 10.

⁷⁹¹ Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian* (*Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan*), 187-89.

⁷⁹² However, the policy ended soon after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988. See Ibid., 185-89; Dickson, "The Kuomintang before Democratization: Organizational Change and the Role of Elections," 62.

On October 15, 1984, Liu I-liang (劉宜良, Henry Liu), a Chinese-American double-agent and author of an unflattering biography of Chiang Ching-kuo, was shot to death near Solarz's home in California by three Bamboo Gang gunmen dispatched by the ROC's Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB).⁷⁹³ The State Department called the involvement of the ROC's MIB in the murder "a very serious matter."⁷⁹⁴ There were allegations that Chiang Hsiao-wu (蔣孝武), Ching-kuo's second son, instructed Vice Admiral Wang Hsi-ling (汪希苓), head of MIB, to silence Liu.⁷⁹⁵ The murder unexpectedly brought the human rights issue to a climax.⁷⁹⁶ In February and April 1985, Solarz and Kennedy persuaded their colleagues to pass non-binding resolutions requesting that the ROC deliver suspects charged with the murder of Liu to the US for trial.⁷⁹⁷ Solarz urged the enforcement of H.AMDT.434.⁷⁹⁸ Reagan's State Department and FBI refused to allow human rights issue to interfere with arms sales to Taiwan or disrupt Taipei's financial support for the Nicaraguan Contras.⁷⁹⁹ At home, in early 1985, Taiwan was hit by the Tenth Credit Cooperative scandal, the worst financial scandal in its history. KMT legislator Tsai Chen-chou (蔡辰洲) was at the core of the scandal. It had immense repercussions due to the likely loss of savings deposited by many islanders, and the number of high profile officials who were implicated. Finally, Economic Minister Hsu Li-de (徐立德) stepped down, Finance Minister Lu Jun-kang (陸潤康) was forced to resign and many others being dismissed or reprimanded.⁸⁰⁰ The murder and the financial scandal caused turmoil on the island and wreaked havoc on the image of the

⁷⁹³ For the detailed story of Henry Liu and the murder, see Kaplan, *Fires of the Dragon*.

⁷⁹⁴ Parris H. Chang, "The Changing Nature of Taiwan's Politics," in *Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle*, ed. Denis Fred Simon and Michael Y.M. Kau (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 28.

⁷⁹⁵ Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 183. However, Wang Hsi-ling hinted in 2004 that Chiang Ching-kuo himself gave the instruction to kill Liu. See Liu Kai-ping 劉開平, "Jiang Nan an, Wang Xiling: Jiang Jingguo buyuan guanwo. zhe ni jiu dongle (Wang Hsi-ling's Hint on Henry Liu's Murder: CCK Unwilling to Jail Me. You Know What It Means)," *UDN*, Oct 15 2004.

⁷⁹⁶ Robert A. Scalapino, "U.S.-ROC-PRC Relations: Accident and Purpose in International Relations," in *R.O.C.-U.S.A. relations, 1979-1989*, ed. Jaw-ling Joanne Chang (Taipei: Institute of American Culture, Academia Sinica, 1991), 20.

⁷⁹⁷ *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the sense of Congress that the Taiwan Authorities Should Cooperate Fully in the case of Henry Liu*, 99th Congress, H.CON.RES.49; *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress that the Authorities on Taiwan Should Continue to Cooperate Fully in the Case of Henry Liu*, 99th Congress, H.CON.RES.110; *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress that the Taiwan Authorities Should Cooperate Fully in the Case of Henry Liu*, 99th Congress, S.CON.RES.10.

⁷⁹⁸ For the contents of the amendment, see page 131 of this thesis.

⁷⁹⁹ Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 183. See also Lin Cheng-yi, "The U.S. Factor in Taiwan's Political Development," 132.

⁸⁰⁰ For details, see Chang, "The Changing Nature of Taiwan's Politics," 29.

KMT. In addition, Taiwan's export-led strategy earned huge trade surplus from the US and inevitably invited the revenge of US protectionism;⁸⁰¹ this caused huge uneasiness and lent dynamism to social movements on Taiwan in the second half of the 1980s.⁸⁰²

Beginning of Democratisation

After the PRC and the United Kingdom signed a joint declaration in December 1984 on the return of Hong Kong to China on July 1, 1997, the future of Taiwan again became a subject of concern. In the campaign for provincial and municipal elections scheduled for November 18, 1985, *Dangwai* camp proposed "New Party, New Atmosphere, and Self-determination Will Save Taiwan" as their slogan. In the end they claimed 30% of the vote. The result encouraged the opposition camp to hasten their efforts for a new party.⁸⁰³ On the day of the Taiwan elections, Solarz introduced a resolution urging the KMT to permit the formation of opposition parties, end censorship and guarantee freedom of speech, expression and assembly, and move toward full representative government.⁸⁰⁴ On March 25, 1986, Senator Kennedy introduced another resolution calling for the establishment of a genuinely democratic system.⁸⁰⁵ During the run-up to the formation of the DPP in September 1986, scores of Congress members joined Solarz

⁸⁰¹ The US first experienced a deficit in its trade with Taiwan in 1968. This deficit began to increase significantly after 1975. As a result, in 1977 Washington forced Taipei to comply with an "orderly marketing agreement" designed to curb supplies of low-priced footwear to the US market. In early 1978, the US pressed a textile accord targeting apparel shipments for a period of five years, injuring some of Taiwan's most profitable clothing production. See Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 143. Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 11. Shiao Chyuan-jenq, "Civil Society and Democratization," in *Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China*, ed. Steve Tsang and Tien Hung-mao (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 107.

⁸⁰² This is evidenced by the rise of Jenkins' bill, the passage of the Trade Enhancement Act, and withdrawal of Taiwan's eligibility for Generalized System of Preferences support in the Congress in 1986. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act was passed in 1988. See Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 170. In December 1987, 3000 fruit farmers demanded the government to deal with a drastic price decline caused by imported fruit which came mainly from the US; see Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao 蕭新煌, "The Rise of Social Movements and Civil Protests," in *Political Change in Taiwan*, ed. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 64. The most remarkable social movement was the May 20 Incident. On May 20, 1988, more than 4000 farmers held demonstrations in front of the Legislative Yuan requesting the KMT government not to permit the import of American turkey and fruits. The demonstration ended with a clash with the civilian and military police forces. See Li Hsiao-feng, *Jin bainian Taiwan minzhu yundong gaiyao* (A Summary of the Democratic Movement in Taiwan in the Recent One Hundred Years) (cited).

⁸⁰³ Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 24. See also Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, eds., *Zudang yundong* (Organizing the Opposition Parties), 464.

⁸⁰⁴ A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress concerning Representative Government, Political parties, and Freedom of Expression on Taiwan, 99th Congress, H.CON.RES.233.

⁸⁰⁵ A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress concerning Representative Government, Political parties, and Freedom of Expression on Taiwan, 99th Congress, S.CON.RES.121.

and Kennedy in these demands.

In response to these accumulated pressures, Chiang Ching-kuo embarked upon a policy of political and economic liberalization in an attempt to maintain the dominance of the KMT.⁸⁰⁶ In March 1986, he set up a twelve-man task force to create a blueprint for democratisation. Accordingly, the pent-up opposition force was released. In March, exile Hsu Hsin-liang called his revolution-minded associates in the US to return to Taiwan to speed up the demolition of the KMT regime.⁸⁰⁷ From mid-1986, the island was inundated by spontaneous mass movements. The *Dangwai* camp held street campaigns for six months to appeal for the end of martial law.⁸⁰⁸ On September 28, the opposition camp established the Taiwanese-dominated Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The Taiwan Presbyterian Church, with 100,000 members in southern Taiwan and international connections, lent its weight to the DPP.⁸⁰⁹ The two main themes of the opposition, liberal democracy and self-determination, became the ideology of the DPP.⁸¹⁰ Despite adequate resources to resist democratisation, Chiang did not suppress the new party. He accepted that democratisation was the right thing for the Chinese nation and Taiwan.⁸¹¹ He declared that new parties must honour the constitution, oppose communism and not advocate secessionism.⁸¹² These three principles became the essence of the 1987 National Security Law (NSL), which critics attacked as a veiled attempt to suppress secessionism.⁸¹³

⁸⁰⁶ Some scholars draw a line between liberalization and democratisation; for example, see Constance Squires Meaney, "Liberalization, Democratization, and the Role of the KMT," in *Political Change in Taiwan*, ed. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 97, 100; Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 24, 57. The pressure for economic liberalization mainly came from protectionism of the US; see Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 250-51.

⁸⁰⁷ Liu Ching-pai, *Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng Meiguo benbu yu Taiwan jianguo yundong zhong banyan jueise (The Role of WUFI Headquarters-USA in Taiwan's Nation-Building Movement)* ([cited). See also Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed., ^eds., *Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties)*, 465.

⁸⁰⁸ Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed., ^eds., *Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties)*, 465-67. See also Li Hsiao-feng, *Jin bainian Taiwan minzhu yundong gaiyao (A Summary of the Democratic Movement in Taiwan in the Recent One Hundred Years)* ([cited).

⁸⁰⁹ Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party," 134.

⁸¹⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹¹ Tsang, "Transforming a Party State into a Democracy," 13-14.

⁸¹² Chou Yangsun and Andrew J. Nathan, "Democratic Transition in Taiwan," 289; Harris, "Towards Taiwan's Independence," 28; Hsueh Yueh-shun, Tseng Pin-tsang, and Hsu Jui-hao, ed., ^eds., *Cong jieyan dao jieyan (The Martial Law Era)*, 438, 40, 47-49; Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 47-48.

⁸¹³ Harris, "Towards Taiwan's Independence," 31.

American Connections to Taiwan's Democratisation

Although there is no question that democratic transition in Taiwan began in 1986, the sources of democratisation remain controversial. No scholars have investigated the link between these sources and external forces, such as the influence of the US. This part will clarify the connection between the US and present traditional arguments about the sources of democratisation. There are four theories.⁸¹⁴ First, theorists of modernization argue that democracy is a consequence of rapid economic growth and social change.⁸¹⁵ The origin of many socio-economic correlates of democracy such as high levels of industrialization, urbanization, *per capita* income, literacy rates and mass communication in Taiwan can be traced to the US. American aid prepared the ground for industrialization and urbanization, and raised *per capita* income and literacy rates; American confidence in Taiwanization enabled the unfolding of US-PRC rapprochement, which initiated Chiang Ching-kuo's policies of industrialization and urbanization. Finally, industrialization and urbanization advanced Taiwanese wealth and political opposition, and led to the burgeoning of mass communication. The US may not be the only source for these socio-economic changes; however, undoubtedly it is the most important force dedicated to such changes.

Second, some argue that democracy was the result of the KMT's long-term commitment to democracy or stress Chiang Ching-kuo's critical role in supporting democratisation.⁸¹⁶

⁸¹⁴ There are many other theories and research methodologies on the democratisation of Taiwan. However, examination of each of these theories is beyond the scope of this thesis. Examples of other approaches to the study of the democratisation of Taiwan are detailed in Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 8-15. See also William L Parish and Charles Chi-hsiang Chang, "Political Values in Taiwan: Sources of Change and Constancy," in *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, ed. Tien Hung-mao (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 28; Wu Mi-cha and Chang Yen-hsien, *Jianli Taiwan de guomin guojia (Establish a Civic Nation for Taiwan)*, 178-79.

⁸¹⁵ Cheng Tun-jen, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 471-72; Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 9-10; Tien Hung-mao, "Dynamics of Taiwan's Democratic Transition," 103-05; Tsang, "Transforming a Party State into a Democracy," 10-11. Chu and Lin argue that "the transition was triggered by a protracted process of diplomatic derecognition and facilitated by the cumulative social and political mobilization produced by rapid industrialization and strong economic growth." See Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 82.

⁸¹⁶ Chang, "The Changing Nature of Taiwan's Politics," 31; Chou Yangsun and Andrew J. Nathan, "Democratic Transition in Taiwan," 283; Huang Teh-fu, "Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang," 106; Tien Hung-mao, "Dynamics of Taiwan's Democratic Transition," 105-06; Tien Hung-mao,

On October 7, 1986, Chiang told Katherine Graham, owner of the *Washington Post*, that the KMT would soon lift martial law and legalize the formation of new political parties.⁸¹⁷ The next day, Chiang impressed on his colleagues the necessity for adjustment because "the world is changing and the situation is changing" and the ruling KMT must adopt reforms.⁸¹⁸ Until his death from diabetes in January 1988, he did not groom any successor; instead, he dismissed right-wing efforts to gain control of the KMT.⁸¹⁹ Although he was instrumental in democratisation, the context of Taiwan's political development, his indigenisation in particular, was primarily defined by separatist intention of the US after the Korean War, and a great deal of credit should be attributed to the socio-economic changes in the following decades, which were legacies of separatism-oriented American aid. As mentioned earlier, in 1970 O. V. Armstrong had argued that by the mid-1980s the KMT "must somehow be encouraged to transfer more real power to the Taiwanese and acquiesce in the eventual Taiwanization of the Republic of China."⁸²⁰ Given the widening of political and economic differences across the Strait, the immense economic and political power of native Taiwanese, and the relentless pressure from the US,⁸²¹ Chiang Ching-kuo must have realized that democratisation was irreversible and Taiwanization was inevitable.

Third, counter-elites argued that democratisation was the result of democratic opposition forces.⁸²² As explored above, the rise and growth of political opposition was linked to rapid economic growth and socio-economic changes. More importantly, American economic assistance to Taiwan had long been an integral part of the separatism-oriented Formosan autonomy movement. After the Korean War, the resumption of US aid was designed to first aggrandize the economic power of native Taiwanese and then promote

"Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State," 39-40; Tsang, "Transforming a Party State into a Democracy," 13.

⁸¹⁷ Hsueh Yueh-shun, Tseng Pin-tsang, and Hsu Jui-hao, ed., ^eds., *Cong jieyan dao jieyan (The Martial Law Era)*, 437-38.

⁸¹⁸ Chang, "The Changing Nature of Taiwan's Politics," 31.

⁸¹⁹ James Wang believes that Chiang Ching-kuo had "clearly indicated his resolve to surrender real political power to the Taiwanese." See Wang, "KMT's Localization Claim Is Empty." See also Tai Kuo-hui, Wang Tso-jung, and Hsia Chen, *Aizeng Li Denghui (Love and Hatred of Lee Teng-hui)*, 80, 84-85. Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 83.

⁸²⁰ See page 98 of this thesis.

⁸²¹ Dickson, "The Kuomintang before Democratization: Organizational Change and the Role of Elections," 64, 65.

⁸²² Tien Hung-mao, "Dynamics of Taiwan's Democratic Transition," 106-08. See also Hsueh Yueh-shun, Tseng Pin-tsang, and Hsu Jui-hao, ed., ^eds., *Cong jieyan dao jieyan (The Martial Law Era)*, v-x.

Taiwanese political input. Apparently, American aid and subsequent economic support fostered the growth of the Taiwanese-dominated private sector, created sources of economic power, and enabled the Taiwanese political opposition to undermine the KMT regime.

Fourth, some argue that since 1977 a series of calculated moves by both the KMT and the opposition, or "a continuous process of bargaining," resulted in democratic transition.⁸²³ Again, the sphere of the KMT's political manoeuvre is defined by separatist intention of the US and the rise and growth of the opposition was a result of American economic assistance.

There is another convincing argument. The disruption of the patron-client system, as demonstrated in the local factions' rebellions against the KMT, enabled the opposition's victory in the 1977 local elections and initiated democratisation.⁸²⁴ However, economic growth emboldened local factional leaders, undermined the KMT's patron-client system and helped the opposition to take advantage of the internal divisions of the local factions.

Consequently, Taiwan's democratisation evolved in the context of separatist intention of the US, a protracted process of US-PRC rapprochement, the Taiwanese nationalist opposition movement, the legacies of American aid, and the partnership between some US Congress members and Taiwanese nationalists. Almost every source can be traced to US influence, which is most manifest in American aid, which aimed to promote Taiwanese nationalism. In short, Taiwan's democratisation is a natural corollary of its progression along a different historical and civilization trajectory under the influence of the US.

Economic Liberalization

American protectionists were the most important factor that pushed for economic

⁸²³ Cheng Tun-jen, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 490. See also Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 80; Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 11; Tien Hung-mao, "Dynamics of Taiwan's Democratic Transition," 107-08.

⁸²⁴ Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 268-70.

liberalization of Taiwan.⁸²⁵ The proliferation of the service industries, stock exchange companies and private banks was the legacy of economic liberalization. The source and the legacy had two implications. Firstly, after the mid-1980s, in order to deal with US protectionism and overseas competition, many businessmen became more politically involved in politics and elections.⁸²⁶ They were congenial with the opposition; it was said that the DPP was primarily funded by donations from small and medium-sized businesses.⁸²⁷ Secondly, many local faction members "entered the service industries or shared in the establishment of stock exchange companies and private banks,"⁸²⁸ furthering their economic strength and political autonomy from the mainlander elite. Due to ethnicity, the native factions had little difficulty changing their identity. Soon after Chiang Ching-kuo died, some native factional leaders united to challenge China identity.⁸²⁹ Moreover, in the early 1990s, both the native businessmen and factional leaders, together with the DPP, united around Lee Teng-hui in his power struggle against the mainlander elites.⁸³⁰ Because both the rise of the opposition and the enhancement of the political autonomy of the native local factional can be traced to the economic boom associated with American aid, the implications of economic liberalization again remind us of the success of American aid in helping the rise of Taiwanese structuralism.

Before democratisation, there was no distinction between democratisation and Taiwanization; Taiwanese opposition to dictatorship, support of democratisation and structuralist aspirations to end the domination of the mainlander elites amounted to the same thing.⁸³¹ However, democratic transition lent dynamism to secessionism.

Secessionism and the Conflict over National Identity

From Opposition to Revolution

In late October 1986, overseas secessionists began stealing into Taiwan to a warm

⁸²⁵ Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 219.

⁸²⁶ Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 240; Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 218.

⁸²⁷ Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 222.

⁸²⁸ Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 241-42; Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 218.

⁸²⁹ For the detail, see page 150 of this thesis.

⁸³⁰ For the detail, see page 159 and 171 of this thesis.

⁸³¹ Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 244.

welcome from their supporters.⁸³² The radical *New Tide* faction spearheaded a fusillade of social movements to capitalize "the power of a popular, democratic revolution;" it intended to carve a strong mass movement as the foundation to bring the DPP to power.⁸³³ This gave rise to two tactics of the DPP: political agitation and mass education, and mobilization of activists and supporters to participate in party-organized or party-sponsored demonstrations, rallies, and parades.⁸³⁴ During the run-up to the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly elections on November 10, 1986, the DPP aggressively promoted independence and self-determination. The *New Tide* admitted that "self-determination" was a code word for independence.⁸³⁵ The debate on national identity consequently intensified. To mitigate the division over national identity to win election, the DPP manifesto advocated that the future of Taiwan should be decided by the residents of Taiwan, stressing the common ground of self-determination instead of the blatant call for independence.⁸³⁶ In addition, the 1986 year-end central supplementary elections and opinion polls showed that all DPP candidates underscored a distinct national identity and supported democratic reform issues that were quite consistent with the emphasis on Taiwan identity.⁸³⁷ Democratic transition thus considerably undermined the authoritarian rule of the KMT.⁸³⁸ In fact, democratic elections since the 1980s had become an instrument of the nationalist oppositionists to realize independence.⁸³⁹

In June 1987, Hsu Shih-kai (許世楷) chaired the WUFI and urged the expeditious transfer of overseas secessionist power to Taiwan.⁸⁴⁰ Not long after the KMT lifted martial law and replaced it with the National Security Law on July 15, the *New Tide* pushed the DPP to formally adopt a plank in its platform on November 10: "people have

⁸³² Chang Mau-kuei, "Political Transformation and Ethnization of Politics in Taiwan".

⁸³³ Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 28.

⁸³⁴ Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party," 129.

⁸³⁵ Ibid., 136. Or, "self-determination" is a "soft" version of Taiwan independence; see Cheng Tun-jen and Hsu Yung-ming, "Issue Structure, the DPP's Factionalism, and Party Realignment," 146.

⁸³⁶ Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 43; Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party," 137.

⁸³⁷ Hu Fu, "The Electoral Mechanism and Political Change in Taiwan," 158-59, 62.

⁸³⁸ Ibid., 167.

⁸³⁹ Ibid., 167-68.

⁸⁴⁰ Lin Ming-hsien, *Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji* (*A Chronology of Relevant Events of World United Formosans for Independence*) ([cited]).

the freedom of advocating Taiwan independence.”⁸⁴¹ Domestic oppositionists and overseas secessionists reached an agreement on national identity; they gradually integrated into a secessionist group despite initial hesitation; they launched mass protest movements and exploited billowing social movements to promote self-determination and independence.⁸⁴² This constituted a massive and intensive “enlightenment” process of secessionism. Consequently, domestic political opposition was no longer limited to the struggle for democracy; it became an independent nation-building movement attempting to persuade the general public to oppose the KMT and support independence.⁸⁴³ Accordingly, the political conflict over national identity between the Taiwanese and mainlanders replaced the provincial conflict that had been characterized by social structural inequalities since 1945.⁸⁴⁴ As a result, two concurrent developments – the politicization of ethnic cleavage and the emergence of national identity crisis – compounded the democratisation of Taiwan.⁸⁴⁵ Democratisation altered the distribution of power between ethnic groups and entailed the change in political symbolism and identity.⁸⁴⁶ These developments vindicated the prediction of the Conlon Report in late 1959 about the political crisis that would accompany democratisation.⁸⁴⁷

Continued US Pressure for Taiwanization

Meanwhile, the US legislative and executive branches continued pressing for Taiwanization. On April 8, 1987, Senator Kennedy introduced a resolution that stressed the free and fair election of all members of all central representative bodies as steps toward a genuinely representative government.⁸⁴⁸ Solarz followed suit in the House on May 13.⁸⁴⁹ On October 14, 1987, the State Department invited Chang Tsan-hung (張燦

⁸⁴¹ Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 29. See also Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 43.

⁸⁴² Chang Mau-kuei, “Political Transformation and Ethnization of Politics in Taiwan”; Lu, “Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party,” 130. For the initial disputes on the issue of independence, see Cheng Tun-jen and Hsu Yung-ming, “Issue Structure, the DPP’s Factionalism, and Party Realignment,” 146-50; Lu, “Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party,” 134-38, 40-42.

⁸⁴³ Chang Mau-kuei, “Political Transformation and Ethnization of Politics in Taiwan”.

⁸⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 8

⁸⁴⁵ Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, “The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan,” 81, 82.

⁸⁴⁶ Cheng Tun-jen and Hsu Yung-ming, “Issue Structure, the DPP’s Factionalism, and Party Realignment,” 146.

⁸⁴⁷ See page 74 of this thesis.

⁸⁴⁸ *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress concerning Representative Government, Political Parties, and Freedom of Expression on Taiwan*, 100th Congress, S.CON.RES.46.

⁸⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, H.CON.RES.124.

鑒), former WUFI Chairman, to deliver a speech in a closed session of the Secretary's Open Forum. His speech reiterated active Taiwanese demands for self-determination, fair and free plebiscite and independence. He proffered three suggestions on Taiwan policy: the suspension of arms sales to Taiwan, the threatened use of economic sanctions to force Chiang Ching-kuo regime to allow more freedom of speech and assembly, and support for the Taiwanese home-returning campaign. This event marked America's first official contact with the secessionist camp.⁸⁵⁰

Awakened Identity of Veterans

On October 15, the KMT approved a statute raising the prohibition on visiting family members on the mainland by Chinese veterans in Taiwan despite the official policy of "no contact, no negotiation, no compromise." The humanitarian policy delivered a message: "The veterans would have the free choice to live in China or settle down in a democratic Taiwan."⁸⁵¹ The US ostensibly welcomed the warmer relationship between the two rival regimes; but, soon Washington expressed its concern to Taipei that the pace of KMT mainland policy was too rushed; some US officials were worried about the result of ensuing economic and political interaction.⁸⁵² However, as veterans flocked to visit relatives on the mainland, they found themselves categorized as "*Taibao*" (台胞, Taiwan compatriots) by Beijing, which helped justify the rise of political nationalism on Taiwan.⁸⁵³

The Escalation of Identity Confrontation at Home

After Lee Teng-hui became president upon the death of Chiang Ching-kuo on January 13, 1988, nationalist forces mounted their challenge to the KMT. On February 27, in a lecture commemorating February 28, WUFI Chairman Hsu Shih-kai again urged members to return to Taiwan to advocate secessionism. The publicization of

⁸⁵⁰ George T. Chang 張燦鑒, *Taiwan: Old Myths and New Realities* [internet] (WUFI, 1987 [cited Nov 24 2003]), available from <http://www.wufi.org.tw/eng/chnamyth.htm>. See also Yang Chih-chieh 楊志潔, 84 Zhang: *Zhang Canhong de yanshuo* (Chapter 84: A Speech by Zhang Canhong) [internet] (Taiwan Tati Cultural And Educational Foundation, 1987 [cited Nov 24 2003]), available from <http://taiwantt.org.tw/books/cryingtaiwan4/content/content2.htm>.

⁸⁵¹ Wang, "KMT's Localization Claim Is Empty."

⁸⁵² Wang Hsiao-po, *Liang'an guanxi lunji* (A Collection of Arguments on Cross-Strait Relations), 42-43.

⁸⁵³ Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 252; Shih Cheng-feng, *Taiwan minzu zhuyi* (Taiwanese Nationalism), 214; Shih Cheng-feng, "Taiwan yishi de tansuo (An Exploration of Taiwanese Consciousness)," 77.

secessionism worried other factions with different positions on national identity in the DPP. Although the DPP's April 17 Resolution maintained the common ground of self-determination⁸⁵⁴ to mitigate the tension among internal factions,⁸⁵⁵ legislator Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) proposed four conditions for advocating independence.⁸⁵⁶ Meanwhile, due to ethnicity, the native factions in the KMT had little difficulty changing their identity. On April 22, 1988, many native KMT legislators joined forces to establish the first subsidiary organization within the KMT – “*Jisi zaocanhui*” (集思早餐會, often abbreviated to *Jisihui*, 集思會). Its foremost initiator Huang Chu-wen (黃主文) openly indicated the organization's ambition to snatch power from the mainlander elites, which could also be seen as a challenge to China identity.⁸⁵⁷ This escalated the confrontation of national identity. The dividing issue made Taiwanese nationalism exclusive, even within the DPP itself.⁸⁵⁸ Senior mainlander members Lin Cheng-chieh (林正杰) and Fei Hsi-ping came under Taiwanese nationalist attack; they left the DPP in late 1988.⁸⁵⁹

Internal and External Confrontation in 1989

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) talks in June 1982 marked another period of détente between the superpowers. After Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev assumed office in 1985, US-USSR relations quickly thawed. This led to a summit meeting in Moscow on May 29, 1988. Next, the USSR completed its withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan on February 15, 1989. Soon the tide of democratisation began to sweep Eastern Europe. As a result, from the mid-1980s Sino-US relations began to

⁸⁵⁴ Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 29.

⁸⁵⁵ Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 43-44.

⁸⁵⁶ “If the Kuomintang and the Communists enter into one-sided peace talks, if the KMT sells out the interests of the Taiwanese people, if the Chinese Communists “unify” Taiwan, or if the KMT does not institute real democratic constitutional government, this party should advocate Taiwan independence.” See Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 29-30.

⁸⁵⁷ Among the original twenty-one members, fifteen had faction background; three years later, twenty-six out of forty-five members had support of local factions; see Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian* (*Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan*), 229, 32. See also Chang Mau-kuei, “Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism),” 245. This clique later became Lee Teng-hui's close ally in struggling against mainlander elites.

⁸⁵⁸ Gold, “Taiwan's Quest for Identity in the Shadow of China,” 175.

⁸⁵⁹ Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 43-44; Lu, “Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party,” 132.

reflect "intrinsic bilateral interests and interactions."⁸⁶⁰ Two events followed the change of international power politics. Domestically, in December 1988, WUFI Chairman Hsu Shih-kai's "*Draft of the Republic of Taiwan Constitution*" was published in the journal *Ziyou niandai* (自由年代, *The Liberty Era Monthly*). Soon, the journal founder Cheng Nan-jung (鄭南榕), a second-generation mainlander secessionist, was indicted by the KMT. He refused to be arrested alive and set himself on fire on April 7, 1989. This stimulated many to think of the issue of Taiwan independence.⁸⁶¹

On the mainland, the Tiananmen Incident occurred on June 4. KMT anti-Communist propaganda in the past four decades had already severely undermined the sense of racial unity across the Strait.⁸⁶² The Tiananmen Incident prompted many in Taiwan to question the future of reunification with Communist China.⁸⁶³ Given the political antagonism and insurmountable economic gap across the Strait, the "Taiwanized" mainlanders and their families were obliged to identify their interests and sentiments with Taiwan.⁸⁶⁴ In terms of Sino-US relations, "the hostility felt for each other's political system" that "helped to sustain the Sino-American confrontation throughout the 1950s and 1960s" immediately dominated America's China policy.⁸⁶⁵ The day after the Tiananmen Incident, President George H.W. Bush urged the US not to let China "pull back to its pre-1972 era of isolation and repression."⁸⁶⁶ To calm the domestic backlash against Beijing's bloody suppression of dissidents, Bush issued sanctions on June 5 and 20 banning high-level visits, reducing technology transfers, and restricting aid programs.⁸⁶⁷ However, American hostility to Beijing after the Incident made most

⁸⁶⁰ Shambaugh, "Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations," 206.

⁸⁶¹ Li Hsiao-feng, *Jin bainian Taiwan minzhu yundong gaiyao* (A Summary of the Democratic Movement in Taiwan in the Recent One Hundred Years) ([cited]; Meaney, "Liberalization, Democratization, and the Role of the KMT," 101.

⁸⁶² Hsu Tsung-mao, *Taiwanren lun* (An Analysis of the Taiwanese), 82.

⁸⁶³ Li Hsiao-feng, *Jin bainian Taiwan minzhu yundong gaiyao* (A Summary of the Democratic Movement in Taiwan in the Recent One Hundred Years) ([cited]).

⁸⁶⁴ Tien Hung-mao, "Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State," 43.

⁸⁶⁵ Shambaugh, "Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations," 206, 08.

⁸⁶⁶ NARA, *The President's News Conference, June 5, 1989* [internet] ([cited Jan 29 2003]), available from <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1989/89060500.html>.

⁸⁶⁷ Gang Dongjun and Chen You 剛棟俊, 陳友, *Meiguo dui Hua zhengce 50 nian* (America's China Policy in the Past 50 Years) (Guangdong: Guangdong renmin, 2001), 311-12.

politicians more willing to criticise China.⁸⁶⁸ Many Congressional resolutions rekindled the issues of Sino-US cultural conflict and cross-Strait cultural differences.

The Senate passed an amendment on July 19 which denounced Beijing's "willingness to use force against the Chinese people who were demonstrating peacefully for democracy," and reiterated that the future of Taiwan should be settled peacefully, without coercion, and in a manner acceptable to the people on Taiwan. The amendment maintained that US-PRC relations should depend upon Beijing's willingness to refrain from the use or the threat of force in resolving Taiwan's future.⁸⁶⁹ On November 16, Pell introduced a resolution mandating that the President oppose all loans by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to China which failed to meet basic human needs; increase funds to the Voice of America for transmissions into China; support Taiwan's accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); and impose further sanctions on China.⁸⁷⁰ On November 18, a resolution was introduced to draw attention to the differences between Taiwan and the PRC on the development in human rights and democracy; it required that the US foreign policy "accurately reflect the primacy that U.S. policy places on political and economic freedom and human rights."⁸⁷¹ On the same day, Solarz introduced two resolutions; one repeated the concern over the future of Taiwan;⁸⁷² the other urged Taipei to continue to advance human rights and democracy.⁸⁷³ Consequently, after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, terms such as "human rights," "democracy" and "the future of Taiwan" came to connote Sino-US "cultural conflict" and cross-Strait "cultural difference."

From May to November, more blacklisted secessionists returned to Taiwan. Solarz mentioned Congressional interest in the upcoming elections on December 2 as a key test

⁸⁶⁸ Ezra F. Vogel, "Introduction: How Can the United States and China Pursue Common Interests and Manage Differences?" in *Living with China: U.S./China Relations in the Twenty-first Century*, ed. Ezra F. Vogel (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 24.

⁸⁶⁹ S.AMDT.285, 101st Congress.

⁸⁷⁰ *A Resolution Expressing the Support of the Senate regarding Democratic Reforms and Human Rights on Taiwan*, 101st Congress, S.RES.210.

⁸⁷¹ *Expressing the Sense of the Congress with Respect to United States Relations with the People's Republic of China and with the Republic of China on Taiwan*, 101st Congress, H.CON.RES.233.

⁸⁷² *Expressing the Sense of the Congress with Respect to the Future of Taiwan*, 101st Congress, H.CON.RES.234.

⁸⁷³ *To Express the Sense of the Congress regarding Democratic Reforms and Human Rights in Taiwan*, 101st Congress, H.CON.RES.235.

of Taipei's commitment to democracy. He referred to the blacklisted secessionists and warned that the US would be very concerned about the KMT legal actions taken against them because of their political activities and statements while in the US.⁸⁷⁴ Solarz even led a delegation of American politicians in a visit to Taiwan, monitored the elections and supported secessionist candidates.⁸⁷⁵ As a result, in the local and legislative elections on December 2, 1989, the DPP claimed 38.3% and 28.2% in the local and national elections respectively.⁸⁷⁶ The *New Tide Magazine* and other DPP candidates who joined the New Nation Alliance (*Xin guojia lianxian*, 新國家連線), organized by Lin I-hsiung and characterized by secessionist platform, performed especially well. Their success proved the feasibility of advocating secessionism.⁸⁷⁷ In contrast, mainlanders began to realize that they had become an ethnic group of "new residents" in the political arena and had to face the redistribution of power that was demanded by native Taiwanese.⁸⁷⁸

Summary

American confidence in "One China, One Taiwan" and Taiwanization facilitated US-PRC rapprochement. Throughout the Three Joint Communiqués, the US government preserved the spirit of Truman's political assertion of the undetermined legal status of Taiwan by ostensibly "acknowledging" "one China;" furthermore, the condition of a "peaceful resolution" to the Taiwan issue, enshrined in each of the Joint Communiqués, legitimised US military intervention in the case of a PRC strike across the Strait. The TRA further consolidated the American position on Taiwan. Consequently, the Three Joint Communiqués, along with the TRA, inherited the spirit of separatist intention and reconciled the need of US-PRC rapprochement with the

⁸⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁵ Paaui Shiu-lam, *Taidu' muhou (Behind the Scene of Taiwan Independence)*, 18, 33.

⁸⁷⁶ DPP, *Minjindang dashi nianbiao (A Chronology of Relevant Events of the Democratic Progressive Party)* [internet] (DPP, [cited Oct 16 2003]), available from <http://www.dpp.org.tw/>.

⁸⁷⁷ Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 44-45; Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 30. According to Hughes, DPP candidates affiliated with the New Nation Alliance claimed 7 out of the 10 new Legislative seats won by the DPP and 13 in the municipal councils of Taipei and Kaohsiung.

⁸⁷⁸ Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 247; Hu Tai-li 胡台麗, "Yuzai yu fanshu - Taiwan 'rongmin' de zuqun guanxi yu rentong (Yam and Sweet Potato - Ethnic Relations and Identity of Veteran-Mainlanders in Taiwan)," in *Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong (The Relations among Ethnic Groups and National Identity)* (Hong Kong: Yeqiang, 1993), 319-21; Shih Cheng-feng, "Taiwan yishi de tansuo (An Exploration of Taiwanese Consciousness)," 77.

promotion of Taiwanese nationalism.

Each communiqué took its toll on the KMT regime but benefited Taiwanese nationalism. On the one hand, each communiqué challenged the legitimacy of the KMT. Although Chiang Ching-kuo launched indigenisation to strengthen legitimacy, indigenisation facilitated US-expected Taiwanization, eroded the “one China” policy, substantiated Taiwan’s independence in the international community, promoted US-Taiwan unofficial and commercial relations, benefited the political and economic advance of the Taiwanese, and expanded American values and lifestyles in Taiwan. On the other hand, each communiqué galvanized political nationalism, justified the opposition’s appeals for democratic reforms, advanced the partnership between some US Congress members and secessionist Taiwanese in the name of human rights and democracy, and built up domestic and international pressure for democratisation and Taiwanization.

Despite the debates over the sources of Taiwan’s democratisation, America’s separatist intention since the Korean War, a protracted process of US-PRC rapprochement, the nationalist opposition movement, the socio-economic changes, and the partnership between some US Congress members and Taiwanese nationalists together constituted the context of Taiwan’s democratisation. Almost every source can be traced to US influence, which is most manifest in American economic aid, which was intended to promote Taiwanese nationalism. Taiwan’s democratisation is a natural corollary of its progression along a different historical and civilization trajectory under the influence of the US.

Furthermore, US aid helped to create Taiwanese structuralism, instances of which include the Provincial Assembly proposition in 1966, the rise of the opposition in the 1970s, the establishment of the DPP in 1986, the native faction’s ambition to take power from mainlander elites in 1988; even the victory of Lee Teng-hui’s power struggle against the mainlander elites in the early 1990s were connected to Taiwanese structuralism.

The influx and publicization of overseas political nationalism in the early 1980s undermined the traditional Chinese national identity and caused division of national

identity at home. Committed secessionists further instrumentalized billowing social movements to promote self-determination and independence. As a result, they transformed domestic political opposition movement into an independent nation-building movement. Meanwhile, after the forty-year separation from the mainland and Chiang Ching-kuo's political liberalization, mainlanders became increasingly "Taiwanized" through the identification of their interests and sentiments with Taiwan. The Tiananmen Incident prompted societal reflection over the choice of national identity. The electoral victory of secessionist candidates in December 1989 reflected the success of the pollination of secessionism on the island.

Chapter 5: 1989-2000

STRATEGIC REALIGNMENT AND THE FRUITION OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM

Introduction

Deng Xiaoping's policies of reform and openness facilitated China's strong economic and military development; the PRC gradually rose as a regional power. On the eve of the conclusion of the Cold War, China's looming hegemony worried the governments of America, Japan and Taiwan. The shared perception of the threat from Beijing prompted conservative forces in Washington and secessionist politicians in Taipei to realign their interests for security cooperation. On the one hand, America began adjusting its strategic cooperation with China. After the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, the US Congress often uses "human rights," "democracy" and "the future of Taiwan" to connote Sino-US "cultural conflict" and cross-Strait "cultural difference." On the other hand, native Taiwan leader Lee Teng-hui was at the threshold of Taiwanization, riding the irrevocable trend of democratisation. The collapse of the communists in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in next two years removed the common interests between Washington and Beijing. Communist China itself became a target of American containment. The progress of Taiwanization thus carried tremendous strategic significance.

This chapter explores how America and Taiwanese nationalists realigned their strategic interests by jointly promoting Taiwanization. Some main questions include: How was Lee's Taiwanization linked to Chiang Ching-kuo's indigenisation and US-anticipated Taiwanization? How did Lee meet internal challenge and dominate the track of Taiwanization? How did he deliver the political engineering? How did America support his Taiwanization? How did Taiwanization affect domestic ethnic groups and national identity? What had Lee's political engineering achieved in terms of the progress of "Taiwan Independence Roadmap"?

Lee Teng-hui's Initial Rise to Power and the US

Signs of Divergence from Chiang Ching-kuo's Indigenisation

After Chiang Ching-kuo's demise, the power struggle in the KMT was intense. The internal struggle between Premier Yu Kuo-hua (俞國華) and KMT Secretary General Li Huan (李煥) and the help of James Soong (宋楚瑜) resulted in Lee Teng-hui's succession as Chairman of KMT on July 8 1988.⁸⁷⁹ As head of both the party and the state, Lee consolidated his power cautiously. To minimize the challenge from the conservative elements in the KMT, he pledged to follow Chiang Ching-kuo's "indigenisation."

In February 1988 he introduced a new "retirement plan" to ease elderly mainlanders out of the Legislative Yuan, National Assembly and Control Yuan in the name of democratisation. This was conducive to the goals of the DPP's mass movements: force all senior legislators to retire and make the public aware of the desirability of founding a "new and independent state."⁸⁸⁰ From October 1988, he tolerated the return of blacklisted overseas dissidents to Taiwan. The passage of People's Organization Law on January 27, 1989 legalized the formation of opposition parties and admitted political pluralism. When 1989 year-end local and legislative elections approached, more overseas secessionists sneaked into Taiwan from May to November to promote independence. Some high-profile secessionists, including Kuo Pei-hung (郭倍宏), Li Ying-yuan (李應元), even appeared at campaign events.⁸⁸¹ Representative Solarz openly supported these blacklisted secessionists and even visited Taiwan to help secessionists' campaigns.⁸⁸² After being sentenced to a ten-year prison term, exiled secessionist Hsu Hsin-liang was granted commutation to six years and eight months; radical secessionist Huang Hua (黃華) assumed the leadership of the Taiwan

⁸⁷⁹ For the details of Lee's succession, see Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian* (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan), 194-95. See also Harris, "Towards Taiwan's Independence," 29; Liu Xurui and Shi Guoqiang 劉栩瑞, 史國強, *Li Denghui diguo mori* (The End of Lee Teng-hui's Empire) (Hong Kong: Li wen, 2000), 45-49; Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 166.

⁸⁸⁰ Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party," 130.

⁸⁸¹ Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian* (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan), 206.

⁸⁸² See page 152 of this thesis.

independence movement.⁸⁸³ Lee seemed very tolerant and showed little interest in a crackdown. In terms of foreign affairs, Lee had advocated pragmatic diplomacy since January 1989.⁸⁸⁴ In March 1989, Lee visited Singapore and accepted the title of President from Taiwan. During 1989, Taipei welcomed ties with Grenada, Belize and Liberia despite their formal recognition of the PRC. Lee's pragmatic diplomacy became a practice of dual recognition, marking a departure from the one-China principle.⁸⁸⁵ In terms of economic development, Lee seemed more interested in internationalisation. In cross-Strait relations, Lee seemed indifferent to the 1989 Tiananmen Incident.⁸⁸⁶ These developments signalled his deviation from Chiang Ching-kuo's indigenisation.

American Support of Lee's Watch Cabinet

Conservative American politicians soon noticed Lee's departure from the line of Chiang Ching-kuo. American support for Lee was most manifest in political encouragement and economic cooperation. The strong urge for Taiwan to continue to promote democracy from the US Congress helped Lee minimize the likely political resistance to his rise to power at home. To ease the increasing trade deficit with Taiwan and to strengthen Taiwan's international economic viability, some Congress members proposed a US-Taiwan Free Trade Area (FTA) agreement. The first FTA resolution came in 1988 and two more followed in early 1989.⁸⁸⁷ After the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, numerous resolutions were introduced to denounce Beijing and support Taipei, rekindling the issues of Sino-US cultural conflict and cross-Strait cultural differences.⁸⁸⁸ A resolution was introduced on June 15 to urge Bush to encourage the Organization for Economic

⁸⁸³ Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 206.

⁸⁸⁴ Lee Teng-hui 李登輝, *Taiwan de zhuzhang (An Argument of Taiwan)* (Taipei: Yuanliu, 1999), 127-28; Lee Teng-hui 李登輝, *Yazhou de zhilue (A Strategy of Asia)* (Taipei: Yuanliu, 2000), 252.

⁸⁸⁵ Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 84; Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 163.

⁸⁸⁶ Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 206.

⁸⁸⁷ *A Bill to Authorize the Establishment of a United States-Taiwan Free Trade Area*, 100th Congress, H.R.5563; *A Bill to Authorize the Establishment of a United States-Taiwan Free Trade Area*, 101st Congress, S.944; *To Authorize the Establishment of a United States-Taiwan Free Trade Area*, 101st Congress, H.R.1748.

⁸⁸⁸ See page 152 of this thesis.

Cooperation and Development (OECD) to consider Taiwan's membership.⁸⁸⁹ On November 20, 1989, the Congress introduced a bill to influence the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to reconsider the title of "Taipei, China" for Taiwan and to resolve this dispute in a fashion acceptable to Taiwan. It was signed by Bush and became law the next day.⁸⁹⁰ The strong US support helped Taiwan evade the sovereignty issue and entered the General Agreement Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on January 1, 1990 under the title "the Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu."⁸⁹¹

Lee's Concealed Agenda for Taiwanization

Lee's toleration of secessionists and efforts for dual recognition worried many in the KMT.⁸⁹² As the March 1990 presidential election approached, the power and ideological struggle split the KMT into two camps: the mainstream camp supporting Lee, and the non-mainstream camp headed by Taiwanese Lin Yang-kang (林洋港) and mainlander Chiang Wei-kuo (蔣緯國). Lin was one of the earliest native elites promoted by Chiang Ching-kuo; Wei-kuo was Ching-kuo's brother. The split led to the "February power struggle." Lee received strong support from native businessmen and factions while most mainlander politicians backed the non-mainstream camp.⁸⁹³ Although Lee mobilized eight seniors to persuade the non-mainstream contenders to resign from KMT nomination, it was not successful; the balance "was finally tilted in Lee's favour by a senior islander politician who had a mixture of local faction and business backgrounds."⁸⁹⁴ The unity of native businessmen and factions thus helped Lee secure the KMT nomination and win the election for the Eighth President of the ROC on March 20, 1990. This symbolized another victory of Taiwanese structuralism and for US aid.

⁸⁸⁹ *To Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*, 101st Congress, H.R.2655.

⁸⁹⁰ *Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1990*, 101st Congress, H.R.3743.

⁸⁹¹ Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 169.

⁸⁹² Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 206.

⁸⁹³ Shiao Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 223.

⁸⁹⁴ *Ibid.* The politician in question is Tsai Hung-wen (蔡鴻文); for the detail, see Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 200-04, 21.

Lee began to focus on Taiwan's relations with China and democratisation.⁸⁹⁵ Probably there was one central motive behind his efforts. Lee shared Taiwanese nationalist belief that the island had been oppressed by alien regimes in the distant past. In consequence, he asserted that the biggest problem for Taiwan was how to remove the alien regime.⁸⁹⁶ Meanwhile, he was determined to resolve the identity issue of ethnic groups: There is an exclusive choice between Chinese identity or Taiwan identity. He believed that the goal of democratisation is "*bentuhua*" (本土化, indigenisation) of Taiwan and that identity is the most critical issue in Taiwan's democratisation process.⁸⁹⁷

Most scholars referred to Chiang Ching-kuo's recruiting Taiwanese since around 1970 as "*bentuhua*;" Lee also asserted his political engineering as "*bentuhua*." For the convenience of differentiating his efforts from Chiang Ching-kuo's indigenisation, Lee's political engineering is referred to as "Taiwanization."⁸⁹⁸ In contextual terms, indigenisation is different from Taiwanization. The former is for the KMT regime to strengthen its ruling legitimacy in the wake of US-PRC rapprochement, while the latter is for ethnic Taiwanese to achieve political domination of the island in the wave of democratisation.⁸⁹⁹ This differentiation is pertinent and helpful in explaining the fundamental differences between Chiang's and Lee's administrations.⁹⁰⁰ This differentiation is particularly valid because Lee had always regarded the KMT as an alien regime, and, since early 1994, he had openly accused the KMT as being such. His political engineering was to produce an exclusive Taiwan identity in the process of

⁸⁹⁵ Lee Teng-hui, *Yazhou de zhilue (A Strategy of Asia)*, 249.

⁸⁹⁶ Ibid., 35. Some may argue that Lee's work, *A Strategy of Asia*, was published much later and therefore the source is not reliable. Actually, it is hard to give an exact assessment of Lee's mindset in 1990. At this point of time, he was surrounded by KMT conservatives and increasingly enmeshed in power struggle; revealing his disapproval, if not hatred, of the KMT would only prompt his opponents to unite against himself. Only after gradually consolidating power, did Lee begin accusing the KMT as an alien regime. He openly did so for the first time during an interview by Japanese journalist Ryotaro Shiba in March 1994; for further detail, see page 173 of this thesis.

⁸⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁸ For the definition of "Taiwanization," see page 75 of this thesis.

⁸⁹⁹ Taiwanization is different from democratisation; the latter has started since the second half of the 1980s due to a whole range of people who want more efficient and representative government, while the former is for ethnic Taiwanese to achieve political domination of the island in the wave of democratisation in the 1990s. See also Yu, "The Politics of Taiwanisation (II): The Road to a New Identity," 29.

⁹⁰⁰ Some scholars may argue that Taiwanization implies building an exclusive ethnic conception of the Taiwan nation and that Taiwanization comes after 2000. However, considering the context in which the term "Taiwanization" first appears and the utility in differentiating Lee's political engineering from Chiang's, the author applies the original definition of Taiwanization given on page 75 throughout the thesis.

democratisation, so as to remove the control of the alien KMT regime. His "Taiwanization" thus aimed to achieve "Taiwanese domination of Taiwan." In addition, after retirement in 2000, he became the standard bearer of secessionist fundamentalism; his Taiwanization actually aimed to break Taiwan away from the mainland. Consequently, Lee's Taiwanization served two goals: to achieve Taiwanese domination of Taiwan and to break Taiwan away from China. This was different in essence from Chiang Ching-kuo's indigenisation which sought to justify and extend the rule of the KMT over Taiwan. By contrast, Lee's goals concurred with the Taiwanization expected by America, which aimed for separatist self-determination. To achieve the goals, he concealed his agenda from the mainlander elites but collaborated with the DPP. Furthermore, his motivation to relieve the Taiwanese of the control by the mainlander group was typical of structuralism.⁹⁰¹

The First Stage of Lee's Taiwanization and the US

During the 1990 presidential election, the mainlander members of the National Assembly used the election for political extortion; they raised attendance fee for themselves and requested that their term of office be extended. This sparked island-wide protests and student demonstrations in March 1990.⁹⁰² Furious students presented four proposals: to disband the National Assembly, to abolish the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion, to convene a National Affairs Conference, and to set a timetable for democratic reforms.⁹⁰³ These appeals were consistent with the DPP's positions on political reform.⁹⁰⁴ On March 21, Lee announced that he would convene a National Affairs Conference (NAC) in late June to review constitutional reform and national unification. He deliberately used the NAC as an irregular approach to evade the checks of the KMT party-state system and promote Taiwanizing reforms.⁹⁰⁵

⁹⁰¹ For the definition of structuralism, see page 89 of this thesis.

⁹⁰² Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 58-59; Liu Xurui and Shi Guoqiang, *Li Denghui diguo mori* (*The End of Lee Teng-hui's Empire*), 52. See also Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 52.

⁹⁰³ Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 52.

⁹⁰⁴ DPP, *Minjindang dashi nianbiao* (*A Chronology of Relevant Events of the Democratic Progressive Party*) ([cited]).

⁹⁰⁵ Lee Teng-hui, *Yazhou de zhilue* (*A Strategy of Asia*), 249.

US Congress' Messages after Taiwan's 1990 Presidential Election

Before the election, Lee dismantled the KMT's established advantages, tapped overseas secessionist forces into the island, and leveraged his pragmatic diplomacy with economic prosperity and the credit of democratisation. After the election, he made conciliatory gestures toward the student demonstrators and DPP. These moves painted a promising prospect for US-expected Taiwanization. US Congress members sought to promote closer relations with Taiwan. On March 27, Solarz introduced a concurrent resolution that had for the first time suggested that the future of Taiwan be determined "through effective democratic mechanisms, such as a plebiscite;" thirty colleagues joined the co-sponsorship.⁹⁰⁶ On May 24, Representative Donald J. Pease introduced a resolution granting the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) status to the PRC on condition that Beijing accede to Taiwan's admission into GATT; the resolution was co-sponsored by nineteen Representatives. The House passed the bill in mid-October.⁹⁰⁷ On June 7, Senator William V. Roth introduced a resolution which again advocated Taiwan's membership in the GATT; sixty-five colleagues became co-sponsors.⁹⁰⁸ A bill expressing support of the issue of Taiwan's title in the ADB was introduced on June 21; it became law on November 5.⁹⁰⁹ In October 1990, Congress invited Shih Ming-teh to attend a testimony and deliver a speech on Capitol Hill.⁹¹⁰ Before and after the NAC, surging Congressional support of Lee reinforced his agenda of Taiwanization.

Achieving Taiwanese Domination of Taiwan

The NAC since June 28, 1990 raised the curtain of Taiwanization. The consensus reached by the NAC included the direct election of President and Governor, the speedy retirement of senior representatives in the national elective bodies, the termination of the Period of Communist Rebellion and the Temporary Provisions, and the amendment of

⁹⁰⁶ *Expressing the Sense of the Congress concerning the Future of Taiwan*, 101st Congress, H.CON.RES.293.

⁹⁰⁷ *Regarding the Extension of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment to the Products of the People's Republic of China*, 101st Congress, H.R.4939.

⁹⁰⁸ *A Resolution to Express the Sense of the Senate the Support of Taiwan's Membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*, 101st Congress, S.RES.296.

⁹⁰⁹ *Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1991, and for Other Purposes*, 101st Congress, H.R.5114.

⁹¹⁰ DPP, *Minjindang dangshiguan/liren dangzhuxi/Shi Mingde (Democratic Progressive Party History/Chairmen/Shih Ming-teh)* [internet] (DPP, [cited Feb 16 2005]), available from <http://www.dpp.org.tw/>.

the constitution.⁹¹¹ Although these points are democratic political reforms that have to take place without regard to the ethnicity of the population, they all contributed to ethnic Taiwanese political domination of the island republic. Taiwanization unfolded in accordance with the consensus of the NAC.⁹¹²

Domestic Politics: Constitutional Reforms, Ideological Partnership and Constructuralism

Lee launched the first constitutional reform in April 1991. On April 22, 1991, Lee declared the conclusion of the Period of Communist Rebellion, abolished the Temporary Provisions, confined the constitutional jurisdiction within Taiwan, admitted the legality of the PRC's rule over the mainland, and stipulated that the people of Taiwan were alone eligible for membership in the national elective bodies.⁹¹³ For his American audience, this constitutional reform carried out US scholars John King Fairbank's and Douglas Mendel's suggestions in the 1970s about impairing Beijing's sovereign right of using force against Taiwan by unilaterally eliminating the rationale of the "civil war" and disclaiming the ROC's sovereignty over the mainland.⁹¹⁴ It also fulfilled US diplomat Armstrong's prediction that once the Taiwanese gained power, "the island will undergo a virtual political revolution" by abolishing many existing policies such as abandoning "the claim that a government on Taiwan is that of all China."⁹¹⁵

In accordance with the consensus of the NAC, the second formal National Assembly election was held on December 21, 1991 and all the senior representatives of the national elective bodies were retired on December 31, 1991. Due to their demographic dominance, native Taiwanese had secured a dominant share in the National Assembly since 1991. Lee then accomplished the second constitutional reform in May 1992. The second article of the amendment stipulated that the president and vice president were to be elected only by the people of Taiwan. Consequently, national institutions

⁹¹¹ Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 52-53.

⁹¹² Peter Yu argues that Taiwanization starts with Lee Teng-hui's embarkment on amending the Constitution; see Yu, "The Politics of Taiwanisation (II): The Road to a New Identity," 30.

⁹¹³ Lee Teng-hui 李登輝, *Li Denghui zhizheng gaobai shilu* (*A Faithful Account of Lee Teng-hui's Rule*) (Taipei: Yinke, 2001), 230.

⁹¹⁴ Faibank believed "a mere declaration from Taipei that the regime is ruling only its presently held territory might be enough to create a new situation [for lending plausibility to the idea of Taiwan's independence]." See Fairbank, "Taiwan: Our Hardy Perennial Problem," 135. Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 226.

⁹¹⁵ Wang, "KMT's Localization Claim Is Empty."

only represented the people of Taiwan; the ROC government was granted its ruling power and legal authority only by the people of Taiwan and had nothing to do with the people on the mainland.⁹¹⁶ The first and second constitutional reforms consequently legalized the domination of Taiwan by the people on the island and foreshadowed Lee's proposition of "special state-to-state relationship" in July 1999.⁹¹⁷

The DPP convened a National Party Congress in June 1991. The *New Tide* leader Lin Cho-shui (林濁水) proposed to adopt a clear plank in its platform and charter calling for an independent Republic of Taiwan. Chen Shui-bian softened the proposal by calling for a referendum on Taiwan independence rather than a unilateral declaration by a DPP government, thereby stressing the role of the democratic process in such a vital decision. The DPP National Party Congress passed this amendment on June 23, 1991.⁹¹⁸ The independence plank, which cemented the DPP's image as an "independence party," read as follows:

In accordance with Taiwan's actual sovereignty, an independent country should be established and a new constitution promulgated in order to create a legal and political system appropriate to the realities of Taiwan society, and to return to international society in accordance with principles of international law. ... Based on the principle of popular sovereignty, the establishment of a sovereign, independent and self-government Republic of Taiwan and promulgation of a new constitution should be carried out by all residents of Taiwan through a national referendum.⁹¹⁹

This appeal is consistent with "self-determination" since a new constitution and a national referendum are presented in terms of a democratic scheme. However, some uneasiness lurks behind the formula. By nature, the appeal for a new country with a new constitution no longer constitutes a political democratic reform within the ROC system, but a political revolution for nation-building.⁹²⁰ The "independence plank" satisfied secessionist aspirations for *de jure* independence; it inevitably involved a change of *status quo*, which could easily trigger a military conflict in the crisis-prone Taiwan Strait. Therefore, in the context of the Taiwan Strait, secessionist

⁹¹⁶ Lee Teng-hui, *Li Denghui zhizheng gaobai shilu* (*A Faithful Account of Lee Teng-hui's Rule*), 230.

⁹¹⁷ Ibid. For Lee's proposing of "special state-to-state relationship" in July 1999, see page 193 of this thesis.

⁹¹⁸ DPP, *Minjindang dashi nianbiao* (*A Chronology of Relevant Events of the Democratic Progressive Party*) ([cited]; Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 125.

⁹¹⁹ Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 125.

⁹²⁰ Cheng Tun-jen and Hsu Yung-ming, "Issue Structure, the DPP's Factionalism, and Party Realignment," 139; Hu Fu, "The Electoral Mechanism and Political Change in Taiwan," 168.

fundamentalism can be defined as the pursuit of a Republic of Taiwan in accordance with the "independence plank," regardless of international opposition and the risk of a catastrophic war.⁹²¹

The relationship between Lee and the DPP grew closer. Between 1990 and 1992, Lee "actively sought political compromise and ideological accommodation from the DPP by conceding to various DPP political demands."⁹²² Lee also began giving the DPP tangible financial support in the name of promoting multi-party politics. In the following years, he stressed "popular sovereignty" of the independence plank on many occasions. In response, the DPP sided with Lee whenever it was possible to undermine the non-mainstream camp.⁹²³ Meanwhile, the DPP made the subject of commemorating the February 28 Incident part of an ethno-national narrative.⁹²⁴ In the early stage of democratisation, nationalist mobilization based on ethnicity, or politicisation of ethnic identity, was the most effective strategy available to the opposition.⁹²⁵

Moreover, Lee cautiously roused an anti-KMT sentiment, which gave birth to an anti-KMT populism.⁹²⁶ Since the early 1990s, Lee has appealed to Taiwanese consciousness for mass support to push aside the mainlander rivals; in fact, this anti-KMT sentiment was more structuralist than populist. The "Lee Teng-hui syndrome" won the general support from the native Taiwanese.

Lee's use of division structuralism and his strategizing with DPP's ethno-nationalism deepened the cleavage in ethnic relations and the crisis of national identity that had emerged since the democratic transition. To promote a united community identity and

⁹²¹ As will be demonstrated in Chapter 6, the "independence plank" heralded the rise of fundamentalism after the DPP became ruling party in 2000.

⁹²² For the details of these demands, see Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 85.

⁹²³ Ibid; Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 88; Shih Cheng-feng, *Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism)*, 18, 79, 82.

⁹²⁴ Edmondson, "The February 28 Incident and National Identity," 36.

⁹²⁵ Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 234, 44-45; Edmondson, "The February 28 Incident and National Identity," 33; Wu Mi-cha and Chang Yen-hsien, *Jianli Taiwan de guomin guojia (Establish a Civic Nation for Taiwan)*, 100-02; Wu Nai-teh, "Ethnic Consciousness, Political Support, and National Identity," 49-50.

⁹²⁶ For the original definition of populism, see Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 8; Torcuato S. Di Tella, "Populism and Reform in Latin America," in *Obstacles to Change in Latin America*, ed. Claudio Véliz (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 47.

political harmony, Lee proposed “*shengming gongtongti*” (生命共同體; literally “living community”) in August 1991.⁹²⁷ Consistent with the definition of Taiwanization, it was a deliberate attempt to include all ethnic groups in the polity, especially members of the mainlander elites, during ethnic Taiwanese rise to dominate the political arena on the island. In addition, this was Lee’s first constructuralistic argument for the imposition of a new vision of nation-building in the direction of Taiwanization.

Foreign Relations

Congressional support for Taiwan’s plebiscite, entry to the GATT and title in the ADB surged after Lee’s election. Solarz introduced a resolution on July 11, 1990 opposing international loans to China and promoting peaceful evolution in China, imposing further sanctions on China and advancing Taiwan’s economic viability and political independence.⁹²⁸ This encouraged Lee to raise Taiwan’s visibility and challenge the “one China” policy. In the days leading to the First Persian Gulf War, Taipei proposed to donate US\$100 million in September 1990 to attract international publicity.⁹²⁹ Even though Lee’s donations were dubbed “money diplomacy,” Taiwan’s economic prosperity and political democratisation led Bush to praise the democratic development of Taiwan since May 1991.⁹³⁰ Lee responded immediately. The following month, a group of eighty KMT legislators petitioned for the ROC to reapply to the UN “at an appropriate time.”⁹³¹ On July 8, 1991, Taiwan placed a large advertisement in the *New York Times* to declare its flexibility and pragmatism.⁹³² Capitol Hill’s association between China’s MFN status and Taiwan’s accession to GATT pushed the Bush administration to express its support for Taiwan’s entry into GATT. The US became the first major power in GATT to announce that it favoured Taiwan’s application.⁹³³ Following the dissolution

⁹²⁷ Lee himself translates “gongtongti” as “community,” see *Cunzai xiwang fazhan: Li Denghui xiansheng ‘shengming gongtongti’ zhiguo linian* (Existence, Hope, Development: Lee Teng-hui’s Political Philosophy of ‘Living Community’), ed., ^eds., (Taipei: Zhengzhong, 1993), 13-14, 16, 64.

⁹²⁸ *Imposing Additional Conditions on the Extension of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment to the Products of the People’s Republic of China*, 101st Congress, H.R.5252.

⁹²⁹ Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 163.

⁹³⁰ Bush remarked: “Driven forward by the engine of economic growth and trade, especially with the U.S., South Korea and Taiwan have shed their once-authoritarian rule in favour of democracy and freer trade.” NARA, *Remarks at the Yale University Commencement Ceremony in New Haven, Connecticut, May 27, 1991* [internet] ([cited Jan 29 2003]), available from <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91052700.html>.

⁹³¹ Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 163.

⁹³² Ibid.

⁹³³ Ibid., 169.

of the Warsaw Pact in July, Taiwan won another symbolic victory in joining Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) along with the PRC and Hong Kong.

Economic Development

Lee initiated the "Six-Year Project of National Economic Construction" to promote economic competitiveness in 1991. By 1992, Taiwan possessed \$82 billion in foreign exchange reserves, the largest in the world. Per capital income had reached US\$10,000 a year and Taiwan was the sixth largest trading partner of the US and the thirteenth largest trading power in the world. Some six hundred US companies maintained offices in Taiwan at the beginning of the 1990s.⁹³⁴ As American commercial stakes on Taiwan increased, US-Taiwan unofficial relations grew stronger.

Breaking Taiwan away from China

In order to dispel Beijing's suspicions of his independence sentiments, Lee adopted the "Guidelines for National Unification" passed by the National Unification Council (NUC) in 1991.⁹³⁵ These guidelines asserted the principle of "one China, two political entities," recognized the PRC's jurisdiction over the mainland, called for eventual unification on the basis of "parity," and spelled out conditions for unification. The Guidelines proved a paradoxical rejection of unification with the mainland because "the further apart the political and economic systems of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait might grow, the further away would be the actual act of unification."⁹³⁶ After his retirement, Lee openly confessed to the news media that both the NUC and the "Guidelines for National Unification" had been used to provoke the PRC.⁹³⁷ In addition, Lee adamantly refused to lift the ban on direct air and sea links with the mainland.⁹³⁸

Strategic Realignment in the Name of Regional Peace and Stability

After the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Soviet Union

⁹³⁴ Ibid., 167-68.

⁹³⁵ Lee Teng-hui, *Yazhou de zhilue (A Strategy of Asia)*, 254.

⁹³⁶ Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 67.

⁹³⁷ Lin Ho-ming 林河名, "Li Denghui: Guotonghui dou Zhonggong yongde (Lee Teng-hui: The National Unification Council Was Used to Provoke the PRC)," *UDN*, May 18 2002.

⁹³⁸ Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 84.

Communist Party, the Soviet Communist regime faced imminent dissolution; Bush immediately reasserted at a press conference on August 24, 1991 that the goals of US foreign policy were freedom, democracy and self-determination.⁹³⁹ The collapse of the Soviet Union in late December 1991 undermined the strategic basis for America's close relations with China. Because Washington saw China as the only power with the potential to challenge US dominance in the Asia-Pacific region, Taiwan again became part of the Sino-US strategic equation and a "burr in the saddle" of Sino-US relations.⁹⁴⁰

For practical considerations of winning votes and consolidating strategic position, Bush announced on September 2, 1992 that the US would sell 150 F-16 A/B fighters worth \$5.9 billion to Taiwan; he claimed that the deal was in the interest of maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.⁹⁴¹ This arms sales decision was a remarkable contradiction to the August 17 Communiqué. Bush dismissed Beijing's vehement protest by stating that "the importance of the 1982 Communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan lies in its promotion of common political goals: peace and stability in the area through mutual restraint."⁹⁴² Maintaining peace and stability in the Asia Pacific had thus overridden the August 17 Communiqué. Moreover, these arms sales highlighted Section 3(b) of the TRA, which stipulates: "The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defence articles and services *based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan* ..."⁹⁴³ Beijing's increasing verbal threats and military build-up made successive US administrations conclude that it was necessary to continue providing the military articles and services necessary to Taiwan's defence – just as American law provides.⁹⁴⁴

Moreover, neither the Shanghai Communiqué nor US de-recognition of Taiwan interrupted the cooperation between the CIA, National Security Agency (NSA) and Taiwan's Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB) in intelligence-gathering activities. The

⁹³⁹ Shih Ko-min 施克敏, *Cong huafu kan Taipei (Watch Taipei from Washington DC)* (Taipei: Zheng zhong shu ju, 1993), 124.

⁹⁴⁰ Klintworth, "China and Taiwan - From Flashpoint to Redefining One China," 20.

⁹⁴¹ Kan, "RL30341." See also NARA, *Remarks to General Dynamics Employees in Fort Worth, Texas, September 2, 1992* [internet] ([cited Jan 30 2003]), available from <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1992/92090202.html>.

⁹⁴² NARA, *Remarks to General Dynamics Employees* ([cited]).

⁹⁴³ *Taiwan Relations Act*. Emphasis is my own.

⁹⁴⁴ Feldman, "The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1429."

NSA continued to staff a listening post outside Taipei that monitored radio frequencies used by the China Air Force.⁹⁴⁵ The US and Taiwan even extended their intelligence-gathering net to cover India in order to monitor the PLA's military build-up in the Asia-Pacific region. By 1993, this extensive intelligence-exchange network had begun bearing valuable fruit.⁹⁴⁶

The Second Stage of Lee's Taiwanization and the US

With the collapse of Leninism, Stalinism and Maoism, American perception of its traditional values was reinforced; so were its assertions of their universal validity.⁹⁴⁷ During the 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton attacked Bush for not giving stronger support for Taiwan. After Clinton was elected President in November 1992, many conservative Republicans were immediately ready to throw the same accusation at him. In the meantime, the political power of native Taiwanese had significantly increased. To maintain KMT domination in the national elective bodies, KMT Secretary General James Soong (宋楚瑜) nominated wealthy and powerful native factional leaders in the 1991 National Assembly and the 1992 Legislative Yuan elections.⁹⁴⁸ Therefore, native factional leaders and businessmen inundated the national elective bodies. However, the remarkably increased nomination of native factional leaders and tycoons lent credence to the DPP's accusation of KMT corruption and plutocracy, tarnishing the KMT but benefiting the DPP;⁹⁴⁹ DPP votes exceeded 30% in national elections for the first time.⁹⁵⁰ After the 1991 and 1992 national elections, native politicians from across the political spectrum dominated the state power apparatus.

⁹⁴⁵ Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 145-46.

⁹⁴⁶ For details, see Hsieh Chung-liang and Chu Ming 謝忠良, 朱明, "Tai-Mei gao jieting, Yindu kai 'houmen' (India Joins Taiwan and America's Intelligence Exchange to Monitor the PLA)," *Yi Zhoukan* (Next Magazine), Jan 3, No. 32 (2002), 42-47.

⁹⁴⁷ Oksenberg, "Living with China," 60.

⁹⁴⁸ In the 1991 National Assembly election, seventy-nine out of one hundred and eighty-three KMT runners (43.16%) were native factional leaders or businessmen; in the 1992 Legislative Yuan election, fifty-eight out of ninety-eight KMT runners (59.18%) were native factional leaders or businessmen; see Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian* (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan), 226-28, 42-45; 49.

⁹⁴⁹ Ibid., 227-28, 42-45, 49; Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 87-88, 98.

⁹⁵⁰ DPP scored 31.7% in this legislators election in 1992. See Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 75.

The domestic politics in the US and Taiwan alike facilitated calls for support of the island republic in accordance with values of democracy and self-determination, underscoring Sino-US cultural conflict and cross-Strait cultural differences.

Legalization of the TRA's Precedence over August 17 Communiqué

Some conservative Congress members favoured formal efforts "to strengthen US-Taiwan relations in ways sure to antagonize the PRC."⁹⁵¹ They dismissed Beijing's criticism that arms sales and other aspects of continued US support reduced Taipei's interest in negotiations on the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland.⁹⁵² They were interested in using Taiwan's democratisation as a wedge to "foster separatist tendencies among ethnic groups that Beijing regards as threatening to state security."⁹⁵³ In early 1993, the House Republicans proposed H.R.2333, calling for Clinton to send Cabinet-level officials to Taiwan and to show clear support for Taiwan.⁹⁵⁴ Section 706 of H.R.2333 asserted the TRA's legal primacy over the August 17 Communiqué. Section 706 (Applicability of TRA), known as the Murkowski Amendment, declared:

Section 3 [of the TRA] ... is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

*'(d) The provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section [on arms sales] shall supersede any provision of the August 17, 1982, Joint United States-China Communiqué related to these matters and regulations, directives, and policies based thereon.'*⁹⁵⁵

Despite Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott's letter of March 8, 1993 to Senator Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, urging the deletion of Section 706,⁹⁵⁶ H.R.2333 was still introduced by Representative Lee H. Hamilton to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 8. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously adopted the Amendment to TRA on July 15, 1993. Clinton signed H.R.2333 into PL103-236 on April 30, 1994. It stipulates that Section 3 of TRA

⁹⁵¹ Derry B. Dumbaugh, "CRS Issue Brief for Congress: IB98034: Taiwan: Recent Developments and US Policy Choices," (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 2001).

⁹⁵² Ibid.

⁹⁵³ Ibid.

⁹⁵⁴ Kan, "RL30341," note 62. See also *To Authorize Appropriations for the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, and Related Agencies, to Authorize Appropriations for Foreign Assistance Programs*, 103rd Congress, H.R.2333.

⁹⁵⁵ H.R.2333. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted Murkowski Amendment to TRA by a vote of 20-0 on July 15, 1993; see Lasater, *The Changing of the Guard*, 139-43.

⁹⁵⁶ Lasater, *The Changing of the Guard*, 143.

(on arms sales) takes precedence over the August 17 Communiqué.⁹⁵⁷

Achieving Taiwanese Domination of Taiwan

Domestic Politics: Ideological Partnership, Constitutional Reforms, and Constructuralism

The 1991 and 1992 elections brought Lee new allies in the power struggle. In hopes of maintaining political dominance, the KMT significantly increased the share of native faction leaders and tycoons in the central power apparatus in the early 1990s, marking the elevation of plutocracy from local to national level and transforming the KMT into a party of "state elites, local factions, and big business."⁹⁵⁸ After Lee consolidated power in the party and in the state, he became the paramount patron of the KMT's patron-client system.⁹⁵⁹ After Chiang Ching-kuo's death, many native KMT legislators showed their ambition to snatch power from the mainlander elite. When native factions and tycoons sensed Lee's identity agenda, they rallied to Lee against his opponents in the KMT.⁹⁶⁰ Lee also used internecine balancing to prevent rivals from uniting against him.⁹⁶¹ Accordingly, Premier Hau Po-tsun (郝柏村), former Chief of General Staff, a mainlander heavyweight in the non-main stream camp, and a strong Chinese nationalist who had repeatedly asserted that the ROC army would not fight for Taiwan independence, soon became a salient target for Lee and many native KMT legislators that supported Lee.⁹⁶² The DPP's victory in the 1992 year-end Legislative Yuan election gave Lee a decent chance to oust Hau. Plutocratic forces, native factions and the DPP united, with Lee's

⁹⁵⁷ Kan, "RL30341," note 62.

⁹⁵⁸ Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 232-33, 44-45; Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 88.

⁹⁵⁹ Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 248.

⁹⁶⁰ Ibid., 232; Huang Kuang-kuo 黃光國, *Mincui wangTai lun (Populism Will Destroy Taiwan)* (Taipei: Shangzhou wenhua, 1997), 17; Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 223. For example, Huang Chu-wen, one of the leaders of "Jisi zaocanhui" (see page 150 of this thesis), later became Lee's chief aid. Lee promoted Huang to Minister of Internal Affairs in the mid-1990s. After Lee retired and vigorously supported secessionism since 2000, Huang allied other like-minded associates to establish Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) in 2000 under Lee's encouragement. TSU is often seen as the most fundamentalist party for Taiwan independence. It respects Lee as its spiritual leader.

⁹⁶¹ Liu Xurui and Shi Guoqiang, *Li Denghui diguo mori (The End of Lee Teng-hui's Empire)*, 55-56.

⁹⁶² For the sharp differences between Lee and Hau, see Chen Ming-tong, *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)*, 207-15; Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 60, 79-80; Lu Keng and Ma Si-ping 陸鏗, 馬西屏, *Bienaoile, Denghui xiansheng: 12 wei guanjian renwu tan Li Denghui (Stop the Farce, Mr. Teng-hui: 12 Key Figures' Accounts on Lee Teng-hui)* (Taipei: Tianxia yuanjian, 2001), 101-23.

acquiescence, to attack and humiliate Hau, who was forced to resign on February 2, 1993.⁹⁶³ Lee won another vital battle on August 10, 1993, after some reformist KMT elites declared their intention to desert the corrupt, Lee-led KMT and established the China New Party.⁹⁶⁴ The departure of the mainlander elites from the ruling KMT symbolized the victory of Taiwanese structuralism; this could also be seen as an extended legacy of American aid.

In the summer of 1994, Lee launched his third constitutional reform, which considerably enhanced presidential powers and was thus likened to an "emperor system."⁹⁶⁵ In addition, the constitutional reform enabled the first elections to be held for the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung and for provincial governor in December 1994.⁹⁶⁶ In the 1994 year-end Taipei mayoral election, Lee engineered a "dump-save" to split the KMT supporters and trigger native unity, resulting in Chen Shui-bian's election as Mayor of Taipei in December 1994.⁹⁶⁷ Christopher Hughes argued that Lee used the constitutional reform to bring the DPP into government,⁹⁶⁸ and that Lee's strong presidential system appeared to have "achieved a wide degree of consensus with the DPP based on its function of steering Taiwan between the Charybdis represented by the dangers of ethnic conflict and the Scylla of mainland policy."⁹⁶⁹ In other words, Lee used a self-destructing ethnic conflict and provoking mainland policy in the democratisation process to deliver his political engineering of Taiwanization. As a result, the ethnic conflict and ideological struggle over national identity at home worsened. Michael Chang asserted that the most critical political issues in Taiwan were

⁹⁶³ Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 85-86; Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 82; Lee Teng-hui, *Yazhou de zhilue (A Strategy of Asia)*, 244-46; Liu Xurui and Shi Guoqiang, *Li Denghui diguo mori (The End of Lee Teng-hui's Empire)*, 29, 54-55.

⁹⁶⁴ Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 88-89, 101.

⁹⁶⁵ Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 87.

⁹⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁷ There were three main contenders in the election, including incumbent, native KMT Huang Ta-chou (黃大洲), popular mainlander New Party Chao Shao-kang (趙少康) and native DPP Chen Shui-bian. A few months before the election, a large fire claimed many lives and dealt a heavy blow to mayor Huang. It was reported that when he was to announce to drop out of the race at a press conference, Lee Teng-hui called Huang a few minutes before the press conference demanding him to stay as KMT runner. This divided the traditional supporters of the KMT. Lee's manoeuvre also alerted Taiwanese voters to dump unpopular native Huang and save native Chen. As a result, Chen scored 43.7%, Huang 25.9% and Chao 30.2%. Had Huang dropped, KMT supporters could have cast their votes for Chao, who might have won the election.

⁹⁶⁸ Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 87.

⁹⁶⁹ Ibid., 88.

the conflicts among ethnic groups and nationalisms.⁹⁷⁰ This fulfilled Scalapino's prediction in the 1959 Conlon Report that political crises would follow democratisation.⁹⁷¹

The newly established China New Party, often denigrated as the most conservative of mainlander elements, did not take a strong position on unification or openly advocate Chinese nationalism; within months of its establishment, it quietly dropped "China" from its title.⁹⁷² The depression of China identity, exemplified by the New Party's dropping of "China" from its title to maintain its political competitiveness, suggested the success of cultural assimilation by the dominant, native Taiwanese ethnic group. Lee further publicized "*shengming gongtongti*" at a press conference on May 20, 1993.⁹⁷³ This was to reaffirm his desire for political harmony and his vision of nation-building in the direction of Taiwanization. On March 31, 1994, Lee had a controversial interview with Japanese journalist Ryotaro Shiba. In the interview, published as "The Sorrows of Born Taiwanese," Lee nostalgically described his Japanese identity, accused the KMT of being an alien regime, echoed "popular sovereignty" in DPP independence plank, called the argument of Taiwan belonging to China a "strange dream," and expressed his hope for a regime that was dedicated to the welfare of the Taiwanese.⁹⁷⁴ Then, on December 30, 1994, Lee juxtaposed "popular sovereignty" with "*shengming gongtongti*" during a KMT conference. He explained that the former was to "stir up the consciousness of every citizen to be 'master of his own country'" while the latter was to "[integrate] the free will of the individual with the wealth and good of society."⁹⁷⁵ The two terms proved to be constructuralistic arguments for imposing a new vision of nation-building and breaking the island away from the mainland.

Breaking Taiwan away from China

⁹⁷⁰ Chang Mau-kuei, "Political Transformation and Ethnization of Politics in Taiwan".

⁹⁷¹ See page 74 of this thesis.

⁹⁷² Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 101; Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 84.

⁹⁷³ *Cunzai xiwang fazhan: Li Denghui xiansheng 'shengming gongtongti' zhiguo linian* (Existence, Hope, Development: Lee Teng-hui's Political Philosophy of 'Living Community'), ed., ^eds., 13-14, 16, 64.

⁹⁷⁴ UDN, 'Hui' hui yixiu, gaobie shier nian zhizheng/jianjie yu nianbiao/Li Denghui dashiji [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 7 2003]), available from

http://udn.com/SPECIAL_ISSUE/FOCUSNEWS/LEE/framed.htm.

⁹⁷⁵ Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 98.

Lee grew more vocal in simultaneously advancing Taiwan's economic viability and political independence in global society. Taipei had been pushing for re-entry into the UN since August 1993. To suppress the bid, Beijing issued the first *White Paper on Taiwan* on August 31, 1993. Moreover, there was ongoing economic integration across the Strait, consistent with the rise of the Greater China phenomenon, or Greater China Economic Circle.⁹⁷⁶ Lee was displeased to see the growing economic dependence of the island on the mainland. In February 1994, after leading a 140-member trade delegation to visit Philippine President Ramos, Indonesian President Suharto, and His Majesty King Bhumipol Adulyadej of Thailand, he announced the "Southwards Policy" in an attempt to decrease cross-Strait economic interdependence, which many secessionists believe would lead to Taiwan's dependence on Mainland China.⁹⁷⁷

The Alliance between Congress and Lee

Lee's Taiwanization smacked of anti-Chinese nationalism. Most US Congress members and conservatives sought a strategic alliance with him. In May 1994, Lee made a state visit to Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and South Africa. In Costa Rica, he elaborated upon "popular sovereignty" by arguing that Taiwan's sovereignty resided in the people of Taiwan.⁹⁷⁸ An episode provided Congress with an opportunity to support Lee. The State Department had allowed him to make a refuelling stop in Hawaii en route to Costa Rica but denied him a visa to enter the US.⁹⁷⁹ This enraged Senators Hank Brown and Frank H. Murkowski. On May 19, they invited Lee to the US and sent a sharply worded letter to Clinton; in the letter, they blasted the State Department's rude treatment of Lee and informed Clinton of their invitation to Lee.⁹⁸⁰ On the same day, Murkowski alluded to the MFN and human rights issues related to China and asserted that Taiwan and Hong Kong should be an integral part of US Asian policy.⁹⁸¹

⁹⁷⁶ Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 177-78.

⁹⁷⁷ Shih Cheng-feng, *Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism)*, 166.

⁹⁷⁸ UDN, 'Hui' hui yixiu, gaobie shier nian zhizheng/jianjie yu nianbiao/Li Denghui dashiji ([cited].

⁹⁷⁹ This happened when Lee visited Central America and Africa and stopped halfway in Hawaii. Lee deliberately refused to get off the plane in protest of being denied a visa to enter the US. This incident drew the attention of supporters of Taiwan in the Congress. See Lee Teng-hui, *Li Denghui zhizheng gaobai shilu (A Faithful Account of Lee Teng-hui's Rule)*, 264-65. See also Kan, "RL30341," note 62.

⁹⁸⁰ Frank H. Murkowski, *United States Policy toward China and Taiwan (Senate - May 19, 1994)* [internet] (1994 [cited Mar 12 2003]), available from <http://www.fas.org/news/taiwan/1994/s940519-taiwan.htm>.

⁹⁸¹ Ibid., ([cited].

According to leaked secret and top-secret documents, in June 1994 Lee instructed the Taiwan National Security Bureau to establish a secret US\$100 million fund to buy influence with foreign governments, institutions and individuals. Influential lobbyists, think tanks, researchers and politicians with access to Taiwan's lobbying fund thus endeavoured to win American public sympathy for Taiwan, to increase US arms sales to Taiwan, to support Taiwan's bid for re-entering the UN, and to integrate Taiwan into US-Japan theatre-missile-defence (TMD) system.⁹⁸² Many institutions such as Cassidy & Associates, the Pacific Forum, the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation had business relationships with this lobbying fund; three top Bush appointees in the State Department, including Carl Ford Jr. (Assistant Secretary of state for intelligence and research), James Kelly (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs), John Bolton (Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security), former Japanese prime minister Ryūtarō Hashimoto, and former Japanese Vice-Defence Minister Masahiro Akiyama were all alleged to have been implicated in this lobbying fund in the 1990s.⁹⁸³ Of the seven steering committees established by Lee's lobbying funds, the Mingde (明德) Committee exerted the most significant influence upon the subsequent relations between the US, Japan and Taiwan.⁹⁸⁴

The influence operations proved successful. To challenge the regulation that senior Taiwan officials transiting the US en route to other countries were not permitted to remain in the US for twenty-four hours, Senator Hank Brown, along with other Congressional supporters of Taiwan proposed two amendments between July and October to ensure that the Taiwan President could enter the US under certain

⁹⁸² David Corn, *Taiwangate? - Bush Appointees Linked to Secret Slush Funds Update* [internet] (The Nation, Apr 10, 2002 [cited Feb 9 2003]), available from <http://www.thenation.com/capitalgames/index.mhtml?bid=3&pid=42>; Hsieh Chung-liang 謝忠良, "Guoanju juemi wenjian puguang, Li Denghui feifa nuoyong 35 yi (Leaked National Security Agency Top-Secret Document Revealed Lee Teng-hui Illegally Misappropriated \$3.5 Billion New Taiwan Dollars)," *Yi Zhoukan (Next Magazine)*, Mar 21, No. 43 (2002), 10-23; John Pomfret, "Secret Taiwan Fund Sought Friends, Influence Abroad," *WP*, Apr 5 2002.

⁹⁸³ Corn, *Taiwangate?* ([cited]; Hsieh Chung-liang, "Guoanju juemi wenjian puguang, Li Denghui feifa nuoyong 35 yi (Leaked National Security Agency Top-Secret Document Revealed Lee Teng-hui Illegally Misappropriated \$3.5 Billion New Taiwan Dollars)," 17; Pomfret, "Secret Taiwan Fund Sought Friends, Influence Abroad."

⁹⁸⁴ Hsieh Chung-liang, "Guoanju juemi wenjian puguang, Li Denghui feifa nuoyong 35 yi (Leaked National Security Agency Top-Secret Document Revealed Lee Teng-hui Illegally Misappropriated \$3.5 Billion New Taiwan Dollars)," 16-19.

conditions.⁹⁸⁵ In the meantime, Murkowski and his associates pushed the Clinton administration to increase contacts with Taiwan. After conducting the "Taiwan Policy Review," the Clinton administration decided in September 1994 to allow the CCNAA to change its name to Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO), and to support Taiwan's membership in international organizations without requirement of statehood.⁹⁸⁶ However, in response to Taipei's second bid for readmission into the UN in 1994, the Clinton administration made it clear that the US did not support this bid.⁹⁸⁷

The Taiwan Policy Review resulted in a modest increase in contacts with Taiwan. Senator Murkowski introduced a resolution on September 28, calling for the US to welcome the Taiwan President and other high-level officials to the US; to allow unrestricted office calls by all Taiwan representatives to all US departments and agencies; to send cabinet-level officials to Taiwan on a regular basis; to support a proposal in the UN for formal observer status for Taiwan, a proposal for its full admission into international organizations, change the name of Taiwan's representative office in the US to the "Taipei Representative Office"; to approve defensive arms sales to Taiwan based solely on its self-defence needs; to upgrade the status of the AIT; to include a report by the Secretary of State to specified congressional committees on US relations with Taiwan; and to raise US concerns about the PRC's threat to forcefully reunify with Taiwan. The resolution was passed on October 5.⁹⁸⁸

1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crises

Lee's Visit to Cornell University and the Ensuing Crises

The Mingde project was established in 1994 with the budget interest of part of Lee's lobbying funds. It successfully established secret political, intelligence and security

⁹⁸⁵ *S.AMDT.2150*, 103rd Congress; *S.AMDT.2462*, 103rd Congress. The conditions set by the two amendments include: (i) Trade or business with Taiwan that will reduce the U.S.-Taiwan trade deficit; (ii) Prevention of nuclear proliferation; (iii) Threats to the national security of the United States; (iv) The protection of the global environment; (v) The protection of endangered species; or (iv) Regional humanitarian disasters. See also Holdridge, *Crossing the Divide*, 256; Kan, "RL30341," note 61.

⁹⁸⁶ Kan, "RL30341," note 61.

⁹⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁸ *A Resolution to Express the Sense of the Senate concerning U.S. Relations with Taiwan*, 103rd Congress, S.RES.270.

cooperation between Taiwan, America and Japan and foreshadowed the aggravation of cross-Strait relations.⁹⁸⁹ Financed by Lee's lobbying funds, lobbying firm Cassidy & Associates continued to drive for Lee's visit to the Cornell University.⁹⁹⁰ In March 1995, three concurrent resolutions were introduced to request that Clinton promptly declare that the US would welcome a private visit by Lee to Cornell University.⁹⁹¹ On April 6, a resolution to amend the TRA to permit visits to the US by the democratically elected leadership of Taiwan was introduced in the House.⁹⁹² Clinton yielded to Congressional pressure and announced his approval of Lee's visa application on May 22.⁹⁹³ Lee thus delivered his lecture "Always in my heart" at Cornell University on June 9. The lecture boasted of Taiwan's economic prosperity, political reforms and respect for human rights, and advocated "popular sovereignty" to highlight the differences across the Strait.⁹⁹⁴ He believed that PRC President Jiang Zemin (江澤民) had known about his visit; the deterioration of cross-Strait relations resulted from the rise of the hawkish forces in Beijing.⁹⁹⁵ The bottom line was that Beijing broke off high-level talks on cross-Strait relations and excoriated Lee for attempting to lead Taiwan toward independence. On July 21, 1995, the PLA conducted its first nuclear-capable M-9 short-range ballistic missile test-firings, and military exercises began during the following months.

China's military intimidation evoked different reactions from the Clinton administration, Congress, and Taiwan. Clinton maintained his faith in "one China." A few weeks after the PRC's first missile test-firings toward Taiwan, Secretary of State Warren

⁹⁸⁹ Hsieh Chung-liang, "Guoan juemi wenjian puguang, Li Denghui feifa nuoyong 35 yi (Leaked National Security Agency Top-Secret Document Revealed Lee Teng-hui Illegally Misappropriated \$3.5 Billion New Taiwan Dollars)," 14, 16.

⁹⁹⁰ Ibid., 22; Pomfret, "Secret Taiwan Fund Sought Friends, Influence Abroad."

⁹⁹¹ *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress regarding a Private Visit by President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States*, 104th Congress, S.CON.RES.9; *Expressing the Sense of the Congress regarding a Private Visit by President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States*, 104th Congress, H.CON.RES.53; H.CON.RES.33.

⁹⁹² *To Amend the Taiwan Relations Act to Permit Visits to the United States by the Elected Leaders of the People of Taiwan or Their Elected Representatives*, 104th Congress, H.R.1460. The resolution failed to become a section of the TRA.

⁹⁹³ Kan, "RL30341."

⁹⁹⁴ Lee disclosed the author of *Always in My Heart* to be Jason Hu, then-Director-General, Government Information Office. Refer to Lee Teng-hui, *Li Denghui zhizheng gaobai shilu (A Faithful Account of Lee Teng-hui's Rule)*, 266.

⁹⁹⁵ Lee Teng-hui, *Yazhou de zhilue (A Strategy of Asia)*, 239; Tai Kuo-hui, Wang Tso-jung, and Hsia Chen, *Aizeng Li Denghui (Love and Hatred of Lee Teng-hui)*, 157.

Christopher reportedly delivered a letter from Clinton to Jiang Zemin. In the letter, Clinton assured Jiang for the first time of his "Three Noes" policy: the US would oppose or resist Taiwan independence; not support "Two China" or "One China, One Taiwan;" and not support Taiwan's entry to the UN.⁹⁹⁶ In the meantime, US Congress members vehemently denounced China's belligerence while applauding Taiwan's democracy.⁹⁹⁷

Beijing's harsh rhetoric and military provocations caused mixed reactions on Taiwan. On the one hand, Beijing's behaviour advance political nationalism. Calling for domestic harmony and unity, Lee first proposed "New Taiwanese" in August 1995; he argued that anyone who identifies with the interests of Taiwan is a Taiwanese.⁹⁹⁸ This position was identical to the constructuralistic definition of Taiwanese that had been proposed by overseas secessionists.⁹⁹⁹ In December 1995, in response to internal and external crises, the DPP Central Standing Committee passed a resolution stating that Taiwan's government should include representatives of all political forces.¹⁰⁰⁰ DPP Chairman Shih Ming-teh said, "if we come to power, we will not need to, nor will we declare independence."¹⁰⁰¹ This position softened the 1991 "independence plank." He invited the New Party for "Grand Reconciliation" coffee on December 14, 1995. Shih and the New Party concluded a symbolic reconciliation between Taiwanese and mainlander ethnic groups so as to present a united front to the PRC. On the other hand, however, Beijing's intransigence strengthened Taiwanese ethno-nationalism. Shih did not win much credit within the DPP. In the climate of primitive and chauvinistic ethno-nationalism, many colleagues questioned Shih's integrity, ability and intelligence for associating with the New Party that had been impugned by the DPP as PRC "fellow travellers." Even Peng Ming-min, champion of constructuralistic nationalism, rejected the theme of Grand Reconciliation.¹⁰⁰²

Beijing's leadership seemed to disregard the alliance between Lee and many Congress

⁹⁹⁶ James Mann, *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Vintage, 2000), 330. Also refer to Kan, "RL30341."

⁹⁹⁷ See, for example, Shella Jackson-Lee, *Taiwan and World Recognition* [internet] (Library of Congress, 1995 [cited Mar 3 2003]), available from <http://thomas.loc.gov>.

⁹⁹⁸ Lee Teng-hui, *Taiwan de zhuzhang (An Argument of Taiwan)*, 77.

⁹⁹⁹ See page 95 of this thesis.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 103.

¹⁰⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 129.

¹⁰⁰² *Ibid.*, 130.

members and discount Taiwanese nationalist sentiment. Taiwan would hold its ninth presidential election on March 23, 1996. Hoping to influence the result, Beijing announced on March 5 that it would launch another round of successive missile test firings and military exercises beginning on March 8. On March 6, the Senate passed a resolution condemning the missile tests, called for Beijing to cease its bellicose actions, and requested that in accordance with the TRA the President should immediately consult with Congress on an appropriate US response to the tests and re-examine the nature and quantity of defence articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defence capability in light of the heightened threat.¹⁰⁰³ The administrative staff objected to the resolution. As scheduled, Beijing conducted missile test-firings in two impact areas near Taiwan on March 8, followed by military exercises.¹⁰⁰⁴

America's Bottom Line on Taiwan Security

The Clinton administration responded with the following comment on March 14, 1996:

However serious, the present situation does not constitute a threat to Taiwan of the magnitude contemplated by the drafters of the TRA. The PRC pressure against Taiwan to date does not add up to a "threat to the security or the social or economic system" of Taiwan. ... The United States recognizes the Government of the PRC as "the sole legal Government of China." The US acknowledges the Chinese position that "there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." In 1982, the US assured the PRC that it has no intention of pursuing a policy of "Two Chinas" or "One China, One Taiwan."¹⁰⁰⁵

Disgruntled Congress members strongly urged Clinton to re-examine the US-China relationship.¹⁰⁰⁶ In the meantime, Lee launched influence operations to pressure the Clinton administration into changing its attitude toward the PLA's military exercise. According to news reports, Lee sent his confidant Peng Run-tzu (彭榮次), president of Taiwan Transport Machinery Corporation and a member of the Mingde Committee, to urge Ryūtarō Hashimoto, Japanese prime minister and also a member of Mingde Committee, to ask the US to send troops to protect Taiwan. Ryūtarō Hashimoto's secret envoy told Clinton that Tokyo had only two options: Japan would either surrender to

¹⁰⁰³ *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress regarding Proposed Missile Tests by the People's Republic of China*, 104th Congress, S.CON.RES.43.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Lee Teng-hui, *Li Denghui zhizheng gaobai shilu (A Faithful Account of Lee Teng-hui's Rule)*, 268-76.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Kan, "RL30341."

¹⁰⁰⁶ Craig Thomas, *Taiwan Resolution (Senate - March 15, 1996)* (Library of Congress, 1996 [cited Mar 17 2003]), available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r104:1/temp/~r104Y13XHt>.

China or establish nuclear force instantly, if the US would not use its military force to protect Taiwan.¹⁰⁰⁷ Moreover, the House overwhelmingly passed a concurrent resolution on March 19 to request that the US "maintain a naval presence sufficient to keep open the sea lanes in and near the Taiwan Strait" and should "assist in defending them against invasion, missile attack, or blockade by the People's Republic of China."¹⁰⁰⁸ This gave the people on Taiwan an unrealistic prospect of guaranteed American rescue in case of war.¹⁰⁰⁹ The Senate unanimously passed the concurrent resolution on March 21.

Clinton finally bowed to the domestic and allies' pressure. Citing the security clause of the TRA, Section 2(b) of which requires the US consider with "grave concern" any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan's future, Clinton sent two carrier battle groups to defuse the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.¹⁰¹⁰ This was the bottom line of US policy on Taiwan. In peacetime, the US deliberately downgraded the strategic significance of Taiwan to smooth its association with the PRC. In case of imminent war, the US would neutralize the Taiwan Strait, even at the cost of war with the PRC, to ensure Taiwan's security. This had been the case in the Cold War era and in 1996 under the terms of the TRA. This will be particularly true in future US-PRC strategic competition.

Lee Teng-hui's Re-election

On March 20, 1996, Lee claimed 54% of the vote in a field of four candidates in Taiwan's first direct presidential election, a sign of the completion of democratisation.¹⁰¹¹ Lee's re-election reinforced his alliance with many Taiwanization-minded Congress

¹⁰⁰⁷ Hsieh Chung-liang, "Guoanju juemi wenjian puguang, Li Denghui feifa nuoyong 35 yi (Leaked National Security Agency Top-Secret Document Revealed Lee Teng-hui Illegally Misappropriated \$3.5 Billion New Taiwan Dollars)," 18-19.

¹⁰⁰⁸ *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of Congress regarding Missile Tests and Military Exercises by the People's Republic of China*, 104th Congress, H.CON.RES.148.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Liu Xurui and Shi Guoqiang, *Li Denghui diguo mori (The End of Lee Teng-hui's Empire)*, 57.

¹⁰¹⁰ Kan, "RL30341." See also *Taiwan Relations Act*; Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 134-35.

¹⁰¹¹ Samuel Huntington argues that the consolidation of a democratic regime is the last stage of democratisation; see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 35. There has been much discussion over the process of democratic consolidation in Taiwan; for example, see Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 81. Most scholars see March 1996 election as the completion of the democratisation of Taiwan; see Tien Hung-mao and Cheng Tun-jen 田宏茂, 鄭敦仁, "Crafting Democratic Institutions," in *Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China*, ed. Steve Tsang and Tien Hung-mao (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 23; Tsang, "Transforming a Party State into a Democracy," 15.

members and conservatives. The election drew an ideological, political and strategic line of demarcation between democratic Taiwan and totalitarian China.¹⁰¹² Many US Congress members paid tribute to Lee every year on Inauguration Day, his anniversary in office, National Day and in their meetings with Lee. In return, Lee repeatedly stressed to US Congress members that Taiwan was a symbol of American value system and idealism, freedom and democracy, that Taiwan represented significant geo-strategic value, that the PRC was bellicose and inflexible and that China was divided. These ceremonial exchanges reaffirmed Sino-US "cultural conflict" and cross-Strait "cultural differences." The 1996 direct presidential election also symbolized the alternative incarnation of "self-determination." Senator Murkowski urged his colleagues in the Senate to give "our continued support as he now moves forward to map out Taiwan's destiny." He joined "many friends in Taiwan in celebrating President Lee's triumph as Taiwan marks a milestone in civilization's march down the road of self-determination."¹⁰¹³ Moreover, Taiwan's democratisation carried a far more important message. As Representative Dan Burton said, "Democracy is not a system of government unimportant to Asians."¹⁰¹⁴ It is a common thought of American politicians that Taiwan has a vital role to play in the peaceful evolution of China.

As cross-Strait relations worsened, Taiwan's economic viability became a prime concern. On July 26, 1996, a resolution was introduced in the House to urge Taiwan's entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a separate customs territory without making it contingent upon the previous or simultaneous entry of the PRC.¹⁰¹⁵ Many conservatives in Washington shared Lee's views that the "Greater China" was more a trap than an attraction. Taiwan's admission to the WTO became another point of contention between the US and China.

¹⁰¹² House Representative Tom Lantos's remark was most typical. See Tom Lantos, *Congratulations to President Lee Teng-hui and the People of Taiwan on the First Democratic Election - March 25, 1996* [internet] (Library of Congress, 1996 [cited Mar 4 2003]), available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r104:1./temp/~r104gN5mWT>.

¹⁰¹³ Frank Murkowski, *National Endowment for Democracy Tribute to President Lee Teng-hui* [internet] (Library of Congress, 1996 [cited Mar 4 2003]), available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r104:1./temp/~r104OTkT8m>.

¹⁰¹⁴ Dan Burton, *Congratulations Republic of China* [internet] (Library of Congress, 1996 [cited Mar 4 2003]), available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r104:1./temp/~r104J7pNSa>.

¹⁰¹⁵ *Expressing the Sense of the House of Representatives That Taiwan Should Be Admitted to the World Trade Organization without Making Such Admission Conditional on the Previous or Simultaneous Admission of the People's Republic of China to the WTO*, 104th Congress, H.RES.490.

DPP's Discourse after 1996

After the missile crisis and presidential election in March, the DPP moderated its rhetoric and took a new emphasis of substantive independence. In the "Manifesto for the Taiwan Independence Movement in a New Era" published in May, some secessionism activists expressed a preference for substantive over formal independence. The document declared: "Taiwan independence does not necessarily require changing the name of the country to 'Taiwan.' The national name, flag and anthem are not important goals of the Taiwan independence movement." This caused some DPP hardliners to announce in August that they would leave the party and establish the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP).¹⁰¹⁶

Congressmen-Lee Alliance vs. Clinton's "One China"

Entrenched Independence Stance and Strategic Alliance

On April 17, 1996, Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō (橋本龍太郎) signed "Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century," reaffirming American determination to consolidate its hegemonic position in East Asia.¹⁰¹⁷ The Clinton administration seemed to follow "one China" in principle more than in policy. In a speech on "American Interests and the US-China Relationship" on May 17, Secretary of State Christopher stated that "Taiwan has prospered under the 'one China' policy," reminded Taiwan to pursue an expanded international role "in a way that is consistent with a 'one China' policy," and strongly urged "both sides to resume the cross-Straits dialogue that was interrupted last summer."¹⁰¹⁸ On June 28, 1996, the US and Japan commenced reviewing the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. This inevitably created worry in Beijing. In July, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake travelled to China to pursue the "strategic dialogue." Lake scheduled a meeting with Wang Daohan (汪道涵), chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan

¹⁰¹⁶ Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 129.

¹⁰¹⁷ For the contents of the Joint Declaration, refer to Glenn D. Hook et al., *Japan's International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2001), 476.

¹⁰¹⁸ Kan, "RL30341."

Strait (ARATS). Although the arrangement was cancelled after Lake's arrival in China, it marked a new proactive US stance on cross-Strait relations.¹⁰¹⁹

Conservative American politicians and strategists continued to advance their position on Taiwan. After the European Parliament adopted a bill supporting Taiwan's participation in the community of nations, including the UN, on July 24, the House passed a concurrent resolution to endorse the European Parliament's initiative.¹⁰²⁰ On October 1, 1996, Representative David Funderburk warned China that it "must learn to bend, to change its old mindset about Taiwan being a province. Taiwan has never been under People's Republic of China's jurisdiction."¹⁰²¹ Meanwhile, Lee entrenched his independence stance. In September, Lee broached his "no haste, be patient" policy at a National Unification Council meeting. The policy placed restrictions on investment more than US\$50 million, investments in high technology industries, and investment in infrastructure.¹⁰²² Despite his pointed reference to restrictions on Taiwanese investment in but not on trade with the mainland, the attempt to resist economic integration was evident.¹⁰²³

In December, Lee convened a National Development Conference, another unconventional approach to circumvent the resistance to independence from residual KMT loyalists in the state and party apparatus. Lee, his supporters in the KMT, and the DPP together claimed that the government of Taiwan province, the biggest bureaucratic organisation in the ROC political structure, should be "streamlined" to promote administrative efficiency. Lee actually intended to eliminate Taiwan "province" in order to refute the PRC's argument that Taiwan was a renegade "province" of China.¹⁰²⁴ According to the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), a fundamentalist party that revered Lee as its spiritual leader, removing the "province" system was a follow-up of the 1991 and 1992 constitutional reforms to break Taiwan away from China and resolve the issue

¹⁰¹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁰ *Endorsing the Adoption by the European Parliament of a Resolution Supporting the Republic of China on Taiwan's Efforts at Joining the Community of Nations*, 104th Congress, H.CON.RES.212.

¹⁰²¹ David Funderburk, *A Tribute to President Lee and Taiwan* [internet] (Library of Congress, 1996 [cited Mar 4 2003]), available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r104:1./temp/~r104jC4bLO>.

¹⁰²² Available online at <http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/index1-e.htm>.

¹⁰²³ Shih Cheng-feng, *Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism)*, 219.

¹⁰²⁴ Lee Teng-hui, *Yazhou de zhilue (A Strategy of Asia)*, 255.

of sovereignty altogether.¹⁰²⁵ This conclusion was realized in Lee's fourth constitutional reform in July 1997. Removing the province system not only reinforced the independence stance, but also vitiated the power base of mainlander group by pushing aside James Soong, the incumbent Governor of Taiwan province.¹⁰²⁶

Very few members of the US Congress considered this strategic alliance with Lee unwise. On January 30, 1997, Senator Dianne Feinstein requested that *Congressional Record* publish a speech that she had made to the Asia Society, "China: The Future." In the speech, she warned, "Taiwan must understand that its efforts to assert itself internationally cannot be a guise for moving towards independence" and "containment [of China] is not in the interest of the United States."¹⁰²⁷ However, Congressional support for this strategic alliance was overwhelming. Article 5 of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation under revision stipulated bilateral "cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan." Although Japan tended to interpret the scope of activities as "situational," the possibility of US-Japan cooperation in any conflict over Taiwan was inevitably called into question and was criticized vehemently by the PRC.¹⁰²⁸ Especially, Japanese political leaders such as Kajiyama Seiroku (Japanese Liberal Democratic Party Cabinet Secretary), and Ozawa Ichirō (Liberal Party leader) had stated that the Taiwan Strait did indeed fall within the scope of US-Japan bilateral cooperation.¹⁰²⁹ At the height of the debate over the term "situational," on March 30, 1997 the *New York Times* reported that Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich had made it absolutely clear in Shanghai how the US would respond to PRC's use of force against Taiwan. He told Chinese top leaders that if the PRC attacked Taiwan, "We will defend Taiwan. Period."¹⁰³⁰ Therefore, the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation reinforced the faith of secessionist Taiwanese. They were convinced that the US and Japan would jointly defend Taiwan in case of war. Lee asserted that Japanese Prime

¹⁰²⁵ TSU, *A-hui bo jiaoshi: ni buneng bu zhidao de Li Denghui (Uncle Hui Classroom: Something You Should Know about Lee Teng-hui)* [internet] (Taiwan Solidarity Union, 2001 [cited Feb 9 2003]), available from <http://www.tsu.org.tw/tsa-main.html>.

¹⁰²⁶ Tai Kuo-hui, Wang Tso-jung, and Hsia Chen, *Aizeng Li Denghui (Love and Hatred of Lee Teng-hui)*, 70, 72, 167-68, 235-36.

¹⁰²⁷ Dianne Feinstein, *China: The Future* [internet] (Library of Congress, 1997 [cited Mar 7 2003]), available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r105:1/temp/~r105K6xvDp>.

¹⁰²⁸ Hook et al., *Japan's International Relations*, 141.

¹⁰²⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁰ Seth Faison, "Gingrich Warns China That U.S. Would Step In to Defend Taiwan," *NYT*, Mar 31 1997, 1.

Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō indicated on April 9 that the 1997 Guidelines would apply to areas including Taiwan and the Spratly Islands.¹⁰³¹

After Gingrich led a Congressional delegation to Asia, House Representative Alcee L. Hastings relayed on May 6, 1997 to his colleagues Lee's remarks stressing Taiwan as symbol of American values and idealism, freedom and democracy, the geographic significance of Taiwan and the fact of a divided China.¹⁰³² One month after Hong Kong's reversion to China on July 1, 1997, the Senate referred to the Committee of Foreign Relations a resolution that stated:

(1) The transfer of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China does not alter the current and future status of Taiwan;

(2) The future of Taiwan should be determined by peaceful means through a democratic process in accordance with the principle of self-determination, as outlined in the Charter of the United Nations;

(3) The United States should assist in the defence of Taiwan in case of threats or military attack by the People's Republic of China against Taiwan.¹⁰³³

The sponsor of the resolution, Senator Torricelli, claimed, "No treaties exist which determine the future status of Taiwan, and Taiwan has maintained a *de facto* independence since 1949. The formula of 'one country, two systems' ... has no relevance to Taiwan."¹⁰³⁴ This resolution marked a third-party's rejection of Beijing's "one country, two systems." Noticeably, it amounted to a quasi-formal revival of the "undetermined status of Taiwan" which had been suspended since the Nixon administration.

On September 23, 1997, the US and Japan finally adopted the revised Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation. The revised Guidelines reinforced Taiwan's independence stance and the strategic alliance between Taiwanization-minded Congress

¹⁰³¹ Lee Teng-hui, *Li Denghui zhizheng gaobai shilu* (A Faithful Account of Lee Teng-hui's Rule), 384. This piece of data exists in the appendix of the book. On account of the sensitivity of the issue, this entry has never been publicly discussed. Considering the clandestine operations of the Mingde committee, it was very likely that Lee Teng-hui and Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō reached some kind of secret agreement.

¹⁰³² Feinstein, *China: The Future* ([cited]).

¹⁰³³ *A Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate That the Transfer of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China Not Alter the Current or Future Status of Taiwan as a Free and Democratic Country*, 105th Congress, S.RES.114.

¹⁰³⁴ Ibid.

members and Lee.

The "Three Noes" Policy in 1997, 98 Summit Talks

As more US Congress members became more vocal in their support of Taiwan, the Clinton administration deepened its commitment to "one China." In the Joint US-China Statement of 1997 Clinton-Jiang Summit in Washington, despite failing to satisfy the PRC's desire to have a "fourth Communiqué," the Clinton administration reiterated that "it adheres to its 'one China' policy and the principles set forth in the three US-China joint Communiqués" with no reference to the TRA at all.¹⁰³⁵ At the press conference, Clinton expressed the hope that the PRC and Taiwan would resume a constructive cross-Straits dialogue and expand cross-Straits exchanges. "Ultimately, the relationship between the PRC and Taiwan is for the Chinese themselves to determine – peacefully." He added that "the most important thing the US can do to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the differences is to adhere strictly to the one China policy" and "the Chinese people know how to resolve this [differences] when the time is right, and we just have to keep saying we hope the time will be right as soon as possible. Sooner is better than later."¹⁰³⁶ James Mann noted in his *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton*:

At this press conference with Jiang Zemin, Clinton seemed to add one potentially important new element to the American position on Taiwan ... Before that time, no American president had sought to put such time pressure on the need for reunification of China and Taiwan."¹⁰³⁷

However, White House officials later insisted that Clinton's remark was extemporaneous and was not intended to change US policy. On October 31, the State Department for the first time made public the "Three Noes" policy:

We certainly made clear that we have a one-China policy; that we don't support a one-China, one-Taiwan policy. We don't support a two-China policy. We don't support Taiwan independence, and we don't support Taiwanese membership in organizations that require you to be a member state. We certainly made that very clear to the Chinese.¹⁰³⁸

The wording of "oppose or resist efforts by Taiwan to gain independence" in the

¹⁰³⁵ Kan, "RL30341." For the details regarding the 1997 Summit, see Mann, *About Face*, 355-56.

¹⁰³⁶ Kan, "RL30341."

¹⁰³⁷ Mann, *About Face*, 415, note 52.

¹⁰³⁸ Kan, "RL30341."

1995-Three Noes had been changed into a more neutral “don’t support Taiwan independence.”

TRA vs. Clinton’s “Three Noes”

Alarmed by the Clinton administration’s pronounced leaning toward Beijing, the Lee camp in Taipei and the conservative camp in Washington reinforced each other in defying Clinton’s commitment to Beijing. On November 6, 1997, the House passed the “United States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence Cooperation Act.” The Act reaffirmed the American commitment to the security of Taiwan, peaceful resolution of Taiwan issue, Taiwan’s strategic significance, PLA’s missile threat and the “undetermined status of Taiwan.” Section 3 (relating to establishment and operation of a theatre ballistic missile defence system in the Asia-Pacific region) mandated:

Not later than July 1, 1998, the Secretary of Defence shall submit to the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report containing ... a description of any existing United States missile defence system that could be transferred to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act in order to allow Taiwan to provide for its self-defence against limited ballistic missile attacks.¹⁰³⁹

Section 4, on the transfer of ballistic missile defence systems to Taiwan, stated:

It is the sense of the Congress that the President, if requested by the Government of Taiwan and in accordance with the results of the study under section 3, should transfer to the Government of Taiwan appropriate defence articles or defence services ... for the purpose of establishing and operating a local-area ballistic missile defence system to protect Taiwan ...¹⁰⁴⁰

The resolution was passed with a remarkable margin of 245-175. The tug of war between the US legislative and executive branches continued. Representative Sherrod Brown introduced a bill on February 12, 1998 to request the US government’s support for Taiwan’s representation in the World Health Organization (WHO). Forty-five colleagues agreed to co-sponsor.¹⁰⁴¹ On June 27, 1998, at the 1998 Clinton-Jiang Summit in Beijing, Clinton reaffirmed “one China” policy to Jiang and urged the pursuit

¹⁰³⁹ This act was first introduced on September 3, 1997. *To Implement the Provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act concerning the Stability and Security of Taiwan and United States Cooperation with Taiwan on the Development and Acquisition of Defensive Military Articles (or United States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act)*, 105th Congress, H.R.2386.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴¹ *Relating to Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization*, 105th Congress, H.CON.RES.219.

of cross-Strait discussions.¹⁰⁴² On June 30, Clinton informally reiterated his "Three Noes" policy:

I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don't support independence for Taiwan, or Two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement. So I think we have a consistent policy. Our only policy has been that we think it has to be done peacefully. That is what our law says, and we have encouraged the cross-Strait dialogue.¹⁰⁴³

In response to Clinton's "Three Noes" policy, concerned members in both the Senate and the House overwhelmingly passed resolutions (92-0 in the Senate on July 10 and 390-1 in the House on July 2), reaffirming the US commitment to Taiwan in accordance with the TRA.¹⁰⁴⁴ On July 22, 58 Representatives sponsored a resolution to reconsider the issue of Taiwan's entry to the WHO.¹⁰⁴⁵ Representative Gerald B. H. Solomon repeated the WHO issue on October 7 to mitigate Taipei's difficulty resulting from Clinton's "Three Noes" policy; the House unanimously passed the concurrent resolution on October 10.¹⁰⁴⁶

Jigsaw Puzzles in the Taiwan Independence Roadmap

Lee's Neo-Taiwanese-ism for Cultural Assimilation

On July 22, 1998, Lee delivered a speech on the future of Taiwan to the National Unification Council. Explicitly, he reaffirmed the intention for peaceful reunification. However, he reiterated "one divided China," rejected "one country, two systems," stressed Taiwan's geo-strategic importance, expressed hope for admission to international organization, and criticized Clinton's "Three Noes" policy. Representative Benjamin A. Gilman urged his colleagues on August 6 to read this "provoking and insightful" speech and asked for its inclusion in the *Congressional Record*.¹⁰⁴⁷ Representative Robert Smith repeated Lee's message to his colleagues on September

¹⁰⁴² Kan, "RL30341."

¹⁰⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴⁴ *Affirming the United States Commitment to Taiwan*, 105th Congress, H.CON.RES.301; *A Concurrent Resolution Affirming U.S. Commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act*, 105th Congress, S.CON.RES.107.

¹⁰⁴⁵ H.J.RES.126.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Ibid., H.CON.RES.334.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Benjamin A. Gilman, *The Future of Taiwan* [internet] (Library of Congress, 1998 [cited Mar 8 2003]), available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r105:1./temp/~r105t2fPdx:e0>.

24.¹⁰⁴⁸ On October 9, 1998, Representative Gerald Solomon not only repeated these similar points in the Congress but also called for his colleagues to support Lee's nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize.¹⁰⁴⁹

As some Congress members hurried to nominate Lee for the Nobel Peace Prize, he was in fact sailing the state between self-destructive ethnic conflicts at home and sensitive mainland policy across the Strait. In the past, Lee had used divisive structuralism and cooperated with the DPP's ethno-nationalism in an attempt to remove the control of mainlander elites on the one hand; on the other hand, he proposed constructuralistic arguments such as "*shengming gongtongti*" and "popular sovereignty" to remedy ethnic conflict and ideological cleavage. To deal with the escalation of ideological and ethnic conflicts that were created by the power struggle at home, on October 24, 1998, the eve of Taiwan Retrocession Day, Lee formally proposed his neo-Taiwanese-ism. This called for the four main ethnic groups to disregard the demarcation between unification and independence camps in the interest of national unity, "regardless of the time of their arrival, their mother tongue or their geographical origins."¹⁰⁵⁰ Neo-Taiwanese-ism is inherently antagonistic to Chinese nationalism; Lee hoped the new, consolidated Taiwanese would fight against the rival power China.¹⁰⁵¹ Following "*shengming gongtongti*" and "popular sovereignty," neo-Taiwanese-ism was Lee's third constructuralistic argument to inspire the diversified ethnic groups for a new nation and to impose a new vision of nation-building. It was the culmination of Lee's agenda. To live up to his duty as KMT chairman, Lee bestowed upon mainlander KMT candidate Ma Ying-Jeou (馬英九) the title of "new Taiwanese" to help him in the 1998 year-end campaign for Mayor of Taipei against incumbent Chen Shui-bian.¹⁰⁵² After Ma won the election, he established the "New Taiwanese Foundation."

¹⁰⁴⁸ Robert Smith, *Commending President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan* [internet] (Library of Congress, 1998 [cited Mar 4 2003]), available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r105:1./temp/~r105ZZuqhf>.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Gerald B. H. Solomon, *President Lee Teng-hui and the Nobel Prize* [internet] (Library of Congress, 1998 [cited Mar 7 2003]), available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r105:1./temp/~r105Y54fCm>.

¹⁰⁵⁰ OPROC, *President Lee Addresses National Assembly* [news release] (1998 [cited Mar 24 2003]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4>. See also Shih Cheng-feng, "Taiwan yishi de tansuo (An Exploration of Taiwanese Consciousness)," 91. Lee Teng-hui, *Taiwan de zhuzhang (An Argument of Taiwan)*, 262-65.

¹⁰⁵¹ Huang Chun-chieh, "Lun 'Taiwan yishi' de fazhan ji qi tezhi (The Development and Characteristics of Taiwanese Consciousness)," 23-24. See also Kuo Chao-lieh, "Taiwan yishi de lishi guiji (The Historical Track of Taiwanese Consciousness)," 56-57.

¹⁰⁵² Lee Teng-hui, *Taiwan de zhuzhang (An Argument of Taiwan)*, 262-63.

Synergy in the China-US-Taiwan Power Struggle

Lee's allies in Congress continued to advance Taiwan's defence capability, economic viability and political independence in global society. More resolutions were passed to support Taiwan's participation in international organizations such as the WHO, to promote the TRA, and to address the issue of military balance across the Strait. The Department of Defence completed its mandated report of "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait" on February 1, 1999.¹⁰⁵³ The report intensified controversy on whether the US should provide ballistic missile defence systems to Taiwan despite vehement criticism from Beijing. Representative Dana Rohrabacher introduced a resolution on March 11, 1999 to express grave Congressional concerns over the PRC's growing arsenal of nuclear and conventionally armed ballistic missiles, the movement of those missiles into a closer geographic proximity to Taiwan, and the effect that military build-up might have on stability in the Taiwan Strait.¹⁰⁵⁴ On March 24, 1999, Senators Helms and Torricelli jointly introduced S.693, the "Taiwan Security Enhancement Act" (TSEA). Senator Helms questioned Clinton's "Three Noes" policy, elaborated that TSEA sought to suppress 1982 August 17 Communiqué, promoted arms sales to Taiwan, required the President to make annual report on Taiwan's defence requests, and redressed Taiwan's readiness deficiencies resulting from its isolation in the past two decades by enhancing bilateral military exchanges, joint training, and establishing direct communication.¹⁰⁵⁵

To allay the pressure from the Congress, some prominent officials in the Clinton administration made a laundry list of suggestions for resumption of cross-Strait talks since January 1998. On March 24, Assistant Secretary of State Stan Roth proposed the "interim agreement" across the Strait.¹⁰⁵⁶ In response to Senator Jesse Helms' questions about Clinton's "Three Noes" policy, Stan Roth cited the precedents: a 1971 statement by Kissinger, a 1972 statement by Nixon, a 1979 statement by Deputy Secretary of State

¹⁰⁵³ DoD, "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait," (1999).

¹⁰⁵⁴ *Concerning the Taiwan Relations Act*, 106th Congress, H.CON.RES.53.

¹⁰⁵⁵ *A Bill to Assist in the Enhancement of the Security of Taiwan*, 106th Congress, S. 693; Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams*, 333.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Kan, "RL30341," note 17.

Warren Christopher, and President Reagan's 1982 Communiqué.¹⁰⁵⁷ In the meantime, many secessionist Taiwanese joined the melee in Washington DC. In April 1999, DPP Legislator Tsai Tung-jung led a delegation from Taiwan to lobby for TSEA on Capitol Hill. He and some of the delegates were scheduled to meet Carl Ford, Asia specialist in the Pentagon.¹⁰⁵⁸ In addition, supporters of the secessionist Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) and the Taiwan independence movement campaigned in the *Washington Post* for the passage of the TSEA.¹⁰⁵⁹ Accordingly, the House introduced another version of the TSEA, H.R.1838, on May 18, 1999.¹⁰⁶⁰

Military balance across the Strait became the focus of attention. Senator Trent Lott introduced an amendment on May 26 to direct the Secretary of Defence to submit to the Congress a report by February 1 of each year, in both classified and unclassified form, detailing the security situation in the Taiwan Strait.¹⁰⁶¹ He introduced S.AMDT.576, on June 8 to direct the Office of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defence and the United States Pacific Command to address all gaps in military balance, and direct the US National Defence University and other defence research centres to perform further research and analysis.¹⁰⁶² Both amendments became parts of two separate laws in October 1999.¹⁰⁶³

The events since the early 1990s illustrate a cyclic pattern of interaction between the Clinton administration, Taiwanization-minded Congress members and conservatives, Lee Teng-hui, and the Beijing leadership. When Clinton strengthened his "one China" commitment or Beijing pressed its goals on Taiwan, Lee responded by insisting upon "a divided China," rejection of "one country, two systems" and the ideological, political and strategic demarcation of democratisation. Taiwanization-minded Congress members and conservatives criticized Clinton's commitment to China, decried Beijing's military build-up and intimidation, echoed Lee's arguments and aspirations, emphasized the

¹⁰⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Nadia Tsao, "Lobbying Firm Draws Fire," *TT*, Jul 10 2000, 3.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶⁰ *To Assist in the Enhancement of the Security of Taiwan*, 106th Congress, H.R.1838. The TSEA of the House is slightly different from the TSEA of the Senate.

¹⁰⁶¹ S.AMDT.394, 106th Congress.

¹⁰⁶² S.AMDT.576, 106th Congress.

¹⁰⁶³ S.AMDT.394 became part of PL106-65 on October 5; S.AMDT.576 part of PL106-79 on October 25, 1999.

cross-Strait differences and promised more effective assistance and commitment to the security of Taiwan. Congressional support fuelled Lee's assertion about his agenda on identity and cross-Strait relations and assured the progress of Taiwanization, which in turn antagonized Beijing leaders, who then resorted to rhetorical and military intimidation against Taiwan and rushed the Clinton administration for more commitment to "one China."¹⁰⁶⁴ Thus the cycle repeated itself. Any move could trigger a new cycle to strengthen the "one China" commitment but at the same time reinforce the Congress-Lee alliance. This demonstrates a synergy in the trilateral power struggle between China, America and Taiwan. This explains why the US simultaneously advanced relations with China and Taiwan against competing needs across the Strait in the 1990s.

Discourses on Taiwan's Future toward the End of the 20th Century

DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future"

The DPP had been gaining ground in local elections since its foundation. The DPP's advance in popularity from the early 1990s on was due in large part to the extremely poor governance of the KMT, with rising corruption and a deterioration in law and order. In addition, Lee's assistance and straightforward Congressional support helped its advance. In the county magistrate elections on November 29, 1997, the DPP claimed 43% of the votes and won twelve seats, administering 71.59% of the population on Taiwan.¹⁰⁶⁵ Lee's Taiwanization originated as a local triumph. This victory brought euphoria for independence activists. However, some moderates in the DPP took the rising economic integration across the Strait into consideration. In February 1998, the DPP held a symposium on China policy. Hsu Hsin-liang proposed "*dadan xijin*" (大膽西進, Go West Boldly), advocating deeper economic engagement with the PRC. He argued that the best way to avoid forcible "annexation" was to integrate the mainland Chinese and Taiwanese economies and embed Taiwan in international economic institutions. *Formosa* faction leaders believed that direct postal, trade, and

¹⁰⁶⁴ A crisis before the 1997 Clinton-Jiang Summit (Washington) is a good example: two weeks before the summit, Beijing officials pressed determinedly for Clinton's "Three Noes" policy in black and white in the joint statement to be issue in the summit. Mann, *About Face*, 355-56.

¹⁰⁶⁵ DPP, *Minjindang dashi nianbiao* (A Chronology of Relevant Events of the Democratic Progressive Party) ([cited]).

transportation links with the mainland would deter PRC aggression.¹⁰⁶⁶ His close ally Shih Ming-teh suggested that Taiwan consider a commonwealth arrangement with the mainland.¹⁰⁶⁷ But the *New Tide* faction strongly opposed moderation on the cause of independence.¹⁰⁶⁸

DPP's mainstream believed that maintaining *status quo* or *de facto* independence instead of declaring *de jure* independence best served the electoral requirement of Taiwan. To allay people's fear of reckless declaration of independence and to launch the campaign for the presidency in 2000, the DPP National Party Congress reached a compromise and on May 8, 1999 passed the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future":

DPP leaders have consistently reiterated that the party will not provoke China by declaring independence or otherwise, nor will the DPP call for a referendum on the issue as long as the current political environment's *status quo* remain unchanged. ... Therefore, unless Taiwan's independent sovereignty is immediately threatened, the DPP will not initiate calls to hold a referendum on Taiwan independence, even when the party comes to power.¹⁰⁶⁹

This resolution formally recognized *de facto* independence as established independence. It was a compromise between hardliners and moderates. Shortly thereafter, some heavyweight moderates such as Hsu Hsin-liang and Shih Ming-teh were forced to resign from the DPP. The DPP became increasingly fundamental in its quest for independence.

Lee's "Special State-to-State Relationship"

As Lee's term of office drew to a close, he became more aggressive in his secessionist agenda. On July 9, 1999, during an interview by Deutsche Welle, he argued:

Since the PRC's establishment, the Chinese communists have never ruled Taiwan, Penghu, Jin-men, and Ma-zu, which have been under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China. ... Since our constitutional reform in 1991, we have designated cross-Strait ties as nation-to-nation, or at least as special state-to-state ties, rather than internal ties within "one China" between a legitimate government and a rebellion group, or between central and local governments.¹⁰⁷⁰

Moreover, there were well-grounded allegations that Lee attempted to aggrandize the

¹⁰⁶⁶ Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 130.

¹⁰⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 131-32.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Kan, "RL30341."; Lee Teng-hui, *Li Denghui zhizheng gaobai shilu (A Faithful Account of Lee Teng-hui's Rule)*, 230.

power of the National Assembly and extend the Assembly members' terms of office in order to put his "special state-to-state relationship" into the constitution; he even attempted to extend his own tenure to ensure "special state-to-state relationship" would be part of the next constitutional reform.¹⁰⁷¹ However, under questioning from AIT Director Darryl Norman Johnson about whether the argument of "special state-to-state relationship" had deviated from the ROC constitution, Lee still vigorously defended his goal for unification with Mainland China.¹⁰⁷² On July 22, Lee took great pains to assure Richard Bush, AIT/Washington Director, that he adamantly opposed Taiwan's independence but approved of peaceful unification.¹⁰⁷³

Clinton's "Three Pillars" Policy

Lee's "special state-to-state relationship" immediately escalated the tensions across the Strait and intensified the tug of war between the US executive and legislative branches. Clinton issued his "Three Pillars" policy on July 21, 1999. On the question of whether the US was obligated to defend Taiwan militarily if it abandoned the one China policy and would continue to provide military aid if Taiwan pursued separatism, he stated:

Well, let me say first of all, a lot of those questions are governed by the Taiwan Relations Act, which we intend to honor. Our policy is clear: We favor the one China policy; we favor the cross-Strait dialogues. The understanding we have had all along with both China and Taiwan is that the differences between them would be resolved peacefully.¹⁰⁷⁴

US Conservatives' Urge to End the "Ambiguity Strategy"

On that day, Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said that Lee's statement had "created an opportunity to break free from the anachronistic, Beijing-inspired one-China policy which has imprisoned US policy toward China and Taiwan for years."¹⁰⁷⁵ On July 29, Representative Sherrod Brown urged the US government to adopt a "One China, One Taiwan" policy that would reflect the reality

¹⁰⁷¹ Tai Kuo-hui, Wang Tso-jung, and Hsia Chen, *Aizeng Li Denghui (Love and Hatred of Lee Teng-hui)*, 156, 72-74.

¹⁰⁷² Lee Teng-hui, *Li Denghui zhizheng gaobai shilu (A Faithful Account of Lee Teng-hui's Rule)*, 240-41.

¹⁰⁷³ Lo Chia-wei 羅嘉薇, "Su Qi chushu tan 'liangguolun' dao 'yibian yiguo' (Su Chi's Book Gives An Account of 'Special State-to-State Relationship' and 'One Side, One Country')," *UDN*, Jan 5 2004.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Kan, "RL30341."

¹⁰⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

that Taiwan and China were two separate nations.¹⁰⁷⁶ On July 30, Senator Slade Gorton excoriated Clinton's "constructive engagement" with China, defended Lee's statement as reasonable, and requested the article "On the Wrong Side," a conservative *Washington Post* column by Michael Kelly, be inserted as into the *Congressional Record*.¹⁰⁷⁷ On August 20, twenty-three members of the conservative Heritage Foundation and the Project for the New American Century, including Richard Armitage and Paul Wolfowitz, issued the "Statement on the Defence of Taiwan," which stated:

It has ... become essential that the United States make every effort to deter any form of Chinese intimidation of the Republic of China on Taiwan and declare unambiguously that it will come to Taiwan's defence in the event of an attack or a blockade against Taiwan ...

The United States should also make clear that ... the future of Taiwan must reflect the will of the people of Taiwan as expressed through their duly elected government. If the people of Taiwan do not want to be united with the mainland until China becomes a democracy, the United States has a moral obligation and strategic imperative to honor that determination.

Efforts by the Clinton administration to pressure Taipei to cede its sovereignty and to adopt Beijing's understanding of "One China" are dangerous and directly at odds with American strategic interests, past US policy, and American democratic ideals.

The time for strategic and moral "ambiguity" with regard to Taiwan has passed. We urge the administration and leaders in Congress to make a clear statement of America's commitment to the people of Taiwan. Such a commitment is consonant with our nation's interests and ideals, and will help ensure peace in East Asia.¹⁰⁷⁸

To defend the Clinton administration's position, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Susan Shirt proposed on September 5 "one country, three systems" as a possible approach for "one China."¹⁰⁷⁹ On September 7, Representative Gilman, Chairman of the International Relations Committee, wrote to Clinton that it was a "common misperception" that Washington officially conceded that Beijing was the capital of the "one China" that included Taiwan. He urged, "under no circumstances should the United States move toward Beijing's version of 'one China'."¹⁰⁸⁰ At the 1999 Clinton-Jiang APEC Meeting, on September 11, Clinton defused the crisis by reaffirming his policy on Taiwan:

¹⁰⁷⁶ *Expressing the Sense of the Congress That the United States Should Adopt a 'One China, One Taiwan Policy' Which Reflects the Present Day Reality that Taiwan and China Are Two Separate Nations*, 106th Congress, H.CON.RES.166.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Slade Gorton, *Administration's Constructive Engagement with China* [internet] (Library of Congress, 1999 [cited Mar 10 2003]), available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r106:1./temp/~r106r6i0LB>.

¹⁰⁷⁸ *Statement on the Defense of Taiwan*, [internet] (The Heritage Foundation & The Project for the New American Century, 1999 [cited Feb 28 2003]), available from <http://www.newamericancentury.org/Taiwandefensestatement.htm>.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Kan, "RL30341," note 17.

¹⁰⁸⁰ *Ibid*.

My message is that our policy has not and will not change. We favor one China. We favor a peaceful approach to working out the differences. We favor the cross-Strait dialogue. Our policy has not changed and it will not change.¹⁰⁸¹

The US had remained outside the debate on whether to place the issue of the ROC's membership on the agenda of the General Assembly, since Taipei launched the first annual appeal in 1993. On September 15 1999, the Clinton administration declared for the first time that the US opposed Taiwan's bid to re-enter the UN.¹⁰⁸²

An earthquake measuring 7.3 on the Richter scale struck Taiwan on September 21. This disaster delayed but did not interrupt the escalation of tension. Preoccupied with the struggle on the diplomatic arena, Beijing was insensitive to the sufferings of the Taiwanese people. The two amendments on Taiwan security introduced by Senator Lott became a section of two separate laws in October.¹⁰⁸³ Despite the great international pressure and the seismic catastrophe, Lee continued to repeat his "special state-to-state relationship" in *Foreign Affairs* in November.¹⁰⁸⁴ By the end of November 1999, in the Appropriation Act for the Fiscal Year 2000, the US Congress consolidated its position in terms of consultations on arms sales to Taiwan, military balance across the Strait and participation of Taiwan in international organizations.¹⁰⁸⁵ Then on February 1, 2000, the House overwhelmingly passed the TSEA by a vote of 341-70. Stressing the political antithesis across the Strait, the TSEA called on the US to "maintain the capacity to resist any form of coercion that jeopardizes the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan."¹⁰⁸⁶ Chairman of the House International Relations Committee Benjamin A. Gilman issued a challenge to Clinton over his opposition to the TSEA bill.¹⁰⁸⁷

Beijing's 2000 White Paper and Premier Zhu Rongji's Warning

¹⁰⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸² Ibid., note 90.

¹⁰⁸³ For the contents of these two amendments, see page 191 of this thesis.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Lee Teng-hui, *Li Denghui zhizheng gaobai shilu* (A Faithful Account of Lee Teng-hui's Rule), 258.

See also Lee Teng-hui, *Yazhou de zhilue* (A Strategy of Asia), 28.

¹⁰⁸⁵ *An Act Making Consolidated Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2000, and for Other Purposes*, 106th Congress, H.R.3194. It became PL106-113 on November 29, 1999.

¹⁰⁸⁶ *Taiwan Security Enhancement Act*.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Benjamin A. Gilman, *Gilman Challenges Clinton over Taiwan* [internet] (USDOS, 2000 [cited Mar 11 2003]), available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/giltaiw.htm>.

Mao Zedong had claimed that China would be patient in the goal of reunification and recognized that a cross-Straits solution might require decades; however, subsequent leaders viewed the Taiwan issue with greater urgency and “feared that continuation of the existing *de facto* situation could lead to the permanent separation of Taiwan rather than to reunification.”¹⁰⁸⁸ On February 21, just weeks before Taiwan’s presidential election, Beijing issued *The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue*, which declared:

The so-called controversy about democracy and system is an excuse for obstructing the reunification of China. In recent years the Taiwan authorities have repeatedly declared that “democratisation on the China mainland is the key to the reunification of China” and that “the real essence of the cross-Straits issue is a contest between systems.” This is an excuse for postponing and resisting reunification ...¹⁰⁸⁹

Beijing thus created a new, third condition for the use of force against Taiwan, “if the Taiwan authorities refuse, *sine die*, the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits reunification through negotiations.”¹⁰⁹⁰ This time Beijing’s arbitrary rebuff of democracy and new threat to Taiwan caused tremendous concern. This white paper was seen as the latest attempt to interfere with the upcoming Taiwan presidential election and to warn the US. The white paper elicited wide criticism from the Clinton administration, the Pentagon, Congress, academia and the American media.¹⁰⁹¹ White House spokesman Joe Lockhart said on February 22 that the US viewed any threat to Taiwan with “grave concern” and indicated that the US would respond by sending aircraft-carrier battle groups to support the fledgling democracy just as it did in the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.¹⁰⁹² On the same day, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Helms and House International Relations Committee Chairman Gilman issued separate statements saying they were “deeply concerned” by the PRC’s new threats to Taiwan.¹⁰⁹³ According to Gilman:

¹⁰⁸⁸ Barnett, *U.S. Arms Sales: The China-Taiwan Tangle*, 22.

¹⁰⁸⁹ TAO, *The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue* [internet] (2000 [cited Mar 10 2003]), available from <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/features/taiwanpaper/taiwan.html>. The first White Paper on Taiwan was issued in August 1993.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Ibid., ([cited]). The first two ifs are: if a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries.

¹⁰⁹¹ Tsao Chang-ching 曹常青, *Zhongguo dui Tai baipishu zao quanqiu qianze (China's White Paper Caused Global Condemnation)* [internet] (Asia Democracy Foundation, 2000 [cited Mar 11 2003]), available from <http://asiademo.org/2000/03/20000304a.htm>.

¹⁰⁹² Reuters, “Warnings to China - Washington Takes Threats to Taiwan Very Seriously,” *ABC News*, Feb 22 2000.

¹⁰⁹³ Jesse Helms and Benjamin A. Gilman, *Text: Chairmen Helms, Gilman Statements on Threats against Taiwan (Congressional Foreign Affairs Leaders 'Deeply Concerned')* [internet] (USDOS, 2000 [cited Mar 11 2003]), available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/helmsgl.htm>.

It is a clear example of how the Clinton administration has led Beijing to believe the United States will not stand behind its moral and security commitments to Taiwan.

The administration's policy of accommodation toward Beijing is proving to be ineffective and is destabilizing the region. A firmer stance toward Beijing is required.¹⁰⁹⁴

On February 23, Undersecretary of Defence Walter B. Slocombe warned China that it would face "incalculable consequences" if it followed through on threats to use force against Taiwan.¹⁰⁹⁵ In late February, the news media, including the four national papers, the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Wall Street Journal* and the *Los Angeles Times*, published editorials condemning Beijing for its reckless action and showing sympathy toward Taiwan.¹⁰⁹⁶ Lee seized the chance to step up his influence operations in Washington. According to the *Washington Post*:

The Mingde Committee also used Cassidy to lobby for increased arms sales to Taiwan. Among the Cassidy lobbying team at the time was Carl W. Ford Jr., now assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research. Taiwanese officials said Ford helped fashion a March 1, 2000, letter to then-President Clinton from then-Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS.) suggesting that congressional approval of permanent normal trade relations with China might depend on the Clinton administration's moving "promptly" to approve Taiwan's weapons request.

Ford also testified before Congress, where he was identified as a consultant to the Taiwan Research Institute, in favor of major arms sales, including destroyers equipped with the Aegis radar system, a view that goes further than the current Bush administration. The Mingde group also arranged for Ford to travel to Taiwan in 2000 during George W. Bush's presidential election campaign, documents and Taiwanese officials said.¹⁰⁹⁷

On March 15, in response to a Hong Kong reporter's question on the "three ifs" mentioned in *The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue*, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基) asserted that some people in some specific country have been viewing China as a potential enemy, using Taiwan as an unsinkable "aircraft carrier" to oppose China and intending the Taiwan issue to be postponed indefinitely. He added: "These people would be happy to see the Taiwan issue drag on indefinitely. ... There have also been threats of retaliation, possibly armed intervention, against China if it tries to settle the Taiwan issue."¹⁰⁹⁸ Next, asked by a Singaporean reporter about his opinion on the

¹⁰⁹⁴ Ibid., ([cited]).

¹⁰⁹⁵ Dumbaugh, "IB98034."; Steven Mufson and Helen Dewar, "Pentagon Issues Warning to China-U.S. Officials Criticize Beijing's Broadening of Reasons to Use Force Against Taiwan," *WP*, Feb 23 2000, 16.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Tsao Chang-ching, *Zhongguo dui Tai baipishu zao quanqiu qianze (China's White Paper Caused Global Condemnation)* ([cited]).

¹⁰⁹⁷ Pomfret, "Secret Taiwan Fund Sought Friends, Influence Abroad."

¹⁰⁹⁸ Zhongyang dang'anguan, ed., eds., *Zhongguo gongchandang bashinian zhengui dang'an (Valuable Documents of Chinese Communists in the Past Eighty Years)*, 1769-70. See also CNN, Zhu: *China Will Never Allow Taiwan to Declare Independence* ([cited]).

rising popularity of secessionist Chen Shui-bian, Zhu seriously warned, “Taiwan tongbao, nimen yao jingti a (台灣同胞，你們要警惕啊; My Taiwanese fellows, you must be alert)!”¹⁰⁹⁹

A few hours later, Gilman released a statement regretting the PRC official’s statements “designed to intimidate the Taiwanese people into voting for a candidate acceptable to China.” He hoped that the Taiwanese would “ignore these contemptible threats” and said:

It is also regrettable that the Chinese have turned to blaming the United States for the problems in their relationship with Taiwan. It seems to me that the refusal to renounce the use of force, an unprecedented military buildup, and threatening rhetoric against Taiwan would be more central to the difficulties in the relationship. The United States has been key to the peace and stability that we have seen across the Taiwan Strait for over 50 years.”¹¹⁰⁰

The Fruition of Nationalism and the Accomplishment of Taiwanization

Zhu Rongji’s warning caused a backlash on Taiwan. Many were fed up with Beijing’s rhetoric and military intimidation. When Lien Chan (連戰) stated, “if Chen is elected, young men would have to trade in their ‘A-bian’ knitted caps for bullet-proof helmets,” these remarks came uncomfortably close to siding with Beijing.¹¹⁰¹ Many believed that Lee Teng-hui again practiced a “dump-save” strategy. That some of Chen’s important endorsements came from Lee’s allies or close friends, including native industrial tycoon Hsu Wen-lung (許文龍), was offered as evidence of conspiracy. Hsu suggested publicly that Chen was the most appropriate heir to Lee’s legacy.¹¹⁰² On March 18, Chen and his running mate Lu Hsiu-lien (呂秀蓮, Annette Lu) were elected president and vice president of the ROC, with 39.3% of the votes. James Soong claimed 36.84% and Lien Chan 23.1%.¹¹⁰³ Obviously, Chen had benefited by the “dump-save” effect between cognate but divided James Soong and Lien Chan. DPP’s victory in 2000 election marked the first transfer of power and advanced the Taiwanese nationalists’

¹⁰⁹⁹ Zhongyang dang’anguan, ed., ^eds., *Zhongguo gongchandang bashinian zhengui dangan (Valuable Documents of Chinese Communists in the Past Eighty Years)*, 1770-71.

¹¹⁰⁰ Benjamin A. Gilman, *Gilman Blasts Chinese Intimidation of Taiwan* [internet] (USDOS, 2000 [cited Mar 11 2003]), available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/gilman315.htm>.

¹¹⁰¹ Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*, 193.

¹¹⁰² Ibid., 193-94.

¹¹⁰³ *Xuanju niandu ji leibie yilan biao (A Table of Election Years and Categories)*, [internet] (Central Election Commission, Dec 24 2003 2003 [cited Jan 4 2004]), available from <http://210.69.23.140/cec/cechead.asp>.

aspiration for "self-determination."

However, the voting results reflected the wounds of ethnic division and identity struggle. Secessionist Chen Shui-bian won only 39.3% of the votes. Pro-unification Soong and Lien together claimed 59.94%. Had there been no "dump-save" effect, Soong could have become president-elect. Lien and Soong originally attempted to campaign as a team, with one as the presidential candidate and the other as the vice presidential candidate; but this plan was strongly opposed by Lee Teng-hui and thus aborted. Noticeably, although Soong dropped out of the KMT and ran as a maverick, he organized a "New Taiwanese Service Team" to draw support. Consequently, despite all the difficulties of ethnic conflicts and the cleavage of national identity, "neo-Taiwanese-ism" has become the political consensus about the future of Taiwan. It is a natural by-product of Taiwanization.¹¹⁰⁴ "Neo-Taiwanese-ism" represents the fruition of constructuralism, which produces the seeds of political and ideological harmony and symbolizes the preliminary accomplishment of intra-island cultural assimilation or Taiwanization, though it may take decades to repair the damage done by ethnic conflict and ideological cleavage. The accomplishment of cultural assimilation, or Taiwanization, has far more significant implications. The consolidation of "new Taiwanese" constructuralism may seal Taiwan as a cultural bastion of America in the epochal Sino-US struggle.

Congress was very satisfied with the election result. In late March, Congress passed two concurrent resolutions to congratulate the people of Taiwan for the successful conclusion of their presidential elections.¹¹⁰⁵

Summary

Since 1990, Lee's democratisation sought to produce an exclusive Taiwan identity; the

¹¹⁰⁴ George Woei Tsai, "The Politics of Taiwanisation (I): Rise of New Taiwanism," in *Taiwanisation: Its Origin and Politics*, ed. National University of Singapore (Singapore: World Scientific, 2001), 3.

¹¹⁰⁵ *A Concurrent Resolution Congratulating the People of Taiwan for the Successful Conclusion of Presidential Elections on March 18, 2000*, 106th Congress, S.CON.RES.99; *Congratulating the People of Taiwan for the Successful Conclusion of Presidential Elections on March 18, 2000*, 106th Congress, H.CON.RES.292.

ultimate goal of his democratisation was Taiwanization, which would secure the Taiwanese domination of Taiwan and break Taiwan away from China. This was identical with US-anticipated, separatist Taiwanization, which would secure ethnic Taiwanese political domination of the island and include members of mainlander elites in the process. The support from the US Congress and the Bush administration reinforced Lee's agenda. The strategic realignment was dedicated to the promotion of Taiwan's economic viability and political independence in the international community and the island republic's defence capability.

Lee used divisive structuralism and connived with the DPP's ethno-nationalism to push the mainlander elites aside.¹¹⁰⁶ The departure of the mainlander elites in 1993 symbolized another victory of Taiwanese structuralism and another extended legacy of American aid. Lee also launched constitutional reforms to materialize secessionist institutional changes, advance his domination of the power apparatus and aggrandize the DPP. He delivered his identity agenda to the rancour of domestic mainlander groups and the cross-Strait agenda to the hostility of Mainland China.

Domestic politics in America and Taiwan after late 1992 witnessed more calls to support Taiwan in accordance with "democracy" and "self-determination" and expedited bilateral strategic realignment. After the collapse of the Communist bloc, the US legalized the primacy of the TRA over the August 17 Communiqué to advance its arms sales to Taiwan in the name of maintaining regional peace and stability. The goal of Taiwanization prompted many Congress members and conservatives to establish a strategic alliance with Lee in the name of supporting democratisation; the latter then used clandestine lobbying funds to reinforce his relationship with the former. In the climate of US-Taiwan strategic realignment, a unique synergy effect enabled the US to advance its relations simultaneously with China and Taiwan; the strategic alliance between many US Congress members and Lee helped dismiss Clinton's faith in "one China," counter Beijing's rhetoric and military intimidation, and assure Taiwanization.

The 1996 presidential election symbolized the completion of democratisation and the

¹¹⁰⁶ For the definition of structuralism, see page 89 of this thesis.

alternative incarnation of “self-determination.” However, Lee’s structuralism and connivance with ethno-nationalism worsened ethnic conflict and ideological cleavage. Because Taiwanization requires the inclusion of members of mainlander elites during ethnic Taiwanese rise to dominate the political arena, to remedy these maladies, unite the diversified ethnic groups and impose a new vision of nation-building, Lee proposed constructuralistic arguments such as “*shengming gongtongti*,” “popular sovereignty” and “new Taiwanese.”

Taiwanization was accomplished in 2000. Despite the crises of ethnic conflicts and ideological cleavage, “neo-Taiwanese-ism” has become the political consensus about the future of Taiwan. It is a natural by-product of Taiwanization, represents the fruition of constructuralism, and symbolizes the preliminary accomplishment of cultural assimilation or Taiwanization. In retrospect, Taiwanization resulted from democratisation, domination of political agenda by Taiwanese nationalists,¹¹⁰⁷ ambience of US-Taiwan strategic realignment, and the maturity of political nationalism. The consolidation of “new Taiwanese” constructuralism may indefinitely seal Taiwan as a cultural bastion of America in the epochal Sino-US struggle.

¹¹⁰⁷ Taiwanese nationalists here include not only the ethnic Taiwanese-dominated opposition party DPP, but also president Lee Teng-hui and his native supporters in the political and business field. Together, they are immensely strong and influential.

Chapter 6: Since 2000

STRATEGIC SYMBIOSIS AND THE DISPERSION OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM

Introduction

After the pro-independence DPP took power in 2000, the government seemed dissatisfied with the alternative incarnation of self-determination with the completion of democratisation and Taiwanization, but eager for the adventure beyond *de facto* independence. Congress became increasingly adamant in consolidating its position on Taiwan. Many advisors of presidential candidate George W. Bush repeatedly issued hawkish opinions against China. In late October 2000, China had made clear in its biggest military show in thirty-five years that it viewed the US as potential enemy Number One.¹¹⁰⁸ As a result, the crisis-prone Taiwan Strait has become a regional flashpoint. The US-China strategic competition is a realistic phenomenon. The US and Taiwan need each other more than ever to expand their mutual interests and prepare for the worst.

This chapter shows how Washington and Taipei have cooperated to prepare for US-China strategic competition. The focus here is the central argument of strategic symbiosis. The chapter first demonstrates how Sino-US strategic competition facilitates US-Taiwan strategic symbiosis and explores the essence of this symbiotic partnership. It then studies the impact of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) Incident on this partnership. The following section examines how and why the referendum and new constitution have come to dominate the trilateral interaction in the Taiwan Strait. Finally, the chapter explores the implication of Chen Shui-bian's re-election in 2004.

¹¹⁰⁸ Associated Press, *Eyeing Taiwan, Balkans, China Prepares Scenarios for War with U.S.* [internet] (CNN, 2000 [cited Dec 5 2004]), available from <http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/east/10/22/china.gunningforamerica.ap/>.

Chen's Initial Policies and the US

The Compromising "Five Noes" and the "New Middle Way"

After the 2000 election, maverick James Soong established the People First Party (PFP). The New Party, PFP and many KMT reformist elites were eager to redeem the honour of their spiritual leader Chiang Ching-kuo, rehabilitate the KMT and prevent the DPP from rushing for declaring independence. Because the main colour of the party flag of the KMT is blue, the three cognate opposition parties coalesced to form an ideologically pro-unification pan-blue camp. Considering Clinton's faith in "one China," Beijing's hostility and the prospective containment by the looming pan-blue camp, Chen cautiously proposed in his May 20 inauguration speech a compromising "Five Noes" policy: he will "not declare independence," "not change the national title," "not push forth the inclusion of the so-called "state-to-state" description in the Constitution," "not promote a referendum to change the *status quo*," and "the abolition of the National Reunification Council or the National Reunification Guidelines will not be an issue."¹¹⁰⁹ The "Five Noes" provided a provisional peace structure across the Strait.

Chen proposed his "New Middle Way" at the London School of Economics in December 1999 as a discourse of a Taiwanese presidential candidate's political philosophy for an international audience. His New Middle Way incorporated the concepts of democratic reform, regional and national security, and globalisation.¹¹¹⁰ After the election, he expanded it to incorporate ideas of pluralism, balancing and sharing.¹¹¹¹ Because both the "Five Noes" and the "New Middle Way" were a compromise between ideal and reality, his initial national policies were characterized by compromise.

Domestic Politics

Consistent with the "New Middle Way," Chen aimed to establish a political middle ground by embracing pluralism and removing radicalism to build a functioning civil

¹¹⁰⁹ OPROC, *Inaugural Speech (2000/5/20): Taiwan Stands Up - Toward the Dawn of a Rising Era* [internet] (2000 [cited Jan 23 2004]), available from http://www.president.gov.tw/1_president/e_subject-06e.html.

¹¹¹⁰ OPROC, *The Third Way for Taiwan: A New Political Perspective* [internet] (2000 [cited Jan 26 2004]), available from http://www.president.gov.tw/1_president/e_subject-041e.html.

¹¹¹¹ OPROC, *Zongtong jiejian geguo qinghetuan (President Receives Congratulatory Delegations from Various Countries)* [internet] (2000 [cited Jan 26 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

society.¹¹¹² Despite his words for ethnic reconciliation, at a press conference on July 31, Chen dismissed the "1992 consensus" on "one China, respective interpretations" as "1992 spirit" of "dialogue, exchange and shelving disputes."¹¹¹³ Chen's denial of "one China" revived bitter partisan and ideological struggle. As a minority power-holder in the legislature, the DPP's arbitrary decision on October 27 to abort the partially built fourth nuclear power plant further exacerbated political instability. In addition, many secessionist groups intended to compensate Chen's inappropriateness in promoting independence as ROC president. In December 2000, sixty groups founded a secessionist World Taiwanese Congress (WTC) in Washington DC. Chen extolled the contribution of these peripheral, civilian groups in promoting Taiwan independence.¹¹¹⁴

Economic Development

Chen stressed further liberalization and internationalization by supporting Taiwan's membership in the WTO. Supporting Taiwan's entry to the WTO had become routine in Congress since July 1996. A resolution was introduced on March 2, 2000 to request that the US counter any effort by any WTO member country to block Taiwan's entry to the WTO.¹¹¹⁵ In mid-May, days before Chen took office, three resolutions, including H.R.4444, were introduced.¹¹¹⁶ Chen urged Clinton's Secretary of Transportation Rodney E. Slater on June 15 not to allow Beijing's preceding accession to hinder or delay Taiwan's accession to the WTO.¹¹¹⁷ H.R.4444 became law in October 2000.

¹¹¹² OPROC, *The Third Way for Taiwan* ([cited]. Chen's "New middle Way" seemed to cover many aspects in theory. In practice, it emphasized the mitigation of ethnic conflicts and the promotion of ethnic reconciliation. Meyers believed the term "civil society" is used in the context of Taiwan "to include both an ideological market process and private organizations that share an adjusted political culture." See Ramon H. Myers, "A New Chinese Civilization: The Evolution of the Republic of China on Taiwan," *The China Quarterly*, No. 148, Special Issue: Contemporary Taiwan (1996).

¹¹¹³ OPROC, *Presidential Press Conference(2000/07/31)* [internet] (2000 [cited Jan 28 2004]), available from http://www.president.gov.tw/1_president/e_subject-06.html.

¹¹¹⁴ Crystal Hsu, "Chen Walks Fine Line at WTC," *TT*, Mar 18 2001.

¹¹¹⁵ *Expressing the sense of Congress on the accession of Taiwan to the World Trade Organization*, 106th Congress, H.CON.RES.262.

¹¹¹⁶ *Expressing the sense of Congress regarding the accession of Taiwan to the World Trade Organization*, 106th Congress, H.CON.RES.330; *To Authorize Extension of Nondiscriminatory Treatment (Normal Trade Relations Treatment) to the People's Republic of China.*, 106th Congress, H.R.4444; *To Require Any Authorization of Extension of Nondiscriminatory Treatment (Most-Favored-Nation Treatment) to the Products of the People's Republic of China to Be Effective Only after a Vote Is Taken by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference regarding the Decision and Protocol of Accession for Chinese Taipei (Taiwan) and after China's accession to the WTO*, 106th Congress, H.R.4509.

¹¹¹⁷ OPROC, *President Chen Meets with US Secretary of Transportation Rodney E. Slater* [internet] (2000 [cited Jan 23 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4>.

Chen began promoting a knowledge-based economy in June 2000. Taiwan's economic upgrading was closely related to three links with the mainland. However, the sovereignty issue and ideological conflict interfered with economic exchange with the mainland. In addition, fundamentalist independence forces were deeply concerned about the destructive "hollow-out" effect of China on Taiwan's economy.¹¹¹⁸ Although Chen openly admitted that it was right time for three links,¹¹¹⁹ only modest, symbolic, decriminalising "mini-three-links" between Taiwan's two frontline islands of Kinmen (金門) and Matsu and China's Xiamen (廈門) and Fuzhou (福州) harbours in Fujian (福建) Province were put into practice on January 1, 2001. But he promised at the end of 2000 to replace Lee Teng-hui's patience policy with "jiji kaifang, youxiao guanli" (積極開放, 有效管理, positive openness with effective management) on cross-Straits economic exchange as Taiwan marched toward a knowledge-based economy.¹¹²⁰

Unfortunately, the global economic recession and inept decision-making compounded the difficulties. The twist of aborting and resuming the fourth nuclear power plant project entailed huge legal compensations. The failing economic performance since the March presidential election only fuelled ethnic and ideological strife. These events precluded consensus on political and financial reforms. As a result, exodus of industries, sluggish investment and rising unemployment continued.¹¹²¹

Foreign Relations: Dispersion of Taiwanese Nationalism

Chen actively highlighted independent sovereignty and denied "one China." Taipei strongly objected to Beijing's reference to "one China" as the PRC and asserted that accepting "one China" was tantamount to accepting "one country, two systems," which

¹¹¹⁸ Vice President Lu even attributed Taiwan's economic recession since 1988 to Taiwanese businessmen's feverish investment in Mainland China. See OPROC, *Fuzongtong canjia '2001 caijing gaofeng huiyi' kaimu* (Vice President Attends the Opening Ceremony of the '2001 Economic and Financial Summit Meeting') [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 2 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

¹¹¹⁹ OPROC, *Presidential Press Conference (2000/09/16)* [internet] (2000 [cited Jan 31 2004]), available from http://www.president.gov.tw/1_president/e_subject-06.html.

¹¹²⁰ OPROC, *President Chen's Cross-Century Remarks* [internet] (2000 [cited Feb 2 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

¹¹²¹ OPROC, *Zongtong chuxi 'jingji fazhan zixun weiyuan huiyi' yubei huiyi* (President Addresses the Opening Ceremony of the Preparatory Session of the Economic Development Advisory Conference) [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 8 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

Taiwan would never accept.¹¹²² Chen avidly promoted a comprehensive relationship with the EU and launched head of state diplomacy by inviting heads and prominent guests of other states to Taiwan and making state visits to friendly nations. Chen and his deputy Lu Hsiu-lian (Annette Lu) made good use of liberal and neo-liberal philosophy to expand international support. They associated with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other groups to build up interconnectedness and interdependence with global society, focused their attention on the security of Asia-Pacific and Taiwan Strait, and supported Taiwan's bid for readmission into the UN. By drawing attention to Taiwan's independent sovereignty and advocating its ties to and participation in international society, the DPP is in effect dispersing the seeds of Taiwanese nationalism in the global community and crafting a comprehensive regional security alliance against China.¹¹²³

Accumulating Dynamics for a New Age

In August 2000, the DPP heated up the issue of readmission into the UN in the capacity of government. Convinced by Lee Teng-hui's account that the US did not oppose his "special state-to-state relationship" but was only offended that Washington had not been informed in advance,¹¹²⁴ Chen argued on August 28 that unification with the PRC contradicted the principles of freedom, democracy and self-determination.¹¹²⁵ Chen thus became the first president to openly oppose unification with China.

Congressional support soared. Two concurrent resolutions calling for direct communication with top Taiwanese officials and to reduce restrictions on high-level visits by Taiwanese officials were referred to both House Committee on International Relations and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in September.¹¹²⁶ In October,

¹¹²² OPROC, *Presidential Press Conference(2000/08/28)* [internet] (2000 [cited Jan 28 2004]), available from http://www.president.gov.tw/1_president/e_subject-06.html.

¹¹²³ "Comprehensive security" broadens the concept of security beyond military security; it originally stressed to extend economic power for security ends, see Hook et al., *Japan's International Relations*, 135; Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Economic Power and Security: Japan and North Korea* (London: Routledge, 1999), 22, 26. Chen aims to strengthen regional security by employing more approaches to expand interdependence and interconnectedness.

¹¹²⁴ Lee Teng-hui, *Li Denghui zhizheng gaobai shilu (A Faithful Account of Lee Teng-hui's Rule)*, 242-44.

¹¹²⁵ OPROC, *Presidential Press Conference(2000/08/28)* ([cited]).

¹¹²⁶ *Expressing the Sense of the Congress regarding High-Level Visits by Taiwanese Officials to the United States*, 106th Congress, H.CON.RES.401. A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of

Congress passed a concurrent resolution, signed by eighty-six of its members, supporting Taiwan's appropriate participation in the UN and other international organizations and calling for the US government to extend active support.¹¹²⁷ A resolution was introduced on October 27 to request that Taiwan issue be resolved peacefully through a democratic mechanism and with the express consent of the people of Taiwan.¹¹²⁸ On the issue of US arms sales to Taiwan, a resolution was introduced on May 9 to request that a mechanism to be devised to allow for Congressional input in the decision making of arms sales to Taiwan.¹¹²⁹ Two resolutions were introduced in July and October to direct the President to consult with congressional leaders, committee chairmen, and ranking members not less than thirty days prior to the next round of arms talks between the US and Taiwan. This became public law in early November 2000.¹¹³⁰ Congress thus secured a stronger position in decision-making on arms sales to Taiwan. Added to the Congress' promotion of Taiwan's international political status and defence arms acquisition were strong calls to remove the ambiguity strategy on Taiwan from members of the Bush campaign team, such as Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleezza Rice, Robert Zoellick, Richard Armitage and George W. Bush himself. In short, pro-Taiwan US Congress members and conservatives and Taiwanese secessionists were encouraging each other to leap the hurdle presented by the "one China" faith of the outgoing Clinton administration.

Strategic Symbiosis on the Basis of Taiwanization

Raising the Curtain of US-PRC Strategic Competition

Congress regarding High-Level Visits by Taiwanese Officials to the United States, 106th Congress, S.CON.RES.140.

¹¹²⁷ *Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding Taiwan's participation in the United Nations*, 106th Congress, H.CON.RES.390.

¹¹²⁸ *Expressing the Sense of the House of Representatives That the Future of Taiwan Should Be Resolved Peacefully through a Democratic Mechanism and with the Express Consent of the people of Taiwan*, 106th Congress, H.RES.659.

¹¹²⁹ *An Original Bill Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2001, and for Other Purposes*, 106th Congress, S.2522.

¹¹³⁰ *Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2001, and for Other Purposes*, 106th Congress, H.R.5526; *Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2001, and for Other Purposes*, 106th Congress, H.R.4811.

During the campaign, Bush said it was time to remove the ambiguity about US policy on Taiwan; after his election, many of his advisers, including Defence Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Defence Secretary Wolfowitz, were outspoken advocates of clarity when it comes to defending Taiwan from PRC.¹¹³¹ Before joining the Bush Administration, Rice, Zoellick, and Armitage all articulated conservative views of how to manage the challenges that a rising China poses to the interests of peace and democracy in Asia.¹¹³² Rice believed that despite the argument for economic interaction with Beijing, "China is still a potential threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. ... China resents the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region." She asserted that China is a "strategic competitor, not the 'strategic partner' the Clinton administration once called it."¹¹³³ Armitage and Wolfowitz had already made their positions clear in the "Statement on the Defence of Taiwan."¹¹³⁴ After Bush's election, three alleged beneficiaries of Lee Teng-hui's lobbying funds, Carl Ford Jr. (Assistant Secretary of state for Intelligence and Research), James Kelly (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs), and John Bolton (Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security), became top Bush appointees in the State Department.¹¹³⁵ On January 17, 2001, at his confirmation hearing for the position of Secretary of State, General Colin L. Powell defined China as a strategic competitor and a potential regional rival, but neither a partner nor an inevitable and implacable foe.¹¹³⁶ In an internal briefing, George J. Tenet, Director of CIA, enumerated the "rise of Chinese power, military and other," together with terrorism and WMD as the three top threats facing the US.¹¹³⁷

H.R.428 was introduced on February 6, 2001 to advocate Taiwan's participation in the WHO; ninety-two Representatives were co-sponsors.¹¹³⁸ Since early 2001, in numerous receptions with visiting American dignitaries, Chen Shu-bian sought to redeem the reputation of "trouble maker" for Taipei and accused Beijing of refusing to

¹¹³¹ Kelly Wallace, *Bush Pledges Whatever It Takes to Defend Taiwan* [internet] (CNN, 2001 [cited Dec 9 2003]), available from <http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/04/24/bush.taiwan.abcf/>.

¹¹³² Tkacik, *The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1717* ([cited]).

¹¹³³ Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interests," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 1 (2000): 55-56.

¹¹³⁴ See page 195 of this thesis.

¹¹³⁵ Corn, *Taiwangate?* ([cited]); Pomfret, "Secret Taiwan Fund Sought Friends, Influence Abroad."

¹¹³⁶ USDOS, *Confirmation Hearing by Colin L. Powell* [internet] (2001 [cited Jan 13 2004]), available from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/443.htm>.

¹¹³⁷ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 34-35.

¹¹³⁸ *Concerning the Participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization*, 107th Congress, H.R.428.

deal with the new DPP government and continuing to expand its military build-up and increase its missiles against Taiwan.¹¹³⁹ In particular, on March 19, on the issue of ROC's new Asia-Pacific strategy, he assured some US delegates to the "2001 Taipei Roundtable" that "Taiwan will continue dedicating itself to playing the role of 'maintaining peace, security and balance' in the Asia-Pacific region."¹¹⁴⁰ Congress responded with a reaffirmed commitment to the TRA.¹¹⁴¹ On March 28, 2001, Representative David Vitter introduced a bill to urge to incorporate Taiwan into the TMD project.¹¹⁴² In the meantime, the US National Defence University (NDU) made its first, one-week tour in Taiwan in March 2001 in accordance with S.AMDT.576 to gain first-hand information on the island republic's defence capabilities.¹¹⁴³ The US Air War College (AWC) was going to visit Mainland China in May to gain information on PLA's offence capabilities. The NDU and the AWC together were performing research and analysis about the gap of military balance across the Strait.

Sealing Taiwan as a Symbiotic Partner

On April 1, 2001, a US Navy surveillance aircraft and a Chinese jet fighter collided in mid-air over international waters. The damaged US airplane made an emergency landing on China's Hainan (海南) Island. The plane and its twenty-four crewmembers were detained by the PRC for eleven days. This marked Bush's first foreign policy crisis. The Bush administration judged that China had become a serious challenge to many US interests in Asia.¹¹⁴⁴ The Chen Shui-bian government has been looking forward to joining the TMD project and volunteered to play the role of "maintaining peace, security and balance" in the Asia-Pacific region. This incident prompted Bush

¹¹³⁹ Chen's s with Anthony Lake and Stanley Roth were just two of many examples. See OPROC, *Zongtong jiejian Meiguo guowuyuan qian yatai zhuli guowuqing Lushida (President Receives Former US Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth)* [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 2 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>; OPROC, *Zongtong jiejian Meiguo qian guojia anquan guwen Leike (President Receives Former US National Security Advisor Lake)* [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 2 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

¹¹⁴⁰ OPROC, *President Chen Meets with U.S. Delegates to the '2001 Taipei Roundtable'* [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 2 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

¹¹⁴¹ *Expressing the sense of the Congress relating to the Taiwan Relations Act*, 107th Congress, H.CON.RES.67.

¹¹⁴² *To Establish the Policy of the United States with Respect to Deployment of Missile Defense Systems Capable of Defending Allies of the United States against Ballistic Missile Attack*, 107th Congress, H.R.1283.

¹¹⁴³ For the contents of S.AMDT.576, see page 191 of this thesis.

¹¹⁴⁴ Tkacik, *The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1717* ([cited]).

and Chen to forge a partnership in the name of defending the democratic achievement and economic prosperity of Taiwan and preserving peace and stability of Asia Pacific region.

As tensions rose between the US and the PRC, Taiwan immediately came to the fore. On April 12, Ambassador Harvey Feldman asserted, "It is important to bear in mind that the absence of US diplomatic recognition does not alter [the ROC on Taiwan's] status [as a state] in international law."¹¹⁴⁵ The ruling DPP pursued closer defence cooperation with America. When receiving US Congress members in early and mid-April, Chen urged Washington to provide advanced defence weapons to Taiwan in 2005 to redress the military imbalance which was shifting in favour of the mainland, and relax restrictions on visit exchange of high-level officials in charge of security, diplomatic and defence affairs.¹¹⁴⁶ At the same time, Taipei more enthusiastically dispersed the seeds of Taiwanese nationalism in global community and wove a comprehensive regional security alliance against China. On April 16, Vice President Annette Lu, who has been promoting some form of Asia alliance through the connection of "soft national power" in the form of NGOs, called for regional countries to initiate NGO efforts to form an Asia-Pacific Community to deal with the common military threat of the PRC.¹¹⁴⁷ On April 19, President Chen boasted to use "duoyuan waijiao" (多元外交, poly-diplomacy) – multi-faceted diplomacy such as head of state, trade, democracy, humanity and all-people diplomacy – to expand Taiwan's international exposure. He announced his plan to attend a summit meeting in Latin America in May.¹¹⁴⁸

At this juncture, both American and Japanese governments decided on April 20 to grant a visa to former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui, who turned out in retirement to be a standard bearer of independence fundamentalism. Washington's granting of the visa to Lee pleased Taipei but enraged Beijing. On April 23, Bush authorized a record \$7

¹¹⁴⁵ Feldman, "The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1429."

¹¹⁴⁶ For instance, see OPROC, *President Chen Meets with a Delegation of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs* [internet] (2001 [cited Jan 31 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

¹¹⁴⁷ OPROC, *Vice President Lu Addresses the Asian Forum on Women and Power* [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 2 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

¹¹⁴⁸ OPROC, *Zongtong jiejian zhongnan meizhou waijiao jizhe fanghuatuan (President Receives Visiting Diplomatic Correspondents from Central America)* [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 2 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

billion arms sales to Taiwan, including four Kidd class destroyers that would be ready by 2003, eight diesel submarines, twelve P-3C Orion anti-submarine aircraft, and many other advanced weapons. These weapons had very high strategic significance. The new submarines and anti-submarine aircraft together would provide Taiwan's navy the capability to destroy the PRC's maritime transportation, launch maritime onslaught, blockade and special operations to counter PLA's blockading efforts.¹¹⁴⁹ Military experts believe that Kidd class destroyers are a complement for TMD-capable Aegis destroyers. Despite the formal deferral of the release of Aegis to Taiwan, news media disclosed that the Bush administration had privately informed Chen Shui-bian and Defence Minister Tang Yao-ming (湯曜明) that the US intended to sell Aegis destroyers to Taiwan once the related defence research was done by the US.¹¹⁵⁰ White House officials who were briefing reporters said that whether the Aegis destroyers were sold in 2001 or not, they will still be available to Taiwan by 2010.¹¹⁵¹ This revealed the American scheme to restore a security alliance with Taiwan by integrating the island into its TMD project.

Furthermore, Bush said in an interview on ABC's "Good Morning America" on April 24 that the US would do "whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself" in the event of attack by China.¹¹⁵² He seemed to have openly removed the ambiguity about whether the US would defend Taiwan in case of attack by Communist China, which has been the essence of the so-called "ambiguity strategy" since the enactment of the TRA in 1979. The comment aroused concern from Congressional Democrats. Later that day Bush reminded Taiwan that he also supported "one China" policy and implied that, if Taipei declared independence, the US would not feel obligated to defend Taiwan from the military consequences. This warning proved hollow because Taipei chose to believe his

¹¹⁴⁹ Lu Te-yun 盧德允, "Guofangbu: weilai liangnian Taihai junli youshi xiang zhonggong qingxie (Ministry of National Defense: Military Balance across the Taiwan Strait Will Shift to Favor the PRC in Two Years)," *UDN*, Jul 3 2004.

¹¹⁵⁰ *UDN*, "Taiwan qude shendunjian shiji yuelai yue buli (Increasingly Adverse Timing for Taiwan to Acquire the Aegis-Class Destroyers)," Jan 28 2004. In June 2004, native Legislative Speaker Wang Chin-ping reaffirmed that the US would sell Aegis destroyers to Taiwan. See Lin Pao-ching 林寶慶, "Wang Jinping: qianjian guozao buneng meiyu xianshi (Wang Chin-ping: Policy to Produce Indigenous Submarines Must Take Reality into Consideration)," *UDN*, Jun 25 2004.

¹¹⁵¹ Charles Snyder, "No Aegis, but Hefty Package Offered," *TT*, Apr 25 2001, 1.

¹¹⁵² ABC, *Bush Vows Taiwan Support* [internet] (ABC, 2001 [cited Jun 19 2004]), available from <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/taiwan010425.html>. See also Charles Snyder, "US 'Will Defend' Taiwan," *TT*, Apr 26 2004, 1.

earlier guarantee. Taipei issued a formal statement on April 25 welcoming the arms sales decision, readily accepting the role of proxy balancer.¹¹⁵³

The Essence and Fortification of Strategic Symbiosis

Defining Strategic Symbiosis

These events had far more critical significance. The 2000 Taiwan presidential election symbolized the completion of Taiwanization. On the basis of Taiwanization, the DPP government's acceptance of the role of proxy balancer fulfils American exploitation of Taiwanese nationalism in the epochal Sino-US antagonism, as assumed in the "Taiwan Independence Roadmap."¹¹⁵⁴ Moreover, the use of Taiwanese nationalism is not limited to proxy balancing. It could inflame Chinese nationalism, which in turn would (1) alert the international community, especially East Asian countries in disputes with China on the sovereignty of islands on the sea-line-of-communication, to the renewed threat of China; (2) facilitate Taipei-sought poly-diplomacy and regional comprehensive security alliance against Beijing; (3) justify the US presence and security alliance in East Asia; and (4) solidify Taiwanese nationalism, as exemplified in 1996 and 2000 presidential elections.

Consequently, US-Taiwan strategic symbiosis consists of proxy balancing and influence operations. America and Taiwan strengthen mutual defence cooperation against China.¹¹⁵⁵ This is proxy balancing for wartime purposes. On the other hand, secessionist Taipei relentlessly disperses the seeds of Taiwanese nationalism to promote regional comprehensive security alliance against Beijing. Any of Beijing's intimidations, military or rhetoric, can easily trigger backlash from Taipei and misgivings from neighbouring countries, and help expand US-Japan security alliance and justify continued domination or expansion of American influence in Asia Pacific and in the global community. By dispersing the seeds of Taiwanese nationalism, Taipei diffuses its influence upon the ideology of other countries. This is Taipei's influence operations

¹¹⁵³ OPROC, *Presidential Office Responds to US Arms Sales to Taiwan* [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 2 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4>.

¹¹⁵⁴ See page 79 of this thesis.

¹¹⁵⁵ Robert S. Ross, "Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations," *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2002). Available from http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/toc/ins27.2.html.

in peacetime.¹¹⁵⁶ The symbiotic partnership goes against China's rise to regional hegemony and global superpower. Moreover, this strategic partnership goes along well with the seemingly altruistic goals of defending the democratic achievement and economic prosperity of Taiwan and preserving peace and stability of Asia Pacific region. Therefore, the ultimate goal of strategic symbiosis could be construed as to make the PRC a democratic and free country, or a constructive member of the world community, as Chen has claimed.¹¹⁵⁷

Fortification of Strategic Symbiosis

Congress became even more interested in promoting Taiwan's political independence and bilateral security cooperation. On April 27, Representative Henry J. Hyde introduced H.R.1646 to treat Taiwan as a major non-NATO ally with respect to the sale of defence articles or services and to promote AIT like an embassy.¹¹⁵⁸ The US Air War College cancelled a visit by a group of graduating line officers to China and visited Taiwan instead in a show of support. In late April and mid-May, Congress introduced two resolutions to welcome Chen's visit to the US.¹¹⁵⁹ Moreover, the Bush administration planned to increase the American forward presence, including two carrier task forces with overwhelming superiority and three Los Angeles-class attack submarines to stations in Guam in preparation for a major war against China. The US Navy would have increased access to facilities in Singapore and the Philippines. America would adopt a rapid pre-emptive strategic strike as a prelude to intervention.¹¹⁶⁰

¹¹⁵⁶ This is different from Lee Teng-hui influence operations, in which Lee used clandestine lobbying funds to buy influence with foreign governments, institutions and individuals; see page 175 of this thesis.

¹¹⁵⁷ OPROC, *Zongtong jiejian Meiguo lianbang canyiyuan waijiao weiyuanhui zhuxi Baideng (President Chen meets with U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joe Biden)* [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 5 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>. See also Benjamin A. Gilman, *Welcoming Madame Chen Wu Sue-jen - Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (Extensions of Remarks - September 18, 2002)*. [internet] (Library of Congress, 2002 [cited Mar 1 2004]), available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r107:1./temp/~r107gpjAJg>.

¹¹⁵⁸ *To Authorize Appropriations for the Department of State for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003, and for Other Purposes*, 107th Congress, H.R.1646. H.R.1646 became PL 107-228 on September 30, 2002. Section 693 prescribes: "American Institute in Taiwan and the residence of the director of the American Institute in Taiwan should publicly display the flag of the United States in the same manner as United States embassies, consulates, and official residences throughout the world." Section 1206 prescribes: "Taiwan shall be treated as though it were designated a major non-NATO ally."

¹¹⁵⁹ *A Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate Welcoming Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian to the United States*, 107th Congress, S.RES.89. *Expressing the Sense of the Congress Welcoming President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan to the United States*, 107th Congress, H.CON.RES.135; *H.AMDT.41*, 107th Congress.

¹¹⁶⁰ Ross, "Navigating the Taiwan Strait," 77-78.

The Pentagon launched programs to strengthen Taiwan's C⁴ISR for joint operations in the future.¹¹⁶¹

America's strong support reinforced Chen's secessionist foreign policies. On May 17, during his videoconference with the Council on Foreign Relations, he urged Washington to relax restraints that had been imposed on him for his next transit in the US three days later.¹¹⁶² When Chen transited the US during his ambitious fifteen-day five-nation state visit to Latin America, the US government elevated its reception of Chen in terms of transit lengths and treatment. Meanwhile, H.R.428, regarding Taiwan's participation in the WHO,¹¹⁶³ became PL107-10 on May 28, 2001. This marked the first time that a US president had officially endorsed Taipei's WHO efforts.

Chen continued to challenge the notion of "one China." Dr. Joseph S. Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs of the Clinton administration, tried to reverse the course of US-PRC strategic competition. He proposed to Chen on July 5 his "interim agreement" which aimed to decrease tension and preserve peace across the Strait under the notion of "one China." Chen used his "Five Noes" to reject Nye's proposal.¹¹⁶⁴ Chen's audience in the Congress did not like Clinton's top officials' idea of "one China" either. They promoted more arms sales to Taiwan and Taiwan's international status. Representative Jim Kolbe introduced a bill on July 17 to request more Congressional input on the decision to sell arms to Taiwan.¹¹⁶⁵ This became US law in January 2002. Representative Gary L. Ackerman introduced a bill on July 24 to endorse Chen's participation in APEC in October 2001.¹¹⁶⁶ In August and September, two resolutions were introduced to urge Taiwan's

¹¹⁶¹ C⁴ISR is a military term referring to command, control, communication, computer, information, surveillance, reconnaissance.

¹¹⁶² OPROC, *President Chen's Videoconference with the Council on Foreign Relations* [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 3 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4>.

¹¹⁶³ See page 209 of this thesis.

¹¹⁶⁴ OPROC, *President Chen Meets with Dr. Joseph S. Nye, Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University* [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 4 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4>.

¹¹⁶⁵ *Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2002, and for Other Purposes*, 107th Congress, H.R.2506.

¹¹⁶⁶ *Expressing the Sense of Congress to Encourage Full Participation in the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum*, 107th Congress, H.CON.RES.194.

membership in the UN and other international organizations.¹¹⁶⁷ Representative Sherrod Brown introduced a resolution, H.R.2739, to carry PL107-10 a step further by authorizing the Secretary of State to initiate a plan to endorse and obtain observer status for Taiwan at the annual summit of the WHA in May 2002 and to instruct the US delegation there to implement such plan.¹¹⁶⁸

Taipei reinforced its influence operations. Chen's deputy Annette Lu again urged members of a visiting US think tank on May 22 to form a "North East Asia Alliance" to help preserve peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region.¹¹⁶⁹ After Beijing won the bid to host the 2008 Olympics Games, Lu instantly warned the world of the danger of inflated Chinese nationalism.¹¹⁷⁰ In mid-August, the Lu's Taiwan Alliance for Global Peace sponsored a "Global Peace Rally" in Taipei. Five Nobel Peace Prize winners, legislators from numerous countries, distinguished guests of NGOs, and scholars attended the conference on "Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait."¹¹⁷¹

In addition, Chen's thoughts on cross-Strait economic exchange were war-oriented, despite his professed desire to promote normalization of economic and trade relations. The DPP government convened an Economic Development Advisory Conference (EDAC) in late July 2001 to consult economists and entrepreneurs about how to pursue economic upgrading with an appropriate division of labour with the mainland so as to maintain Taiwan's competitive advantage in the "economic war with China."¹¹⁷²

Overall, Chen's expectation of the trilateral relations is best exemplified by two meetings.

¹¹⁶⁷ *Expressing the Sense of the House regarding United States Policy toward Taiwan's Membership in International Organizations*, 107th Congress, H.RES.221. *Expressing the Sense of Congress regarding United States Policy toward Taiwan's Membership in International Organizations*, 107th Congress, H.CON.RES.219.

¹¹⁶⁸ *To Amend Public Law 107-10 to Require a United States Plan to Endorse and Obtain Observer Status for Taiwan at the Annual Summit of the World Health Assembly in May 2002*, 107th Congress, H.R.2739.

¹¹⁶⁹ OPROC, *Fuzongtong jiejian Meiguo zhiku xuezhe fanghua tuan (Vice President Receives a Delegation of US Think Tank Scholars)* [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 4 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

¹¹⁷⁰ OPROC, *Inaugural Statement of the Taiwan Alliance for Global Peace* [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 5 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4>.

¹¹⁷¹ OPROC, *President Chen's Congratulatory Message to the 2001 Global Peace Assembly* [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 5 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4>.

¹¹⁷² OPROC, *Zongtong chuxi 'jingji fazhan zixun weiyuan huiyi' yubei huiyi (President Addresses the Opening Ceremony of the Preparatory Session of the Economic Development Advisory Conference)* ([cited]).

On August 6, he assured a delegation led by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joe Biden that Taiwan supported the US' interest in developing constructive relations with the PRC so as to make China a free and democratic country. Chen urged Washington to play the role of, if not mediator, "messenger, balancer and facilitator" to facilitate negotiations across the Strait.¹¹⁷³ He repeated the message on August 23 to a thirty-three-member delegation spearheaded by House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry Hyde. He boasted Taiwan could exert a "beacon effect" for the democratisation of China.¹¹⁷⁴ Chen's ultimate security scheme was, as he told a group of Pacific Forum CSIS scholars on August 31, to extend the US-Japan security alliance to cover other Asian countries to assure the peace of Taiwan Strait.¹¹⁷⁵

The Impact of 9/11

The Impact on US-Taiwan Strategic Symbiosis

The terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001 overshadowed strategic competition between the US and China. After 9/11, anti-terrorism became America's primary national security policy. Because of the need for anti-terrorism measures, the Bush administration restored US-PRC strategic partnership. Many American conservatives believed that "in a post-September 11 world, the Administration's preoccupation with the war on terrorism, Iraq, and especially North Korea has led policy-makers to downplay China's resistance and hostility to US initiatives in Asia and elsewhere."¹¹⁷⁶ Since 9/11, the Bush administration publicly made its support of Taiwan secondary to winning Beijing's cooperation. For the need of anti-terrorism campaign, the US established close military relations with Uzbekistan, Georgia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Consequently,

¹¹⁷³ OPROC, *Zongtong jiejian Meiguo lianbang canyiyuan waijiao weiyuanhui zhuxi Baideng (President Chen meets with U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joe Biden)* ([cited]).

¹¹⁷⁴ OPROC, *Zongtong jiejian Meiguo lianbang zhongyiyuan guoji guanxi weiyuanhui zhuxi Haide (President Chen Meets with U.S. House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry Hyde)* [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 5 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

¹¹⁷⁵ OPROC, *Zongtong jiejian laihua canjia 'Yatai anquan guoji luntan 2001 nian Taipei yuanzhuo huiyi' yuhui waibin (President Chen Meets with Participants in the 'Asia Pacific Security Forum 2001 Taipei Roundtable')* [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 2 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

¹¹⁷⁶ Tkacik, *The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1717* ([cited]).

American military influence entered the backyard of the PRC. The US even considered deploying the NMD in Afghanistan to link with the TMD that were scheduled for deployment in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. At the same time, the US also strengthened its military cooperation with traditional allies such as New Zealand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore by conducting a series of military exercises.¹¹⁷⁷ There are some in the PRC who are concerned about the possibility of the War on Terror being used as a smokescreen to contain China. Some secessionist power holders in Taipei notice that the US is expanding its military presence in Asia Pacific and assert that the situations after 9/11 benefit Taiwan. With fewer strings attached, the US Congress continued to make multifarious efforts to strengthen relations with Taiwan.

Strategic Interests and Military Balance

Within a week of 9/11, three bills were introduced in the Senate to transfer to Taiwan four Kidd class destroyers, a complement for TMD-capable Aegis destroyers. Bill S.1438 became PL107-107 on December 28, 2001.¹¹⁷⁸ It was reported that the Bush administration had privately informed Chen Shui-bian and Minister of Defence Tang Yao-ming that the US intended to sell Aegis destroyers to Taiwan once the related defence research had been completed.¹¹⁷⁹

The unclassified summary of CIA's December 2001 "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015" asserted that before 2015 the US would in all likelihood face ICBM threats from North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Russia and China.¹¹⁸⁰ The Pentagon disclosed the unclassified part of its "Nuclear Posture Review" in January 2002 and categorized "a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan" as one of several immediate contingencies.¹¹⁸¹ In fact, the Pentagon informed the US Congress of its

¹¹⁷⁷ For a comprehensive record of events marking US military expansionism in Asia Pacific after 9/11, see Chang Ya-chung and Sun kuo-hsiang 張亞中, 孫國祥, *Asia-Pacific Comprehensive Security Prospecting Review 2001-2002* (Taipei: Yuan-Liou, 2002), 253.

¹¹⁷⁸ *A Bill to Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2002 for Military Activities of the Department of Defense*, 107th Congress, S.1438.

¹¹⁷⁹ UDN, "Taiwan qude shendunjian shiji yuelai yue buli (Increasingly Adverse Timing for Taiwan to Acquire the Aegis-Class Destroyers)."

¹¹⁸⁰ CIA, *Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015* [internet] (CIA, 2001 [cited Mar 18 2004]), available from http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001.pdf.

¹¹⁸¹ *Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts]*, [internet] (Global Security.org, 2002 [cited Mar 15 2004]), available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>.

possible emergency use of nuclear weapons against China and six other nations.¹¹⁸²

In May 2002 Congress passed H.R.4546, National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. The original Section 1202 instructed the Secretary of Defence to implement a comprehensive plan to conduct joint operational training and exchanges of senior officers to improve the defensive capabilities of Taiwan and to enhance interoperability of US-Taiwan joint operations.¹¹⁸³ Had this version of the bill been passed, this would have been equivalent to the restoration of the defence assistance mechanism. Additionally, the bill set the parameters for defence spending and was worth \$383 billion, including the full amount requested by Bush to develop a missile defence system. Beijing worried an anti-ballistic missile umbrella could emasculate its small nuclear deterrent and be stretched to cover Taiwan. PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan (孔泉) thus called parts of the bill "anti-China."¹¹⁸⁴

The Pentagon submitted to the Congress on July 12 the "Annual Report on the Military Power of the PRC." Three days later, the US-China Security Evaluation Committee published "US-China Security Review Report." These two reports together argued that without adopting democracy and reforms, China's economic rise would continue to pose a military threat to the peace and stability of Taiwan and East Asia and thus endanger US national security. The US even questioned Beijing's commitment to anti-terrorism. US Air Force General Richard Myers publicly doubted on August 9, 2002 that the PRC was providing weapons to al Qaeda forces that were believed to be hiding in Pakistan.¹¹⁸⁵

The status of the TRA has continued to rise. On August 14, three days before the twentieth anniversary of the 817 Communiqué, NSC Spokesman Sean McCormack asserted that the governing law on US arms sales to Taiwan is the TRA, indirectly

¹¹⁸² Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Nuclear Plan Sees New Targets and New Weapons," review of Nuclear Posture Review, *NYT*, Mar 10 2002.

¹¹⁸³ *To Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2003 for Military Activities of the Department of Defense*, 107th Congress, H.R.4546. There were seven versions of this bill; four versions, H.R.4546.RH, EH, PCS, EAH, included this section. The last version did not.

¹¹⁸⁴ Joseph E. Stiglitz, *China Says U.S. Defence Bill Violates Sovereignty* [internet] (NucNews, 2002 [cited Mar 18 2004]), available from <http://nucnews.net/nucnews/2002nn/0205nn/020512nn.htm#020>.

¹¹⁸⁵ USDOS, *Air Force General Doubts Chinese Assisting Al Qaeda* [internet] (U.S.D.O.S., 2002 [cited Mar 19 2004]), available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/alqaeda.w.htm>.

reaffirming the TRA's precedence over the August 17 Communiqué.¹¹⁸⁶ Bush further signed H.R.1646¹¹⁸⁷ into PL107-228 on September 30 and H.R.4546¹¹⁸⁸ into PL107-314 on December 2, 2002. Section 1210 of PL107-314 stipulates that the President shall "submit to Congress a report on the feasibility and advisability of conducting combined operational training with, and exchanges of general and flag officers" between the US and Taiwan forces. The timing of its enforcement depends on the US interpretation of the threat from China. As a preliminary step toward this highly elevated exchange, Congress approved the dispatch of active staff and officers to work in the AIT in the name of improving administrative efficiency.¹¹⁸⁹ This certainly helped the interoperability for future US-Taiwan joint operations against the PLA, although the original controversial Section 1202 of H.R.4546 was dropped.¹¹⁹⁰ In 2003, Congress introduced two additional bills. On March 26, 2003, a resolution sought to incorporate Taiwan as an NATO member in the development and deployment of TMD as soon as technologically possible.¹¹⁹¹ On June 26, 2003, a more specific resolution demanded that China dismantle the missiles that threatened Taiwan, otherwise Bush would authorize the sale of the Aegis system to Taiwan for self-defence against the threat of a missile attack by China.¹¹⁹² These bills reflected continuing American attempts to restore a para-strategic security alliance with Taiwan by integrating the island into its TMD project.

High-Level Visit Exchange

When Annette Lu made her first state tour to Central America in late September 2000, the Clinton administration did not allow her a transit in New York. During her ambitious "soft diplomacy tour" to Central America in January 2002, however, she was allowed to have a transit in New York, attend a public banquet hosted by local Taiwanese

¹¹⁸⁶ USDOS, *NSC Briefing for Foreign Media*, Sean McCormack, *National Security Council Spokesman*, Washington DC, August 14, 2002 [internet] (2002 [cited Mar 19 2004]), available from <http://www.fpc.state.gov/12693.htm>.

¹¹⁸⁷ For the contents of the bill, see page 214 of this thesis.

¹¹⁸⁸ For the contents of the bill, see page 219 of this thesis.

¹¹⁸⁹ Wang Li-chuan 汪莉絹, "Mei junzhi renyuan zhuTai, Zhonggong fandui (PRC Opposes the Assignment of Active US Military Personnel to Taiwan)," *UDN*, Dec 22 2004.

¹¹⁹⁰ See page 219 of this thesis.

¹¹⁹¹ *To Establish the Policy of the United States with Respect to Deployment of Missile Defense Systems Capable of Defending Allies of the United States Against Ballistic Missile Attack*, 108th Congress, H.R.1454.

¹¹⁹² *Expressing the Sense of Congress regarding Security for Taiwan*, 108th Congress, H.CON.RES.232.

Americans, have a breakfast meeting with American financial entrepreneurs, and arrange some other public activities in Los Angeles.¹¹⁹³ The US-Taiwan Defence Summit 2002 was held in Florida from March 10 to 12. Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly met privately with Taiwan Defence Minister Tang Yao-ming. This was the first time a Taiwan Defence Minister had visited the US in decades. Wolfowitz reiterated Bush's commitment of "whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan.

On April 23, PRC Vice President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) made his first official visit to the US. In the face of US-PRC cooperation for anti-terrorism, a formal visit by Chen Shui-bian to the US was impossible. However, transit diplomacy, or a special reception for Chen during his transit to other countries, would reap the same political effect. With the manoeuvring of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, a bipartisan organisation dedicated to promoting US-Taiwan relations, Chen enjoyed a public banquet and exchanged opinions with many Congress members during his transit in New York en route to his state visit to four African countries in early July. Even after Chen's remark of "one side, one country" on August 3, the Taiwan Caucus successfully orchestrated Taiwan first lady Chen Wu Shu-jen (陳吳淑珍)'s ostentatious ten-day visit to the US in late September.¹¹⁹⁴

Taiwan's Participation in International Organizations

After the 2001 April aircraft collision, support for Taiwan's participation in international organizations became an established part of American foreign policy. Due to America's adamant support, Taiwan became a formal member of WTO on January 1, 2002. Winning a seat in the WHO is another target of Taipei. In fact, support for Taiwan's participation in the WHA and WHO has been an annual ritual. H.R.428 was introduced in early February 2001;¹¹⁹⁵ after the incident with the military planes, it was signed into

¹¹⁹³ OPROC, *Fuzongtong jiejian Meiguo zaiTai xiehui lishi zhuxi Buruizhe* (Vice President Meets with AIT Chairman Richard Bush) (2002 [cited Mar 4 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

¹¹⁹⁴ OPROC, *Zongtong jiejian Meiguo lianbang zhongyiyuan 'guohui taiwan lianxian' fangwentuan* (President Chen Receives a U.S. Congressional Taiwan Caucus) (2001 [cited Mar 12 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

¹¹⁹⁵ See page 209.

PL107-10 in late May 2001. H.R.2739¹¹⁹⁶ and a Senate resolution in February 2002 led to PL107-158 on April 4, 2002.¹¹⁹⁷ After the outbreak of the SARS epidemic in South-East Asia, two resolutions supporting Taiwan's participation in WHA and WHO were signed into law as PL108-28 in late May 2003.¹¹⁹⁸ In 2004, three resolutions led to PL108-235, another endorsement of Taiwan's participation in the WHO.¹¹⁹⁹

Free Trade Agreement

For many decades Taiwan's economic viability has been a major concern for the power holders on the island. To many Taiwanese secessionists, economic integration across the Strait spells Mainland China's economic annexation of Taiwan. The DPP government saw the establishment of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US and other countries as a solution to prevent economic annexation by China. Taipei has been lobbying for FTA for many years. On November 6, 2001, just five days before the WTO approved China's and Taiwan's simultaneous entry at its ministerial meeting in Doha, Qatar, the ASEAN+1 Summits in Brunei Darussalam endorsed PRC Premier Zhu Rongji's proposal to set up a "Framework on Economic Cooperation" and to establish within ten years an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (AFTA), which boasts to have GDP of US\$2 trillion and two-way trade of US\$1.23 trillion based on a combined market of 1.7 billion people.¹²⁰⁰ This proposal would make the PRC's rise to economic hegemony in Asia inevitable. Hours later, Senator Max Baucus introduced a bill to advocate an FTA with Taiwan.¹²⁰¹ In November 2001, China replaced the US and became Taiwan's largest export market; Taiwan's economic dependence on the Mainland

¹¹⁹⁶ See page 216 of this thesis.

¹¹⁹⁷ Before H.R.2739 became law, a similar resolution, S.1932, was introduced on February 12, 2002; see *A Bill to Require a United States Plan to Endorse and Obtain Observer Status for Taiwan at the Annual Summit of the World Health Assembly in May 2002*, 107th Congress, S.1932.

¹¹⁹⁸ *A Bill concerning Participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization*, 108th Congress, S.243; *To Amend Public Law 107-10 to Authorize a United States Plan to Endorse and Obtain Observer Status for Taiwan at the Annual Summit of the World Health Assembly in May 2003*, 108th Congress, H.R.441. S.243 became PL 108-28 on May 29, 2003.

¹¹⁹⁹ *Concerning participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization*, 108th Congress, H.R.3793. *A Bill To Address the Participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization*, 108th Congress, S.2092. *To Address the Participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization*, 108th Congress, H.R.4019. George W. Bush, *Statement by the President on S. 2092, an Act concerning participation of Taiwan in the WHO* [internet] (White House, 2004 [cited Jan 13 2005]), available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040614-9.html>.

¹²⁰⁰ *ASEAN, Press Statement by the Chairman of the 7th ASEAN Summit and the Three ASEAN + 1 Summits, Brunei Darussalam, 6 November 2001* (ASEAN, 2001 [cited Mar 13 2004]), available from <http://www.aseansec.org/5316.htm>.

¹²⁰¹ *United States-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement Act of 2001*, 107th Congress, S.1636.

continued to deepen. Six months later, the PRC and ASEAN launched formal negotiations to conclude a Free Trade Area pact. These developments made the FTA an urgent issue for Taipei. Chen promoted on September 9, 2002 the establishment of FTA between Taiwan and the US, Japan and ASEAN.¹²⁰² Although Beijing warned all nations with which it had diplomatic relations not to sign the FTA with Taiwan, the House introduced a resolution in March 2003 to urge the US to enter into an FTA with Taipei.¹²⁰³ A week later, a more aggressive bill was introduced to reaffirm American commitment to the TRA, address the PRC's threat to Taiwan and urge the US government to publicly support an FTA with Taiwan.¹²⁰⁴

The US Congressional Taiwan Caucus

On December 20, 2001, a hundred days after 9/11, Representative Robert Wexler raised the idea of a Taiwan caucus with President Chen.¹²⁰⁵ Wexler announced the formation of the 85-member Congressional Taiwan Caucus on April 9, 2002. It proved the fastest growing congressional caucus; in a few months, the membership expanded to more than one hundred members. In the name of strengthening bilateral relations in accordance with the TRA, the Taiwan Caucus actively promoted economic and strategic cooperation. The Caucus's efforts enabled Chen to enjoy a special transit reception in New York in early July, and his wife to undertake a ten-day visit to the US in late September 2002.¹²⁰⁶

The Impact on DPP Government's National Policies

After 9/11, Taipei noticed the US was expanding its military presence in the Asia Pacific region; Annette Lu soon asserted that the situation benefited Taiwan.¹²⁰⁷ The DPP

¹²⁰² OPROC, *President Chen Addresses the Opening of the 26th Joint Conference of ROC-USA & US-Taiwan Business Councils* (2002 [cited Mar 16 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4>.

¹²⁰³ *Expressing the Sense of Congress relating to a Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Taiwan*, 108th Congress, H.CON.RES.98.

¹²⁰⁴ *Expressing the Sense of Congress that the United States Government Should Reaffirm Its Unwavering Commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act as the Cornerstone of United States Relations with Taiwan*, 108th Congress, H.CON.RES.117.

¹²⁰⁵ Robert Wexler, *Wexler Announces Formation of Congressional Taiwan Caucus* [internet] (2002 [cited Feb 3 2004]), available from http://www.wexler.house.gov/press_releases/Apr_9_02.htm.

¹²⁰⁶ OPROC, *Zongtong jiejian Meiguo lianbang zhonggyiyuan 'guohui taiwan lianxian' fangwentuan* (President Chen Receives a U.S. Congressional Taiwan Caucus) ([cited]).

¹²⁰⁷ OPROC, *Fuzongtong zai 'chengda qiye guanli xiejinhui' yi 'tansuo Taiwan qiantu' weiti fabiao yanjiang* (Vice President Makes a Speech on 'Exploring the Future of Taiwan' to the 'Cheng Ta Business Administration Association') (2001 [cited Mar 3 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4>.

gained another victory in the election for the fifth Legislative Yuan on December 1, 2001, winning 87 of the 225 seats. The newly established secessionist Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) claimed 13 seats.¹²⁰⁸ The DPP, TSU along with other secessionist parties are referred to as the pan-green camp. In the pan-blue camp, the KMT gained 68 seats, the PFP 46, and the New Party 1 seat. The DPP became the largest party.¹²⁰⁹ On March 17, at the second World Taiwanese Congress (WTC), boasting the DPP's dominant position in the Legislative Yuan, Chen told the strongly pro-independence WTC that he shared their dream, without specifying what it was.¹²¹⁰ Therefore, the expansion of US influence after 9/11 helped Chen slip away from his "New Middle Way" to favour secessionism.

However, domestic and international pressure for cross-Straits "three links" was mounting. To balance secessionism with the need of "three links," Chen claimed to pursue the normalization of cross-Straits relations and a balanced political, economic and military relationship.¹²¹¹ When inspecting the frontline Tatan islet (大擔島) on May 9, Chen announced his intention to organize a high-level DPP delegation to visit Beijing to resume cross-Straits talks and to commit to the normalization of economic and trade relations.¹²¹² Before and after the talk, many entrepreneurs visited Beijing or declared approval of the "three links." On May 18, Formosa Plastics Group chairman Wang Yung-ching (王永慶) pressed Chen for "three links;" he asserted that Taiwanese were also Chinese and that both Taiwan and Mainland were part of China. The influential American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei (AmCham) also strongly urged Chen in its 2001 and 2002 White Papers to establish direct sea, air and communication links with China to take advantage of Taiwan's proximity to the world's most populous market.¹²¹³

¹²⁰⁸ The TSU was only established on July 24, 2001. It respected Lee Teng-hui as its spiritual leader and proved a fundamentalist force for the cause of Taiwan independence.

¹²⁰⁹ *Xuanju niandu ji leibie yilan biao* (A Table of Election Years and Categories), ([cited]).

¹²¹⁰ OPROC, *Zongtong chuxi shijie taiwanren dahui* (President Chen Attends the Second Annual World Taiwanese Congress) (2002 [cited Mar 4 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

¹²¹¹ OPROC, *President Chen's Address to the CSIS Taipei Roundtable 2002* (2002 [cited Mar 4 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

¹²¹² OPROC, *Zongtong peitong meiti zhuguan qianwang Jinmen diqu bing zhi dadandao canfang* (President Accompanies News Media Directors to Visit Kinmen and Tatan Islet) (2002 [cited Mar 5 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

¹²¹³ AmCham, *2001 Taiwan White Paper Part 1* (2001 [cited Mar 8 2004]); 5, available from <http://amcham.com.tw/publications.php>; AmCham, *2002 Taiwan White Paper Overview* (2002 [cited Mar 8 2004]); 12, available from <http://amcham.com.tw/publications.php>.

Chen: "One Side, One Country"

However, as usual, the audacious "Tatan talk" received little good response from Beijing, which seemed content with its economic attraction and elevated international status as a result of US-PRC anti-terrorism cooperation. Beijing was deeply suspicious of Chen and denied him any credit in promoting economic exchange. At this juncture, Chen was pleased to learn about the bright prospect of global and domestic economic recovery.¹²¹⁴ Therefore, Beijing's rigidity only escalated tensions in the diplomatic battlefield. Chiu I-jen (邱義仁), Secretary-General of Taiwan's National Security Council, urged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) on July 18 to launch offensive diplomacy, or "*fenghuo waijiao*" (烽火外交, flames-of-war diplomacy), to expand Taiwan's foreign relations.¹²¹⁵ When Chen Shui-bian was sworn in as DPP chairman on July 21, the PRC had reportedly offered US\$60 million in aid and US\$77 million toward debt relief to the Pacific islet state Nauru to buy its swing of recognition from Taipei to Beijing.¹²¹⁶ In response to the humiliation, Taipei broke off diplomatic relations with Nauru; Chen warned that he had not ruled out the possibility of "going our own way."¹²¹⁷ In his opening address at the twenty-ninth annual meeting of the secessionist World Federation of Taiwanese Association (WFTA) on August 3, Chen expounded:

What does "Taiwan to walk its own road" mean? ... Taiwan's own road is Taiwan's road to democracy, Taiwan's road to freedom, Taiwan's road to human rights, and Taiwan's road to peace.

... In short, Taiwan and China standing on opposite sides of the Strait, there is one country on each side. This should be clear. ... Only the 23 million people of Taiwan have the right to decide the future, fate, and status of Taiwan. [This decision] will be made by referendum.¹²¹⁸

¹²¹⁴ OPROC, *Zongtong tingqu Zhonghua jingji yanjiuyuan 'guoneiwai jingji xiankuang zhanwang' jianbao* (President Attends the Briefing of Chung Hua Institution for Economic Research on 'Prospect of International and Domestic Economic Development') (2002 [cited Mar 6 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

¹²¹⁵ Monique Chu, "NSC Urges 'Offensive' Foreign Policy," *TT*, Jul 19 2002.

¹²¹⁶ Monique Chu, "Nation Left with 27 Friends after Nauru Defection," *TT*, Jul 22 2002.

¹²¹⁷ Lin Chieh-yu, "Taiwan May Go 'Own Way': Chen," *TT*, Jul 22 2002.

¹²¹⁸ See OPROC, *President Chen Delivers the Opening Address of the 29th Annual Meeting of the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations via Live Video Link* (2002 [cited Mar 5 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>. OPROC's translation is different from CNN's, which goes as "Each side is a country. This needs to be clear." See CNN, *Taiwan Leader Calls for Independence Vote* [internet] (CNN, 2002 [cited Mar 5 2004]), available from <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/03/taiwan.chen/>. Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs standardizes the term "yibian yiguo" as "There is one country on each side of Taiwan Strait"; or "one side, one country." See http://www.mofa.gov.tw/mofa91/web/application.php?oid=web_statistic_trans_cn.

This was a clear departure from the “Five Noes;” CNN interpreted his talk as a call for a vote on independence.¹²¹⁹ Indeed, this remark heralded his proposition of national referendum for a new constitution that would symbolize a new, independent nation in the second half of 2003. Chen’s proposition of “one side, one country” was not merely an expression of diplomatic frustration or revenge. The prospect of economic recovery, and, more importantly, the steady progress of the US-Taiwan symbiotic partnership must have emboldened him. This diplomatic setback was a catalyst for a showdown with Beijing.

Chen's United Front under Democracy, Economy and Security

“One side, one country” crystallized DPP secessionism, aggravated cross-Strait relations and caused immediate concern from Washington. Chen held a series of high-level strategic meetings to integrate all fronts of policies to deal with the political, economic and military challenges posed by Beijing. In late August 2002 he summarized that democracy, economy and security were the three pillars of peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.¹²²⁰ On the issue of democracy, he declared the creation of an “Asian Democratic Alliance” and a “Taiwan Foundation for Democracy” to establish a democratic regional community.¹²²¹ This echoed Bush’s campaign promise to work “toward a day when the fellowship of free Pacific nations is as strong and united as our Atlantic partnership.” As it was in NATO, the US would be an indispensable leader of an Asian democratic alliance.¹²²² The US was happy to see Taiwan promote regional awareness of political risks in association with China; “Taiwan’s attainment of real democracy has established a deep and enduring bond

¹²¹⁹ CNN, *Taiwan Leader Calls for Independence Vote* ([cited]). For the contents of the “Resolution on Taiwan’s Future,” see page 193 of this thesis.

¹²²⁰ OPROC, *President Chen’s Remarks on the Eve of the Anniversary of the September 11 Attacks* (2002 [cited Mar 5 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4>; OPROC, *President Chen Addresses the Opening Ceremony of the 2002 Asia-Pacific Democratic Cooperation Forum* (2002 [cited Mar 8 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4>.

¹²²¹ OPROC, *President Chen Addresses the Opening Ceremony of the 2002 Asia-Pacific Democratic Cooperation Forum* ([cited]); OPROC, *Zongtong jiejian canjia ‘Yatai minzhu hezuo luntan dahui’ yuhui waibin* (*President Meets with Participants in the Asia-Pacific Democratic Cooperation Forum*) [internet] (2002 [cited Mar 19 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4>. The Taiwan Foundation for Democracy was established on June 17, 2003.

¹²²² Ellen Bork, *Replace ASEAN* (New American Century, 2001 [cited Mar 8 2004]), available from <http://www.newamericancentury.org/eastasia2001.htm>.

between it and the US.”¹²²³

On the issue of economy, Chen had urged Taiwan in July 2001 to face the challenge from a rising China to win the inevitable “economic war.”¹²²⁴ To avoid focusing outbound investment on the mainland and maintain economic independence, on July 29, 2002, Chen revived the discredited “Southwards Policy” of Lee Teng-hui to encourage Taiwanese investment in Southeast Asian countries.¹²²⁵ Annette Lu visited Indonesia in mid-August to demonstrate commitment to the policy.” Taipei also sought to reach FTA with regional countries. These measures helped restore Lee’s “no haste, be patient” policy. In the face of China’s economic rise, many countries in the region endured the blows of economic “hollow-out effect” and exodus of foreign direct investment.

On the issue of security, Premier Yu Hsi-kun (游錫堃) promised former US Defence Secretary William Cohen in a closed-door meeting in Haiti on August 7 that Taiwan planned to allocate NT\$700 billion for arms procurement through 2012.¹²²⁶ This was on the one hand Taipei’s strategy to appease America’s backlash against Chen’s “one side, one country” with a huge arms procurement plan. On the other hand, it was also Taipei’s commitment to the role of proxy balancer. Taipei’s call for regional security awareness goes beyond self-defence. Beijing had portrayed Taiwan independence as a terrorist movement. In return, on September 10, Chen argued that the planned “unlimited war” of the PRC against Taiwan was strikingly similar to terrorism. He claimed that the four hundred tactical guided missiles against Taiwan, adding to this arsenal fifty missiles a year, posed a grave threat to security in the Taiwan Strait and Asia-Pacific region.¹²²⁷

¹²²³ USDOS, *Good U.S.-China Relations Require Clarity, Directness* [internet] (2002 [cited Mar 8 2004]), available from <http://lists.state.gov/archives/us-china.html>.

¹²²⁴ OPROC, *Zongtong chuxi 'jingji fazhan zixun weiyuan huiyi' yubei huiyi (President Addresses the Opening Ceremony of the Preparatory Session of the Economic Development Advisory Conference)* ([cited]. See also Lin Chieh-yu, “Chen Urges Part Two of Miracle,” *TT*, Jul 23 2001.

¹²²⁵ OPROC, *Zongtong canjia yazhou Taiwan shanghui lianhe zonghui dijiujie nianhui kaimu dianli (President Attends the Opening Ceremony of the Ninth Annual Meeting of Asia-Taiwan Business Association)* (2002 [cited Mar 18 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

¹²²⁶ Ko Shu-ling, “Government Outlines Spending for Weapons,” *TT*, Aug 9 2002.

¹²²⁷ OPROC, *President Chen’s Remarks on the Eve of the Anniversary of the September 11 Attacks* ([cited]).

Domestically, "democracy, economy and security" promoted political nationalism. Internationally, this slogan was a reminder to the regional and global communities of the threats from China, a target of soft containment. Moreover, it promotes regional support of US-Japan security alliance and bilateral security pacts with the US, adding to the expansion of American influence and values in Asia Pacific and even on the global stage. Because of Taipei's lobbying efforts the European Parliament overwhelmingly passed a resolution calling on Beijing to remove all missiles aimed at Taiwan and gradually reduce its stockpile, calling on its member states to support Taiwan's participation in the WHO, urging EU Commission for a FTA with Taiwan, and demanding European Council of Ministers to invite Taiwan to the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).¹²²⁸ Taipei then launched a "one person, one letter" campaign, urging every Taiwanese to write a letter to an international figure or friend to highlight Beijing's bellicosity and focus international attention on the missile issue.

The Emergence of Secessionist Adventurism

9/11 might have slowed the proliferation of strategic symbiosis between the US and Taiwan; however, it has not altered the course in the slightest. The Congress has relentlessly sought further cooperation with Taiwan; the Bush administration has signed many important Taiwan-friendly bills into laws, including PL107-107, PL107-228, PL107-314, PL107-10, 107-158, PL108-28 and PL108-235. The progress of strategic symbiosis in the seemingly adverse climate of US-PRC anti-terrorism cooperation inspired Chen's adventurism, exemplified by the proposition of "one side, one country." Despite Washington's strong reaction to the proposition, when the pressure receded, he seemed to use it unabashedly. For example, he reaffirmed "one side, one country" during a meeting with the media on September 13.¹²²⁹ During the campaign for Taipei's and Kaohsiung's mayoral elections in late 2002, he kept repeating the argument of "one side, one country." Washington did not seek further explanation. This marks Chen's steps forward toward "pushing the envelope." Even in the face of adversities, he makes only limited concessions and abides his time for next step toward the goal.

¹²²⁸ Ibid., ([cited). See also TT, "Government Hails Europe for Its Support of Taiwan," Sep 6 2002.

¹²²⁹ Lin Mei-ling and Lin Wan-yu 林美玲, 林宛諭, "Bian chongshen liang'an yibian yiguo yao fen qingchu (Bian Reiterates That Each Side Is a Country Needs to Be Clear)," *UDN*, Sep 14 2002.

The Referendum and the New Constitution

Taiwanese Nationalism as an Election Gambit

The mayoral elections for Taipei and Kaohsiung, scheduled for December 7, 2002 were seen a prelude to the 2004 presidential campaign. The ruling performance of the DPP had been encumbered with global economic recession, lack of experience, ethnic and ideological conflict. The DPP had to find a way for drawing support. On October 25, 2002, at a campaign rally for the DPP Taipei City mayoral candidate Li Ying-yuan (李應元), Chen Shui-bian questioned opponent mainlander Ma Ying-Jeou's loyalty to Taiwan, insinuating that Ma's visits to Hong Kong and refusal of Chen's invitation to the presidential office amounted to accepting "one country, two systems."¹²³⁰ Because Ma was born in Hong Kong, Chen used the mainlander elite's link with China to imply that Ma is not an ethnic Taiwanese but a nostalgic Chinese, who presumably might accept Beijing's political arrangement and betray the interests of Taiwanese. This was DPP's conventional wisdom of ethno-nationalism. On November 23, more than 120,000 farmers and fishermen from all over Taiwan marched through the streets of Taipei to protest the failure of the ruling DPP to ease the impact of Taiwan's entry into the WTO upon their livelihood.¹²³¹ This was the largest street protest in Taiwan's history; even more alarming was that farmers and fishermen had been the traditional supporters of the DPP. The DPP was awakened to the danger of losing the presidency in 2004. Awakening native supporters' ethno-nationalism became a prime concern for the DPP.

Beijing's mishandling of such issues as Hong Kong and the SARS pandemic gave Chen a decent chance to bring attention to the issue of national identity and link it to ethno-nationalism. In December 2002, the government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region began a legislative drive to enact Article 23 of the Basic Law, which "seeks to eliminate any possibility of Hong Kong being used by any outside force to oppose China and foment chaos at home."¹²³² For many people on Hong Kong, this

¹²³⁰ Lin Chieh-yu and Sandy Huang, "Chen Lashes Out at Ma," *TT*, Oct 26 2002.

¹²³¹ Tsai Ting-i, "Taipei Sees Biggest Demo Ever," *TT*, Nov 24 2004.

¹²³² Chang Kuo-cheng 張國城, "What Article 23 Means for Taiwan," *TT*, Dec 27 2002.

move violated Beijing's promise of "no change for fifty years." Hundreds of thousands of Hong Kong residents took to the streets in protest. Taipei seized the chance to denounce Beijing's recklessness and betrayal of people. The outbreak of SARS in spring 2003 and Beijing's incompetent handling of the epidemic again accentuated the systematic differences across the Strait. Therefore, issues of Hong Kong and SARS helped the DPP to direct attention to the issue of national identity. Questioning the national identity of the pan-blue elites evoked ethno-nationalism and linked ethno-nationalism with national identity. To question the national identity of the pan-blue elites, the DPP began stressing the alien attributes of the pan-blue elites, of the national title and of the obsolete Constitution.

On August 16, 2003, Chen and Lee Teng-hui said that Taiwan would pay a painful price if conservative forces regained power.¹²³³ One week later, Lee urged the rectification of the nation's title from ROC to Taiwan so that Taiwan could become a "normal country;" he urged major constitutional changes to bring it into line with the reality of Taiwan's situation.¹²³⁴ These ideas were consistent with Chen's position on "Republic of Taiwan," "new constitution" and "referendum" in the 1991 "independence plank."¹²³⁵ In fact, Chen echoed Lee in late 2004 by declaring that he hoped to oversee significant changes that would make Taiwan a "normal country"¹²³⁶ and that he was to rename all of Taiwan's public agencies within the next two years.¹²³⁷ He thus declared on September 28, 2003 that a new constitution for Taiwan would be enacted in 2006.¹²³⁸ This smacked of secessionist fundamentalism.¹²³⁹ In this context, critics were right to comment that only a new constitution would build Taiwan into a "normal country,"¹²⁴⁰ and that drafting a new constitution indicated an intention to alter the *status quo*.¹²⁴¹ Since then, "normal country" has become a code for the fundamentalist mission that strongly inspires an ultimate change of *status quo*; and "new constitution" and "referendum" have become vehicles to accomplish this mission.

¹²³³ Chang Yun-ping, "Chen, Lee Warn of Conservative Forces' Return," *TT*, Aug 17 2003.

¹²³⁴ Chang Yun-ping, "Change of Name Must Happen: Lee."

¹²³⁵ See page 164 of this thesis.

¹²³⁶ See page 246 of this thesis.

¹²³⁷ See page 247 of this thesis.

¹²³⁸ Chang Yun-ping and Huang Tai-lin, "President Makes DPP Birthday Pledge."

¹²³⁹ For the definition of secessionist fundamentalism, see page 164 of this thesis.

¹²⁴⁰ Lin Chieh-yu and Ko Shu-ling, "Presidential Office, Cabinet Defend President," *TT*, Oct 1 2003.

¹²⁴¹ Hsu Yung-ming, "Drafting a Constitution Would Alter Status Quo."

In short, when “new constitution” and “referendum” rose to dominate the headlines at the end of 2003, the DPP was in fact attacking the central issue of national identity, hinting at the alien attributes of the pan-blue elites, evoking ethno-nationalism, and taunting Beijing in order to boost native support, as it had in the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections. In terms of international propaganda, however, “new constitution” was said to promote efficiency and “referendum” to consolidate democracy, and thereby allay any international misgivings about changing the *status quo*.

Converging Positions on the Referendum, New Constitution and Identity

Secessionism thus ascended to the main theme of the 2004 presidential election. On October 25, 2003, the DPP boasted that some 200,000 people had taken to the streets of Kaohsiung to support Chen’s appeal for a new constitution through a national referendum.¹²⁴² Chen started a seven-day trip to America in late October to attend a ceremony celebrating Panama’s Independence Day. On the issue of transit propaganda, probably because of conventional wisdom of boosting the DPP’s popularity, the Bush administration gave Chen an unprecedented two-day transit in New York and Alaska respectively. On the evening of October 31, after accepting an international human rights award in New York, Chen delivered a 31-minute speech promoting his ideas of referendum, new constitution and consolidating Taiwan as a normal, democratic country.¹²⁴³ Many US Congress members went to meet him. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage phoned Chen to express his welcome; even Neil Bush, President Bush’s younger brother, called on Chen at his hotel, which was seen as a top-secret but highly symbolic arrangement. At a November 1 banquet on the cruiser *New York*, Chen praised the US as Taiwan’s true friend; in response, AIT/Washington Director Shaheen said that Bush himself was Taiwan’s guardian angel. Chen even bragged about his two meetings with Secretary of State Colin Powell in Panama on November 3. While in transit in Alaska en route home on November 4, he received a red-carpet welcome and a medal of honour from Governor Frank Murkowski. The DPP lauded Chen’s successful trip; domestic opinion polls showed that Chen’s approval rating had risen, surpassing

¹²⁴² Lin Chieh-yu, “Kaohsiung Gets behind Referendum Bid,” *TT*, Oct 26 2003.

¹²⁴³ OPROC, *President Chen’s Address upon Receiving the Human Rights Award by the International League for Human Rights* [internet] (2003 [cited Jun 19 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4>.

that of KMT chairman Lien Chan.¹²⁴⁴ Five days after Bush had made a resounding call to expand democracy around the world in a speech to the National Endowment for Democracy, Chen seized the chance to reiterate that a new constitution should be created to continue the country's democratic progress and put before the public in a referendum on December 10, 2006, International Human Rights Day.¹²⁴⁵

Anxious about the popularity gains of Chen, the pan-blue camp had heated debates over the wisdom of shouldering the responsibility of national security and checking the outcry for direct civic power, something that had given an unfair advantage to the DPP in past years. A reversal of thinking gained ground in the pan-blue camp. They decided to let the DPP take the consequence of promoting direct civic power. On November 15, Lien Chan proposed the "New Constitution Trilogy" in an attempt to pre-empt DPP initiatives for a new constitution. Declaring that his trilogy was more radical than Chen's proposal and that it would be realized two years before Chen's would, Lien announced his intention to "propose our new constitution draft next February" for the first stage, "amend the current Constitution to add a referendum article" after the election for the second stage, and "put our new constitution draft to a referendum at the same time as the legislative elections next December" for the final stage.¹²⁴⁶ On the central issue of national identity, Wang Chin-ping (王金平), native Legislative Speaker and the future pan-blue campaign-director, said Lien himself had not denied "each side is a country."¹²⁴⁷

Implying US support of the DPP and Chen, AIT/Washington Director Shaheen emphatically indicated at a Thanksgiving dinner with the Taiwanese Club in Washington DC that Washington understood that Taiwan's requirements for referendum and new constitution were meant to advance efficiency but not for independence.¹²⁴⁸ On another occasion, she urged Taiwan to buy arms from the US to upgrade its C⁴ISR

¹²⁴⁴ For the detail of the trip see CNA, *Xishou tongqing, xinrong zhi lu* (Join to Celebrate a Trip of Prosperity) [internet] (Central New Agency, 2003 [cited Dec 26 2003]), available from <http://www.cna.com.tw/spec/index.php?no=0198>.

¹²⁴⁵ Chang Yun-ping, "Chen Drafts Timetable on Constitution," *TT*, Nov 12 2003.

¹²⁴⁶ Lin Chieh-yu and Jimmy Chuang, "Lien Trumpets KMT Constitutional Plan," *TT*, Nov 16 2003.

¹²⁴⁷ Yang Yu-wen, Lin Ching-yin, and Fan Ling-chia 楊羽雯, 林敬殷, 范凌嘉, "Wang Jinping zhuanfang (Interview with Wang Chin-ping)," *UDN*, Nov 18 2003.

¹²⁴⁸ Chang Tsung-chih 張宗智, "Tsai Yingwen: gongtou zhixian shi xingdong shihou (Tsai Ing-wen: Time to Enact a New Constitution through a National Referendum)," *UDN*, Nov 17 2003.

capabilities.¹²⁴⁹ She stressed that the US had never said it “opposes Taiwan independence” and what the US said was that it “doesn’t support Taiwan independence.” The implication was that arms deals served as insurance for Chen’s drive for secessionism.

Bush’s Taiwan Doctrine: Opposition to the Unilateral Change of *Status quo*

The Bush administration needed China’s help in denuclearising North Korea, reconstructing Iraq, stabilising Afghanistan, fighting terrorism, and stemming the growing trade deficit. In recent months the US had noticed Taipei’s provocative stance and Beijing’s hardening rhetoric. Responding to PRC’s warning of war if Taipei pressed for independence, and to the perilous race for the new constitution between the pan-blue and pan-green camps on Taiwan, US State Department Deputy Spokesman Adam Ereli bluntly declared on November 19 that the US would “oppose any attempt by either side to unilaterally change the situation – or change the *status quo* in the Taiwan Strait.”¹²⁵⁰ On November 20, Mr. Randy Schriver, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, warned that “if any of [new constitution and referendum] efforts touch on Taiwan’s status in a way that leads us in that direction towards independence, we’re not going to be supportive of that.” However, he repeatedly stated that under Bush’s Taiwan policy, that “the United States does not support Taiwan independence.”¹²⁵¹

Taking advantage of Bush’s *non-support of* instead of opposition to independence, Chen craftily stressed that the essence of his consultative referendum to coincide with the presidential election was defensive; one article of the DPP’s referendum legislation permitted the president to hold a referendum if the country was under attack and its sovereignty was subject to change. At this moment, the pan-blue camp reversed its check of referendum and new constitution. On November 27 the Legislative Yuan passed the referendum law that had been drafted by the pan-blue camp. The pan-blue’s

¹²⁴⁹ Chang Tsung-chih 張宗智, “Xiixin tan Taiwan anquan zuihao mai quanxian (Shaheen Says Taiwan Had Better Buy Comprehensive Insurance for Security),” *UDN*, Nov 17 2003.

¹²⁵⁰ USDOS, *Daily Press Briefing*, Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, Washington DC, November 19, 2003 [internet] (2003 [cited Dec 26 2003]), available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/26422.htm>.

¹²⁵¹ *U.S.-Taiwan-China Issues*, Randy Schriver, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Foreign Press Center Briefing, [internet] (GlobalSecurity.org, 2003 [cited Dec 26 2003]), available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/taiwan/2003/26534.htm>.

referendum law concurred with DPP position that the president had the power to hold a referendum in the case of a national emergency, but stated that the president could not hold a non-binding consultative referendum, a provision that deprived Chen of his justification to hold a consultative referendum.¹²⁵² However, Chen soon declared to hold the referendum as scheduled; in the first consultative defensive referendum, he would demand that the PRC renounce the use of force and immediately withdraw all ballistic missiles against Taiwan. He hinted ominously that the first referendum would be followed by the second and third referenda without specifying what their wording would be.¹²⁵³

The PRC had asserted that Chen was only using the defensive referendum under the pretext of democracy to break Taiwan away from China.¹²⁵⁴ The Bush administration had to adopt concrete precautions to prevent escalation of tensions. On December 1, James Moriarty, Director of Asian Affairs on the NSC, delivered a face-to-face caution and a letter from Bush to Chen to warn the latter about his referendum calling for China to withdraw ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan.¹²⁵⁵ On the very same day, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher declared, "we oppose any attempt by either side to unilaterally change the *status quo* in the Taiwan Straits ... we would be opposed to any referenda [*sic*] that would change Taiwan's status or move towards independence."¹²⁵⁶ Still Chen replied that Taiwan referendum was to focus on the threat of PRC missiles but not on independence; Chen seemed determined to use the "unneeded quarrel" to take on China and help his prospects for re-election.¹²⁵⁷

Washington was tired of Chen's manipulation of the referendum. On December 8, one day before meeting new PRC Prime Minister Wen Jiabao (溫家寶), the Bush administration issued an unusually blunt statement to Taipei, one that was broadly

¹²⁵² UDN, "Guo-Qin ban gongtoufa sandu, zhengyuan bu paichu fuyi (After Third Reading of the KMT-PFP Referendum Bill, the Executive Yuan Might Request for Reconsideration)," Nov 28 2003.

¹²⁵³ UDN, "Zongtong: 320 gongtong hanwei guojia zhuquan (President: 320 Referendum to Defend National Sovereignty)," Nov 30 2003.

¹²⁵⁴ David Stout, "Bush Tells China Leader He Opposes Taiwan's Referendum," *NYT*, Dec 9 2003.

¹²⁵⁵ David E. Sanger, "U.S. Asks Taiwan to Avoid a Vote Provoking China," *NYT*, Dec 9 2003.

¹²⁵⁶ USDOS, *Daily Press Briefing, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Washington DC, December 1, 2003* [internet] (2003 [cited Dec 25 2003]), available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/26776.htm>.

¹²⁵⁷ Keith Bradsher and Joseph Kahn, "Taiwan Referendum to Focus on Missiles, Not Independence," *NYT*, Dec 5 2003; *NYT*, "Unneeded Quarrel Over Taiwan," Dec 6 2003.

interpreted as a warning that Washington opposed any declaration of independence and even political discussion or a referendum on the subject.¹²⁵⁸ Hours later on December 9, Chen dismissed Bush's warning by insisting that the referendum would not centre on independence or try to alter the *status quo*, apparently believing that Bush's recent support of democracies around the world placed him in no position to condemn a freely held election on Taiwan.¹²⁵⁹ Chen repeated that the first referendum would certainly lead to a second one, without specifying what its goal would be.¹²⁶⁰

In response, an enraged Bush called the PRC a "partner in diplomacy working to meet the dangers of the 21st century."¹²⁶¹ He told Wen Jiabao that he opposed Chen's willingness "to make decisions unilaterally that change the *status quo*," a clear reference to Chen's drive for referendum.¹²⁶² Chen remained defiant despite Bush's explicit opposition. On December 22, he declared that he would abandon his "Five Noes" promise if Beijing stepped up its military threats.¹²⁶³ This unexpected addition of conditions and caveats to his basic policies substantiated the perceived willingness to change the *status quo*. He then declared on December 31 that the March election was a Taiwanese "holy war" against the Chinese Communists.¹²⁶⁴ Consequently, Chen's arguments and moves were no longer merely electoral gambits but concrete nation-building strategies. This raised considerable concerns. Kenneth Lieberthal feared that a new constitution written on Taiwan would acknowledge that the government in Taipei does not rule Shanghai or Chongqing but rules Taiwan.¹²⁶⁵ Harry Harding clearly indicated that the Americans were alert to Chen's intention of using the first "opposing-PRC-missile" referendum as a base for revoking his own "Five Noes"

¹²⁵⁸ Sanger, "U.S. Asks Taiwan to Avoid a Vote Provoking China."

¹²⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁶⁰ Kuo Hsien-sheng and Cheng Kuang-lung 郭先盛, 鄭光隆, "Bian: gongtou zouchu diyibu, jiuyou dierbu (Bian: The First Referendum Will Certainly Be Followed by a Second One)," *UDN*, Dec 9 2003.

¹²⁶¹ USDOS, *Bush Calls U.S., China 'Partners in Diplomacy'* [internet] (2003 [cited Dec 10 2003]), available from <http://lists.state.gov/SCRIPTS/WA-USIAINFO.EXE?A1=ind0312b&L=us-china>.

¹²⁶² USDOS, *Bush Reaffirms U.S. Commitment to One-China Policy* [internet] (2003 [cited Dec 10 2003]), available from <http://lists.state.gov/SCRIPTS/WA-USIAINFO.EXE?A1=ind0312b&L=us-china>. See also Stout, "Bush Tells China Leader He Opposes Taiwan's Referendum."

¹²⁶³ Lin Chieh-yu, "Chen Tells China He May Revoke 'Five Noes' Pledge," *TT*, Dec 23 2003.

¹²⁶⁴ Reuters, "China Condemns Taiwan's President," *WP*, Jan 1 2004.

¹²⁶⁵ Kenneth Lieberthal, "Dire Strait: The Risks On Taiwan," *WP*, Jan 8 2004.

and for more radical independence policies in his following referenda.¹²⁶⁶ Harding pointed out that one of the most dearly-held beliefs of secessionist Taiwanese was that as soon as Taiwan declared formal independence, Beijing would strike against Taiwan; the US would then be forced to intervene and become embroiled in a war with the PRC.¹²⁶⁷

Peace Referendum

Tying Technical Arms Acquisition to Ideological Referendum

To allay international concern and pressure, Chen moderated his position on January 16 by adding the peace factor to his “defensive referendum.” He made a televised appeal that a “peace referendum” was to increase people’s awareness of PRC threats and maintain the *status quo* of peace. He announced two questions that would appear on the peace referendum on March 20:

1.The People of Taiwan demand that the Taiwan Strait issue be resolved through peaceful means. Should Mainland China refuse to withdraw the missiles it has targeted at Taiwan and to openly renounce the use of force against us, would you agree that the Government should acquire more advanced anti-missile weapons to strengthen Taiwan's self-defence capabilities?

2.Would you agree that our Government should engage in negotiation with Mainland China on the establishment of a “peace and stability” framework for cross-Strait interactions in order to build consensus and for the welfare of the peoples on both sides?¹²⁶⁸

These two questions abandoned the previous demands that the PRC renounce the use of force against Taiwan and immediately remove all ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan; and, they had nothing to do with a new constitution symbolizing Taiwan’s new status as a “normal country.” The first questions were designed to appease the Bush administration with implication of huge arms acquisitions so as to deliver the first ever referendum, which might benefit Chen’s bid for re-election and pave the way for future referenda.

Undermining the Unification Ideology of the Pan-Blue Camp

By linking peace and democracy, the “peace referendum” strengthened nationalism at

¹²⁶⁶ Sun Yang-ming 孫揚明, “Hua fu xue zhe Hehanli: gongtou wenti zai taidu mailuo (Washington Scholar Harry Harding: The Referendum Issue in the Context of Taiwan Independence),” *UDN*, Jan 12 2004.

¹²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶⁸ Keith Bradsher, “Taiwan's Leader Tones Down Referendum Opposed by Beijing,” *NYT*, Jan 17 2004; OPROC, *President Chen's Televised Statement of the Peace Referendum on March 20* [news release] (2004 [cited Jan 19 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4>.

home. Annette Lu accused the KMT of Chinese chauvinism and argued that the 2004 presidential election was a struggle of "Taiwanese heart against Chinese heart."¹²⁶⁹ This strategy caused confusion and debates on how to respond to the "peace referendum" in the pan-blue camp.¹²⁷⁰ On January 26, questioning the legality and necessity of the planned referendum, all of the fourteen pan-blue mayors and county commissioners urged Chen to reconsider the "illegal and unnecessary" referendum.¹²⁷¹ In a debate with Chen on February 21, Lien Chan declared he would not vote for the illegal and controversial referendum.¹²⁷² Inactivity by not casting vote became a standard measure of opposing the referendum. The pan-green camp then launched "Remembering February 28 Hand-in-Hand Rally" to rally popular support for referendum. On February 28, more than one million people formed a human chain around Taiwan. The success nudged Chen's popularity rating higher. Lien in turn appealed to neo-Taiwanese-ism for support.

Softening International Opposition

All the signals coming from Washington and other places continued to indicate that the referendum was highly risky and irresponsible. Although all the evidence clearly suggests that Washington did not want the referendum to go ahead, it appeared that the US was unable to prevent Taiwan holding its first referendum. American high-level officials thus informed the Japanese news media on February 18 that the US could accept the referendum in Taiwan as long as it did not involve any attempt to change the *status quo*. The DPP caucus interpreted this as the first joint endorsement by the US and Japan for the referendum. In fact, the DPP had made this prediction months earlier.¹²⁷³ This was indirectly corroborated when Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage modified his previous remark by adding on March 10 that the necessity of the

¹²⁶⁹ Zhongyangshe 中央社, "Lu Xiulian: daxuan shi Taiwanxin duikang Zhongguoxin (Lu Hsiu-lien: Presidential Election Is a Competition between Taiwanese Heart and Chinese Heart)," *UDN*, Jan 17 2004.

¹²⁷⁰ Lin Ching-yin 林敬殷, "320 gongtou, lanjun taidu zai zhuanbian buzai dizhi (The Pan-blue Camp No Longer Boycotts the March 20 Referendum)," *UDN*, Jan 21 2004.

¹²⁷¹ Huang Tai-lin, "Local Chiefs Rail against Referendum," *TT*, Jan 27 2004.

¹²⁷² Chang Yun-ping, "Candidates Focus on the Referendum," *TT*, Feb 22 2004.

¹²⁷³ Hsu Ya-ching 許雅靜, "Minjindangtuan: Mei-Ri wei Taiwan gongtou beishu zaozai yiliao (DPP Caucus Has Predicted US-Japan Endorsement of Taiwan Referendum as the Final Result Months Earlier)," *UDN*, Feb 20 2004.

referendum was for the people of Taiwan to decide.¹²⁷⁴

Strengthening Proxy Balancing

The fact that both the ruling and the opposition parties on Taiwan were considering a new constitution accentuated the security clause of the TRA.¹²⁷⁵ The *Washington Times* reported on March 5 that the Pentagon had unofficially agreed to sell Aegis destroyers to Taiwan.¹²⁷⁶ After all, in the face of rising military threat of the PRC, strengthening proxy balancing became a practical consensus between the conservative Pentagon and the Taiwanese nationalist government.

The Fruits of Adventurism

Overall, the transition from the original referendum to peace referendum provides an edifying lesson. Originally, Chen had planned to enact a new constitution through a national referendum to promote Taiwan as a “normal country.” This was to implement 1991 “independence plank” to change the *status quo*, an aspiration of the fundamentalists. With Washington’s timely aid to his transit diplomacy and the promotion of Taiwan identity by the fundamentalist faction, Chen’s adventurism consolidated Taiwanese nationalism. When facing pressure from Washington, he retreated first to “defensive referendum” and then to “peace referendum” but managed to secure US permission to hold the first referendum and strengthened proxy balancing. Adventurism with limited compromise seemed an effective way to maximize his political interests.

Implications of the 2004 Presidential Election

Domestic: Converging Ideologies with Tenacious Wounds

One week before the presidential election, more than one million people joined nationwide marches and rallies organized by the pan-blue camp against Chen. The

¹²⁷⁴ Lin Pao-ching 林寶慶, “Armitage tan gongtou ying you Taiwan renmin jue ding (Armitage: Necessity of Referendum is up to the People on Taiwan to Decide),” *UDN*, Mar 12 2004.

¹²⁷⁵ Harvey Feldman, “More Bowing to Beijing,” *WP*, Jan 17 2004.

¹²⁷⁶ Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Inside the Ring,” *Washington Times*, Mar 5 2004, A05. See also Lin Pao-ching 林寶慶, “Huashengdun shibao: Mei feizhengshi tongyi shou Tai shendunjian (Washington Times: US Unofficially Agrees to Sell Aegis-Class Destroyers to Taiwan),” *UDN*, Mar 6 2004.

event was an obvious move to counter the effect of the stunning turnout of the "Remembering February 28 Hand-in-Hand Rally." KMT Chairman Lien Chan and PFP Chairman James Soong kissed the earth in Taipei and Taichung respectively to demonstrate their love for Taiwan. Lien asserted that the ROC was a sovereign state which "we can not, and will not allow to be swallowed, merged or united with" the PRC and swore to defend Taiwan's freedom and democracy with blood and life.¹²⁷⁷ This again indicates that the consolidation of Taiwan identity forced the members of the pro-unification camp to identify their interests with Taiwan; to win support, the pan-blue camp had to promote political nationalism, another departure from pro-unification ideology. However, this does not mean that the ethnic conflict was over: to boost Chen's rating, Lee Teng-hui openly urged Taiwanese to eradicate the alien KMT regime and conservatives.¹²⁷⁸

In this neck-to-neck campaign, the mysterious attempted assassination episode on the afternoon of March 19 played a key role in the re-election of Chen.¹²⁷⁹ Some estimated the plot resulted in Chen's gain of 120,000 ballots and thus vanquished the presumably winning Lien-Soong opposition coalition.¹²⁸⁰ Ultimately, Chen-Lu claimed 50.11% of the votes, only 0.22% (29,518 votes) higher than the 49.89% claimed by the Lien-Soong.¹²⁸¹ The referendum was invalidated because less than half of the electorate cast ballots on the two referenda questions. The election results had two domestic implications. Firstly, compared to Chen's rating of 39.3% in 2000, 50.11% was a considerable rise in terms of support. The ruling DPP benefited from controlling the primary administrative resources; that is, the ruling DPP uses the administrative resources to reward its followers and consolidate the network of political support.

¹²⁷⁷ Huang Tai-lin, "Lien, Soong Hold Dramatic Rally," *TT*, Mar 14 2004; Tsai Hui-ping, Chen Chih-ping, and Lin Hsin-hui 蔡惠萍, 陳志平, 林新輝, "Lien-Song qinwen tudi, fanlan qunzhong feiteng (Pan-Blue Supporters Seethed with Excitement when Lien-Soong Kissed the Earth)," *UDN*, Mar 14 2004.

¹²⁷⁸ Lo Hsiao-ho and Liu Pao-chieh 羅曉荷, 劉寶傑, "Lee Teng-hui gaohu: chedi xiaomie wailai zhengquan (Lee Teng-hui: Root out the Alien Regime)," *UDN*, Mar 14 2004.

¹²⁷⁹ The blue camp suspected that the assassination was directed by Chen and his close protégé. See Chen Chih-ping 陳志平, "Guomindang ceshi baogao 319 qiangji'an yi you 2 xianchang (KMT's Ballistic Testing Report Suggests the 319 Gunshot Case Had 2 Scenes)," *UDN*, Jul 1 2004; Huang Kuo-liang 黃國樑, "Shuai Huamin: 319 qiangji'an buneng paichu zidao ziyuan (Shuai Hua-min: 319 Gunshot Case Should Not Rule Out the Possibility of a Self-Interest Scheme)," *UDEN*, Jun 30 2004.

¹²⁸⁰ *UDEN*, "Qiangji xiaoying xuanpiao xiaozhang 12 wan (Assassination Plot Results in a Flux of 120,000 Ballots)," Mar 21 2004.

¹²⁸¹ *Xuanju niandu ji leibie yilan biao (A Table of Election Years and Categories)*, ([cited]).

Chen's re-election was expected to expand the gain-loss gap in bigger Taipei and in the other parts of Taiwan within the next four years. Secondly, given the facts that each of the rival ideological camps has the support of about half of the voters on Taiwan and that the pan-blue camp is phasing out its unification platform, the consolidation of Taiwanese nationalism would facilitate more competition and collaboration between the rivals toward an ideological convergence.

International Arena: A Paradoxical Crack in Strategic Symbiosis

The White House delayed extending its official congratulation until March 26. Even then, the congratulatory statement was only issued on-line by the Press Secretary.¹²⁸² If this was retaliation against Chen's dismissal of Bush's warnings on the referendum issue, Chen was unmoved and remained defiant. He declared on March 29 in an interview with the *Washington Post* that his narrow re-election victory was a mandate from voters to press ahead with an aggressive agenda to develop Taiwan as an "independent, sovereign country" despite the risk of war with China.¹²⁸³ Even after China warned that a new constitution would sever Taiwan's legal ties with the mainland, and senior Chinese military officers declared that China was willing to go to war against Taiwan over the issue, even if it means a global boycott of the Olympic Games in 2008,¹²⁸⁴ Chen vowed in a BBC interview on March 31 to press ahead with plans to put the new constitution to a direct referendum, insisting that constitutional reform was "never a timetable for independence."¹²⁸⁵ His defiant adventurism splits the US-Taiwan symbiotic partnership. On the one hand, he worked hand-in-glove with US conservative forces to strengthen proxy balancing. On the other hand, he is undoing Taipei's influence operations.

Ever-Strengthening Proxy Balancing

Chen's determination for a new constitution even at the cost of war and his firm belief that the US would never give up Taiwan pushed proxy balancing to the fore. The Pentagon informed Congress on March 30 that it would sell to Taiwan two Ultra-High

¹²⁸² *Statement on Taiwan Elections*, [internet] (White House, 2004 [cited May 14 2004]), available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040326-6.html>.

¹²⁸³ Philip P. Pan and David E. Hoffman, "Taiwan's President Maintains Hard Line; Chen Rebukes China in Interview," *WP*, Mar 30 2004.

¹²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸⁵ BBC, *Chen Vows Constitutional Reform* [internet] (BBC, 2004 [cited May 14 2004]), available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3581407.stm>.

Frequency long-range Early Warning Radar systems. These radar systems provided Taiwan with early warning and detection of ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft and would become a vital component of Taiwan's air and missile defence architecture.¹²⁸⁶ The *New York Times* reported on April 7 that B-52's were back in Guam after more than decade, part of a wide-ranging Pentagon drive to make Guam a "power projection hub" on the edge of Asia.¹²⁸⁷ When pressed by China to reduce American arms sales to Taiwan to lessen the risk of conflict across the Strait, US Vice President Dick Cheney rejected it, declaring "We are going to assist Taiwan to acquire the capability to defend itself," adding that China had "significantly increased" its own military deployments against Taiwan in recent years,¹²⁸⁸ though he said that if Taiwan declares independence, the US will not protect it from Chinese aggression.¹²⁸⁹

The House of Representatives passed the *National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005* on May 20, 2004, the same day that Chen delivered his inaugural address. Section 1215 of the Act stipulates the exchanges of senior military officer (a general or flag officer of the Armed Forces on active duty) and senior official (a civilian official of the Department of Defence at the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence or above) to focus on defending Taiwan against potential submarine and missile attacks by the PLA.¹²⁹⁰ Although Section 1215 was finally dropped in the final version of the PL108-375, the legislative history of the bill reaffirmed US conservative forces' intention to restore its para-strategic alliance with Taiwan.

Noting Beijing's concern over the ruling party's secessionism and opposition parties' departure from pro-unification ideology, the Pentagon's annual report on China's military power to the Congress stated that Beijing was preparing for military contingencies despite its leaders' talk of peaceful reunification.¹²⁹¹ The report suggested that Taiwan

¹²⁸⁶ Lin Pao-ching 林寶慶, "Mei shouwo liangtao changcheng yujing leida (US Sells to Taiwan Two Sets of Long-Range Early Warning Radar)," *UDN*, Apr 2 2004. See also USDOS, *Kelly Says Taiwan Relations Act Key to West Pacific Stability (State Department official's April 21 Congressional testimony)* (2004 [cited May 18 2004]), available from <http://lists.state.gov/archives/us-china.html>.

¹²⁸⁷ NYT, "Looking for Friendly Overseas Base, Pentagon Finds It Already Has One," *NYT*, Apr 7 2004.

¹²⁸⁸ NYT, "Cheney Presses Beijing on North Korea," *NYT*, Apr 14 2004.

¹²⁸⁹ Judy Wu, "It's Not Fair," *TT*, May 8 2004.

¹²⁹⁰ *To Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2005 for Military Activities of the Department of Defense*, 108th Congress, H.R.4200. It became PL108-375 on October 28, 2004.

¹²⁹¹ DoD, "FY04 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power," (Washington DC: DoD, 2004), 11-12.

might target the Three Gorges Dam as an asymmetric deterrence against China's attempted invasion.¹²⁹²

On June 10 Chen declared that NT\$610.8 billion (US\$18.25 billion) arms budget was the price for maintaining US-Taiwan defence relationship.¹²⁹³ Five days later, the bipartisan US-China Economic and Security Review Commission called on the US to "conduct a fresh assessment of the one-China policy, given the changing realities in China and Taiwan" and the "continued viability" of not recognizing Taiwan as a separate country, and reviewed whether the US needs to improve defence support for Taiwan.¹²⁹⁴

In July, the PLA carried out its largest military exercises of the year on Dongshan (東山) Island, featuring an amphibious mock invasion of Taiwan backed by guided missiles to intimidate secessionists.¹²⁹⁵ Meanwhile, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld indicated in Japan that American base on Ryukyu was closely monitoring the Taiwan Strait.¹²⁹⁶ The Pentagon tested in its Operation Summer Pulse '04 a worldwide and simultaneous deployment of its seven aircraft carrier battle groups.¹²⁹⁷ The National Defence University launched a "Dragon's Thunder" war game on July 12 to specifically examine responses to an increasingly likely Chinese military action against Taiwan.¹²⁹⁸

On July 15, *Taipei Times*, a pro-DPP English-language newspaper, published a

¹²⁹² Ibid., 52-53.

¹²⁹³ Lo Chia-wei 羅嘉薇, "6108 yi jungou, Bian: weixi Tai-Mei fangwei guanxi bixu daijia (Bian: NT\$610.8 Billion Arms Budget a Necessary Price for Maintaining US-Taiwan Defence Relationship)," *UDN*, Jun 11 2004.

¹²⁹⁴ Bill Gertz, "Panel Suggests Revisiting U.S. 'One-China' Policy," *The Washington Times*, Jun 16 2004; Charles Snyder, "US Group Suggests 'One China' Rethink," *TT*, Jun 16 2004.

¹²⁹⁵ *TT*, "Beijing Plans Massive Military Exercises This Month," Jul 5 2004.

¹²⁹⁶ Chen Shih-chang, "Lunsifei: Liuqiu Meijun jidi miqie jianshi Taihai (Rumsfeld: US Base on Ryukyu Closely Monitors Taiwan Strait)," *UDN*, Jul 7 2004.

¹²⁹⁷ The goals of the Summer Pulse '04 include "maintaining the ability to respond to crises around the globe, enhance regional security and relationships, meet combatant commander requirements including forward presence, and demonstrate a commitment to allies and coalition partners." See DoD, *Seven Carrier Strike Groups Underway for Exercise 'Summer Pulse '04'* [internet] (DoD, 2004 [cited Aug 12 2004]), available from <http://www.cffc.navy.mil/dodrelease.htm>.

¹²⁹⁸ Jim Wolf, *Pentagon War Game Based on China Threat to Taiwan* [internet] (Reuters, 2004 [cited Aug 12 2004]), available from <http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=ZIBE4HU20OVGEGRBAE0CFEY?type=domesticNews&storyID=5685376>. See also Hung Po-chang, "Mei longyin yanxi jiaxiang Zhonggong duiTai junshi weixie (US 'Dragon's Thunder' Exercise Simulates PRC Military Threat against Taiwan)," *UDEN*, Jul 16 2004.

sensational story: a front-page report by Beijing-backed *Wen Wei Po* (文匯報) in Hong Kong said PRC military chief Jiang Zemin had vowed to attack Taiwan by 2020 in response to Taiwan's independence timetable.¹²⁹⁹ In turn, the US planned to deploy another aircraft carrier in either Guam or Hawaii to monitor the tensions in the Korean peninsula and Taiwan Strait.¹³⁰⁰ On July 18, *Wen Wei Po* accused the US of supporting Taiwan's development of strategic WMD, including mid- and long-range guided missiles, biological and chemical weapons, depleted uranium bombs, long-range bombers, advanced fighters and submarines and of assisting Taiwan to construct a space satellite network to maintain surveillance on the southeast coastal provinces of the PRC.¹³⁰¹

Critics believed the PLA was determined to obtain absolute maritime supremacy over 500 nautical miles of its coast in the next ten years.¹³⁰² From April to November 2004, Taiwan engaged in its most ambitious annual military exercise, codenamed "Han Kuang (Han Glory) 20," in which Taiwan has for the first time used the US Joint Theatre Computer Simulation System.¹³⁰³ On December 21, the AIT verified that the US government would dispatch active military officers and civilian staff of the Pentagon to replace those working in the AIT to provide needed defence assistance.¹³⁰⁴ These events indicate the US military was taking definite steps to enhance interoperability for future joint US-Taiwan operations against the PLA.

Vitiated Influence Operations

Chen's adventurism was cause for concern. It was reported that before the Taiwan election, Bush was so infuriated about Chen's deliberate escalation of cross-Strait tension

¹²⁹⁹ Jiang said the period "before or after 2020 is the time to resolve the Taiwan issue." TT, "Jiang Promises to Attack Taiwan by 2020," Jul 17 2004.

¹³⁰⁰ Chen Shih-chang, "Xi Taipingyang Mei ni bushu diersao hangkong mujian (US Plans to Deploy Second Aircraft Carrier in Western Pacific)," *UDN*, Jul 17 2004.

¹³⁰¹ Ni Wan-chun, "Wenhuibao: Mei zhu Tai yanzhi huimiexing wuqi (Wen Wei Po: US Assists Taiwan to Develop Weapon of Mass Destruction)," *UDEN*, Jul 20 2004.

¹³⁰² Ni Wan-chun, "Zhonggong zizhijian chengjun jin hua sannian duo shijian (It Takes Only a Little over Three Years for PRC Indigenous Warships to Join Active Service)," *UDEN*, Jul 21 2004; *UDN*, "Zhonggong qianjian shinian mubiao zhengduo wubaili zhihaiquan (PRC Submarines Aim to Gain Maritime Supremacy over 500 Nautical Miles off Its Coast in Ten Years)," Jul 30 2004.

¹³⁰³ Ting Shu-fan, "Ziwo shixian de Taihai weiji (The Self-Realizing Taiwan Strait Crisis)," *UDN*, Jul 22 2004. Former Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Command Adminral Dennis Blair had headed a 20-strong military delegation and observed a "Han Kuang 19" in 2003. He observed some of the "Han Kuang 20" secessions in 2004.

¹³⁰⁴ Wang Li-chuan, "Mei junzhi renyuan zhuTai, Zhonggong fandui (PRC Opposes the Assignment of Active US Military Personnel to Taiwan)."

that he referred to Chen as a "son of a bitch."¹³⁰⁵ After the election, Chen's adventurism pushed Beijing to harden its policy. On April 15, the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) of China's State Council asserted that Chen's agenda for a new constitution and national referendum was a timetable for independence.¹³⁰⁶ This pushed the US to clarify its position on *status quo*. Observing the twenty-fifth Anniversary of the TRA, James A. Kelly, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said during a congressional hearing that the term "*status quo*" was up to the US government to define:

For Beijing, this means no use of force or threat to use force against Taiwan. For Taipei, it means exercising prudence in managing all aspects of cross-Strait relations. For both sides, it means no statements or actions that would unilaterally alter Taiwan's status.¹³⁰⁷

Kelly reaffirmed that "Our foremost concern is maintaining peace and stability in order to advance US interests, spare the region of the dangers of war, safeguard Taiwan's democracy, and promote China's constructive integration into the global community as well as the spread of personal freedom."¹³⁰⁸ He warned both sides against changing the US-defined *status quo*. To the understanding of John Tkacik, "*status quo*" means "no unification, no independence and no war."¹³⁰⁹ AIT/Taipei Director Douglas H. Paal had long been irritated by Chen's defiance of American opposition to the new constitution and referendum issues. He specifically warned Taipei not to take Beijing's military threat as an empty threat and not to regard the 2008 Olympic Games as a good time for declaring Taiwan independence.¹³¹⁰

The problem is that Taiwanese and Chinese nationalisms continue to feed each other. Each side is eager to shift the "*status quo*" in its own favour. On May 9, China's Prime

¹³⁰⁵ Sun Yang-ming 孫揚明, "Buxi cengyong yingwen 'sanzijing' maBian (Bush Ever Used 'Son of Bitch' to Curse Bian)," *UDN*, Dec 24 2004.

¹³⁰⁶ Melody Chen, "MAC Blasts Back at China," *TT*, Apr 15 2004. See also UDN, "Guotaiban: gongtou zhixian jiushi taidu shijianbiao (Taiwan Affairs Office: Referendum and New Constitution Are Timetable for Taiwan Independence)," Apr 15 2004.

¹³⁰⁷ James A. Kelly, *Overview of U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan - Testimony at a Hearing on Taiwan, House International Relations Committee, April 21, 2004* (USDOS, 2004 [cited Dec 4 2004]), available from <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/31649.htm>.

¹³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, ([cited]).

¹³⁰⁹ CNA, "US Support Weakening, Confab Told," 4.

¹³¹⁰ Huang Mei-hui 黃美惠, "Baodaoge: Beijing aoyun bushi Taiwan hushenfu (Douglas Paal Warned Taipei Not to Take the 2008 Olympic Games as an Amulet for Declaring Independence)," *UDN*, May 6 2004; UDN, "Baodaoge: liang'an 92nian dacheng yiZhong gezi biao (Paal Douglas: Both Sides Reached the Agreement of 'One China, Separate Description' in 1992)," May 6 2004.

Minister Wen Jiabao declared that he would consider enacting a "Unification Law."¹³¹¹ The two main goals of the planned "Unification Law" were the first to counter Chen's plan for a new constitution and arrange a timetable for unification, and secondly to counter America's TRA.¹³¹² Beijing had apparently entered a new and possibly violent phase in its decades-long struggle against Taiwan independence.¹³¹³ By contrast, Chen declared in his second inaugural address on May 20 to enact a timely, relevant and viable new constitution before his term expired in 2008.¹³¹⁴ Deliberately avoiding any mention of his "Five Noes," Chen touched on lightly his promise to continue to "honour the promises and principles set forth in my inaugural speech in 2000."¹³¹⁵ Fundamentalists were pleased that Chen no longer referred to "Five Noes."¹³¹⁶

Taipei continued to call for other democratic countries in Asia-Pacific to join Taiwan to counterbalance the military threat posed by the PRC. Chen's address to the Second Democratic Pacific Assembly on August 13 again singled out Beijing as the common enemy of Asia-Pacific in the name of democracy, peace and economic prosperity. However, during a Beijing trip, Australia Foreign Minister Alexander Downer warned that Taiwan should not provoke cross-Strait tensions and that Australia was not obligated to help the US defend Taiwan, though Australia Prime Minister John Howard later corrected the remark.¹³¹⁷ Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong (李顯龍) said on August 22, "If the [cross-Strait] conflict is provoked by Taiwan, then Singapore cannot support Taiwan." He also said that Singapore would not recognize Taiwan if it declared independence.¹³¹⁸ On September 24, Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo

¹³¹¹ Chiu Pei-fen 仇佩芬, "Wen Jiabao: renzhen kaolu ding 'tongyifa' (Wen Jiabao: Seriously Consider Enacting a Unification Law)," *UDN*, May 11 2004.

¹³¹² *UDN*, "Li Jiaquan: tongyifa zhendui taidu, hui tixian shijianbiao (Li Jiaquan: Unification Law Aims to Counter Independence and Will Embody a Timetable for Unification)," May 17 2004.

¹³¹³ Willy Lam, *Beijing Steps up Pressure on Chen* [internet] (CNN, 2004 [cited May 25 2004]), available from <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/05/18/china.willycolumn/>.

¹³¹⁴ OPROC, *President Chen's Inaugural Address 'Paving the Way for a Sustainable Taiwan'* [internet] (2004 [cited May 21 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4>.

¹³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, ([cited]).

¹³¹⁶ Huang Ya-shih, Li Shun-te, and Liu Pao-chieh 黃雅詩, 李順德, 劉寶傑, "Dupai manyi: 'sibu yi meiyou' tongtong chuju (Secessionists Are Satisfied with No Repetition of 'Five Noes' in the Inauguration Speech)," *UDN*, May 21 2004.

¹³¹⁷ Joy Su, "Mark Chen Slams 'Unfit' Aussie Minister Downer," *TT*, Aug 21 2004; Tien Su-i 田思怡, "Chen Tangshan pi Ao waizhang shiyan xiang Zhong chaogong (Mark Chen Denounces Australian Foreign Minister as Paying Tribute to China for His Indiscreet Remark on Taiwan)," *UDN*, Aug 21 2004.

¹³¹⁸ Li Ling-i 李令儀, "Li Xianlung: Taiwan ruo tiaopi liang'an chongtu Xing bu zhichi (Singapore PM Li Xianlung: No Support for Taiwan If It Causes Conflict across the Strait)," *UDN*, Aug 23 2004; Reuters,

(楊榮文) told the UN General Assembly that actions by Taiwan's independence groups could provoke war with China and "at stake is the stability of the entire Asia-Pacific region." In response, Mark Chen, head of Taiwan's MOFA, chastised Singapore on September 27 in Hoklo: "Singapore is a country only as big as a piece of snot" and "Singapore holds China's *lan pa* (卵葩, testicles) with its hands."¹³¹⁹

On September 25, in response to an anti-government arms procurement budget protest, DPP Premier Yu proposed a "balance of terror" to safeguard Taiwan's security.¹³²⁰ Senior Presidential advisor Koo Kwang-min (辜寬敏) placed a full-page advertisement in *New York Times* and *Washington Post* to berate Bush and urge the US to abandon "one China" policy.¹³²¹ Mark Chen was said to have expressed similar opinions to some pro-Taiwan scholars such as Richard Bush and John Tkacik in a conference in September.¹³²²

The increased dynamics of secessionism justified regional concerns. In an interview in Hong Kong on October 25, Secretary of State Colin Powell urged both sides to "look for ways of improving dialogue across the Straits and move forward toward that day when we will see a peaceful unification." He reaffirmed "one China" by saying that "Taiwan is not independent. It does not enjoy sovereignty as a nation,"¹³²³ although he amended "peaceful unification" into "peaceful resolution" on October 27.¹³²⁴ The DPP government remained defiant. On November 21, Chen Shui-bian declared his hope to

Singapore PM Sets out Taiwan Stance [internet] (Taiwan Security Research, 2004 [cited Dec 16 2004]), available from <http://taiwansecurity.org/Reu/2004/Reuters-230804.htm>.

¹³¹⁹ Melody Chen, "Foreign Minister Slams Singapore," *TT*, Sep 28 2004. In the Taiwanese, or Hoklo language, *lan pa* means "testicles." If someone holds another's *lan pa*, he is fawning over that person.

¹³²⁰ Ko Shu-ling, "Yu Heralds a 'Balance of Terror'," *TT*, Sep 26 2004.

¹³²¹ Chang Tsung-chih 張宗智, "Gu Kuanmin Niushi Huayou deng quanban guanggao pi Mei yiZhong zhengce (Taiwan Presidential Advisor Koo Kwang-ming Put a Full-Page Ad in the NYT and WP Blasting US 'One China' Policy)," *UDN*, Oct 6 2004; Charles Snyder, "US Officials Give Koo Ad Covert Support," *TT*, Oct 10 2004, 1.

¹³²² Chang Tsung-chih 張宗智, "Mei guanyuan yihuo: guanggao neirong shifou daibiao Bian lichang? (US Official Wonders: Is the Ad Really the Position of Bian?)," *UDN*, Oct 6 2004.

¹³²³ USDOS, *Interview with Anthony Yuen of Phoenix TV* [internet] (2004 [cited Dec 16 2004]), available from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/37361.htm>.

¹³²⁴ USDOS, *Interview with Ron Insana of CNBC* [internet] (2004 [cited Dec 16 2004]), available from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/37487.htm>.

bring the constitution into line with the reality so to make Taiwan a "normal country."¹³²⁵ On December 5, he pledged to change the names of all government and diplomatic agencies in Taiwan within two years. The declaration and promise proved that Chen's "normal country" agenda was identical to Lee's "normal country." The Bush administration is not naïve enough to fail to appreciate the risks associated with the code name "normal country." Deputy Spokesman of State Department Ereli made it clear on December 7, "changes of terminology ... would appear to unilaterally change Taiwan's status, and for that reason we're not supportive of them."¹³²⁶ Even so, Chen's MOFA was determined to change the names of Taiwan's quasi-embassies abroad.

Pan-Blue: America's Alternative

In early 2004, US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice urged Americans to help China in its huge transition to realize the integration of economic freedoms and political liberty so that it could become a constructive international player. She reasserted that no one should try and change the *status quo*.¹³²⁷ However, after Chen's re-election, if the pan-green camp dominated the legislature in the 2004 year-end election, Chen's adventurism to "push the envelope" could only escalate cross-Strait tensions to the brink of war. In contrast, the pan-blue camp has undergone a metamorphosis since the 1980s. "New Taiwanese" is the dominant belief of the pan-blue elite; unification is slipping out of its platform. In November 2004, the Ministry of Education released a proposed Taiwan-centric curriculum for high schools, stating that the ROC is not the legal government of Taiwan.¹³²⁸ This rekindled the debate over Taiwan's legal status. Despite the exchange of fire, the pan-green and pan-blue camps reached a consensus on "popular sovereignty." Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kau Ying-mao (高英茂) argued that realistic "popular sovereignty" is an alternative legal structure that could be

¹³²⁵ OPROC, *Zongtong canjia 'Huang Xinjie xiansheng jinian jiangzuo' (President Attends 'A Commemoration Lecture on Mr. Huang Hsin-chieh')* [internet] (2004 [cited Nov 22 2004]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

¹³²⁶ USDOS, *Press Briefing Transcripts - Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, December 6, 2004* [internet] (2004 [cited Dec 7 2004]), available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2004/39460.htm>.

¹³²⁷ Condoleezza Rice, *The National Security Advisor Delivers Remarks at The McConnell Center for Political Leadership* [internet] (White House, 2004 [cited May 6 2004]), available from <http://usembassy.state.gov/mumbai/wwwwhwashnews1467.html>.

¹³²⁸ Ko Shu-ling, "The Cabinet Gives Ma a History Lesson," *TT*, Nov 11 2004; Li Shun-te and Fan Ling-chia 李順德, 范凌嘉, "Zhengyuan yuanhui bian Taiwan diwei, da 'renmin zhuquan' gongshi ('Popular Sovereignty': Consensus after a Debate over the Legal Status of Taiwan in the Executive Yuan Meeting)," *UDN*, Nov 11 2004.

used to refute the PRC's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.¹³²⁹ KMT Vice Chairman Ma Ying-Jeou echoed Kau by suggesting that the building of a consensus on "popular sovereignty" would invalidate external challenges to the sovereignty issue.¹³³⁰

As the 2004 year-end legislature election approached, American manoeuvres to thwart DPP adventurism were underway. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said on December 10 that Taiwan was probably the largest landmine in US-China relations; he warned that the TRA did not require the US to defend Taiwan if it was attacked; and said "We all agree that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China."¹³³¹ This constituted a dire warning to the adventurous ruling DPP. On December 11, the pan-blue camp won 114 seats in the 225-seat legislature, outnumbering the pan-green's 101 seats and remaining a majority. An important factor in the pan-blue's victory was a suggestion of the AIT. The AIT studied Taiwan's political opinions and told the KMT that the DPP had adopted a precise vote-allocation strategy, which sought to maximize the number of electees by distributing votes among specific candidates. The AIT warned that the pan-blue camp would lose if it did not resort to vote allocation. The pan-blue leaders took the advice, enforced vote allocation and won the election.¹³³² The US seems to believe that the pan-blue camp can better reconcile Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism to maintain peace across the Strait; supporting the originally pro-unification camp has become a viable option for the US to derail Chen's radical agenda for name rectification and new constitution.

Beijing's "Anti-Secession Law": Gain or Loss?

Beijing was too rigid to appreciate the implications of victory of the pan-blue camp or to refine its policy toward Taiwan. On December 17, the PRC National People's Congress

¹³²⁹ Li Shun-te and Fan Ling-chia, "Zhengyuan yuanhui bian Taiwan diwei, da 'renmin zhuquan' gongshi ('Popular Sovereignty': Consensus after a Debate over the Legal Status of Taiwan in the Executive Yuan Meeting)."

¹³³⁰ Ibid.

¹³³¹ USDOS, *Interview With Charlie Rose on PBS* [internet] (2004 [cited Dec 22 2004]), available from <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/39973.htm>.

¹³³² Huang Fu-chi 黃福其, "Shiwu qianli chongpiao zhan, Guomintang chongchu lantian (Unprecedented Efforts to Draw Votes Resulted in KMT Victory)," *UDEN*, Dec 12 2004. For more detail about vote allocation, see Tsai Ting-i, "December 1 Elections: Fairness, Feasibility of Vote Allocation Stirs up Discussion," *TT*, Nov 19 2001, 3.

submitted a draft anti-secession law.¹³³³ On December 27, Beijing released the "Chinese Defence Ministry's White Paper for 2004," characterizing cross-Strait situation as "grim" and elevated Taiwan and sovereignty concerns to top priority for China's armed forces. As a result, senior Japanese officials, including Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura and Defence Agency Director General Yoshinori Ono, disclosed on February 18, 2005 their plan to assure US Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld that "Japan shares a common concern about the future security of Taiwan" in a "2+2 Ministerial" security talk the following day.¹³³⁴ Although there was no direct reference to this point during the news conference on February 19, senior American and Japanese officials issued a joint declaration of their desire to "encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait" as a "common strategic objective."¹³³⁵ A US official remarked that the Japanese government had finally made a public statement of concern about tensions between Taiwan and China.¹³³⁶ A spokesman for the Japanese Foreign Ministry further asserted that the Taiwan Strait fell into the coverage of the US-Japan Security Alliance.¹³³⁷ Consequently, the US-Japan Security Alliance had been expanded to cover the security of Taiwan, despite the denial of the US State Department.¹³³⁸

After the 2004 year-end legislature election, the US skilfully encouraged James Soong to meet Chen Shui-bian. Chen and Soong jointly issued a ten-point conclusion on February 24, 2005. The most important points were as follows: Chen returned to his "Five Noes;" the constitutional reform would not involve issues of national sovereignty, territory, or *status quo* across the Strait; and any change to the *status quo* must come with

¹³³³ Joseph Kahn, "China's Army May Respond if Taiwan Fully Secedes," *NYT*, Dec 18 2004.

¹³³⁴ Joel Brinkley, "Japan Said to Support U.S. on Security of Taiwan," *NYT*, Feb 19 2005.

¹³³⁵ USDOS, *Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee*, Richard Boucher, *Spokesman*, February 19, 2005 [internet] (2005 [cited Mar 22 2005]), available from <http://www.state.gov/t/pa/prs/ps/2005/42490.htm>. See also Joel Brinkley, "U.S. and Japan Declare Concern Over North Korea," *NYT*, Feb 20 2005.

¹³³⁶ Brinkley, "U.S. and Japan Declare Concern Over North Korea."

¹³³⁷ Chang Tsung-chih 張宗智, "Riben: Taihai zhengshi naru Mei-Ri anbao fanwei (Japan: Taiwan Strait Formally Falls into the Coverage of the US-Japan Security Alliance)," *UDN*, Mar 21 2005. See also Yang Ching-shun 楊清順, "Taihai anquan Mei-Ri lieru anbao mubiao (US-Japan Security Alliance Lists Taiwan Strait Security One of Its Objectives)," *UDN*, Feb 19 2005.

¹³³⁸ USDOS, *Daily Press Briefing*, Richard Boucher, *Spokesman*, Washington DC, February 18, 2005 [internet] (2005 [cited Mar 22 2005]), available from <http://www.state.gov/t/pa/prs/dpb/2005/42480.htm>.

the consent of the twenty-three million people of Taiwan.¹³³⁹ Chen's mentor, secessionist constitutionalist Li Hung-hsi (李鴻禧), believed that the conclusion was intended to placate the US.¹³⁴⁰ Indeed, the conclusion could constitute a circuitous adventurism by allaying the concern of the US; on the other hand, Soong's move could be seen as a US maneuver to contain secessionist fundamentalism. However, people in each of the rival camps were very cynical about the result; the fundamentalists accused Chen of betraying the ideal of Republic of Taiwan and the pan-blue camp criticized Soong for rushing to embrace Chen but neglecting the duty of monitoring the ruling DPP. As the two camps exchanged fire with each other and the storm brewed within each camp, headstrong Communist leaders introduced and quickly passed the anti-secession bill that would effectively pre-authorize military action if Taiwan took concrete steps toward formal independence.¹³⁴¹ It drew an instant response from Taipei; in addition to the pan-green camp's condemnation, KMT Vice Chairman Ma Ying-Jeou spearheaded thirteen pan-blue mayors and county commissioners to hold a grand international press conference on March 14 in protest of Beijing's handling of the sovereignty issue and its disrespect of the will of the people on Taiwan.¹³⁴² On March 26, hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese marched on the streets of Taipei to rally international support to the island republic.¹³⁴³

From mid-February to late March, Congress introduced five resolutions strongly opposing the law; H.CON.RES.98 was passed overwhelmingly by 424-4 on March

¹³³⁹ OPROC, *Joint Statement of President Chen and Chairman Soong* [internet] (2005 [cited Mar 31 2005]), available from <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4>. See also Huang Fu-chi, Li Hao-chung, and Wang Cheng-ning 黃福其、李濠仲、王正寧, "Bian-Soong hui 10 gongshi, bu duli, bu tuidong liangguolun (Ten-Point Consensus after Bian-Soong Meeting, Including No Declaration of Independence, No Inclusion of the So-Call 'State-to-State' Description in the Constitution)," *UDEN*, Feb 24 2005.

¹³⁴⁰ Zhongyangshe 中央社, "Li Hongxi: Bian-Soong 10 gongshi, shuogei Mei ting, dang fan fenlie fa (Li Hung-hsi: Bian-Soong Ten Consensuses Are Used to Placate the US and Resist the Anti-Secession Law)," *UDN*, Mar 3 2005.

¹³⁴¹ Kahn, "Beijing Leaders Speak of Force to Keep Taiwan 'Chinese'.", *UDN*, "Fan fenlie fa quanwen (The Full Text of the Anti-Secession Law)."

¹³⁴² Fan Ling-chia 范凌嘉, "Fanlan xianshizhang pi Zhonggong, xiang guoji fasheng (Pan-Blue Mayors and County Commissioners Denounce the PRC at an International Press Conference)," *UDN*, Mar 15 2005; Zhongyangshe 中央社, "Kangyi fan fenlie fa, Ma Yingjiu zhaokai guoji jizhehui (Ma Ying-jiu Held an International Press Conference to Protest the Anti-Secession Law)," *UDN*, Mar 14 2005.

¹³⁴³ Kung Ling-chi 孔令琪, "27 wan ren canjia 326 youxing (270,000 People Participated in the Demonstration on March 26)," *UDEN*, Mar 27 2005. An opinion poll showed that 82.3% Taiwanese oppose the anti-secession law; see Lo Chia-wei 羅嘉薇, "Ba cheng er Taiwan minzhong bu zancheng fan fenlie fa (82% of Taiwan People Disapprove the Anti-Secession Legislation)," *UDN*, Mar 3 2005.

16.¹³⁴⁴ On March 20, in an NBC interview, Chairman of the JCS General Richard Myers reaffirmed Bush's Taiwan doctrine of "no change of the *status quo* by force by either side" and assured to fulfil Bush's decision of "whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself."¹³⁴⁵ When commenting on China's anti-secession law before and during the meeting with her Chinese counterparts in Beijing, Secretary of State Rice categorically stated on March 19 and 21 that neither Taiwan nor China could resolve the cross-Straits problem on its own,¹³⁴⁶ reaffirming the role of the US in defining and maintaining *status quo* of the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, the law prompted the EU's March 21 decision to continue the arms embargo to the PRC.¹³⁴⁷ The embargo was first imposed on China because of concern over human rights in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. Although the EU has wanted to lift the embargo in recent years, it is the Taiwan issue that justifies America's strong opposition to EU's lifting of arms embargo against China, an embargo that hinders China's military modernization.

The linked events provide another vivid example of US-Taiwan strategic symbiosis. In retrospect of the development of such issues as referendum and new constitution, it can be argued that on the basis of Taiwanization, the seed dispersion of Taiwanese nationalism enraged Chinese nationalists, which in turn triggered regional country's misgivings, facilitated the expansion of the US-Japan security alliance, justified the expansion of US influence and consolidated Taiwanese nationalism. As Chinese nationalism becomes increasingly reactionary, chauvinistic and irredentist,¹³⁴⁸ the growing antagonism between Taiwanese nationalism and Chinese nationalism only

¹³⁴⁴ A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Grave Concern of Congress regarding the Recent Passage of the Anti-Secession Law by the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, 109th Congress, S.CON.RES.21; S.CON.RES.24; Expressing the Grave Concern of Congress regarding the Recent Passage of the Anti-Secession Law by the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, 109th Congress, H.CON.RES.98; Expressing the Sense of Congress that the United States Should Strongly Oppose China's Anti-Secession Legislation with Respect to Taiwan, 109th Congress, H.CON.RES.70; Expressing the Sense of Congress that the United States Should Urge the People's Republic of China Not to Enact into Law the So-Called 'Anti-Secession' Legislation with Respect to Taiwan and Should Reaffirm Its Unwavering Commitment to Taiwan, 109th Congress, H.CON.RES.76.

¹³⁴⁵ NBC, Transcript for March 20: Gen. Richard Myers, David Broder, Ron Brownstein, John Harwood and Gwen Ifill [internet] (NBC News, Mar 24, 2005 [cited Mar 31 2005]), available from <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7231263/>.

¹³⁴⁶ USDOS, Interview With Aiko Doden of NHK TV, March 19, 2005 [internet] (2005 [cited Mar 21 2005]), available from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43651.htm>; USDOS, Remarks to the Press in China - Secretary Condoleezza Rice, China World Hotel, Beijing, China, March 21, 2005 [internet] (2005 [cited Mar 21 2005]), available from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43678.htm>.

¹³⁴⁷ "China Warrants an Arms Embargo," NYT, Mar 28 2005.

¹³⁴⁸ Chang, *Return of the Dragon*, 6, 221.

ossifies the symbiotic partnership between US Asian policy and Taiwanese nationalism and hinders China's rise to regional hegemony and to global superpower.

Summary

Since 2000, Washington's belief of US-PRC strategic competition and Taipei's strong aspiration for independence together have created a unique symbiotic partnership, which consists of proxy balancing for wartime mutual defence cooperation, and peacetime influence operations by which Taipei promotes regional comprehensive security, helps expand US-Japan security alliance and justifies the continued domination or expansion of US influence in Asia Pacific and in global community. This strategic symbiosis runs counter to China's rise to regional hegemony and global superpower; the ultimate goal can be construed as to make China a constructive member of the world community.

After 9/11, the US government and pro-Taiwan Congress members continue to maintain cross-Strait military balance, promote high-level visit exchanges, advocate Taiwan's participation in international organizations, aggrandize US security commitment to Taiwan, integrate the island into the TMD system, and promote FTA. The progress of the symbiotic partnership along with the prospect of global and domestic economic recovery and diplomatic setback prompted Chen Shui-bian to utter "one side, one country" and used "democracy, economy and security" to promote a united front against China. 9/11 has not changed the course of this strategic symbiosis.

The "new constitution" and "referendum" were Chen's brainchildren for the 1991 independence plank. Since late 2003, the DPP has used "new constitution" and "referendum" to implicitly link ethno-nationalism with national identity to appeal for native support; they finally become vehicles of secessionist fundamentalism to turn Taiwan into a "normal country." Despite Bush's opposition to the agenda, Chen used adventurism to consolidate the identity of Taiwan, to win 2004 election and to achieve the first referendum. The consolidation of Taiwan identity obliged the pan-blue camp to identify with Taiwan, promote political nationalism and further deviate from their pro-unification ideology.

However, Chen's adventurism has caused regional misgivings, and has made Chinese nationalism more volatile and undermined the ultimate goal of making China a constructive member in global community. His plan for a "normal country" concurs with Lee Teng-hui's fundamentalism. The US government seems to use the Taiwanized pan-blue camp to contain the secessionist fundamentalism on Taiwan. The AIT manoeuvred to help the pan-blue camp win the majority in 2004 legislature election, derailing Chen's agenda of rectifying the national title and enacting a new constitution.

Beijing's rigidity caused miscalculation of the timing and the result of enacting the anti-secession law. The law helps the US-Japan Security Alliance to expand to cover Taiwan, alienates the pan-blue camp and consolidate Taiwanese nationalism, reassures America's military intervention, and prompts the EU to continue its arms embargo to the PRC. The increasing antagonism between Taiwanese nationalism and Chinese nationalism further consolidates the strategic symbiosis between US Asian policy and Taiwanese nationalism and hinders China's rise to regional hegemony and global superpower.

Chapter 7: CONCLUSION

Introduction

This thesis has explored the influence of the US on the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism and the role of Taiwanese nationalism in America's Asian policy. It attempts to provide a stable and enduring picture of America's Taiwan policy. In addition, this thesis has sought to expound American self-interest intention of promoting separatism on Taiwan and American containment against China to vindicate the misgivings of Chinese nationalism.

The Formation & Fortification of Strategic Symbiosis

The main findings of the previous chapters can be summarized as follows:

After the Qing government ceded Taiwan in 1895, ingrained Chinese nationalism prompted the Taiwanese armed and political resistance against Japanese occupation. Japan's fifty-year colonial rule planted the seed of Taiwanese nationalism, an inchoate Taiwanese consciousness – defined by the Chinese diasporas' passion for irredentism on the one hand but inspiring the islanders for an “imagined community” on the other hand. Since the early 1940s, America's involvement in Taiwan affairs has been marked by hegemonism that had incorporated the values of “self-determination.” The KMT's misrule since 1945 takeover and the ensuing February 28 Incident caused the germination of the seed of Taiwanese nationalism. The successive victories of the CCP against the KMT in late 1948 and the imminent prospect of the Communist rule of the whole China pushed the US government to secretly develop separatism on Taiwan so as to deny the island to the Communists. However, the cause of independence had not received strong backing from the Taiwanese community since the beginning. American diplomats' first-hand reports repeatedly stressed that Taiwanese independence groups were disunited, politically illiterate, disorganized and unreliable; that they had small influence but tended to exaggerate the support behind them to force outside action. Without America's promotion of Formosan autonomous movement, the KMT could have

stifled the germinant, vulnerable Taiwanese nationalism. This underlines that America never ruled out Taiwan independence in the name of self-determination to serve US national interests. That is, during the initial Cold War era, America encountered Taiwanese nationalism and helped its germination to serve US hegemony in East Asia.

The Korean War marked the inception of a bipolarised Cold War era. The Truman administration's resumed separatist intention, including political assertion about the undetermined legal status of Taiwan and military neutralization of the Taiwan Strait, directly contributed to the emergence of Taiwanese ethno-nationalism. The US further used economic aid to promote Taiwanese structuralism and undermine the KMT regime. The resulted rapid economic growth from the late 1950s on and accumulative socio-economic changes contributed significantly to the native political struggle against the ruling mainlander elites in the following decades. American aid also nurtured a US-oriented Taiwanese nationalism. By the end of 1960, some US scholars such as John K. Fairbank, Robert Scalapino and A. Doak Barnett had shaped a culture-based "Taiwan Independence Roadmap;" they believed that the Sino-US cultural conflict, cross-Strait cultural differences and intra-island cultural assimilation or Taiwanization would perpetuate an independent Taiwan and envisioned that the "Roadmap" would lead to Taiwan's self-determination short of full independence. In the context of separatist intention of the US, constructivism seemed a natural corollary under the authoritarian rule of the KMT and the persistent threat from the Communists; democratisation had become a common goal of mainlander liberals and Taiwanese nationalists since the late 1950s. As a result of America's separatist strategies and scholars' independence theories, overseas independence groups grew confident that an independent state of Taiwan was going to be established in the 1970s. That is, in the bipolarised Cold War era, America's underlying separatist approaches helped the construction of independence theories and the practical growth of Taiwanese nationalism.

American confidence in "One China, One Taiwan" and Taiwanization facilitated US-PRC rapprochement. The Three Joint Communiqué and the TRA inherited the essence of separatist intention, and reconciled the need of US-PRC rapprochement and the promotion of Taiwanese nationalism. Under the ostensible "one China" policy, each communiqué on the one hand challenged KMT legitimacy and made Chiang Ching-kuo

committed to indigenisation, which facilitated US-expected Taiwanization, eroded “one China” policy, substantiated Taiwan’s independence, promoted unofficial US-Taiwan relations, advanced the economic and political power of the Taiwanese and expanded American values and lifestyles on Taiwan. On the other hand, each communiqué galvanized political nationalism, justified opposition movement’s appeals for democratic reforms, advanced the partnership between some US Congress members sympathetic to the cause of Taiwan independence and secessionist Taiwanese in the name of human rights and democracy and built up pressure for democratisation and Taiwanization. In this context, democratisation was triggered externally by a protracted process of US-PRC rapprochement, promoted internally by the nationalist opposition movement and by the cumulative socio-economic changes, both of which are legacies of US aid, and pushed by the partnership between some US Congress members and Taiwanese nationalists. The influx of overseas secessionist political nationalism caused division of national identity at home; the committed secessionists further sparked an independent nation-building movement and helped the enlightenment of secessionism on the island. In short, the cocoon-like “one China” policy in the Sino-US rapprochement era induced a metamorphosis of US-Taiwan relations and benefited the pollination of Taiwanese secessionism.

Potential Sino-US confrontation loomed around 1989. The shared perception of the threat from Beijing prompted conservatives in Washington and secessionists in Taipei to realign their interests for security cooperation. The progress of Taiwanization carried huge strategic significance. Lee Teng-hui’s Taiwanization aimed to achieve Taiwanese domination of Taiwan and break Taiwan away from China. This was identical with the US scheme of Taiwanization in the “Taiwan Independence Roadmap.” Accordingly, the US legalized the primacy of the TRA over the August 17 Communiqué to advance its arms sales to Taiwan in the name of maintaining regional peace and stability; and, in the name of supporting democratisation and with the facilitation of Lee’s lobbying funds, many US Congress members and conservatives established a strategic alliance with Lee, which helped dismiss Clinton’s faith in “one China,” counter Beijing’s intimidation and assure the advance of Taiwanization. On Taiwan, Lee on the one hand used structuralism and cooperated with the DPP ethno-nationalism to push mainlanders aside; on the other hand, he proposed constructivist arguments to remedy aggravated ethnic

conflict and ideological cleavage, and imposed a new vision of nation-building. Taiwanization was finally accomplished with Chen Shui-bian's victory in 2000 presidential election. Despite the crises of ethnic conflict and national identity, "neo-Taiwanese-ism" has become the political consensus about the future of Taiwan. "Neo-Taiwanese-ism" is a natural by-product of Taiwanization;¹³⁴⁹ it represents the fruition of Taiwanese constructivism and symbolizes the preliminary accomplishment of cultural assimilation. In retrospect, cultural assimilation, or Taiwanization is built upon democratisation and was accomplished with the fruition of Taiwanese nationalism in the ambience of strategic realignment between the US and Taiwanese nationalist power holders.

Since 2000, Washington's belief in Sino-US strategic competition and the ruling DPP's aspiration for independence have together created a unique symbiotic partnership, which consists of proxy balancing for wartime purposes and Taipei's influence operations in peacetime. In the latter, by dispersing the seeds of Taiwanese nationalism in the international community, Taipei seeks to promote regional comprehensive security against China, expand the US-Japan security alliance and justify the continued domination or expansion of US influence in regional and global community. The 9/11 Incident has not changed the course of strategic symbiosis at all. The DPP used "new constitution" and "referendum" to implicitly link ethno-nationalism with national identity to draw support for the 2004 presidential election; these two issues have significantly strengthened Taiwan identity; they finally become fundamentalists' vehicles to alter the *status quo* of the Taiwan Strait. Chen Shui-bian's re-election reinforces bilateral proxy balancing against China; however, his adventurism makes Chinese nationalism so volatile that the US government has to use the pan-blue camp to contain the secessionist fundamentalism on Taiwan. The consolidation of Taiwan identity subjects the pan-blue elite to constructivism; they are increasingly deviating from their pro-unification ideology. Believed to be able to better reconcile the rivaling Chinese and Taiwanese nationalisms, the Taiwanized pan-blue camp can be an alternative partner for bilateral strategic symbiosis. Beijing's rigidity and manipulation of nationalism only result in increased antagonism across the Strait, which assures to consolidate

¹³⁴⁹ Yu, "The Politics of Taiwanisation (II): The Road to a New Identity," 29.

Taiwanese constructivism, ossify the symbiotic partnership between US Asian policy and Taiwanese nationalism and hinders China's rise to regional hegemony and global superpower.

A Historical View of the Past, the Present, and the Future

America's Asian policies have punctuated the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism. During the initial stage of the Cold War, the US encountered germinating Taiwanese secessionism and intended to cultivate separatism on Taiwan to deny the island to Chinese Communists and serve American hegemony. In the bipolarised Cold War era, some American scholars, based on the separatist intention of the US government, forged an ethereal and elusive culture-based "Taiwan Independence Roadmap," which has evolved into an enduring and guiding principle of America's Taiwan policy.

The concept of "cultural conflict" envisioned the epochal confrontation between the US and China, which proved a contemporary reality, despite all the diplomatic rhetoric, exchanges, and cooperation. America treats Taiwan as an integral part of its containment strategy against China, while the latter helps the former continue and expand its influence in the international community. In retrospect, and in the simplest terms, this strategic symbiosis developed on the basis of Taiwanization, which symbolized "cultural assimilation" and rested on democratisation, which highlighted "cultural differences" across the Strait and evolved in the context of separatist intention of America and resulted from the injection of US political values and economic aid, both of which sought to promote democratisation and Taiwanization and thus contributed to Taiwanese nationalism. Put another way, although the goals of American interventionism on Taiwan since late 1948 were based mainly on preventing the expansion of communism in East Asia, Taiwanese nationalism has benefited a lot from the underlying separatist intention of the US government. Taiwanese nationalism grew with the inspiration of American values and the help of American aid. Those values and that aid, along with the dominant majority Taiwanese, enabled the Taiwanese nationalists to insist upon democratisation and achieve Taiwanization, ultimately resulting in strategic symbiosis. In short, the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism and

the antagonism between Taiwanese and Chinese nationalisms both result from Taiwan's progress along a different historical trajectory to that of the mainland under the scheme and influence of America.

The ultimate intention of US policy on Taiwan has remained controversial. Andrew Nathan argues that the US is not concerned about whether Taiwan is independent, only that the issue is resolved peacefully.¹³⁵⁰ However, independence can be either *de facto* or *de jure*; Nathan's argument does not help clarify America's intention. Added to the ambiguity and confusion of the American intention are the contradictory statements by the top officials of the Bush administration, even Bush himself. Bush referred to Taiwan and China as two "countries" and called Taiwan "Republic of Taiwan" on April 4, 2002.¹³⁵¹ After re-election, Chen Shui-bian's escalating adventurism prompted Colin Powell to say on October 25, 2004, "Taiwan is not independent. It does not enjoy sovereignty as a nation,"¹³⁵² and Richard Armitage to say on December 10, 2004, "We all agree that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China."¹³⁵³ However, White House spokesman Scott McClellan said on "February 28," 2005, "when it comes to China and Taiwan, and our position remains the same. We also continue to encourage cross-Strait dialogue between the countries as the best way to resolving some of the issues that remain."¹³⁵⁴ These high-profile, contradictory remarks that show that the US does not simply support Taiwanese nationalism only exacerbate the complexity of the issue.

Indeed, the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue is the focus of the efforts of all major powers involved; as long as the result is peaceful, it does not matter whether the outcome is unification or independence. However, as John King Fairbank has admonished the US since the late 1950s, what Washington confronts is a Beijing regime which has the

¹³⁵⁰ Andrew J. Nathan, "The Effect of Taiwan's Political Reform on Taiwan-Mainland Relations," in *Political Change in Taiwan*, ed. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 216.

¹³⁵¹ Agence France-Presse, "Taiwan Gaffe by Bush an Oral Mistake, Says US," *SCMP*, Apr 8 2002; Chang Tsung-chih 張宗智, "Buxi kouwu? Mei guowuyuan: reng cheng Taiwan huo Taiwan renmin (A Slip of Tongue by Bush? State Department: Still Use Taiwan or People of Taiwan)," *UDN*, Apr 7 2002; TT, "Editorial: Is the US' Taiwan Policy Changing?" Apr 7 2002, 8.

¹³⁵² See page 246 of this thesis.

¹³⁵³ See page 193 of this thesis.

¹³⁵⁴ White House, *February 28, 2005 - Press Briefing by Scott McClellan* [internet] (White House, 2005 [cited Mar 31 2005]), available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-8.html>.

formidable combination of Communism and Chinese nationalism;¹³⁵⁵ the epochal Sino-America antagonism further highlights Taiwan's strategic importance;¹³⁵⁶ and, most importantly, "the fact of Taiwan's independence is our object, not the name."¹³⁵⁷ Although the whole Taiwan independence movement is not a creation of US policy, in the past decades, the US administrations have on the one hand provided crucial support for the Taiwan independence movement by never ruling out independence as an option for the island so as to consolidate US hegemony; Washington has, on the other hand, repeatedly asserted that it does not support Taiwan independence so as to avoid direct conflict with Beijing. Consequently, the *status quo* of Taiwan Strait – "no unification, no independence and no war"¹³⁵⁸ – is the crystallization of perpetuating a *de facto* independent Taiwan.

With the accomplishment of Taiwanization and the realization of the "Taiwan Independence Roadmap," Taiwanese nationalism is now helping American hegemony in the epochal Sino-US confrontation. Because the American Seventh Fleet is able to patrol the Taiwan Straits and use a Taiwan base when situations require, contemporary Taiwan has become a *bona fide* military and cultural bastion of the US, and the westernmost point on America's Western Pacific frontier. A remark by former US Secretary of State Colin Powell is most edifying:

An arms build-up, like those new missiles opposite Taiwan, only deepen tensions, deepen suspicion. Whether China chooses peace or coercion to resolve its differences with Taiwan will tell us a great deal about the kind of relationship China seeks not only with its neighbors, but with us.

The differences between China and Taiwan are fundamentally political. They cannot be solved by military means.¹³⁵⁹

This remark exemplifies the strategic symbiosis between US Asian policy and Taiwanese nationalism. As long as the concept of Sino-US "cultural conflict" or the prospect of Sino-US confrontation remains true, the symbiotic partnership will perpetuate the *de facto* independence of Taiwan, hinder the rise of China to regional hegemony and thence

¹³⁵⁵ Fairbank, "China: Time For a Policy," 37.

¹³⁵⁶ Fairbank, *China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A.*, 54, 65.

¹³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 63.

¹³⁵⁸ CNA, "US Support Weakening, Confab Told," 4.

¹³⁵⁹ USDOS, *Remarks at Asia Society Annual Dinner* [internet] (2003 [cited Jan 12 2004]), available from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/10983.htm>.

to global superpower, and help the US consolidate its national interests in the Asia-Pacific region or even in the global stage.

References

- "Abandon Quemoy and Matsu, America." *Formosan Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1962): 32-33.
- House. *An Act Making Consolidated Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2000, and for Other Purposes*. 106th Congress, H.R.3194.
- House. *Affirming the United States Commitment to Taiwan*. 105th Congress, H.CON.RES.301.
- Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. *Asia, the Pacific, and the United States: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate with Former Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer*, 90th Congress, Jan 31 1967.
- Senate. *A Bill concerning Participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization*. 108th Congress, S.243.
- House. *A Bill Making Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1984*. 98th Congress, H.R.3959.
- Senate. *A Bill To Address the Participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization*. 108th Congress, S.2092.
- Senate. *A Bill to Assist in the Enhancement of the Security of Taiwan*. 106th Congress, S. 693.
- Senate. *A Bill to Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2002 for Military Activities of the Department of Defense*. 107th Congress, S.1438.
- House. *A Bill to Authorize the Establishment of a United States-Taiwan Free Trade Area*. 100th Congress, H.R.5563.
- Senate. *A Bill to Authorize the Establishment of a United States-Taiwan Free Trade Area*. 101st Congress, S.944.
- Senate. *A Bill to Require a United States Plan to Endorse and Obtain Observer Status for Taiwan at the Annual Summit of the World Health Assembly in May 2002*. 107th Congress, S.1932.
- "Chiang's Future." *The New Republic*, Vol. 139, No. 14 (1958).
- "Chiang and Ching and April 24, 1970." *The Independent Formosa*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1970): 2, 12.
- "China Warrants an Arms Embargo." *NYT*, Mar 28 2005.
- House. *Concerning participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization*. 108th Congress, H.R.3793.
- Concerning the Participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization*. 107th Congress, H.R.428.
- House. *Concerning the Taiwan Relations Act*. 106th Congress, H.CON.RES.53.
- Senate. *A Concurrent Resolution Affirming U.S. Commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act*. 105th Congress, S.CON.RES.107.
- Senate. *A Concurrent Resolution Congratulating the People of Taiwan for the Successful Conclusion of Presidential Elections on March 18, 2000*. 106th Congress, S.CON.RES.99.
- Senate. *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Grave Concern of Congress regarding the Recent Passage of the Anti-Secession Law by the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China*. 109th Congress, S.CON.RES.21.
- Senate. *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Grave Concern of Congress regarding the Recent Passage of the Anti-Secession Law by the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China*. 109th Congress, S.CON.RES.24.
- Senate. *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of Congress regarding High-Level*

- Visits by Taiwanese Officials to the United States.* 106th Congress, S.CON.RES.140.
- House. *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of Congress regarding Missile Tests and Military Exercises by the People's Republic of China.* 104th Congress, H.CON.RES.148.
- House. *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the sense of Congress that the Taiwan Authorities Should Cooperate Fully in the case of Henry Liu.* 99th Congress, H.CON.RES.49.
- House. *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress concerning Representative Government, Political Parties, and Freedom of Expression on Taiwan.* 100th Congress, H.CON.RES.124.
- Senate. *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress concerning Representative Government, Political Parties, and Freedom of Expression on Taiwan.* 100th Congress, S.CON.RES.46.
- Senate. *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress concerning Representative Government, Political parties, and Freedom of Expression on Taiwan.* 99th Congress, S.CON.RES.121.
- House. *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress concerning Representative Government, Political parties, and Freedom of Expression on Taiwan.* 99th Congress, H.CON.RES.233.
- House. *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress concerning the Need to Achieve Full Democracy on Taiwan.* 98th Congress, H.CON.RES.344.
- Senate. *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress regarding a Private Visit by President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States.* 104th Congress, S.CON.RES.9.
- Senate. *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress regarding Proposed Missile Tests by the People's Republic of China.* 104th Congress, S.CON.RES.43.
- House. *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress that the Authorities on Taiwan Should Continue to Cooperate Fully in the Case of Henry Liu.* 99th Congress, H.CON.RES.110.
- House. *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress That the Support Provided by the United States to the Asian Development Bank Will Be Terminated If the Republic of China Is Denied Full Membership in the Asian Development Bank.* 98th Congress, H.CON.RES.120.
- Senate. *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress that the Taiwan Authorities Should Cooperate Fully in the Case of Henry Liu.* 99th Congress, S.CON.RES.10.
- House. *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the House of Representatives concerning Martial Law on Taiwan.* 98th Congress, H.CON.RES.129.
- Senate. *A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate concerning Martial Law on Taiwan.* 98th Congress, S.CON.RES.38.
- House. *Congratulating the People of Taiwan for the Successful Conclusion of Presidential Elections on March 18, 2000.* 106th Congress, H.CON.RES.292.
- "Congressman Fraser Urges Self-Determination for the People of Formosa." *The Independent Formosa*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1970): 7, 13.
- "Councillor Su Tung-chi Sentenced to Death." *Formosan Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1962): 17-18.
- "The Declaration on the Establishment of the World United Formosans for

- Independence." *Independent Formosa*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1970): 3, 13-15.
- House. *Endorsing the Adoption by the European Parliament of a Resolution Supporting the Republic of China on Taiwan's Efforts at Joining the Community of Nations*. 104th Congress, H.CON.RES.212.
- House. *Expressing the Grave Concern of Congress regarding the Recent Passage of the Anti-Secession Law by the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China*. 109th Congress, H.CON.RES.98.
- House. *Expressing the sense of Congress on the accession of Taiwan to the World Trade Organization*. 106th Congress, H.CON.RES.262.
- House. *Expressing the Sense of Congress regarding Security for Taiwan*. 108th Congress, H.CON.RES.232.
- House. *Expressing the sense of Congress regarding the accession of Taiwan to the World Trade Organization*. 106th Congress, H.CON.RES.330.
- House. *Expressing the Sense of Congress regarding United States Policy toward Taiwan's Membership in International Organizations*. 107th Congress, H.CON.RES.219.
- House. *Expressing the Sense of Congress relating to a Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Taiwan*. 108th Congress, H.CON.RES.98.
- House. *Expressing the Sense of Congress that the United States Government Should Reaffirm Its Unwavering Commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act as the Cornerstone of United States Relations with Taiwan*. 108th Congress, H.CON.RES.117.
- House. *Expressing the Sense of Congress that the United States Should Strongly Oppose China's Anti-Secession Legislation with Respect to Taiwan*. 109th Congress, H.CON.RES.70.
- House. *Expressing the Sense of Congress that the United States Should Urge the People's Republic of China Not to Enact into Law the So-Called 'Anti-Secession' Legislation with Respect to Taiwan and Should Reaffirm Its Unwavering Commitment to Taiwan*. 109th Congress, H.CON.RES.76.
- House. *Expressing the Sense of Congress to Encourage Full Participation in the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum*. 107th Congress, H.CON.RES.194.
- House. *Expressing the Sense of the Congress concerning the Future of Taiwan*. 101st Congress, H.CON.RES.293.
- House. *Expressing the Sense of the Congress regarding a Private Visit by President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States*. 104th Congress, H.CON.RES.53.
- House. *Expressing the Sense of the Congress regarding a Private Visit by President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States*. 104th Congress, H.CON.RES.33.
- House. *Expressing the Sense of the Congress regarding High-Level Visits by Taiwanese Officials to the United States*. 106th Congress, H.CON.RES.401.
- House. *Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding Taiwan's participation in the United Nations*. 106th Congress, H.CON.RES.390.
- House. *Expressing the sense of the Congress relating to the Taiwan Relations Act*. 107th Congress, H.CON.RES.67.
- House. *Expressing the Sense of the Congress That the United States Should Adopt a 'One China, One Taiwan Policy' Which Reflects the Present Day Reality that Taiwan and China Are Two Separate Nations*. 106th Congress, H.CON.RES.166.

- House. *Expressing the Sense of the Congress Welcoming President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan to the United States*. 107th Congress, H.CON.RES.135.
- House. *Expressing the Sense of the Congress with Respect to the Future of Taiwan*. 101st Congress, H.CON.RES.234.
- House. *Expressing the Sense of the Congress with Respect to United States Relations with the People's Republic of China and with the Republic of China on Taiwan*. 101st Congress, H.CON.RES.233.
- House. *Expressing the Sense of the House of Representatives That Taiwan Should Be Admitted to the World Trade Organization without Making Such Admission Conditional on the Previous or Simultaneous Admission of the People's Republic of China to the WTO*. 104th Congress, H.RES.490.
- House. *Expressing the Sense of the House of Representatives That the Future of Taiwan Should Be Resolved Peacefully through a Democratic Mechanism and with the Express Consent of the people of Taiwan*. 106th Congress, H.RES.659.
- House. *Expressing the Sense of the House regarding United States Policy toward Taiwan's Membership in International Organizations*. 107th Congress, H.RES.221.
- Foreign Relations of the United States 1949*. Vol. 9. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1974.
- House. *H.AMDT.41*. 107th Congress,
- House. *H.AMDT.434*. 97th Congress,
- HyperWar: A Hypertext History of the Second World War. 1943. In *Diplomatic & Political Documents of WWII*, HyperWar Foundation. Available from: <http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Dip/index.html#peaceourtime> [accessed Feb 12 2003].
- House. *Imposing Additional Conditions on the Extension of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment to the Products of the People's Republic of China*. 101st Congress, H.R.5252.
- Key Documents and National Policy Statements. CSIS. Available from: http://www.csis.org/isp/taiwan/US/us_keydocs.pdf [accessed Jan 23 2003].
- House. *Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1990*. 101st Congress, H.R.3743.
- House. *Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1991, and for Other Purposes*. 101st Congress, H.R.5114.
- Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2001, and for Other Purposes*. 106th Congress, H.R.5526.
- House. *Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2001, and for Other Purposes*. 106th Congress, H.R.4811.
- House. *Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2002, and for Other Purposes*. 107th Congress, H.R.2506.
- "Notes: In Memoriam Reverend Dr. Shoki Coe." *Taiwan Communique*, No. 37 (1988): 20-22.
- Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts]. 2002. Global Security.org. Available from: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm> [accessed Mar 15 2004].

- An Original Bill Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2001, and for Other Purposes.* 106th Congress, S.2522.
- The Re-Formation of a Unified Actor: Taiwanese Quest for National Unity and Identity. 2002. Available from:
<http://www6.plala.or.jp/masak12/polsci/ir/#Anchor-27-45980> [accessed Jun 15 2004].
- House. *Regarding the Extension of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment to the Products of the People's Republic of China.* 101st Congress, H.R.4939.
- House. *Relating to Taiwan's participation in the World Health Organization.* 105th Congress, H.J.RES.126.
- House. *Relating to Taiwan's participation in the World Health Organization.* 105th Congress, H.CON.RES.219.
- House. *Relating to Taiwan's participation in the World Health Organization.* 105th Congress, H.CON.RES.334.
- House. *A Resolution Expressing Concern over the Kaohsiung Incident in Taiwan.* 96th Congress, H.RES.708.
- House. *A Resolution Expressing Concern over the Kaohsiung Incident in Taiwan.* 96th Congress, H.RES.616.
- House. *A Resolution Expressing the Sense of the House concerning Martial Law on Taiwan.* 97th Congress, H.RES.591.
- House. *A Resolution Expressing the Sense of the House of Representatives concerning the Future of the People of Taiwan.* 98th Congress, H.RES.112.
- Senate. *A Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate concerning the Future of the People on Taiwan.* 98th Congress, S.RES.74.
- Senate. *A Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate That Taiwan Should Retain Full Membership in the Asian Development Bank.* 98th Congress, S.RES.137.
- Senate. *A Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate That the Transfer of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China Not Alter the Current or Future Status of Taiwan as a Free and Democratic Country.* 105th Congress, S.RES.114.
- Senate. *A Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate Welcoming Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian to the United States.* 107th Congress, S.RES.89.
- Senate. *A Resolution Expressing the Support of the Senate regarding Democratic Reforms and Human Rights on Taiwan.* 101st Congress, S.RES.210.
- Senate. *A Resolution to Express the Sense of the Senate concerning U.S. Relations with Taiwan.* 103rd Congress, S.RES.270.
- Senate. *A Resolution to Express the Sense of the Senate the Support of Taiwan's Membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.* 101st Congress, S.RES.296.
- Senate. *S.AMDT.285.* 101st Congress,
- Senate. *S.AMDT.394.* 106th Congress,
- Senate. *S.AMDT.576.* 106th Congress,
- Senate. *S.AMDT.2150.* 103rd Congress,
- Senate. *S.AMDT.2462.* 103rd Congress,
- Senate. *S.RES.68.* 93th Congress,
- "Statement of the Chinese Government." *Beijing Review*, Vol. 21, No. 51 (1978): 8-9.
- Statement on Taiwan Elections. 2004. White House. Available from:
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040326-6.html> [accessed May 14 2004].

- Statement on the Defense of Taiwan. 1999. The Heritage Foundation & The Project for the New American Century. Available from:
<http://www.newamericancentury.org/Taiwandefensestatement.htm> [accessed Feb 28 2003].
- Taidu lianmeng Riben benbu yuanqi (The Story of WUFI in Japan). 2003. 台獨聯盟日本本部緣起. WUFI. Available from: <http://www.wufi.org.tw/> [accessed Jan 11 2005].
- Taiwan jiaohui gongbao zhoukan (Taiwan Church News). 台灣教會公報周刊. New Taiwan Foundation. Available from:
<http://formosa.yam.org.tw/magazine1.asp?ID=750921341> [accessed Oct 7 2003].
- Taiwan Relations Act*. 96-8. 96th Congress, Apr 10 1979.
- "Thursday, December 16, 1954," Papers of Harry S. Truman, Post-Presidential Files, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
- House. *To Address the Participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization*. 108th Congress, H.R.4019.
- House. *To Amend Public Law 107-10 to Authorize a United States Plan to Endorse and Obtain Observer Status for Taiwan at the Annual Summit of the World Health Assembly in May 2003*. 108th Congress, H.R.441.
- House. *To Amend Public Law 107-10 to Require a United States Plan to Endorse and Obtain Observer Status for Taiwan at the Annual Summit of the World Health Assembly in May 2002*. 107th Congress, H.R.2739.
- House. *To Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*. 101st Congress, H.R.2655.
- House. *To Amend the Taiwan Relations Act to Permit Visits to the United States by the Elected Leaders of the People of Taiwan or Their Elected Representatives*. 104th Congress, H.R.1460.
- House. *To Assist in the Enhancement of the Security of Taiwan*. 106th Congress, H.R.1838.
- House. *To Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2003 for Military Activities of the Department of Defense*. 107th Congress, H.R.4546.
- House. *To Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2005 for Military Activities of the Department of Defense*. 108th Congress, H.R.4200.
- House. *To Authorize Appropriations for the Department of State for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003, and for Other Purposes*. 107th Congress, H.R.1646.
- House. *To Authorize Appropriations for the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, and Related Agencies, to Authorize Appropriations for Foreign Assistance Programs*. 103rd Congress, H.R.2333.
- House. *To Authorize Extension of Nondiscriminatory Treatment (Normal Trade Relations Treatment) to the People's Republic of China*. 106th Congress, H.R.4444.
- House. *To Authorize the Establishment of a United States-Taiwan Free Trade Area*. 101st Congress, H.R.1748.
- House. *To Establish the Policy of the United States with Respect to Deployment of Missile Defense Systems Capable of Defending Allies of the United States Against Ballistic Missile Attack*. 108th Congress, H.R.1454.
- House. *To Establish the Policy of the United States with Respect to Deployment of Missile Defense Systems Capable of Defending Allies of the United States against Ballistic Missile Attack*. 107th Congress, H.R.1283.
- House. *To Express the Sense of the Congress regarding Democratic Reforms and Human Rights in Taiwan*. 101th Congress, H.CON.RES.235.

- House. *To Implement the Provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act concerning the Stability and Security of Taiwan and United States Cooperation with Taiwan on the Development and Acquisition of Defensive Military Articles (or United States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act)*. 105th Congress, H.R.2386.
- House. *To Require Any Authorization of Extension of Nondiscriminatory Treatment (Most-Favored-Nation Treatment) to the Products of the People's Republic of China to Be Effective Only after a Vote Is Taken by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference regarding the Decision and Protocol of Accession for Chinese Taipei (Taiwan) and after China's accession to the WTO*. 106th Congress, H.R.4509.
- Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan. 1952. In *Taiwan Documents Project*. Available from: <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/taipei01.htm> [accessed Oct 11 2002].
- U.S.-Taiwan-China Issues, Randy Schriver, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Foreign Press Center Briefing. 2003. GlobalSecurity.org. Available from: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/taiwan/2003/26534.htm> [accessed Dec 26 2003].
- Senate. *United States-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement Act of 2001*. 107th Congress, S.1636.
- US-Japan San Francisco Peace Treaty. 1951. In *Taiwan Documents Project*. Available from: <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm> [accessed Oct 11 2002].
- The World of 1898: The Spanish-American War. In *Chronology*, Library of Congress. Available from: <http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/chronology.html> [accessed Sep 10 2004].
- Xuanju niandu ji leibie yilan biao (A Table of Election Years and Categories). 2003. 選舉年度暨類別一覽表. Central Election Commission. Available from: <http://210.69.23.140/cec/cehead.asp> [accessed Jan 4 2004].
- Cunzai xiwang fazhan: Li Denghui xiansheng 'shengming gongtongti' zhiguo linian (Existence, Hope, Development: Lee Teng-hui's Political Philosophy of 'Living Community'), ed.^eds. 存在 希望 發展：李登輝先生「生命共同體」治國理念. Taipei: Zhengzhong, 1993.
- ABC. 2001. Bush Vows Taiwan Support. ABC. Available from: <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/taiwan010425.html> [accessed Jun 19 2004].
- Academia Historica 國史館, ed.^eds. *A Chronology of Relevant Events of Taiwan Sovereignty and One China Discourse*. Taipei: Academia Historica, 2002.
- 國史館, ed.^eds. *Yige Zhongguo lunshu shiliao huibian (Documentary Collection on One China Discourse)* 一個中國論述史料彙編. 2 vols. Vol. 1. Taipei: Academia Historica, 2000.
- Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1970.
- Adler, Emanuel, and Michael Barnett. "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective." In *Security Communities*, edited by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 3-28. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Agence France-Presse. "Taiwan Gaffe by Bush an Oral Mistake, Says US." *SCMP*, Apr 8

- 2002.
- Alperovitz, Gar. *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965.
- AmCham. 2001. 2001 Taiwan White Paper Part 1. Available from: <http://amcham.com.tw/publications.php> [accessed Mar 8 2004].
- . 2002. 2002 Taiwan White Paper Overview. Available from: <http://amcham.com.tw/publications.php> [accessed Mar 8 2004].
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1983.
- ASEAN. 2001. Press Statement by the Chairman of the 7th ASEAN Summit and the Three ASEAN + 1 Summits, Brunei Darussalam, 6 November 2001. ASEAN. Available from: <http://www.aseansec.org/5316.htm> [accessed Mar 13 2004].
- Associated Press. 2000. Eyeing Taiwan, Balkans, China Prepares Scenarios for War with U.S. CNN. Available from: <http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/east/10/22/china.gunningforamerica.ap/> [accessed Dec 5 2004].
- Bacevich, Andrew J. *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002.
- Ballantine, Joseph William. *Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign Policy*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1952.
- Barnett, A. Doak. *Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy*. New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper, 1960.
- . *U.S. Arms Sales: The China-Taiwan Tangle*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1982.
- Bauer, Otto. *The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
- BBC. 2004. Chen Vows Constitutional Reform. BBC. Available from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3581407.stm> [accessed May 14 2004].
- Bork, Ellen. 2001. Replace ASEAN. New American Century. Available from: <http://www.newamericancentury.org/eastasia2001.htm> [accessed Mar 8 2004].
- Bradsher, Keith. "Taiwan's Leader Tones Down Referendum Opposed by Beijing." *NYT*, Jan 17 2004.
- Bradsher, Keith, and Joseph Kahn. "Taiwan Referendum to Focus on Missiles, Not Independence." *NYT*, Dec 5 2003, 7.
- Brinkley, Joel. "Japan Said to Support U.S. on Security of Taiwan." *NYT*, Feb 19 2005.
- . "U.S. and Japan Declare Concern Over North Korea." *NYT*, Feb 20 2005.
- Burr, William. 2003. Nixon's Trip to China. GWU. Available from: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106/index.htm> [accessed Dec 11 2003].
- Burton, Dan. 1996. Congratulations Republic of China. Library of Congress. Available from: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r104:1./temp/~r104J7pNSa:> [accessed Mar 4 2003].
- Bush, George W. 2004. Statement by the President on S. 2092, an Act concerning participation of Taiwan in the WHO. White House. Available from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040614-9.html> [accessed Jan 13 2005].

- Bush, Richard. "Helping the ROC to Defend Itself." In *A Unique Relationship: The United States and the Republic of China Under the Taiwan Relations Act*, edited by Roman H. Myers, 79-118. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989.
- Caruson, Kiki. "Book Review: American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2003): 687-88.
- Chai Trong R. 蔡同榮. "The Future of Taiwan." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 26, No. 12 (1986): 1309-23.
- 蔡同榮. "Telegram to President Nixon." *The Independent Formosa*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1970): 9.
- Chan, F. Gilbert. *China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question*. Hong Kong: Asian Research Service, 1984.
- Chan Ta-cheng. 1988. Yi Lei Chen de minzhu fangong (Recalling Lei Chen's Appeals of Anti-Communism and Democracy) 憶雷震的民主反共. Taiwan Tati Cultural And Educational Foundation. Available from: <http://taiwantt.org.tw/cdrom/20020831/content/1980/19880425-100.htm> [accessed Aug 11 2003].
- Chang Chien-lung 張建隆. Taiwan zhenglun (Taiwan Political Review) 台灣政論. New Taiwan Foundation. Available from: <http://formosa.yam.org.tw/magazine1.asp?ID=750801047> [accessed Oct 12 2003].
- Chang, George T. 張燦鑒. 1987. Taiwan: Old Myths and New Realities. WUFI. Available from: <http://www.wufi.org.tw/eng/chnamyth.htm> [accessed Nov 24 2003].
- Chang Kuo-cheng 張國城. "What Article 23 Means for Taiwan." *TT*, Dec 27 2002, 8.
- Chang, Maria Hsia. *Return of the Dragon: China's Wounded Nationalism*. Boulder: Westview Press, 2001.
- Chang Mau-kuei 張茂桂. "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism) 省籍問題與民族主義." In *Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong (The Relations among Ethnic Groups and National Identity)*, 233-78. Hong Kong: Ye qiang, 1993.
- 張茂桂. "Taiwan de zhengzhi zhuanxing yu zhengzhi de 'zuqunhua' guocheng (Political Transformation and Ethnization of Politics in Taiwan) 台灣的政治轉型與政治的「族群化」過程." Paper presented at the Jiaoyu yu Zhongguo guojia minzu rentong (Education and Chinese National Identity), Hong Kong, Jun 1 1996. Available from: <http://taup.yam.org.tw/PEOPLE/961117-5.htm> [accessed Aug 16 2002].
- Chang, Mau-Kuei Michael 張茂桂. "Provincialism and Nationalism." *Taiwan Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1995): 67-96.
- Chang, Parris H. "The Changing Nature of Taiwan's Politics." In *Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle*, edited by Denis Fred Simon and Michael Y.M. Kau, 25-42. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1992.
- Chang Tsung-chih 張宗智. "Buxi kouwu? Mei guowuyuan: reng cheng Taiwan huo Taiwan renmin (A Slip of Tongue by Bush? State Department: Still Use Taiwan or People of Taiwan) 布希口誤？美國務院：仍稱台灣或台灣人民." *UDN*, Apr 7 2002.
- 張宗智. "Gu Kuanmin Niushi Huayou deng quanban guanggao pi Mei yiZhong zhengce (Taiwan Presidential Advisor Koo Kwang-ming Put a Full-Page Ad in

- the NYT and WP Blasting US 'One China' Policy) 辜寬敏紐時華郵登全版廣告批美一中政策." *UDN*, Oct 6 2004.
- 張宗智. "Mei guanyuan yihuo: guanggao neirong shifou daibiao Bian lichang? (US Official Wonders: Is the Ad Really the Position of Bian?) 美官員疑惑: 廣告內容是否代表扁立場?" *UDN*, Oct 6 2004.
- 張宗智. "Ribei: Taihai zhengshi naru Mei-Ri anbao fanwei (Japan: Taiwan Strait Formally Falls into the Coverage of the US-Japan Security Alliance) 日本: 台海正式納入美日安保範圍." *UDN*, Mar 21 2005.
- 張宗智. "Tsai Yingwen: gongtong zhixian shi xingdong shihou (Tsai Ing-wen: Time to Enact a New Constitution through a National Referendum) 蔡英文: 公投制憲是行動時候." *UDN*, Nov 17 2003.
- 張宗智. "Xiabin tan Taiwan anquan zuihao mai quanxian (Shaheen Says Taiwan Had Better Buy Comprehensive Insurance for Security) 夏馨談台灣安全最好買全險." *UDN*, Nov 17 2003.
- Chang Ya-chung, and Sun kuo-hsiang 張亞中, 孫國祥. *Asia-Pacific Comprehensive Security Prospecting Review 2001-2002* 亞太綜合安全年報. Taipei: Yuan-Liou, 2002.
- Chang Yun-ping. "Candidates Focus on the Referendum." *TT*, Feb 22 2004, 1.
- . "Change of Name Must Happen: Lee." *TT*, Aug 24 2003, 1.
- . "Chen Drafts Timetable on Constitution." *TT*, Nov 12 2003, 1.
- . "Chen, Lee Warn of Conservative Forces' Return." *TT*, Aug 17 2003, 1.
- Chang Yun-ping, and Huang Tai-lin. "President Makes DPP Birthday Pledge." *TT*, Sep 29 2003, 1.
- Chao H. E., Weng Hsiu-kung, and Kao Chun-ming 趙信愷, 翁修恭, 高俊明. 1977. A Declaration on Human Rights by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. Available from: http://www.pct.org.tw/english/statements_4.htm [accessed Sep 30 2003].
- Chen Chih-ping 陳志平. "Guomintang ceshi baogao 319 qiangji'an yi you 2 xianchang (KMT's Ballistic Testing Report Suggests the 319 Gunshot Case Had 2 Scenes) 國民黨測試報告 319 槍擊案疑有 2 現場." *UDN*, Jul 1 2004.
- Chen, Edward I-te 陳以德. "The Attempt to Integrate." In *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, edited by Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, 240-74. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- . 陳以德. "Formosan Political Movements under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914-1937." *Asian Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1972): 477-97.
- Chen Lung-chu, and Harold D. Lasswell. *Formosa, China, and the United Nations: Formosa in the World Community*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967.
- Chen, Melody. "Foreign Minister Slams Singapore." *TT*, Sep 28 2004, 3.
- . "MAC Blasts Back at China." *TT*, Apr 15 2004, 1.
- Chen Ming-cheng, and Shih Cheng-feng 陳銘城, 施正鋒, ed. ^eds. *A History of World United Formosans for Independence* 台灣獨立建國聯盟的故事. Taipei: Qianwei, 2000.
- Chen Ming-tong 陳明通. *Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan)* 派系政治與台灣政治變遷. Taipei: Xin ziran zhuyi, 2001.

- Chen Shih-chang. "Lunsifei: Liuqiu Meijun jidi miqie jianshi Taihai (Rumsfeld: US Base on Ryukyu Closely Monitors Taiwan Strait) 倫斯斐：琉球美軍基地密切監視台海." *UDN*, Jul 7 2004.
- . "Xi Taipingyang Mei ni bushu diersao hangkong mujian (US Plans to Deploy Second Aircraft Carrier in Western Pacific) 西太平洋美擬部署第二艘航空母艦." *UDN*, Jul 17 2004.
- Chen Shih-hung, and Chang Chien-lung 陳世宏, 張建隆, ed.^eds. *Cong dangwai zhuxuantuan dao dangwai zongbu (Organization of Opposition Movement) 從黨外助選團到黨外總部*. 8 vols. Vol. 3, *Zhanhou Taiwan minzhu yundong shiliao huibian (Documentary Collection on Democratization Movement of Postwar Taiwan)*. Taipei: Academia Historica, 2000.
- Chen Shih-hung, Chang Shih-ying, Hsu Jui-hao, and Hsueh Yueh-shun 陳世宏, 張世瑛, 許瑞浩, 薛月順, ed.^eds. *Documentary Collection on the Lei Chen Case: Selective Archives of the Defense Ministry*. 3 vols. Vol. 1. Taipei: Academia Historica, 2002.
- Cheng Tun-jen 鄭敦仁. "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan." *World Politics*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (1989): 471-99.
- Cheng Tun-jen, and Hsu Yung-ming. "Issue Structure, the DPP's Factionalism, and Party Realignment." In *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, edited by Tien Hung-mao, 137-73. London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996.
- Cheng Yu-feng, and Li Fu-chung 程玉鳳, 李福鐘, ed.^eds. *Guohui gaizao (Congressional Reformation, 1948-1972) 國會改造, 1948-1972*. 8 vols. Vol. 4, *Zhanhou Taiwan minzhu yundong shiliao huibian (Documentary Collection on Democratization Movement of Postwar Taiwan)*. Taipei: Academia Historica, 2001.
- Chiang I-hua 江宜樺. *Ziyou zhuyi, minzu zhuyi yu guojia rentong (Liberalism, Nationalism and National Identity) 自由主義, 民族主義與國家認同*. Taipei: Yangzhi, 1998.
- Chiang Kai-shek, and Philip J. Jaffe. *China's Destiny & Chinese Economic Theory*. New York: Roy, 1947.
- Ching, Leo T. S. *Becoming 'Japanese': Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
- Chiu Hungdah 丘宏達. "Constitutional Development in the ROC in Taiwan." In *In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949*, edited by Steve Tsang, 17-47. London: Hurst, 1993.
- . 丘宏達. "The Taiwan Relations Act and Sino-American Relations." Occasional papers/reprints series in contemporary Asian studies, University of Maryland School of Law, 1990.
- Chiu Pei-fen 仇佩芬. "Wen Jiabao: renzhen kaolu ding 'tongyifa' (Wen Jiabao: Seriously Consider Enacting a Unification Law) 溫家寶：認真考慮訂統一法." *UDN*, May 11 2004.
- Chou, Annie H., ed.^eds. *Documentary Collection on US Aid to ROC*. 3 vols. Vol. 1. Taipei: Academia Historica, 1995.
- Chou, David. "The Republic of China and the Taiwan Relations Act." In *A Unique Relationship: The United States and the Republic of China Under the Taiwan Relations Act*, edited by Roman H. Myers, 140-59. Stanford: Hoover Institution

- Press, 1989.
- Chou Hsiu-huan, and Chen Shih-hung 周琇環, 陳世宏, ed.^eds. *Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties)* 組黨運動. 8 vols. Vol. 2, *Zhanhou Taiwan minzhu yundong shiliao huibian (Documentary Collection on Democratization Movement of Postwar Taiwan)*. Taipei: Academia Historica, 2000.
- Chou Yangsun, and Andrew J. Nathan. "Democratic Transition in Taiwan." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1987): 277-99.
- Chu, Monique. "Nation Left with 27 Friends after Nauru Defection." *TT*, Jul 22 2002, 1.
- . "NSC Urges 'Offensive' Foreign Policy." *TT*, Jul 19 2002, 1.
- Chu Yun-han, and Lin Tse-min. "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan: Social Cleavage, Electoral Competition, and the Emerging Party System." In *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, edited by Tien Hung-mao, 79-104. London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996.
- Chu, Yun-han, and Jih-wen Lin. "Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity." *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 165 (2001): 102-29.
- CIA. 2001. Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015. CIA. Available from: http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001.pdf [accessed Mar 18 2004].
- Clough, Ralph N. *Island China*. Edited by Twentieth Century Fund Study. London: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- CNA. "US Support Weakening, Confab Told." *TT*, Oct 10 2004.
- . 2003. Xishou tongqing, xinrong zhi IU (Join to Celebrate a Trip of Prosperity) 攜手同慶，欣榮之旅. Central New Agency. Available from: <http://www.cna.com.tw/spec/index.php?no=0198> [accessed Dec 26 2003].
- CNN. 2002. Taiwan Leader Calls for Independence Vote. CNN. Available from: <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/03/taiwan.chen/> [accessed Mar 5 2004].
- . 2000. Zhu: China Will Never Allow Taiwan to Declare Independence. Available from: <http://www.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/east/03/15/china.zhu/> [accessed Mar 11 2003].
- Cohen, Marc J., and Emma Teng, ed.^eds. *Let Taiwan Be Taiwan: Documents on the International Status of Taiwan*. Washington: Center for Taiwan International Relations, 1990.
- Cole, Allan B. "Political Roles of Taiwanese Enterprisers." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 7, No. 9 (1967): 645-54.
- Com, David. 2002. Taiwangate? - Bush Appointees Linked to Secret Slush Funds Update. The Nation. Available from: <http://www.thenation.com/capitalgames/index.mhtml?bid=3&pid=42> [accessed Feb 9 2003].
- Czyzak, John J. "Legal Status of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores Islands (Penghu)." Feb 3 1961. USDOS. Confidential. 16.
- Deutsch, Karl W. *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*. Cambridge: M.I.T., 1966.
- Di Tella, Torcuato S. "Populism and Reform in Latin America." In *Obstacles to Change in Latin America*, edited by Claudio Véliz, 47-74. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

- Dickson, Bruce J. "The Kuomintang before Democratization: Organizational Change and the Role of Elections." In *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, edited by Tien Hung-mao, 42-78. London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996.
- DoD. "FY04 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power." 54. Washington DC: DoD, 2004.
- . "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait." 1999.
- . 2004. Seven Carrier Strike Groups Underway for Exercise 'Summer Pulse '04'. DoD. Available from: <http://www.cffc.navy.mil/dodrelease.htm> [accessed Aug 12 2004].
- Domes, Jürgen. "The Kuomintang and the Opposition." In *In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949*, edited by Steve Tsang, 117-33. London: Hurst, 1993.
- DPP. Minjindang dangshiguan/liren dangzhuxi/Shi Mingde (Democratic Progressive Party History/Chairmen/Shih Ming-teh) 民進黨黨史館/歷任黨主席/施明德. DPP. Available from: <http://www.dpp.org.tw/> [accessed Feb 16 2005].
- . Minjindang dashi nianbiao (A Chronology of Relevant Events of the Democratic Progressive Party) 民進黨大事年表. DPP. Available from: <http://www.dpp.org.tw/> [accessed Oct 16 2003].
- Dumbaugh, Derry B. "CRS Issue Brief for Congress: IB98034: Taiwan: Recent Developments and US Policy Choices." Washington DC: Library of Congress, 2001.
- Edmondson, Robert. "The February 28 Incident and National Identity." In *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*, edited by Stephane Corcuff, 25-46. Armonk: M E Sharpe, 2002.
- Evans, Paul M. *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
- Fairbank, John King. *China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A.* Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967.
- . "China: Time For a Policy." *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 199, No. 4 (1957): 35-39.
- . *Chinabound: A Fifty-Year Memoir*. New York: Harper & Row, 1982.
- . "Formosa Through China's Eyes." *The New Republic*, Vol. 139, No. 15 (1958).
- . "Legacies of Past Associations." In *The Foundations of U.S. China Policy*, edited by Urban G. Whitaker, 136. Berkeley: Pacifica Foundation, 1959.
- . "Taiwan: Our Hardy Perennial Problem." In *China Perceived: Images and Policies in Chinese-American Relations*, edited by John King Fairbank. London: Andre Deutsch, 1976.
- Faison, Seth. "Gingrich Warns China That U.S. Would Step In to Defend Taiwan." *NYT*, Mar 31 1997.
- Fan Ling-chia 范凌嘉. "Fanlan xianshizhang pi Zhonggong, xiang guoji fasheng (Pan-Blue Mayors and County Commissioners Denounce the PRC at an International Press Conference) 泛藍縣市長批中共，向國際發聲." *UDN*, Mar 15 2005.
- Feinstein, Dianne. 1997. China: The Future. Library of Congress. Available from: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r105:1./temp/~r105K6xvDp>: [accessed Mar 7 2003].
- Feldman, Harvey. "The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1429: A Primer on U.S.

- Policy Toward the 'One-China' Issue: Questions and Answers." Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2001.
- . "In Clinton's China Shuffle, Taiwan Loses." *WP*, Jul 19 1998, C1.
- . "More Bowing to Beijing." *WP*, Jan 17 2004, A23.
- . "A New Kind of Relationship." In *A Unique Relationship: The United States and the Republic of China Under the Taiwan Relations Act*, edited by Roman H. Myers, 25-48. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989.
- Funderburk, David. 1996. A Tribute to President Lee and Taiwan. Library of Congress. Available from:
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r104:1./temp/~r104jC4bLO>: [accessed Mar 4 2003].
- Gang Dongjun, and Chen You 剛棟俊, 陳友. *Meiguo dui Hua zhengce 50 nian (America's China Policy in the Past 50 Years)* 美國對華政策 50 年. Guangdong: Guangdong renmin, 2001.
- Gao Lang 高朗. *Zhonghua Minguo waijiao guanxi zhi yanbian, 1950-1972 (The Evolution of Republic of China's Diplomatic Relations, 1950-1972)* 中華民國外交關係之演變, 1950-1972. Taipei: Wunan tushu, 1993.
- Gates, Hill. "Ethnicity and Social Class." In *The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society*, edited by Emily Martin Ahern and Hill Gates, 241-81. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981.
- Gertz, Bill. "Panel Suggests Revisiting U.S. 'One-China' Policy." *The Washington Times*, Jun 16 2004.
- Gertz, Bill, and Rowan Scarborough. "Inside the Ring." *Washington Times*, Mar 5 2004, A05.
- Gilman, Benjamin A. 1998. The Future of Taiwan. Library of Congress. Available from:
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r105:1./temp/~r105t2fPdx:e0>: [accessed Mar 8 2003].
- . 2000. Gilman Blasts Chinese Intimidation of Taiwan. USDOS. Available from:
<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/gilmn315.htm> [accessed Mar 11 2003].
- . 2000. Gilman Challenges Clinton over Taiwan. USDOS. Available from:
<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/giltaiw.htm> [accessed Mar 11 2003].
- . 2002. Welcoming Madame Chen Wu Sue-jen - Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (Extensions of Remarks - September 18, 2002). Library of Congress. Available from: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r107:1./temp/~r107gpjAJg>: [accessed Mar 1 2004].
- Gilpin, Robert. *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.
- Glenn, William. "Beating the System." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 79, No. 1 (1973): 13-13.
- Gold, Thomas B. "Taiwan's Quest for Identity in the Shadow of China." In *In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949*, edited by Steve Tsang, 169-92. London: Hurst, 1993.
- Gordon, Michael R. "U.S. Nuclear Plan Sees New Targets and New Weapons." Review of Nuclear Posture Review. *NYT*, Mar 10 2002, 1.
- Gorton, Slade. 1999. Administration's Constructive Engagement with China. Library of Congress. Available from:
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r106:1./temp/~r106r6i0LB>: [accessed Mar

- 10 2003].
- Grasso, June M. *Truman's Two-China Policy*. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1987.
- Gregor, A. James, and Maria Hsia Chang. *The Republic of China and U.S. Policy: A Study in Human Rights*. Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1983.
- Gurtov, Melvin. "Recent Developments on Formosa." *The China Quarterly*, No. 31 (1967): 59-95.
- Halbeisen, Hermann. "In Search of a New Political Order? Political Reform in Taiwan." In *In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949*, edited by Steve Tsang, 73-100. London: Hurst, 1993.
- Harding, Harry. *A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972*. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992.
- Harris, Lillian Craig. "Towards Taiwan's Independence." *Pacific Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1988): 24-37.
- Helms, Jesse, and Benjamin A. Gilman. 2000. Text: Chairmen Helms, Gilman Statements on Threats against Taiwan (Congressional Foreign Affairs Leaders 'Deeply Concerned'). USDOS. Available from: <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/helmsgl.htm> [accessed Mar 11 2003].
- Hinton, Harold C. *China's Turbulent Quest: An Analysis of China's Foreign Relations since 1949*. New York: Macmillan, 1972.
- . *Communist China in World Politics*. Macmillan: Macmillan, 1966.
- Holdridge, John H. *Crossing the Divide: An Insider's Account of Normalization of U.S.-China Relations*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997.
- Hook, Glenn D., Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, and Hugo Dobson. *Japan's International Relations*. London: Routledge, 2001.
- Hou Kun-hung 侯坤宏, ed.^eds. *Guoshiguan cang ererba dang'an shiliao (Archives Materials on the February Twenty-Eighth Incident as Deposited in the Academia Historica)* 國史館藏二二八檔案史料. 3 vols. Vol. 1. Taipei: Academia Historica, 1997.
- Hou Kun-hung, and Hsu Chin-fa 侯坤宏, 許進發, ed.^eds. *Ererba shijian dang'an huibian (Archives Materials on the 228 Incident)* 二二八事件檔案彙編. 10 vols. Vol. 1. Taipei: Academia Historica, 2002.
- Hsiao, Frank S. T., and Lawrence R. Sullivan. "The Chinese Communist Party and the Status of Taiwan, 1928-1943." *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (1979): 446-67. [accessed Aug 27 2004].
- Hsiao, Hsin-huang Michael 蕭新煌. "The Rise of Social Movements and Civil Protests." In *Political Change in Taiwan*, edited by Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, 57-72. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992.
- Hsieh Chung-liang 謝忠良. "Guoanju juemi wenjian puguang, Li Denghui feifa nuoyong 35 yi (Leaked National Security Agency Top-Secret Document Revealed Lee Teng-hui Illegally Misappropriated \$3.5 Billion New Taiwan Dollars) 國安局絕密文件曝光, 李登輝非法挪用 35 億." *Yi Zhoukan (Next Magazine)*, Mar 21, No. 43 (2002): 10-23.
- Hsieh Chung-liang, and Chu Ming 謝忠良, 朱明. "Tai-Mei gao jieting, Yindu kai 'houmen' (India Joins Taiwan and America's Intelligence Exchange to Monitor the PLA) 台美搞截聽, 印度開「後門」." *Yi Zhoukan (Next Magazine)*, Jan 3, No. 32 (2002): 42-47.

- Hsieh Hua-yuan 薛化元. 2001. The 823 Artillery War and Its Historical Significance. Available from: <http://www.twhistory.org.tw/20010820.htm> [accessed Sep 25 2003].
- Hsu, Crystal. "Chen Walks Fine Line at WTC." *TT*, Mar 18 2001, 1.
- Hsu Long-hsuen, and Chang Ming-kai, ed.^eds. *History of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945)*. 2 ed. Taipei: Chung Wu, 1972.
- Hsu Tsung-mao 徐宗懋. *Taiwanren lun (An Analysis of the Taiwanese)* 台灣人論. Taipei: Shibao wenhua, 1993.
- Hsu Ya-ching 許雅靜. "Minjindangtuan: Mei-Ri wei Taiwan gongtou beishu zaozai yiliao (DPP Caucus Has Predicted US-Japan Endorsement of Taiwan Referendum as the Final Result Months Earlier) 民進黨團：美日為台灣公投背書早在意料." *UDN*, Feb 20 2004.
- Hsu Yung-ming 徐永明. "Drafting a Constitution Would Alter Status Quo." *TT*, Oct 3 2003, 8.
- Hsueh Yueh-shun, Tseng Pin-tsang, and Hsu Jui-hao 薛月順, 曾品滄, 許瑞浩, ed.^eds. *Cong jieyan dao jieyan (The Martial Law Era)* 從戒嚴到解嚴. 8 vols. Vol. 1, *Zhanhou Taiwan minzhu yundong shiliao huibian (Documentary Collection on Democratization Movement of Postwar Taiwan)*. Taipei: Academia Historica, 2000.
- Hu Fu 胡佛. "The Electoral Mechanism and Political Change in Taiwan." In *In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949*, edited by Steve Tsang, 134-68. London: Hurst, 1993.
- Hu Tai-li 胡台麗. "Yuzai yu fanshu - Taiwan 'rongmin' de zuqun guanxi yu rentong (Yam and Sweet Potato - Ethnic Relations and Identity of Veteran-Mainlanders in Taiwan) 芋仔與蕃薯 - 台灣「榮民」的族群關係與認同." In *Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong (The Relations among Ethnic Groups and National Identity)*, 279-325. Hong Kong: Yeqiang, 1993.
- Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑. "Lun 'Taiwan yishi' de fazhan ji qi tezhi (The Development and Characteristics of Taiwanese Consciousness) 論「台灣意識」的發展及其特質." In *Zhongguo yishi yu Taiwan yishi: 1999 Aomen xueshu yantaohui*, edited by Xiachao jijinhui, 1-32. Taipei: Haixia xueshu, 1999.
- Huang Fu-chi 黃福其. "Shiwu qianli chongpiao zhan, Guomintang chongchu lantian (Unprecedented Efforts to Draw Votes Resulted in KMT Victory) 史無前例衝票戰，國民黨衝出藍天." *UDEN*, Dec 12 2004.
- Huang Fu-chi, Li Hao-chung, and Wang Cheng-ning 黃福其、李濠仲、王正寧. "Bian-Song hui 10 gongshi, bu duli, bu tuidong liangguolun (Ten-Point Consensus after Bian-Soong Meeting, Including No Declaration of Independence, No Inclusion of the So-Call 'State-to-State' Description in the Constitution) 扁宋會 10 共識 不獨立、不推動兩國論." *UDEN*, Feb 24 2005.
- Huang Hsiu-cheng 黃秀政. *Taiwanshi yanjiu (A Study of Taiwan History)* 台灣史研究. 2nd ed. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1992.
- Huang Kuang-kuo 黃光國. *Mincui wangTai lun (Populism Will Destroy Taiwan)* 民粹亡台論. Taipei: Shangzhou wenhua, 1997.
- Huang Kuo-liang 黃國樑. "Shuai Huamin: 319 qiangji'an buneng paichu zidao ziyan (Shuai Hua-min: 319 Gunshot Case Should Not Rule Out the Possibility of a

- Self-Interest Scheme) 帥化民：319 槍擊案不能排除自導自演." *UDEN*, Jun 30 2004.
- Huang, Mab. *Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973*. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976.
- Huang Mei-hui 黃美惠. "Baodaoge: Beijing aoyun bushi Taiwan hushenfu (Douglas Paal Warned Taipei Not to Take the 2008 Olympic Games as an Amulet for Declaring Independence) 包道格：北京奧運 不是台灣護身符." *UDN*, May 6 2004.
- Huang Tai-lin. "Lien, Soong Hold Dramatic Rally." *TT*, Mar 14 2004, 1.
- . "Local Chiefs Rail against Referendum." *TT*, Jan 27 2004, 1.
- Huang Teh-fu 黃德福. "Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang." In *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, edited by Tien Hung-mao, 105-36. London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996.
- Huang Tzu-yang 黃子揚. 1979. Gaoxiong shijian jishi (A Faithful Account of the Kaohsiung Incident) 高雄事件紀實. WUFI. Available from: <http://www.wufi.org.tw/> [accessed Oct 6 2003].
- Huang Ya-shih, Li Shun-te, and Liu Pao-chieh 黃雅詩, 李順德, 劉寶傑. "Dupai manyi: 'sibu yi meiyou' tongtong chuju (Secessionists Are Satisfied with No Repetition of 'Five Noes' in the Inauguration Speech) 獨派滿意：「四不一沒有」通通出局." *UDN*, May 21 2004.
- Huebner, Jon W. "The Abortive Liberation of Taiwan." *The China Quarterly*, No. 110 (1987): 256-75.
- Hughes, Christopher. *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society*. London: Routledge, 1997.
- Hughes, Christopher W. *Japan's Economic Power and Security: Japan and North Korea*. London: Routledge, 1999.
- Hung Po-chang. "Mei longyin yanxi jiaxiang Zhonggong duiTai junshi weixie (US 'Dragon's Thunder' Exercise Simulates PRC Military Threat against Taiwan) 美龍吟演習假想中共對台軍事威脅." *UDEN*, Jul 16 2004.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
- Jackson-Lee, Shella. 1995. Taiwan and World Recognition. Library of Congress. Available from: <http://thomas.loc.gov> [accessed Mar 3 2003].
- Jacob, Philip E., and Henry Teune. "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community." In *The Integration of Political Communities*, edited by Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, 1-45. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964.
- Jacobs, J. Bruce. "Taiwanese and the Chinese Nationalists, 1937-1945: The Origins of Taiwan's 'Half-Mountain People' (Banshan Ren)." *Modern China*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1990): 84-118.
- Jacoby, Neil Herman. *U.S. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign Aid, Self-Help, and Development*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.
- Kahn, Joseph. "Beijing Leaders Speak of Force to Keep Taiwan 'Chinese'." *NYT*, Mar 8 2005.
- . "China's Army May Respond if Taiwan Fully Secedes." *NYT*, Dec 18 2004.
- Kan, Shirley A. "CRS Report for Congress: RL30341: China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy - Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei."

- Washington DC: Library of Congress, 2001.
- Kang Lu-dao 康綠島. *Li Guoding koushu lishi: Huashuo Taiwan jingyan (Oral History by Li Kuo-ting: An Account on Taiwan Experience)* 李國鼎口述歷史：話說台灣經驗. Taipei: Zhuoyue wenhua, 1993.
- Kaplan, David E. *Fires of the Dragon*. New York: Atheneum, 1992.
- Kaplan, John. *The Court-Martial of the Kaohsiung Defendants*. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1981.
- Kaufman, Robert R. "Corporatism, Clientelism, and Partisan Conflict: A Study of Seven Latin American Countries." In *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, edited by James M. Malloy, 109-49. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977.
- Kellas, James G. *Nationalist Politics in Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002.
- Kelly, James A. 2004. Overview of U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan - Testimony at a Hearing on Taiwan, House International Relations Committee, April 21, 2004. USDOS. Available from: <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/31649.htm> [accessed Dec 4 2004].
- Kemp, Walter A. *Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: A Basic Contradiction?* Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999.
- Kerr, George. "Formosa's Return to China." *Far Easter Survey*, Vol. 16, No. 18 (1947): 205-08.
- Kerr, George H. *Formosa Betrayed*. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1966.
- Kissinger, Henry A. 1999. National Security Study Memorandum 124: Next Steps towards the People's Republic of China (Apr 19, 1971). In *China and the United States: From Hostility to Engagement, 1960-1998*, ed. Jeffrey T. Richelson. George Washington University. 1. Available from: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB19/02-01.htm> [accessed Apr 16 2002].
- Klintworth, Gary. "China and Taiwan - From Flashpoint to Redefining One China." 63: Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2000.
- Knapp, Ronald G. "The Shaping of Taiwan's Landscapes." In *Taiwan: A New History*, edited by Murray A. Rubinstein, 3-26. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.
- Ko Kiansin 高見信. "The Legal Status of Formosa from the Viewpoint of International Law." *Formosa Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1962): 37-40.
- Ko Shu-ling. "The Cabinet Gives Ma a History Lesson." *TT*, Nov 11 2004, 1.
- . "Government Outlines Spending for Weapons." *TT*, Aug 9 2002, 1.
- . "Yu Heralds a 'Balance of Terror'." *TT*, Sep 26 2004, 1.
- Koebner, Richard, and Helmut Dan Schmidt. *Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political Word, 1840-1960*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964.
- Kou Patkau. "The Movement to Establish a New Opposition Party in Formosa." *Formosan Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1962): 11-16.
- Kung Ling-chi 孔令琪. "27 wan ren canjia 326 youxing (270,000 People Participated in the Demonstration on March 26) 27 萬人參加 326 遊行." *UDEN*, Mar 27 2005.
- Kuo Chao-lich 郭炤烈. "Taiwan yishi de lishi guiji (The Historical Track of Taiwanese Consciousness) 台灣意識的歷史軌跡." In *Zhongguo yishi yu Taiwan yishi: 1999 Aomen xueshu yantaohui*, edited by Xiachao jijinhui, 33-57. Taipei: Haixia xueshu, 1999.
- Kuo Hsien-sheng, and Cheng Kuang-lung 郭先盛, 鄭光隆. "Bian: gongtou zouchu

- diyibu, jiuyou dierbu (Bian: The First Referendum Will Certainly Be Followed by a Second One) 扁：公投走出第一步，就有第二步." *UDN*, Dec 9 2003.
- Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou 賴澤涵, 馬若孟, 魏萼. *Beijuxing de kaiduan: Taiwan ererba shibian (A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947)* 悲劇性的開端：台灣二二八事變. Translated by Luoia Luo. Taipei: Shibao wenhua, 1993.
- . *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.
- Lam, Willy. 2004. Beijing Steps up Pressure on Chen. *CNN*. Available from: <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/05/18/china.willycolumn/> [accessed May 25 2004].
- Lampton, David M. *Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
- Lan Po-chou 藍博洲. *Riju shiqi Taiwan xuesheng yundong (Taiwanese Student Movement during Japanese Occupation Period)* 日據時期台灣學生運動. Taipei: Shibao wenhua, 1993.
- Lantos, Tom. 1996. Congratualtions to President Lee Teng-hui and the People of Taiwan on the First Democratic Election - March 25, 1996. Library of Congress. Available from: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r104:1./temp/~r104gN5mWT>: [accessed Mar 4 2003].
- Lasater, Martin L. *The Changing of the Guard: President Clinton and the Security of Taiwan*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.
- Lavere, Rick. 1999. Extended Deterrence and US Policy in the Taiwan Straits. University of Michigan. Available from: <http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rlavere/taiwan.html> [accessed May 24 2003].
- Lee Hung-hsi 李鴻禧. "Dangqian tongdu lunzhan de xianfaxie di xili (A Constitutionalistic Analysis of the Contemperary Dispute between Unification and Independence) 當前統獨論戰的憲法學底析理." In *Guojia rentong xueshu yantaohui lunwenji (Collection of Articles from the Conference on National Identity)*, 240. Taipei: Caituan faren xiandai xueshu yanjiu jijinhui, 1993.
- Lee Teng-hui 李登輝. *Li Denghui zhizheng gaobai shilu (A Faithful Account of Lee Teng-hui's Rule)* 李登輝執政告白實錄. Taipei: Yinke, 2001.
- . 李登輝. *Taiwan de zhuzhang (An Argument of Taiwan)* 台灣的主張. Taipei: Yuanliu, 1999.
- . 李登輝. *Yazhou de zhilue (A Strategy of Asia)* 亞洲的智略. Taipei: Yuanliu, 2000.
- Lens, Sidney. *The Forging of the American Empire: A History of American Imperialism from the Revolution to Vietnam*. London: Pluto, 2003.
- Li-Min Hsueh, Chen-Kuo Hsu, and Dwight H. Perkins. *Industrialization and the State: The Changing Role of Government in Taiwan's Economy, 1945-1998*. London: Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Li Chia-chuan. "Taiwan jingji de fazhan, lianxiang he sikao (The Association and Reflection on the Development of Taiwan Economy) 台灣經濟的發展，聯想和思考." In *Taiwan: Economy, Society and History*, edited by E.K.Y. Chen, Jack F. Williams and Joseph Wong, 3-14. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1991.
- Li Hsiao-feng 李筱峰. 2000. 424 ciJiang an de lishi yiyi (The Historical Significance of

- the Assassination Attempt against Chiang on April 24) 424 刺蔣案的歷史意義. Li, Hsiao-feng. Available from: <http://www.jimlee.idv.tw/> [accessed Oct 2 2003].
- 李筱峰. 2001. Jin bainian Taiwan minzhu yundong gaiyao (A Summary of the Democratic Movement in Taiwan in the Recent One Hundred Years) 近百年台灣民主運動概要. Li, Xiaofeng. Available from: http://www.jimlee.idv.tw/art_01_17.htm [accessed Oct 6 2003].
- Li Ling-i 李令儀. "Li Xianlung: Taiwan ruo tiaopi liang'an chongtu Xing bu zhichi (Singapore PM Li Xianlung: No Support for Taiwan If It Causes Conflict across the Strait) 台灣若挑起兩岸衝突 星不支持." *UDN*, Aug 23 2004.
- Li Ping-nan 李炳南. *Zhengzhi xieshang huiyi yu Guo-Gong tanpan (The Political Consultation Conferences and the KMT-CCP Negotiation)* 政治協商會議與國共談判. Taipei: Yongye, 1993.
- Li Shun-te, and Fan Ling-chia 李順德, 范凌嘉. "Zhengyuan yuanhui bian Taiwan diwei, da 'renmin zhuquan' gongshi ('Popular Sovereignty': Consensus after a Debate over the Legal Status of Taiwan in the Executive Yuan Meeting) 政院院會辯台灣地位 達「人民主權」共識." *UDN*, Nov 11 2004.
- Liao, Joshua 廖文奎. *Formosa Speaks*. Hong Kong: Graphic Press, 1950.
- Liau Kianliong. "Why Formosa Wants Independence." *Formosan Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1962): 4-8.
- Lieberthal, Kenneth. "Dire Strait: The Risks On Taiwan." *WP*, Jan 8 2004, A23.
- Lin, C. "The Unleashing and Releashing of Chiang Kai-shek." *The Independent Formosa*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1970): 3-6.
- Lin Cheng-yi 林正義. "The U.S. Factor in Taiwan's Political Development." In *R.O.C.-U.S.A. Relations, 1979-1989*, edited by Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, 535. Taipei: Institute of American Culture, Academia Sinica, 1991.
- Lin Chieh-yu. "Chen Tells China He May Revoke 'Five Noes' Pledge." *TT*, Dec 23 2003, 1.
- . "Chen Urges Part Two of Miracle." *TT*, Jul 23 2001, 1.
- . "Kaohsiung Gets behind Referendum Bid." *TT*, Oct 26 2003, 1.
- . "Taiwan May Go 'Own Way': Chen." *TT*, Jul 22 2002, 3.
- Lin Chieh-yu, and Jimmy Chuang. "Lien Trumpets KMT Constitutional Plan." *TT*, Nov 16 2003, 1.
- Lin Chieh-yu, and Ko Shu-ling. "Presidential Office, Cabinet Defend President." *TT*, Oct 1 2003, 3.
- Lin Chieh-yu, and Sandy Huang. "Chen Lashes Out at Ma." *TT*, Oct 26 2002, 1.
- Lin Ching-yin 林敬殷. "320 gongtou, lanjun taidu zai zhuanbian buzai dizhi (The Pan-blue Camp No Longer Boycotts the March 20 Referendum) 320 公投, 藍軍態度再轉變, 不再抵制." *UDN*, Jan 21 2004.
- Lin Ho-ming 林河名. "Li Denghui: Guotonghui dou Zhonggong yongde (Lee Teng-hui: The National Unification Council Was Used to Provoke the PRC) 李登輝: 國統會逗中共用的." *UDN*, May 18 2002.
- Lin Mei-ling, and Lin Wan-yu 林美玲, 林宛諭. "Bian chongshen liang'an yibian yiguo yao fen qingchu (Bian Reiterates That Each Side Is a Country Needs to Be Clear) 扁重申兩岸一邊一國要分清楚." *UDN*, Sep 14 2002.
- Lin Ming-hsien 林茗顯. 2003. *Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji* (A Chronology of

Relevant Events of World United Formosans for Independence) 台灣獨立建國聯盟大事記. WUFI. Available from: <http://www.wufi.org.tw/> [accessed Jan 11 2005].

- Lin Pao-ching 林寶慶. "Armitage tan gongtou ying you Taiwan renmin jue ding (Armitage: Necessity of Referendum is up to the People on Taiwan to Decide) 阿米塔吉談公投應由台灣人民決定." *UDN*, Mar 12 2004.
- 林寶慶. "Huashengdun shibao: Mei feizhengshi tongyi shou Tai shendunjian (Washington Times: US Unofficially Agrees to Sell Aegis-Class Destroyers to Taiwan) 華盛頓時報：美非正式同意售台神盾艦." *UDN*, Mar 6 2004.
- 林寶慶. "Mei shouwo liangtao changcheng yujing leida (US Sells to Taiwan Two Sets of Long-Range Early Warning Radar) 美售我兩套長程預警雷達." *UDN*, Apr 2 2004.
- 林寶慶. "Wang Jinping: qianjian guozao buneng meiyu xianshi (Wang Chin-ping: Policy to Produce Indigenous Submarines Must Take Reality into Consideration) 王金平：潛艦國造不能昧於現實." *UDN*, Jun 25 2004.
- Lindsay, Michael. "Formosa's Future." *The New Republic*, Vol. 139, No. 14 (1958).
- Linz, Juan J. "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain." In *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology*, edited by Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen, 291-341. Helsinki: Distributor: The Academic Bookstore, 1964.
- Liu Chin-ching. "Taiwan jingji suxing zhi tantao (A Study of the Revival of Taiwan Economy) 台灣經濟甦醒之探討." In *Taiwan: Economy, Society and History*, edited by E.K.Y. Chen, Jack F. Williams and Joseph Wong, 15-39. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1991.
- Liu Ching-pai 劉清白. 2003. Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng Meiguo benbu yu Taiwan jianguo yundong zhong banyan jue se (The Role of WUFI Headquarters-USA in Taiwan's Nation-Building Movement) 台灣獨立建國聯盟美國本部於台灣建國運動中扮演角色. WUFI. Available from: <http://wufi.org/WUFIhistory/history.html> [accessed Oct 14 2003].
- Liu Hua-yi, and Kao Chun-ming 劉華義, 高俊明. 1971. Statement on Our National Fate by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. Available from: http://www.pct.org.tw/english/statements_1.htm [accessed Sep 27 2003].
- Liu Jintian 劉金田. *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan ciyu huishi (A Phrase Book of Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping)* 鄧小平文選詞語匯釋. Beijing: Jiefangjun, 1994.
- Liu Kai-ping 劉開平. "Jiang Nan an, Wang Xiling: Jiang Jingguo buyuan guanwo. zhe ni jiu dongle (Wang Hsi-ling's Hint on Henry Liu's Murder: CCK Unwilling to Jail Me. You Know What It Means) 江南案 汪希苓：蔣經國不願關我…這你就懂了." *UDN*, Oct 15 2004.
- Liu, Xiaoyuan. *A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and Their Policies for the Postwar Disposition of the Japanese Empire, 1941-1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Liu Xurui, and Shi Guoqiang 劉栩瑞, 史國強. *Li Denghui diguo mori (The End of Lee Teng-hui's Empire)* 李登輝帝國末日. Hong Kong: Li wen, 2000.
- Lo Chia-wei 羅嘉薇. "6108 yi jungou, Bian: weixi Tai-Mei fangwei guanxi bixu daijia

- (Bian: NT\$610.8 Billion Arms Budget a Necessary Price for Maintaining US-Taiwan Defence Relationship) 6108 億軍購，扁：維繫台美防衛關係必需代價." *UDN*, Jun 11 2004.
- 羅嘉薇. "Ba cheng er Taiwan minzhong bu zancheng fan fenlie fa (82% of Taiwan People Disapprove the Anti-Secession Legislation) 八成二台灣民眾不贊成反分裂法." *UDN*, Mar 3 2005.
- 羅嘉薇. "Su Qi chushu tan 'liangguolun' dao 'yibian yiguo' (Su Chi's Book Gives An Account of 'Special State-to-State Relationship' and 'One Side, One Country') 蘇起出書談「兩國論」到「一邊一國」." *UDN*, Jan 5 2004.
- Lo Hsiao-ho, and Ho Chen-chung 羅曉荷, 何振忠. "Daxuan qian fu Mei, Shi Mingde xuanze taoli (Shih Ming-teh's Choice to Flee to the US before the Presidential Election) 大選前赴美，施明德選擇逃離." *UDN*, Oct 19 2003.
- Lo Hsiao-ho, and Liu Pao-chieh 羅曉荷, 劉寶傑. "Lee Teng-hui gaohu: chedi xiaomie wailai zhengquan (Lee Teng-hui: Root out the Alien Regime) 李登輝高呼：徹底消滅外來政權." *UDN*, Mar 14 2004.
- Lord, Winston. "Memorandum for Henry Kissinger: Memcon of your Conversations with Chou En-lai on July 9 1971." Jul 29 1971. USDOS. Top secret, declassified 2001. George Washington University. 46. Available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/> [accessed May 27 2002].
- Lu, Alexander Ya-li 呂亞力. "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party." In *Political Change in Taiwan*, edited by Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, 121-46. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992.
- Lu Keng, and Ma Si-ping 陸鏗, 馬西屏. *Bienaoile, Denghui xiansheng: 12 wei guanjian renwu tan Li Denghui (Stop the Farce, Mr. Teng-hui: 12 Key Figures' Accounts on Lee Teng-hui)* 別鬧了，登輝先生：12 位關鍵人物談李登輝. Taipei: Tianxia yuanjian, 2001.
- Lu Te-yun 盧德允. "Guofangbu: weilai liangnian Taihai junli youshi xiang zhonggong qingxie (Ministry of National Defense: Military Balance across the Taiwan Strait Will Shift to Favor the PRC in Two Years) 國防部：未來兩年台海軍力優勢向中共傾斜." *UDN*, Jul 3 2004.
- MacFarquhar, Roderick. *Sino-American Relations, 1949-71*. New Abbot: David & Charles, 1972.
- Madsen, Robert A. "Chinese Chess: US China policy and Taiwan, 1969-1979." PhD thesis, Oxford, 1999.
- Mann, James. *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton*. New York: Vintage, 2000.
- Mao Zedong 毛澤東. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. 3rd ed. Vol. 4. Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1969.
- Mayall, James. *Nationalism and International Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- McKinzie, Richard D. 1975. Oral History Interview with Edwin W. Martin. Harry S. Truman Library. Available from: <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/martinew.htm#note> [accessed Oct 7 2002].
- . 1975. Oral History Interview with Livingston Merchant. Harry S. Truman Library. Available from: <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/merchant.htm> [accessed Sep 20 2003].

- Meaney, Constance Squires. "Liberalization, Democratization, and the Role of the KMT." In *Political Change in Taiwan*, edited by Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, 95-120. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992.
- Meisner, Maurice. "The Development of Formosan Nationalism." *The China Quarterly*, No. 15 (1963): 91-106.
- Mendel, Douglas Heusted. *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970.
- . "The Role of Violence in Liberation Movements: A Reader's Opinion." *The Independent Formosa*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1970): 12-13.
- Mengin, Françoise. "State and Identity." In *Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China*, edited by Steve Tsang and Tien Hung-mao, 116-29. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999.
- Milstein, Mark H. 1991. Strategic Ties or Tentacles? Institute for National Security Affairs. Available from: <http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/1091/9110027.htm> [accessed Feb 28 2005].
- Moon, Parker Thomas. *Imperialism and World Politics*. New York: Garland Publishing, 1973.
- Mufson, Steven, and Helen Dewar. "Pentagon Issues Warning to China-U.S. Officials Criticize Beijing's Broadening of Reasons to Use Force Against Taiwan." *WP*, Feb 23 2000.
- Murkowski, Frank. 1996. National Endowment for Democracy Tribute to President Lee Teng-hui. Library of Congress. Available from: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r104:1./temp/~r1040TkT8m>: [accessed Mar 4 2003].
- Murkowski, Frank H. 1994. United States Policy toward China and Taiwan (Senate - May 19, 1994). Available from: <http://www.fas.org/news/taiwan/1994/s940519-taiwan.htm> [accessed Mar 12 2003].
- Myers, Ramon H. "Introduction: A Unique Relationship." In *A Unique Relationship: The United States and the Republic of China Under the Taiwan Relations Act*, edited by Roman H. Myers, 1-24. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989.
- . "A New Chinese Civilization: The Evolution of the Republic of China on Taiwan." *The China Quarterly*, No. 148, Special Issue: Contemporary Taiwan (1996): 1072-90.
- NARA. The President's News Conference, June 5, 1989. Available from: <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1989/89060500.html> [accessed Jan 29 2003].
- . Remarks at the Yale University Commencement Ceremony in New Haven, Connecticut, May 27, 1991. Available from: <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91052700.html> [accessed Jan 29 2003].
- . Remarks to General Dynamics Employees in Fort Worth, Texas, September 2, 1992. Available from: <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1992/92090202.html> [accessed Jan 30 2003].
- Nathan, Andrew J. "The Effect of Taiwan's Political Reform on Taiwan-Mainland Relations." In *Political Change in Taiwan*, edited by Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, 207-19. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992.
- NBC. 2005. Transcript for March 20: Gen. Richard Myers, David Broder, Ron Brownstein, John Harwood and Gwen Ifill. NBC News. Available from:

- <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7231263/> [accessed Mar 31 2005].
- Ni Wan-chun. "Wenhuibao: Mei zhu Tai yanzhi huimiexing wuqi (Wen Wei Po: US Assists Taiwan to Develop Weapon of Mass Destruction) 文匯報：美助台研製毀滅性武器." *UDEN*, Jul 20 2004.
- . "Zhonggong zizhijian chengjun jin hua sannian duo shijian (It Takes Only a Little over Three Years for PRC Indigenous Warships to Join Active Service) 中共自製艦成軍僅花三年多時間." *UDEN*, Jul 21 2004.
- Niu Ciong-hau. "The Formation of the Formosan Nation - A Short History of Formosa." *Formosan Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1962): 45-55.
- Nixon, Richard M. *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*. London: Book Club Associates, 1978.
- NSC. "NSC 37/2: A Report to the President by the National Security Council on the Current Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa." Feb 3 1949. In *Papers of Harry S. Truman*. Top secret, declassified 1975. Harry S. Truman Library. 4.
- . Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 24 (Apr 5, 1977). Jimmy Carter Library. 3. Available from: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/prmemorandums/pres_memorandums.phtml [accessed Apr 23 2002].
- . "Prospects for an Early Successful Chinese Communist Attack on Taiwan." Jul 26 1950. In *Papers of Harry S. Truman*. Secret, declassified 1993. Harry S. Truman Library. 18.
- NYT. "Cheney Presses Beijing on North Korea." *NYT*, Apr 14 2004.
- . "Foreign Policy Questions." Oct 17 1976, 1.
- . "Looking for Friendly Overseas Base, Pentagon Finds It Already Has One." *NYT*, Apr 7 2004, 17.
- . "Unneeded Quarrel Over Taiwan." Dec 6 2003, 14.
- Oksenberg, Michel. "A Decade of Sino-American Relations." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (1982): 175-95.
- . "Taiwan, Tibet and Hongkong in Sino-American Relations." In *Living with China: U.S./China Relations in the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Ezra F. Vogel, 53-96. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997.
- Ong Joktik 王育德. "In The Beginning." *Formosan Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1962): 3.
- OPROC. 2001. Fuzongtong canjia '2001 caijing gaofeng huiyi' kaimu (Vice President Attends the Opening Ceremony of the '2001 Economic and Financial Summit Meeting') 副總統參加「2001 財經高峰會議」開幕. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Feb 2 2004].
- . 2002. Fuzongtong jiejian Meiguo zaiTai xiehui lishi zhuxi Buruizhe (Vice President Meets with AIT Chairman Richard Bush) 副總統接見美國在台協會理事主席卜睿哲. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Mar 4 2004].
- . 2001. Fuzongtong jiejian Meiguo zhiku xuezhe fanghua tuan (Vice President Receives a Delegation of US Think Tank Scholars) 副總統接見美國智庫學者訪華團. Available from:

- <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Feb 4 2004].
- . 2001. Fuzongtong zai 'chengda qiye guanli xiejinhui' yi 'tansuo Taiwan qiantu' weiti fabiao yanjiang (Vice President Makes a Speech on 'Exploring the Future of Taiwan' to the 'Cheng Ta Business Administration Association') 副總統在「成大企業管理協進會」以「探索台灣前途」為題發表演講. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Mar 3 2004].
- . 2000. Inaugural Speech (2000/5/20): Taiwan Stands Up - Toward the Dawn of a Rising Era. Available from: http://www.president.gov.tw/1_president/e_subject-06e.html [accessed Jan 23 2004].
- . 2001. Inaugural Statement of the Taiwan Alliance for Global Peace. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4> [accessed Feb 5 2004].
- . 2005. Joint Statement of President Chen and Chairman Soong. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4> [accessed Mar 31 2005].
- . 2002. President Chen's Address to the CSIS Taipei Roundtable 2002. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4> [accessed Mar 4 2004].
- . 2003. President Chen's Address upon Receiving the Human Rights Award by the International League for Human Rights. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4> [accessed Jun 19 2004].
- . 2001. President Chen's Congratulatory Message to the 2001 Global Peace Assembly. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4> [accessed Feb 5 2004].
- . 2000. President Chen's Cross-Century Remarks. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Feb 2 2004].
- . 2004. President Chen's Inaugural Address 'Paving the Way for a Sustainable Taiwan'. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4> [accessed May 21 2004].
- . 2002. President Chen's Remarks on the Eve of the Anniversary of the September 11 Attacks. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4> [accessed Mar 5 2004].
- . 2004. President Chen's Televised Statement of the Peace Referendum on March 20. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4> [accessed Jan 19 2004].
- . 2001. President Chen's Videoconference with the Council on Foreign Relations. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4> [accessed Feb 3 2004].
- . 2002. President Chen Addresses the Opening Ceremony of the 2002

- Asia-Pacific Democratic Cooperation Forum. Available from:
<http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4> [accessed Mar 8 2004].
- . 2002. President Chen Addresses the Opening of the 26th Joint Conference of ROC-USA & US-Taiwan Business Councils. Available from:
<http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4> [accessed Mar 16 2004].
- . 2002. President Chen Delivers the Opening Address of the 29th Annual Meeting of the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations via Live Video Link. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4> [accessed Mar 5 2004].
- . 2001. President Chen Meets with a Delegation of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. Available from:
<http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4> [accessed Jan 31 2004].
- . 2001. President Chen Meets with Dr. Joseph S. Nye, Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Available from:
<http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4> [accessed Feb 4 2004].
- . 2001. President Chen Meets with U.S. Delegates to the '2001 Taipei Roundtable'. Available from:
<http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4> [accessed Feb 2 2004].
- . 2000. President Chen Meets with US Secretary of Transportation Rodney E. Slater. Available from:
<http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4> [accessed Jan 23 2004].
- . 1998. President Lee Addresses National Assembly. Available from:
<http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4> [accessed Mar 24 2003].
- . 2001. Presidential Office Responds to US Arms Sales to Taiwan. Available from:
<http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4> [accessed Feb 2 2004].
- . 2000. Presidential Press Conference (2000/09/16). Available from:
http://www.president.gov.tw/1_president/e_subject-06.html [accessed Jan 31 2004].
- . 2000. Presidential Press Conference(2000/07/31). Available from:
http://www.president.gov.tw/1_president/e_subject-06.html [accessed Jan 28 2004].
- . 2000. Presidential Press Conference(2000/08/28). Available from:
http://www.president.gov.tw/1_president/e_subject-06.html [accessed Jan 28 2004].
- . 2000. The Third Way for Taiwan: A New Political Perspective. Available from:
http://www.president.gov.tw/1_president/e_subject-041e.html [accessed Jan 26 2004].
- . 2001. Vice President Lu Addresses the Asian Forum on Women and Power. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4>

- [accessed Feb 2 2004].
- . 2001. Vice President Lu Receives Rep. Ben Gilman, Honorary Chairman of the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Feb 5 2004].
 - . 2004. Zongtong canjia 'Huang Xinjie xiansheng jinian jiangzuo' (President Attends 'A Commemoration Lecture on Mr. Huang Hsin-chieh') 總統參加「黃信介先生紀念講座」. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Nov 22 2004].
 - . 2002. Zongtong canjia yazhou Taiwan shanghui lianhe zonghui dijiujie nianhui kaimu dianli (President Attends the Opening Ceremony of the Ninth Annual Meeting of Asia-Taiwan Business Association) 總統參加亞洲台灣商會聯合總會第九屆年會開幕典禮. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Mar 18 2004].
 - . 2001. Zongtong chuxi 'jingji fazhan zixun weiyuan huiyi' yubei huiyi (President Addresses the Opening Ceremony of the Preparatory Session of the Economic Development Advisory Conference) 總統出席「經濟發展諮詢委員會會議」預備會議. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Feb 8 2004].
 - . 2002. Zongtong chuxi shijie taiwanren dahui (President Chen Attends the Second Annual World Taiwanese Congress) 總統出席世界台灣人大會. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Mar 4 2004].
 - . 2002. Zongtong jiejian canjia 'Yatai minzhu hezuo luntan dahui' yuhui waibin (President Meets with Participants in the Asia-Pacific Democratic Cooperation Forum) 總統接見參加「亞太民主合作論壇大會」與會外賓. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Mar 19 2004].
 - . 2000. Zongtong jiejian geguo qinghetuan (President Receives Congratulatory Delegations from Various Countries) 總統接見各國慶賀團. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Jan 26 2004].
 - . 2001. Zongtong jiejian laihua canjia 'Yatai anquan guoji luntan 2001 nian Taipei yuanzhuo huiyi' yuhui waibin (President Chen Meets with Participants in the 'Asia Pacific Security Forum 2001 Taipei Roundtable' 總統接見來華參加「亞太安全國際論壇二〇〇一年台北圓桌會議」與會外賓. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Feb 2 2004].
 - . 2001. Zongtong jiejian Meiguo guowuyuan qian yatai zhuli guowuqing Lushida (President Receives Former US Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth) 總統接見美國國務院前亞太助理國務卿陸士達. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Feb 2 2004].
 - . 2001. Zongtong jiejian Meiguo lianbang canyiyuan waijiao weiyuanhui zhuxi

- Baideng (President Chen meets with U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joe Biden) 總統接見美國聯邦參議院外交委員會主席拜登. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Feb 5 2004].
- . 2001. Zongtong jiejian Meiguo lianbang zhongyiyuan 'guohui taiwan lianxian' fangwentuan (President Chen Receives a U.S. Congressional Taiwan Caucus) 總統接見美國聯邦眾議院「國會台灣連線」訪問團. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Mar 12 2004].
- . 2001. Zongtong jiejian Meiguo lianbang zhongyiyuan guoji guanxi weiyuanhui zhuxi Haide (President Chen Meets with U.S. House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry Hyde) 總統接見美國聯邦眾議院國際關係委員會主席海德. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Feb 5 2004].
- . 2001. Zongtong jiejian Meiguo qian guojia anquan guwen Leike (President Receives Former US National Security Advisor Lake) 總統接見美國前國家安全顧問雷克. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Feb 2 2004].
- . 2001. Zongtong jiejian zhongnan meizhou waijiao jizhe fanghuatuan (President Receives Visiting Diplomatic Correspondents from Central America) 總統接見中南美洲外交記者訪華團. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Feb 2 2004].
- . 2002. Zongtong peitong meiti zhuguan qianwang Jinmen diqu bing zhi dadandao canfang (President Accompanies News Media Directors to Visit Kinmen and Tatan Islet) 總統陪同媒體主管前往金門地區並至大膽島參訪. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Mar 5 2004].
- . 2002. Zongtong tingqu Zhonghua jingji yanjiuyuan 'guoneiwai jingji xiankuang zhanwang' jianbao (President Attends the Briefing of Chung Hua Institution for Economic Research on 'Prospect of International and Domestic Economic Development') 總統聽取中華經濟研究院「國內外經濟現況展望」簡報. Available from: <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4> [accessed Mar 6 2004].
- Paau Shiu-lam 鮑紹霖. *'Taidu' muhou: Meiguoren de changyi yu zhengce (Behind the Scene of 'Taiwan Independence': American Propositions and Policies)* 「台獨」幕後：美國人的倡議與政策. Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju, 1992.
- Pan, Philip P., and David E. Hoffman. "Taiwan's President Maintains Hard Line; Chen Rebukes China in Interview." *WP*, Mar 30 2004, A01.
- Parish, William L., and Charles Chi-hsiang Chang. "Political Values in Taiwan: Sources of Change and Constancy." In *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, edited by Tien Hung-mao, 27-41. London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996.
- Peattie, Mark R. "Japanese Attitudes toward Colonialism." In *The Japanese Colonial*

- Empire, 1895-1945*, edited by Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, 80-127. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Pegg, Scott. "De Facto States in the International System." 26. working paper: University of British Columbia, 1998.
- Peng De-fu 彭德富. "Taiwan difang xuanju yu minzhu zhuanxing zhi yanjiu (A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition) 台灣地方選舉與民主轉型之研究." PhD thesis, National Taiwan Normal University, 2001.
- Peng Ming-min 彭明敏. *A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972.
- Peng Ming-min, Hsieh Chung-min, and Wei Ting-chao 彭明敏, 謝聰敏, 魏廷朝. "The Independence Declaration of Formosa." *Independent Formosa*, Vol. V, No. 1-2 (1966): 2-9.
- Phillips, Steven. "Between Assimilation and Independence." In *Taiwan: A New History*, edited by Murray A. Rubinstein, 275-319. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.
- Pomfret, John. "Secret Taiwan Fund Sought Friends, Influence Abroad." *WP*, Apr 5 2002.
- Reischauer, Edwin Oldfather. *Wanted: An Asian Policy*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955.
- Reuters. "China Condemns Taiwan's President." *WP*, Jan 1 2004.
- . 2004. Singapore PM Sets out Taiwan Stance. Taiwan Security Research. Available from: <http://taiwansecurity.org/Reu/2004/Reuters-230804.htm> [accessed Dec 16 2004].
- . "Warnings to China - Washington Takes Threats to Taiwan Very Seriously." *ABC News*, Feb 22 2000.
- Rice, Condoleezza. 2004. The National Security Advisor Delivers Remarks at The McConnell Center for Political Leadership. White House. Available from: <http://usembassy.state.gov/mumbai/wwwwashnews1467.html> [accessed May 6 2004].
- . "Promoting the National Interests." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 1 (2000): 18.
- Rigger, Shelley. *From Opposition to Power: Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party*. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 2001.
- Riggs, Fred W. *Formosa under Chinese Nationalist Rule*. New York: Macmillan, 1952.
- Robinson, Thomas W. "America in Taiwan's Post Cold-War Foreign Relations." *The China Quarterly*, No. 148, Special Issue: Contemporary Taiwan (1996): 1340-61.
- Rogger, Hans. *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.
- Ross, Robert S. "Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations." *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2002): 48-85. Available from: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/toc/ins27.2.html.
- Sanger, David E. "U.S. Asks Taiwan to Avoid a Vote Provoking China." *NYT*, Dec 9 2003.
- Scalapino, Robert A. "Foreword." In *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, edited by Tien Hung-mao, ix-xiv. London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996.
- . "U.S.-ROC-PRC Relations: Accident and Purpose in International Relations." In *R.O.C.-U.S.A. relations, 1979-1989*, edited by Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, 535.

- Taipei: Institute of American Culture, Academia Sinica, 1991.
- . "United States Foreign Policy - Asia (North East Asia - Communist China and Taiwan)." 119-55. Washington DC: Conlon Associates, 1959.
- Schlesinger, Arthur M. *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965.
- Schoenbaum, Thomas J. *Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988.
- Shambaugh, David. "Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations." In *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, edited by Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, 197-223. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
- Shen, Zhihua. "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Stalin's Strategic Goals in the Far East." *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2000).
- Shiau Chyuan-jenq. "Civil Society and Democratization." In *Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China*, edited by Steve Tsang and Tien Hung-mao, 101-15. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999.
- Shiau Chyuan-Jenq. "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship." In *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, edited by Tien Hung-mao, 213-25. London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996.
- Shih Cheng-feng 施正鋒. "American Policy toward Taiwan - A Taiwanese Nationalist Review." Paper presented at the 2nd Annual Symposium on Taiwan's National Security - 20th Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, Taipei, Nov 7 1998. Available from: <http://mail.tku.edu.tw/cfshih/Introduction.htm> [accessed Apr 25 2004].
- . 施正鋒. "Tai-Zhong guanxi yu guojia anquan - Meiguo de yinsu, guojia rentong, yiji minzu rentong (Taiwan-China Relations and National Security - The American Factor, State Identity, and National Identity) 台-中關係與國家安全 - 美國的因素, 國家認同, 以及民族認同." Paper presented at the Liang'an jiaoliu yu guojia anquan guoji yantaohui (International Conference on Cross-Strait Exchanges and National Security), Taipei, Nov 1 2003. Available from: <http://mail.tku.edu.tw/cfshih/> [accessed Apr 30 2004].
- . 施正鋒. *Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism)* 台灣民族主義. Taipei: Qianwei, 2003.
- . 施正鋒. "Taiwan yishi de tansuo (An Exploration of Taiwanese Consciousness) 台灣意識的探索." In *Zhongguo yishi yu Taiwan yishi: 1999 Aomen xueshu yantaohui*, edited by Xiachao jijinhui, 58-97. Taipei: Haixia xueshu, 1999.
- . 施正鋒. "Wo dui Shi Ming de renshi (My Understanding of Shih Ming) 我對史明的認識." In *Huangye gudeng - Shi Ming (A Lone Lamp in the Wilds - Shih Ming)*, edited by Yeh Po-wen, 64-67. Taipei: Shih Ming jiaoyu jijinhui, 2001.
- Shih Ko-min 施克敏. *Cong huafu kan Taipei (Watch Taipei from Washington DC)* 從華府看台北. Taipei: Zheng zhong shu ju, 1993.
- Shih Ming 史明. *Taiwan's 400 Year History*. Japanese ed. Kasugachō: Otoba Shobō, 1962.
- . 史明. *Taiwanren sibai nian shi (Taiwan's 400 Years History)* 台灣人四百年史. Japanese ed. Tōkyō: Yinyu shufang, 1962.
- Shu Wei-der. "Who Joined the Clandestine Political Organization?" In *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*, edited by

- Stephane Corcuff, 47-69. Armonk: M E Sharpe, 2002.
- Smith, Anthony D. *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.
- Smith, Neil. *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
- Smith, Robert. 1998. Commending President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan. Library of Congress. Available from: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r105:1./temp/~r105ZZuqh>: [accessed Mar 4 2003].
- Snow, Edgar. *Red Star Over China*. 1st revised ed. London: Lowe & Brydone, 1968.
- Snyder, Charles. "No Aegis, but Hefty Package Offered." *TT*, Apr 25 2001, 1.
- . "US 'Will Defend' Taiwan." *TT*, Apr 26 2004, 1.
- . "US Group Suggests 'One China' Rethink." *TT*, Jun 16 2004, 1.
- . "US Officials Give Koo Ad Covert Support." *TT*, Oct 10 2004, 1.
- Solomon, Gerald B. H. 1998. President Lee Teng-hui and the Nobel Prize. Library of Congress. Available from: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r105:1./temp/~r105Y54fCm>: [accessed Mar 7 2003].
- Stainton, Michael. "The Politics of Taiwan Aboriginal Origins." In *Taiwan: A New History*, edited by Murray A. Rubinstein, 27-44. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.
- Sterba, James P. "8 Taiwan Dissidents Go On Trial Today." *NYT*, Mar 18 1980, A7.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2002. China Says U.S. Defence Bill Violates Sovereignty. NucNews. Available from: <http://nucnews.net/nucnews/2002nn/0205nn/020512nn.htm#020> [accessed Mar 18 2004].
- Stolper, Thomas E. *China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands*. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1985.
- Stout, David. "Bush Tells China Leader He Opposes Taiwan's Referendum." *NYT*, Dec 9 2003, international.
- Stuart, John Leighton. 1947. Memorandum on the Situation in Taiwan. In *Taiwan Document Project*. Available from: http://www.taiwandocuments.org/228_01.htm [accessed Sep 15 2003].
- Su, Joy. "Mark Chen Slams 'Unfit' Aussie Minister Downer." *TT*, Aug 21 2004, 4.
- Sun Yang-ming 孫揚明. "Buxi cengyong yingwen 'sanzijing' maBian (Bush Ever Used 'Son of Bitch' to Curse Bian) 布希曾用「三字經」罵扁." *UDN*, Dec 24 2004.
- . 孫揚明. "Hua fu xuezhe Hehanli: gongtou wenti zai taidu mailuo (Washington Scholar Harry Harding: The Referendum Issue in the Context of Taiwan Independence) 華府學者何漢理：公投問題在台獨脈絡." *UDN*, Jan 12 2004.
- Sutter, Rober. "The TRA and the United States' China Policy." In *A Unique Relationship: The United States and the Republic of China Under the Taiwan Relations Act*, edited by Roman H. Myers, 49-78. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989.
- Tai Kuo-hui, Wang Tso-jung, and Hsia Chen 戴國輝, 王作榮, 夏珍. *Aizeng Li Denghui (Love and Hatred of Lee Teng-hui) 愛憎李登輝*. Taipei: Tianxia yuanjian, 2001.
- TAO. 2000. The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue. Available from: <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/features/taiwanpaper/taiwan.html> [accessed Mar 10 2003].
- Thomas, Craig. 1996. Taiwan Resolution (Senate - March 15, 1996). Library of

- Congress. Available from:
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r104:1./temp/~r104Y13XHt>: [accessed Mar 17 2003].
- Tien Hung-mao 田宏茂. "Dynamics of Taiwan's Democratic Transition." In *In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949*, edited by Steve Tsang, 101-16. London: Hurst, 1993.
- . 田宏茂. "Elections and Taiwan's Democratic Development." In *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, edited by Tien Hung-mao, 3-26. London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996.
- . 田宏茂. "Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State: Taiwan's Development Experience." In *Political Change in Taiwan*, edited by Cheng Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard, 33-55. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992.
- Tien Hung-mao, and Cheng Tun-jen 田宏茂, 鄭敦仁. "Crafting Democratic Institutions." In *Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China*, edited by Steve Tsang and Tien Hung-mao, 23-48. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999.
- Tien Su-i 田思怡. "Chen Tangshan pi Ao waizhang shiyan xiang Zhong chaogong (Mark Chen Denounces Australian Foreign Minister as Paying Tribute to China for His Indiscreet Remark on Taiwan) 陳唐山批澳外長失言 向「中」朝貢." *UDN*, Aug 21 2004.
- Ting Shu-fan. "Ziwo shixian de Taihai weiji (The Self-Realizing Taiwan Strait Crisis) 自我實現的台海危機." *UDN*, Jul 22 2004.
- Tkacik, John. 2004. Whose One China? *National Review*. Available from:
<http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/tkacik200406030908.asp> [accessed Jun 5 2004].
- Tkacik, John J. 2003. The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1717: Time for Washington to Take a Realistic Look at China Policy. The Heritage Foundation. Available from:
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/BG1717.cfm> [accessed Dec 17 2003].
- Truman, Harry S. 1950. Letter to Ambassador Warren Austin Restating the US Position on Formosa. Harry S. Truman Library. Available from:
<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/nsc.htm#collect> [accessed Oct 8 2002].
- . *Memoirs (Years of Trial and Hope: 1946-1953)*. 2 vols. Vol. 2. New York: Doubleday, 1955-56.
- Tsai, George Woei. "The Politics of Taiwanisation (I): Rise of New Taiwanism." In *Taiwanisation: Its Origin and Politics*, edited by National University of Singapore, 1-28. Singapore: World Scientific, 2001.
- Tsai Hui-ping, Chen Chih-ping, and Lin Hsin-hui 蔡惠萍, 陳志平, 林新輝. "Lien-Song qinwen tudi, fanlan qunzhong feiteng (Pan-Blue Supporters Seethed with Excitement when Lien-Soong Kissed the Earth) 連宋親吻土地, 泛藍群眾沸騰." *UDN*, Mar 14 2004.
- Tsai Ting-i. "December 1 Elections: Fairness, Feasibility of Vote Allocation Stirs up Discussion." *TT*, Nov 19 2001, 3.
- . "Taipei Sees Biggest Demo Ever." *TT*, Nov 24 2004, 1.
- Tsang, Steve 曾銳生. "Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang's Policy to Reconquer the Chinese Mainland, 1949-1958." In *In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949*, edited by Steve Tsang, 48-72. London:

- Hurst, 1993.
- 曾銳生. "Transforming a Party State into a Democracy." In *Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China*, edited by Steve Tsang and Tien Hung-mao, 1-22. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999.
- Tsao Chang-ching 曹常青. 2000. Zhongguo dui Tai baipishu zao quanqiu qianze (China's White Paper Caused Global Condemnation) 中國對台白皮書遭全球譴責. Asia Democracy Foundation. Available from: <http://asiademo.org/2000/03/20000304a.htm> [accessed Mar 11 2003].
- Tsao, Nadia. "Lobbying Firm Draws Fire." *TT*, Jul 10 2000.
- Tsou, Tang. *America's Failure in China, 1941-1950*. 2 vols. Vol. II. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.
- TSU. 2001. A-hui bo jiaoshi: ni buneng bu zhidao de Li Denghui (Uncle Hui Classroom: Something You Should Know about Lee Teng-hui) 阿輝伯教室：你不能不知道的李登輝. Taiwan Solidarity Union. Available from: <http://www.tsu.org.tw/tsa-main.html> [accessed Feb 9 2003].
- TT. "Beijing Plans Massive Military Exercises This Month." Jul 5 2004, 3.
- . "Editorial: Is the US' Taiwan Policy Changing?" Apr 7 2002, 8.
- . "Government Hails Europe for Its Support of Taiwan." Sep 6 2002, 1.
- . "Jiang Promises to Attack Taiwan by 2020." Jul 17 2004, 1.
- Tu Nien-chung 杜念中. "Sun Liren qieshi paifale yitong xiangyao zhengbian de midian: Meiquo qian guowuqing Lusike toulou Sun'an mixin (Former US Secretary of State Dean Rusk: Sun Li-jen Did Send a Secret Message about an Attempt for Coup) 孫立人確實拍發了一通想要政變的密電：美國前國務卿魯斯克透露孫案秘辛." *Xinxinwen 新新聞*, No. 183 (1990): 24-26.
- Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. *Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992: Uncertain Friendships*. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994.
- Tyson, James. "Christians and the Taiwanese Independence Movement: A Commentary." *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 14, No. Fall (1987): 163-70.
- UDEN. "Qiangji xiaoying xuanpiao xiaozhang 12 wan (Assassination Plot Results in a Flux of 120,000 Ballots) 槍擊效應選票消長 12 萬." Mar 21 2004.
- UDN. "228 shijian siwang shizong babai duo ren (Over 800 People Were Killed or Missing in 228 Incident) 二二八事件死亡失蹤八百多人." Feb 3 2004.
- . "Baodaoge: liang'an 92nian dacheng yiZhong gezi biaooshu (Paal Douglas: Both Sides Reached the Agreement of 'One China, Separate Description' in 1992) 包道格：兩岸九二年達成一中各自表述." May 6 2004.
- . "Fan fenlie fa quanwen (The Full Text of the Anti-Secession Law) 反分裂法全文." Mar 15 2005.
- . "Guo-Qin ban gongtoufa sandu, zhengyuan bu paichu fuyi (After Third Reading of the KMT-PFP Referendum Bill, the Executive Yuan Might Request for Reconsideration) 國親版公投法三讀，政院不排除覆議." Nov 28 2003.
- . "Guotaiban: gongtou zhixian jiushi taidu shijianbiao (Taiwan Affairs Office: Referendum and New Constitution Are Timetable for Taiwan Independence) 國台辦：公投制憲就是台獨時間表." Apr 15 2004.
- . 2001. 'Hui' hui yixiu, gaobie shier nian zhizheng/jianjie yu nianbiao/Li Denghui dashiji 「輝」揮衣袖，告別十二年執政/簡介與年表/李登輝大事記. Available

- from: http://udn.com/SPECIAL_ISSUE/FOCUSNEWS/LEE/framed.htm
[accessed Feb 7 2003].
- . "Li Jiaquan: tongyifa zhendui taidu, hui tixian shijianbiao (Li Jiaquan: Unification Law Aims to Counter Independence and Will Embody a Timetable for Unification) 李家泉：統一法針對台獨，會體現時間表." May 17 2004.
- . "Taiwan qude shendunjian shiji yuelai yue buli (Increasingly Adverse Timing for Taiwan to Acquire the Aegis-Class Destroyers) 台灣取得神盾艦時機越來越不利." Jan 28 2004.
- . "Zhonggong qianjian shinian mubiao zhengduo wubaili zhihaiquan (PRC Submarines Aim to Gain Maritime Supremacy over 500 Nautical Miles off Its Coast in Ten Years) 中共潛艦十年目標爭奪五百浬制海權." Jul 30 2004.
- . "Zongtong: 320 gongtou hanwei guojia zhuquan (President: 320 Referendum to Defend National Sovereignty) 總統：320 公投捍衛國家主權." Nov 30 2003.
- USDOS. 2002. Air Force General Doubts Chinese Assisting Al Qaeda. U.S.D.O.S. Available from: <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/alqaedaw.htm> [accessed Mar 19 2004].
- . 2003. Bush Calls U.S., China 'Partners in Diplomacy'. Available from: <http://lists.state.gov/SCRIPTS/WA-USIAINFO.EXE?A1=ind0312b&L=us-china> [accessed Dec 10 2003].
- . 2003. Bush Reaffirms U.S. Commitment to One-China Policy. Available from: <http://lists.state.gov/SCRIPTS/WA-USIAINFO.EXE?A1=ind0312b&L=us-china> [accessed Dec 10 2003].
- . *The China White Paper, August 1949*. reissued ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967.
- . 2001. Confirmation Hearing by Colin L. Powell. Available from: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/443.htm> [accessed Jan 13 2004].
- . 2003. Daily Press Briefing, Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, Washington DC, November 19, 2003. Available from: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/26422.htm> [accessed Dec 26 2003].
- . 2003. Daily Press Briefing, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Washington DC, December 1, 2003. Available from: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/26776.htm> [accessed Dec 25 2003].
- . 2005. Daily Press Briefing, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Washington DC, February 18, 2005. Available from: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/42480.htm> [accessed Mar 22 2005].
- . *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49*. Washington DC: GPO, 1950.
- . 2002. Good U.S.-China Relations Require Clarity, Directness. Available from: <http://lists.state.gov/archives/us-china.html> [accessed Mar 8 2004].
- . 2005. Interview With Aiko Doden of NHK TV, March 19, 2005. Available from: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43651.htm> [accessed Mar 21 2005].
- . 2004. Interview with Anthony Yuen of Phoenix TV. Available from: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/37361.htm> [accessed Dec 16 2004].
- . 2004. Interview With Charlie Rose on PBS. Available from: <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/39973.htm> [accessed Dec 22 2004].
- . 2004. Interview with Ron Insana of CNBC. Available from:

- <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/37487.htm> [accessed Dec 16 2004].
- . "Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China (August 17 Communiqué of 1982)." Beijing, 1982.
 - . "Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China (Shanghai Communiqué of 1972)." Shanghai, 1972.
 - . 2005. Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, February 19, 2005. Available from: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/42490.htm> [accessed Mar 22 2005].
 - . 2004. Kelly Says Taiwan Relations Act Key to West Pacific Stability (State Department official's April 21 Congressional testimony). Available from: <http://lists.state.gov/archives/us-china.html> [accessed May 18 2004].
 - . "Memorandum for the Chairman, NSC Senior Review Group, NSSM 124: Next Steps Toward the People's Republic of China (PRC)." Apr 17 1971. In *China and the United States: From Hostility to Engagement, 1960-1998*. Top secret, declassified 1974. George Washington University. Available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB19/03-01.htm> [accessed Sep 27 2002].
 - . "Memorandum of Conversation on Formosa Problem, 5 January 1950." In *Papers of Dean Acheson*. Confidential, declassified 1976. Harry S. Truman Library. 5.
 - . "Memorandum, 5 January 1950." In *Papers of Dean Acheson*. Confidential, declassified 1976. Harry S. Truman Library. 1.
 - . The Monroe Doctrine (1823). Available from: <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/50.htm> [accessed Aug 9 2002].
 - . "News Release: Diplomatic Relations with the People's Republic of China and Future Relations with Taiwan." December 2 1978.
 - . 2002. NSC Briefing for Foreign Media, Sean McCormack, National Security Council Spokesman, Washington DC, August 14, 2002. Available from: <http://www.fpc.state.gov/12693.htm> [accessed Mar 19 2004].
 - . 2004. Press Briefing Transcripts - Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, December 6, 2004. Available from: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2004/39460.htm> [accessed Dec 7 2004].
 - . 2003. Remarks at Asia Society Annual Dinner. Available from: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/10983.htm> [accessed Jan 12 2004].
 - . 2005. Remarks to the Press in China - Secretary Condoleezza Rice, China World Hotel, Beijing, China, March 21, 2005. Available from: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43678.htm> [accessed Mar 21 2005].
 - . 2004. Taiwan Relations Act Helps Democracy Thrive, Senator Says. Available from: <http://lists.state.gov/archives/us-china.html> [accessed May 18 2004].
- Vayrynen, Paavo. "Nation State: Some Basic Concepts and Definitions." In *The Future of the Nation State in Europe*, edited by Jyrki Iivonen, 252. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1993.
- Vogel, Ezra F. "Introduction: How Can the United States and China Pursue Common Interests and Manage Differences?" In *Living with China: U.S./China Relations in the Twenty-first Century*, edited by Ezra F. Vogel, 336. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997.
- Wallace, Kelly. 2001. Bush Pledges Whatever It Takes to Defend Taiwan. CNN.

Available from:

<http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/04/24/bush.taiwan.abc/> [accessed Dec 9 2003].

- Wang Cheng-hua 王正華, ed.^eds. *Zhonghua minguo yu Lianheguo shiliao huibian - Zhongguo daibiaoquan (Documentary Collection on R.O.C. and United Nations - Chinese Representation)* 中華民國與聯合國史料彙編. Taipei: Academic Historica, 2001.
- Wang Hsiao-po 王曉波. *Liang'an guanxi lunji (A Collection of Arguments on Cross-Strait Relations)* 兩岸關係論集. Taipei: Haixia, 1997.
- 王曉波, ed.^eds. *Yiwei Kang-Ri shiliao huibian (Documentary Collection of 1895 Resistance against Japan)* 乙未抗日史料彙編. Taipei: Haixia xueshu, 1999.
- Wang, James 王景宏. "KMT's Localization Claim Is Empty." *TT*, Jan 14 2003, 8.
- Wang Li-chuan 汪莉絹. "Mei junzhi renyuan zhuTai, Zhonggong fandui (PRC Opposes the Assignment of Active US Military Personnel to Taiwan) 美軍職人員駐台，中共反對." *UDN*, Dec 22 2004.
- Wang, Mei-ling T. *The Dust That Never Settles: The Taiwan Independence Campaign and U.S.-China Relations*. Lanham: University Press of America, 1999.
- Wang, Peter Chen-main. "A Bastion Created, a Regime Reformed, an Economy Reengineered, 1949-1970." In *Taiwan: A New History*, edited by Murray A. Rubinstein, 320-38. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.
- Weng Chia-in 翁佳音. *Taiwanese Armed Resistances under the Early Japanese Rule (1895-1902)*. Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1986.
- Wexler, Robert. 2002. Wexler Announces Formation of Congressional Taiwan Caucus. Available from: http://www.wexler.house.gov/press_releases/Apr_9_02.htm [accessed Feb 3 2004].
- White House. 2005. February 28, 2005 - Press Briefing by Scott McClellan. White House. Available from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-8.html> [accessed Mar 31 2005].
- . "Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou: President's Visit, Taiwan and Japan." Oct 21 1971. Top secret, declassified 2001. George Washington University. 34. Available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc11.pdf> [accessed Nov 15 2002].
- . "Memorandum for the President's Files: Meeting Between President, Dr. Kissinger, and General Haig, Thursday, July 1, Oval Office." Jul 1 1971. Top secret, declassified 2001. George Washington University. 3. Available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-33.pdf> [accessed Jun 3 2002].
- . "Memorandum of Conversation, 22 February 1972, 2:10 p.m. - 6:00 p.m." Top secret, declassified 1999, 2003. George Washington University. 31. Available from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/DOC_readers/kissinger/nixzhou/12-01.htm [accessed Mar 27 2002, Dec 18 2003].
- . "Memorandum of Conversation, 24 February 1972, 5:15 p.m. - 8:05 p.m." 1972. In *Nixon's Next Trip to China*. Top secret, declassified 2003. George Washington University. 32. Available from

- <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106/NZ-3.pdf> [accessed Dec 15 2003].
- Whiting, Allen Suess. *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968.
- Wolf, Jim. 2004. Pentagon War Game Based on China Threat to Taiwan. Reuters. Available from: <http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=ZIBE4HU20OVGECRBAE0CFEY?type=domesticNews&storyID=5685376> [accessed Aug 12 2004].
- Wong, Timothy Ka-ying. *The Rise and Changing Nature of Taiwanese Nationalism*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 2001.
- Woodward, Bob. *Bush at War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002.
- Wu Jo-yu 吳若予. *Zhanhou Taiwan gongying shiye zhi zhengjing fenxi (The Political-Economic Analysis of the State-Run Business in Postwar Taiwan)* 戰後台灣公營事業之政經分析. Taipei: Yeqiang, 1992.
- Wu, Judy. "It's Not Fair." *TT*, May 8 2004, 8.
- Wu Mi-cha, and Chang Yen-hsien 吳密察, 張炎憲. *Jianli Taiwan de guomin guojia (Establish a Civic Nation for Taiwan)* 建立台灣的國民國家. Taipei: Qianwei, 1993.
- Wu Nai-teh 吳乃德. "Ethnic Consciousness, Political Support, and National Identity: A Preliminary Analysis of the Political Ideologies among Ethnic Groups in Taiwan." *Taiwan Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1995): 45-66.
- Wu Neng-yuan. "Taiwan jingji fazhan de ruogan wenti (Some Issues about the Development of Taiwan Economy) 台灣經濟發展的若干問題." In *Taiwan: Economy, Society and History*, edited by E.K.Y. Chen, Jack F. Williams and Joseph Wong, 40-52. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1991.
- Xinhuanet. 2004. Curbing 'Taiwan Independence' Most Urgent Task. Xinhuanet. Available from: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-05/17/content_1472607.htm [accessed May 21 2004].
- Yang Chih-chieh 楊志潔. 1987. 84 Zhang: Zhang Canhong de yanshuo (Chapter 84: A Speech by Zhang Canhong) 84 章：張燦鑒的演說. Taiwan Tati Cultural And Educational Foundation. Available from: <http://taiwantt.org.tw/books/cryingtaiwan4/content/content2.htm> [accessed Nov 24 2003].
- Yang Ching-shun 楊清順. "Taihai anquan Mei-Ri lieru anbao mubiao (US-Japan Security Alliance Lists Taiwan Strait Security One of Its Objectives) 台海安全美日列入安保目標." *UDN*, Feb 19 2005.
- Yang Yu-wen, Lin Ching-yin, and Fan Ling-chia 楊羽雯, 林敬殷, 范凌嘉. "Wang Jinping zhuanfang (Interview with Wang Chin-ping) 王金平專訪." *UDN*, Nov 18 2003.
- Yu, Peter Kien-hong. "The Politics of Taiwanisation (II): The Road to a New Identity." In *Taiwanisation: Its Origin and Politics*, edited by National University of Singapore, 29-42. Singapore: World Scientific, 2001.
- Yuan Ho-ling 袁鶴齡. "Chutan guojia rentong de waibu yinsu - Meiguo yinsu, Zhongguo yinsu yu Taiwan de guojia rentong (An Introductory Study of the External Factors of National Identity - The American Factor, Chinese Factor and Taiwanese National Identity) 初探國家認同的外部因素 - 美國因素，中國因

- 素與台灣的國家認同." In *Zhongguo yishi yu Taiwan yishi: 1999 Aomen xueshu yantaohui*, edited by Xiachao jijinhui, 490-520. Taipei: Haixia xueshu, 1999.
- Zhongyang dang'anguan 中央檔案館, ed.^eds. *Zhongguo gongchandang bashinian zhengui dangan (Valuable Documents of Chinese Communists in the Past Eighty Years)* 中國共產黨八十年珍貴檔案. 2 vols. Vol. II. Beijing: Zhongguo dang'an, 2001.
- Zhongyangshe 中央社. "Kangyi fan fenlie fa, Ma Yingjiu zhaokai guoji jizhehui (Ma Ying-jiu Held an International Press Conference to Protest the Anti-Secession Law) 抗議反分裂法 馬英九召開國際記者會." *UDN*, Mar 14 2005.
- 中央社. "Li Hongxi: Bian-Song 10 gongshi, shuogei Mei ting, dang fan fenlie fa (Li Hung-hsi: Bian-Soong Ten Consensuses Are Used to Placate the US and Resist the Anti-Secession Law) 李鴻禧：扁宋 10 共識 說給美聽 擋反分裂法." *UDN*, Mar 3 2005.
- 中央社. "Lu Xiulian: daxuan shi Taiwanxin duikang Zhongguoxin (Lu Hsiu-lien: Presidential Election Is a Competition between Taiwanese Heart and Chinese Heart) 呂秀蓮：大選是台灣心對抗中國心." *UDN*, Jan 17 2004.

